Tosi and Warmke, Lecture notes of Philosophy

Download Tosi and Warmke and more Lecture notes Philosophy in PDF only on Docsity! “Conservative Critiques,” 2022, Routledge Companion to Libertarianism, eds. Ben Ferguson and Matt Zwolinski, Routledge, 579-592. 1 Conservative Critiques Justin Tosi Brandon Warmke Abstract: American sociologist Robert Nisbet once described conservatives and libertarians as “uneasy cousins.” The description is apt. While sharing a family resemblance and many of the same political rivals, conservatism and libertarianism are fundamentally at odds. This paper explains why this is so from the conservative perspective. It surveys the starting points and major themes of conservatism and libertarianism. It identifies what conservatives and libertarians agree about. It concludes by showing what conservatives have against libertarianism. 1. Introduction American sociologist Robert Nisbet once described conservatives and libertarians as “uneasy cousins” (1980). The description is apt. While sharing a family resemblance and many of the same political rivals, conservatism and libertarianism are fundamentally at odds. Our task here is to explain why. Or, at least to explain why this is so from the perspective of the conservative. We begin by explaining conservatism and libertarianism. With a better grasp of each, the points of contention will become apparent. 2. Conservatism The term “conservative” didn’t become part of political discussion until the middle of the 19th century. But it captures a long tradition of political thinking that prizes preserving the good things one has and knows—because one knows and loves those things, and because one can easily lose them. Everyone is a conservative about what he knows best.1 For this reason, the conservative prefers “the familiar to the unknown, … the tried to the untried, fact to mystery, the actual to the possible, the limited to the unbounded, the near to the distant, the sufficient to the superabundant, the convenient to the perfect, present laughter to utopian bliss” (Oakeshott, 1991, p. 408). It’s not easy to state the tenets of conservatism. There is ongoing disagreement among those who espouse or study conservatism whether there are any “tenets” of conservatism at all. In 1957, Samuel Huntington (1957) identified three approaches to defining conservatism. According to the aristocratic definition, conservatism is the ideology confined to a specific historical moment, namely the critical reactions to the French Revolution and the violent social upheavals that marked the end of the 18th Century. Edmund Burke’s Reflections on the Revolution in France can be read in this spirit, but perhaps the clearest examples of this approach are the French “reactionary” conservatives such as Joseph de Maistre, who argued for a return to pre- Revolutionary monarchy and aristocracy in France.2 1 Scruton attributes this observation to Robert Conquest (Scruton, 2014, p. 2). 2 See (Maistre, 1994). “Conservative Critiques,” 2022, Routledge Companion to Libertarianism, eds. Ben Ferguson and Matt Zwolinski, Routledge, 579-592. 2 According to the autonomous definition, conservatism is a commitment to a set of values and ideas that form something like an ideology or philosophy. These might include values such as tradition, family, religion, order, property, freedom, and community, or ideas such as pessimism about human nature or skepticism about human reason. Finally, the situational definition says that conservatism is an ideology that only arises as a response to threats to existing institutions of which people generally approve. Conservatism becomes the system of ideas used to justify the established social order and defend it from existential threats. On this definition, conservatism is unlike most ideologies in that it has no first-order commitments to values like liberty, equality, or fraternity. Rather, it is a meta-ideology, defined by its “disposition” toward existing value (Oakeshott, 1991, p. 407). The ideas used to defend current institutions and traditions will differ according to the threat. Conservatism, then, is not inherently opposed to liberalism or socialism. Rather, it opposes radicalism, or any proposal to upset the existing order more than is strictly necessary to conserve what is valuable.3 We’ll understand conservatism according to the autonomous definition. We do this for two reasons. First, there is a long conservative philosophical tradition that is uninterested in defending the feudal aristocracy or urging a return to a pre-Revolution social order. While some modern conservative thought does trace its lineage to Burke and the French Revolution, conservatives have been for some time unconcerned with re-litigating 18th Century French political disputes. Second, we opt for the autonomous over the situational definition because on the latter it would be harder to see the tension between conservatives and libertarians. One could, it seems, be a “conservative libertarian” if the need arose to defend the existing libertarian social order from radical threats. Since our task here is to discuss conservative critiques of libertarianism, the autonomous definition best suits our needs. To fill out the autonomous definition, we’ll canvass some of the ideas that have animated conservative thinkers.4 Our primary aim is to describe what conservatives believe and why, not to argue for these views. This brief survey of conservative thought should help us see how conservatism and libertarianism are, as Nisbet put it, uneasy cousins. Conservative Starting Points Conservative thinking typically begins with two starting points. Conservatives do not have exclusive claims to these starting assumptions or to the values we’ll discuss. Nor will every self-described conservative agree with these starting assumptions, let alone how we develop them. Even so, we have tried to capture a significant strand of conservative thought that ranges from Aristotle, David 3 Michael Oakeshott and Roger Scruton often describe conservatism in dispositional terms. See, for example, Oakeshott’s essay “On Being Conservative” and (Scruton, 2002, chap. 1). For a recent articulation of the dispositional approach to conservatism, see (McPherson, 2019). For what it’s worth, Huntington himself argued that the situational definition best captures Burkean conservatism. 