Piaget's Theory of Cognitive Development: Stages, Questions, and Criticisms, Study notes of Cognitive Development

Download Piaget's Theory of Cognitive Development: Stages, Questions, and Criticisms and more Study notes Cognitive Development in PDF only on Docsity! John Opfer Theories of Cognitive Development Basic Questions 1) What is innate? 2) Does children’s thinking progress through qualitatively different stages? 3) How do changes in children’s thinking occur? 4) Why do individual children differ so much from each other in their thinking? 5) How does brain development contribute to cognitive development? 6) How does the social world contribute to cognitive development? Piaget’s Most Revolutionary Idea Child as scientist 1. construct their own knowledge from experimenting on the world. 2. learn many things on their own without the intervention of older children or adults. 3. are intrinsically motivated to learn and do not need rewards from adults to motivate learning Piaget’s Principles: What changes? • There are distinct stages of cognitive development, with the following properties. • Qualitative change: Children of different ages (and at different stages) think in different ways. • Broad applicability: The type of thinking at each stage pervades topic and content areas. • Brief transitions: Transitions to higher stages of thinking are not necessarily continuous. • Invariant sequence: The sequences of stages are stable for all people through all time. Stages are not skipped. Piaget’s Principles: What does not change? • Three processes work together from birth to account for continuities: • Assimilation: People translate incoming information into a form they can understand. • Accommodation: People adapt current knowledge structures in response to new experience. • Equilibration: People balance assimilation and accommodation to create stable understanding. Piaget’s Sensorimotor Stage • Substage 1 (birth to 1 month): Reflexive Activity • Building knowledge through reflexes (grasping, sucking). • No attempt to locate objects that have disappeared • Substage 2 (1 to 4 months): Primary Circular Reactions • Reflexes are organized into larger, integrated behaviors (grasping a rattle and bringing it to the mouth to suck) • Still no attempt to locate objects that have disappeared. Piaget’s Sensorimotor Stage • Substage 3 (4 to 8 months): Secondary Circular Reactions • Repetition of actions on the environment that bring out pleasing or interesting results (banging a rattle). • Search for objects that have dropped from view or are partially hidden • Substage 4 (8 to 12 months): Coordination of Secondary Reactions • Mentally representing objects when objects can no longer be seen, thus achieving “object permanence.” • Search for completely hidden objects but makes “A-not-B error.” A not B error Piaget’s Preoperational Stage • Development of symbolic representations, that is, the use of one object to stand for another. • For instance, a stick becomes a horse; an eyepatch and kerchief make a pirate. • Characteristic Errors • Egocentrism: Looking at the world only from one’s own point of view. • Centration: focusing on a single, perceptual feature to the exclusion of other features Egocentrism Egocentrism My dad is a policeman... | have a real big dog... (He caught a robber once... } \ ( He licks my face all the time... Conservation Concepts Liquid Quantity Problem Conservation Concepts “Do they have the same amount “Now watch what | do” “Now, do they have the same of clay or a different amount?” (stretching one piece of clay). | amount of clay or a different amount?” • Ability to think abstractly and reason hypothetically. • Ability to engage in scientific thinking. Piaget’s Formal Operations Stage • What influences how long it will take for the pendulum to complete an arc? Pendulum Problem Empirical Evaluation • Very greatly underestimated children’s abilities • Sensorimotor child is a myth • Perception of occluded objects and events indicates enduring representations exist long before a child’s first birthday (e.g., Johnson & Aslin, 1996) INFANTS’ PERCEPTION OF OCCLUSION 359 The visual environment that surrounds us is composed of image fragments that are reflected from object surfaces. Many objects are only partly visible because portions of their surfaces are occluded by other nearer objects. Nevertheless, our experience of the visual array consists not of isolated image fragments but rather of objects whose surfaces extend beyond what is directly visible. Veridical perception of the visual environment, therefore, relies on the ability both to segment visible surfaces (i.e., ascertain the depth plane within which each surface resides with respect to the observer) and to join those edges that define the same objects if the edges are separated by a gap induced by occlu- sion. These processes underlie perception of the unity and coherence of partly occluded objects, or unit formation (Kellman & Shipley, 1991; Nakayama, He, & Shimojo, 1995). Investigations of the ontogenetic origins of unit formation are of vital impor- tance for an understanding of how we perceive and understand the world, and they have attracted considerable attention in recent research. Infants’ perception of object unity has been documented in those as young as 2 to 4 months of age with a habituation paradigm (e.g., Johnson & Aslin, 1995, 1996; Kellman & Spelke, 1983). Infants are shown a display repeatedly until looking decreases to a predetermined criterion, and then they view two test displays that are designed to match the habituation display in different ways. For example, one test display might match only the visible portions of the habituation display, whereas the other might match both visible and inferred portions, as adults would report (see Fig. 1). Young infants typically prefer posthabituation stimuli that are novel, relative to the habituation stimulus, over stimuli that are more familiar (Bornstein, 1985). Therefore, if infants look longer at one test display than at the other, this suggests that the preferred display differs more from what infants perceived during habit- uation. By comparing looking patterns across different displays, these perceived similarities and dissimilarities are used by researchers to determine how infants perceive object unity (for reviews, see Johnson, 1997, 2000). Research on infants’ unit formation has focused on two related issues: infants’ detection and use of available visual information (which is manipulated by the experimenter) and the changes that occur with development in how infants use FIG. 1. Displays employed in past research to investigate young infants’ perception of partly occluded objects (adapted from Johnson & Aslin, 1996). (A) A partly occluded rod, with aligned edges, moves relative to a stationary occluder. (B) A complete rod. (C) A broken rod. After habitua- tion to the partly occluded rod display, infants showed a preference for the broken rod relative to the complete rod, indicating perception of the rod’s unity during habituation. A control group preferred neither test display. INFANTS’ PERCEPTION OF OCCLUSION 359 The visual environment that surrounds us is composed of image fragments that are reflected from object surfaces. Many objects are only partly visible because portions of their surfaces are occluded by other nearer objects. Nevertheless, our experience of the visual array consists not of isolated image fragments but rather of objects whose surfaces extend beyond what is directly visible. Veridical perception of the visual environment, therefore, relies on the ability both to segment visible surfaces (i.e., ascertain the depth plane within which each surface resides with respect to the observer) and to join those edges that define the same objects if the edges are separated by a gap induced by occlu- sion. These processes underlie perception of the unity and coherence of partly occluded objects, or unit formation (Kellman & Shipley, 1991; Nakayama, He, & Shimojo, 1995). Investigations of the ontogenetic origins of unit formation are of vital impor- tance for an understanding of how we perceive and understand the world, and they have attracted considerable attention in recent research. Infants’ perception of object unity has been documented in those as young as 2 to 4 months of age with a habituation paradigm (e.g., Johnson & Aslin, 1995, 1996; Kellman & Spelke, 1983). Infants are shown a display repeatedly until looking decreases to a predetermined criterion, and then they view two test displays that are designed to match the habituation display in different ways. For example, one test display might match only t e visible portions of the habitu ti n display, whereas the other might match both visible and i ferr d p rtions, as adults would report (see Fig. 1). Young infants typically prefer posthabituation stimuli that are novel, relative to the habituation stimulus, over stimuli that are ore familiar (Bornstein, 1985). Therefore, if infants look longer at on test display than at the other, this suggests that the preferred display differs ore from what infants perceived during habit- uation. By comparing looking patterns across different displays, these perceived similarities and dissimilarities are used by researchers to determine how infants perceive object unity (for reviews, see Johnson, 1997, 2000). Research on infants’ nit formation has focused on two related issues: infants’ detection and use of available visual information (which is manipulated by the experimenter) and the changes that occur with development in how infants use FIG. 1. Displays mpl yed in past research to investigate young inf nts’ perception of partly occluded objects (adapted from Johnson & Aslin, 1996). (A) partly occluded rod, with aligned edges, moves relative to a stationary occluder. (B) A complete rod. (C) A broken rod. After habitua- tion to the partly occluded rod display, infants showed a preference for the broken rod relative to the complete rod, indicating perception of the rod’s unity during habituation. A control group preferred neither test display. Empirical Evaluation • Within-concept changes not stage-like • Even within a particular conservation task (e.g., numeric quantity), children’s errors do not follow a set sequence • regressions are common • “stages” are skipped • frequency of correct responses often emerge gradually Empirical Evaluation • No progress in understanding basic mechanisms of change • “For 40 years now we have had assimilation and accommodation, the mysterious and shadowy forces of equilibration, the Batman and Robin of the developmental