4 Introductory discussions of conservatism can be found in (Quinton, 1993; Muller, 1997; O’Hear, 1998; Nisbet, 2001; Ball, Dagger and O’Neill, 2019; Hamilton, 2020). “Conservative Critiques,” 2022, Routledge Companion to Libertarianism, eds. Ben Ferguson and Matt Zwolinski, Routledge, 579-592. 5 left unchecked. Society must have a way of pacifying those human passions that might otherwise interfere with our ability to lead good lives. Conservatives therefore agree with Simone Weil that order is “the first of the soul’s needs” (Weil, 2001, p. 10). By ‘order’ the conservative means a stable society where people can rationally plan their lives in relative peace, and trust others to cooperate. Because of the need for order, conservatives stress the importance of authority.8 This includes, but is not limited to, the authority of the state to create and enforce laws. Conservatives support the rule of law for the order it provides in allowing people to plan their lives (Hayek, 2003, chap. 6). Few conservatives have favored direct democracies. In the interest of order and stability, conservatives favor procedural limits on the political influence of popular whims. One’s life, family, property, and traditions can be tyrannized by the popular majority no less than a single despot. However, the state should not have a monopoly on authority. Conservatives envision a “chain of authority” running from local institutions such as houses of worship and families up to the state. Conservatives emphasize the authority of local institutions as a buffer against the threat of totalizing and centralized state authority. They believe local authorities are better equipped to sustain social order through the traditions people grow up in and associate with. Freedom Although conservatives see both order and authority as crucial elements of a good society, conservatism is not authoritarian. This is because of the emphasis they place on freedom, including broad (but not necessarily absolute) freedoms to express one’s opinions, associate with whom one pleases, engage in trade, and practice one’s religion. Liberalism too stresses the importance of individual freedom. But conservatives, in keeping with their pessimism, take a more cautious approach to freedom. Freedom is not good no matter how it is used.9 Freedom, it is often said, ought to be “ordered” towards constructive ends. Conservatives are suspicious of “liberation” projects, many of which unleash the worst of humankind upon itself. One role of institutions is to keep in check our tendencies to do evil, and to help individuals pursue good lives. Individual freedom is valuable when it is shaped and ordered by good institutions. This occurs not only through the law, but through “intermediate” institutions like religious communities, families, schools, trade unions, and social aid organizations. These intermediate institutions also offer protection from the state. Rather than have their lives imposed upon them by distant technocrats, individuals are free to live according to their own traditions and conceptions of the good. In defending freedom, conservatives do not typically rely on claims about “natural rights” or “self- ownership” or metaphysical theses about autonomy. What appeals to conservatives is not freedom in the abstract, but the function freedom serves in society. Freedom’s value is a natural consequence of conservative starting points, especially skepticism about human reason. Since we lack a sound 8 On conservative views of authority, see (Nisbet, 2000, 2001, chap. 2; Kekes, 2001, chap. 7; Scruton, 2002, chap. 2). 9 Of course, the liberal tradition is highly diverse, and some liberals would also endorse this view of freedom. “Conservative Critiques,” 2022, Routledge Companion to Libertarianism, eds. Ben Ferguson and Matt Zwolinski, Routledge, 579-592. 6 theory of how to organize society, it is better to let individuals and their communities shape their own lives. The conservative’s pessimism, however, justifies certain limits on freedom. “The restraints on men, as well as their liberties,” Burke wrote, “are to be reckoned among their rights” (2003, p. 51). Community Society is not merely a collection of individuals who have their own rights and interests. An atomistic conception of society fails to countenance how individuals are connected through community. Individuals are woven together in a “fabric” as Burke put it, connected by shared language, love of home, national identity, commerce, religion, family, and friendship. The complexity of these relations contributes to conservatives’ reluctance to introduce sweeping social change. Society is fragile, and we should be anxious to preserve the conditions that make it work, even imperfectly. Conservatives emphasize the importance of communities for their role in producing the conditions conducive to good lives.10 Humans are dependent, social beings who seek to put down roots, feel secure, and find a place to call home. There is danger, then, if individuals cannot find community— and even more danger if they can only find it in the state. Down that path lies alienated individuals and the dangerous consolidation of power in central institutions. There is also risk of creating unnecessary strife as people push for the state to adopt values and goals that they might have pursued much more easily through voluntary local institutions, and without forcing them on anyone else. When there are well functioning families, neighborhoods, churches, and local clubs, people can find status, security, and belonging without turning to the state to meet those needs. The integrity of the family has been of special concern to conservatives, as many of them see the family, and not the individual, as the fundamental unit of society. It is within the family that the “transmission of the heritage of civilization” runs from one generation to the next, including moral education and the passing on of traditions (Hayek, 1984). Tradition The theme most commonly associated with conservatism is its commitment to tradition. Conservatives seek to conserve the good things they have and love, and to pass those things on to others. As we have seen, conservatives are skeptical of a priori reasoning about politics. Conservatives instead look to experience as their guide. Accumulations of generations of knowledge are given to us in traditional practices and institutions. Conservatives prefer the tried and true and will defend existing practices and institutions, insofar as they provide the conditions for good lives.11 The very survival of a tradition creates a presumption in favor of its value. This can be true even if, from our current vantage, a practice or institution seems to have no important function, a point memorably made by G.K. Chesterton. Consider a fence that is blocking a road. One kind of reformer, Chesterton wrote, “goes gaily up to it and says, ‘I don’t see the use of this; let us clear it 10 See, for example, (Nisbet, 1990). 11 For a defense of tradition, see (Shils, 2006). “Conservative Critiques,” 2022, Routledge Companion to Libertarianism, eds. Ben Ferguson and Matt Zwolinski, Routledge, 579-592. 7 away.’ To which the more intelligent type of reformer will do well to answer: ‘If you don’t see the use of it, I certainly won’t let you clear it away. Go away and think. Then, when you can come back and tell me that you do see the use of it, I may allow you to destroy it’” (Chesterton, 1990, p. 157). Many of our traditionally bestowed practices and institutions have latent functions, not apparent to us simply by observing their existence. For this reason, conservatives are reluctant to abandon traditions without very good reason. Doing so often leads to unintended and harmful—sometimes devastating—consequences. That said, conservatives will not reflexively defend just any tradition. Conservatives defend traditions that are conducive to good lives. Some traditions are not so conducive, and thus should be jettisoned. Before we do so, however, conservatives will remind us that changes to society pose a risk of making things worse, and that we should be careful not to make such changes before fully understanding what is likely to result. Conservatives therefore support change, not for its own sake, but in service of carefully thought- out reform. They recognize that sometimes change is required, often for the very purpose of retaining valuable practices and institutions. As Burke famously put it, “A state without the means of some change is without the means of its conservation” (2003, p. 19). Change for the sake of reform is best done gradually. This allows people to adapt, and permits an empirical assessment of whether the changes are doing the good we were promised. Doing so requires a kind of practical knowledge, and ought not be undertaken to create a utopia. “Politics,” wrote Oakeshott, “is not the science of setting up a permanently impregnable society, it is the art of knowing where to go next in the exploration of an already existing traditional kind of society” (1991, p. 406). Property One of Burke’s most memorable ideas was his thought that society is “a contract…a partnership not only between those who are living but between those who are living, those who are dead, and those who are to be born” (2003, p. 32). The lineage from past to present and future is the basis of a conservative defense of private property. Conservatives want to preserve ties to family and place over generations. Property rights allow this as each generation builds something and passes it on to the next. Conservatives have also supported private property as a general defense against the totalizing state, and as a way to preserve order, security, and continuity in social life.(Nisbet, 2001, chap. 2) Another continuing theme in conservative thought is the importance of feeling at home in the world. Property, conservatives argue, allows us to put down roots, and use our creative powers to fashion the world in ways that help us to overcome alienation.12 12 See (Scruton, 2002, chap. 5, 2014, chap. 1; McPherson, 2019). We’re grateful to David McPherson for conversations on this point. “Conservative Critiques,” 2022, Routledge Companion to Libertarianism, eds. Ben Ferguson and Matt Zwolinski, Routledge, 579-592. 10 Consequentialist libertarians argue that societies that recognize very strong property rights are more peaceful, productive, and prosperous, and so such rights are ultimately justified on consequentialist grounds.17 Deontological libertarians, following Locke, see property rights as an extension of the natural rights of self-ownership. Free Markets From individual rights and private property, the libertarian commitment to free markets follows effortlessly. If I own something, I possess the exclusive right to decide whether to sell, trade, or give it to anyone I please, so long as they are a free and consenting party to the transaction. The business you conduct with other consenting adults, so long as it doesn’t infringe on the rights of innocent others, is not anyone else’s business. Libertarians point to the ability of free markets, with their use of the division of labor and the price system, to satisfy more efficiently the needs and wants of the billions of humans on earth than any other system tried. Markets are also morally valuable, as they promote personal responsibility, social trust, promise-keeping, and fair dealing with others. Minarchism or Anarchism States tell us what to do, coerce us into handing over some of our property, and threaten us with punishment if we don’t comply with the thousands of laws passed by strangers with whom we have made no voluntary agreement. Libertarians, given their radical notion of freedom and individual rights, regard this as unacceptable. Libertarians therefore prefer a minimal state, though there is disagreement about just how much state action is permissible. According to minarchists, the proper purposes of government are limited strictly to those activities necessary to protect individuals from the aggression of others, such as a police force, a military, and a court system. In contrast, anarchists hold that states should be done away with altogether. Even a limited government requires coercion, and those in power will inevitably abuse and expand their authority. Anarchists support private protection agencies, private court systems for handling conflicts and grievances, and voluntary citizen militias for defense against outside aggression. 