processes. What are they? How do they do their thing? Why is it after all this time, we know more about them than when they first sprang on the scene? What we need is a way to get beyond vague verbal statements of the nature of the developmental processes” (Klahr, 1982) Empirical Evaluation apparatus depicted in Figure 1. Materials included two wooden ramps, each with an adjustable downhill side and a slightly uphill, stepped surface on the other side, and two kinds of balls. The children could set the steepness of each ramp (high or low), the surface of the ramps (rough or smooth), and the length of the downhill run (long or short), and they could choose which type of ball (a rubber ball or a golf ball) to roll down each ramp. They were asked to make comparisons to determine how different variables affected the distance that balls rolled after leaving the downhill ramp. Figure 1 depicts a (con- founded) experimental setup using these materials. At the beginning of the exploration phase, the ramp apparatus was described, and then the children’s baseline competence was assessed. They were asked to set up four experiments: two to determine the effect of steepness and two to determine the effect of run length on how far a ball rolls. Each child received a score indicating the number of unconfounded experiments he or she designed during this first part of the exploration phase. What happened next depended on the child’s training condition. Children in the direct-instruction condition observed as the experi- menter designed several additional experiments—some confounded, and some unconfounded—to determine the effects of steepness and run length. For each experiment, the instructor asked the children whether or not they thought the design would allow them to ‘‘tell for sure’’ whether a variable had an effect on the outcome. Then the instructor explained why each of the unconfounded experiments uniquely identified the factor that affected the outcome, and why each confounded experiment did not. Children in the discovery condition instead continued to design their own experiments, focused on the same two variables that the direct-instruction children were focusing on, but without any instruction on CVS or any feedback from the experimenter. It is important to note that in our operationalization, the difference between direct instruction and discovery learning does not involve a difference between ‘‘active’’ and ‘‘passive’’ learning. In both condi- tions, students were actively engaged in the design of their experi- ments and the physical manipulation of the apparatus. The main distinction is that in direct instruction, the instructor provided good and bad examples of CVS, explained what the differences were be- tween them, and told the students how and why CVS worked, whereas in the discovery condition, there were no examples and no explana- tions, even though there was an equivalent amount of design and manipulation of materials. In the assessment phase, which started immediately after the ex- ploration phase, children in both conditions were asked to design four additional experiments: two to determine the effect of a factor that had been investigated earlier (run length) and two to determine the effect of a factor that had not been investigated earlier (surface). During the assessment phase, the experimenter did not provide any feedback in either condition. The evaluation of science-fair posters took place on Day 2, about a week later. A different experimenter (blind to training condition) asked all children to evaluate two science-fair posters (based on real posters generated by sixth graders from another school) by making comments and suggestions that would help to make the poster ‘‘good enough to enter in a state-level science fair.’’ One poster explored the effect of the number of holes in a Ping-Pong ball on how far the ball traveled when launched from a catapult, and the other poster com- pared the short-term memory of boys and girls for a set of common objects. Both posters—one of which is depicted in Figure 23—bore Fig. 1. The ramps used during the exploration and assessment phases. On each of the two ramps, children could vary the steepness, surface, and length of the ramp, as well as the type of ball. The confounded experiment depicted here contrasts (a) a golf ball on a steep, smooth, short ramp with (b) a rubber ball on a shallow, rough, long ramp. 3Digital images of both posters are available from the first author upon request. Volume 15—Number 10 663 David Klahr and Milena Nigam • Children are terrible experimenters; they do not learn to control variables systematically on their own (Klahr, 2004) Sociocultural Approach • Russian psychologist Lev Vygotsky portrayed children as social beings intertwined with other people who were eager to help them learn and gain skills. Sociocultural Approach • Child as apprentice • Some of children’s abilities are culturally-dependent • Some cognitive change originates in social interaction • Children are both learners and teachers. Some Important Social Interactions • Sharing our thoughts • Joint attention: Infants and social partners focus on common referent. • Social referencing: Children look to social partners for guidance about how to respond to unfamiliar events. • Social scaffolding: • More competent people provide temporary frameworks that lead children to higher-order thinking. • Zone of proximal development: • The range between what children can do unsupported and what they can do with optimal social support. • Elizabeth Spelke: “If children are endowed with abilities to perceive objects, persons, sets, and places, then they may use their perceptual experience to learn about the properties and behavior of such entities....” Core Knowledge Approach to Infant Cognition Core-Knowledge Approach • Principles of core-knowledge theories – Children have innate cognitive capabilities that are the product of human evolutionary processes. – Children are much more advanced in their thinking than Piaget suggested. – Focus on universally adaptive aspects of human cognition – arise early in infancy – have neurophysiological correlates – cross-culturally uniform – basis of more complex understandings Core-Knowledge Theories • Children’s core knowledge: – basic physics (the object concept, support, containment) – animate/inanimate distinction – numerical representation – language – biological categorization Object representation vs. Manual Search Cn a slid lad ti Support vs. Containment • Familiarization: • screen is lowered to hide a portion of the display • ball is then dropped behind screen • screen is raised • ball is seen resting on the floor of the display • looking time to the event is measured Infant ‘Physics’ Support vs. Containment • Test (Consistent Display): • a platform is added above the floor the screen is lowered to hide both surfaces • a ball is then dropped behind the screen • the screen is raised • the ball is seen resting on the raised platform • looking time to the event is measured Infant Physics Solidity of Barriers • Familiarization: • a screen is lowered to hide a portion of the display • ball rolls behind screen • screen is raised • ball is seen resting against right hand wall • looking time to event is measured Infant ‘Physics’ Solidity of Barriers • Test (Consistent Display): • barrier is lowered to floor of display • screen is lowered to hide portion of display • ball rolls behind screeen • screen is raised • the ball is seen resting against barrier • looking time to the event is measured Infant Physics Solidity of Barriers • Test (Inconsistent Display): • barrier is lowered to floor of display • screen is lowered to hide portion of display • ball rolls behind screeen • screen is raised • the ball is seen resting against right hand wall • looking time to the event is measured Infant Physics Conversation with a Child • Scene: Daughter and father in the yard. A playmate rides in on a bike. • Child: Daddy, would you unlock the basement door? • Father: Why? • C: Cause I want to ride my bike. • F: Your bike is in the garage. • C: But my socks are in the dryer! Information Processing Analysis • Top goal: I want to ride my bike. • constraint: I need to shoes to ride comfortably. • fact: I’m barefoot. • Subgoal 1: Get my sneakers • Fact: The sneakers are in the yard. • Fact: Sneakers are uncomfortable on bare feet. • Subgoal 2. Get my socks. • Fact: The sock drawer was empty this morning. • Inference: The socks are probably in the dryer. • Subgoal 3: Get them from the dryer. • Fact: The dryer is in the basement. • Subgoal 4: Go to the basement. • Fact: It’s quicker to go through the yard entrance. • Fact: The yard entrance is always locked. • Subgoal 5: Unlock the door to the basement. • Fact: Daddies have keys to everything. • Subgoal 6: Ask daddy to unlock the door. Information Processing Approach • Three major principles: • Thinking is information processing. • Change is produced by a process of continuous self- modification. • The steps of change can be precisely specified by identifying mechanisms of change. Information-Processing Approach: What changes? • Rules and strategies • Rules are are like lines of code in a computer program; children add and subtract rules over development. Information-Processing Approach: What changes? • Balance Scale Problem (Siegler, 1976) • Rule 1: If the weight is same on both sides, side with more weight goes down. • Rule 2: If one side has more weight, predict it will go down. If weights on two sides are equal (Problem A), choose side with greater distance. • Rule 3: If both weight and distance are equal, predict balance. If one side has more weight or distance, and two side are equal on other dimension, predict that side with greater value on unequal dimension will go down. If one side has more weight and other more distance, guess (Problem B). • Rule 4: Multiply weight times distance (torque). Predict side with greater torque goes down. Problem C Anatomy of Piagetian problems Task A. Dominant dimension B. Subordinate dimension C. Relation between A & B Balance scale Weight Distance from fulcrum C = A x B Conservation of liquid Height of liquid cross-sectional area of liquid C = A x B Conservation of number Length of row Density of objects in row C = A x B Percent Use Microgenetic —*— Retrieval 50 —o- Min 9 ~ Short-Cut Sum 40) | 30 20 - 101 x “Bs. genet 0+ T t T T 1 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 Problems Presented Moral Reasoning Stage 1: Blind Obedience Stage 2: Fear of Punishment Stage 3: Maintaining Relationships Stage 4: Laws/Duties Stage 5: Universal principles