3. Uneasy Cousins In the 1960s, conservative political commentator Frank Meyer argued for a “fusion” between “traditionalism” and libertarianism.18 Traditionalism, Meyer thought, properly emphasized the transcendent moral order and individual virtue, two things he found lacking in libertarian thought. But the problem with traditionalism was its use of political power to coerce citizens to live virtuously, by, say, telling people what kind of sex they can have, what kind of magazines they can buy, or what kinds of chemicals they can ingest. Coerced virtue is not virtue at all. Furthermore, Meyer thought the libertarian was correct to think that the state’s power should be greatly limited to the preservation of domestic peace and order, the administration of justice, and defense against 17 See (Schmidtz, 1994; Hume, 2006, sec. 3). 18 See (Meyer, 1962). The fusionist position was also defended by Stanton Evans, William F. Buckley, and was, for many years, commonly associated with the National Review. “Conservative Critiques,” 2022, Routledge Companion to Libertarianism, eds. Ben Ferguson and Matt Zwolinski, Routledge, 579-592. 11 foreign enemies. According to Meyer, this “fused position” between conservatism and libertarianism strikes the right balance. It recognizes “the transcendent goal of human existence” and that “the duty of men is to seek virtue” while also insisting “that men can not in actuality do so unless they are free from the constraints of the physical coercion of an unlimited state”(Meyer, 2004, p. 17). The fusionist project raises many questions, not least of which is whether libertarian societies are likely to attain the kind of individual virtue and moral order Meyer desired. Unsurprisingly, his view has been criticized by both conservative and libertarian critics.19 Setting fusionism aside, let’s see how the conservative evaluates libertarianism. Commonalities Rejection of an intrusive state Conservatives and libertarians reject expansive, centralized political power that interferes in the economic, social, intellectual, and religious decisions of individuals and communities. This pits them both against ambitious, paternalistic, or authoritarian ideological visions for the state that involve managing the lives of citizens.20 Support for free markets and private property Conservatives and libertarians share a generally positive attitude toward private property and the free exchange of goods and services. Libertarians defend private property and free markets either for rights-based or utilitarian reasons. Conservatives tend to stress the role of markets and private property in preserving civil society, order, and enabling people to feel at home in the world. Conservatives are more inclined to allow for restrictions on property rights and trade under certain circumstances (Kolozi, 2017). Generally, though, conservatives share more in common with libertarians concerning political economy than they do with socialists and welfare liberals. Rejection of equalizing In contrast with welfare liberals, socialists, and Marxists, conservatives and libertarians reject attempts to promote social and material equality between persons. There are many reasons for this. For one, they deny the authority of the state to promote such equality. Second, while conservatives and libertarians endorse equality under the law, they deny that other kinds of equality are more important than freedom, order, virtue, or tradition. Third, they are inclined to view certain kinds of inequalities as valuable, if only because they are instrumental in promoting the creation of wealth, or preserving civil society and social order. Fourth, they argue that to promote social or economic equality, you must treat people unequally in the process, by applying different laws and standards to different groups. Such differential treatment is objectionable. “Those who attempt to level,” Burke wrote, “never equalize” (2003, p. 42).21 19 For a sampling of these discussions, see (Carey, 2004). 20 On these points see (Nisbet, 1980; East, 2004). 21 See also (Kekes, 2003). “Conservative Critiques,” 2022, Routledge Companion to Libertarianism, eds. Ben Ferguson and Matt Zwolinski, Routledge, 579-592. 12 Criticisms Individualism Whatever conservatives and libertarians have in common, and whatever their allegiances against shared political rivals, conservatives and libertarians disagree about several fundamental matters. One point of disagreement concerns the libertarian emphasis on the individual. Conservatives raise two criticisms. The first is that libertarians err in focusing so intensely on individual rights and freedoms at the expense of social groups and institutions. Libertarians begin their philosophical inquiry by imagining the individual shorn of his social identity and roles, and relations to family, friends, neighbors, fellow worshippers, and co-workers. But humans are social creatures, and our identities are inextricably connected to our groups and associations. Although conservatism does not subsume the individual into the collective, it does insist that we cannot properly understand the individual by abstracting her from her social circumstances. Libertarianism proceeds from the assumption that these things are of secondary importance, at best. The institutions to which people belong are not mere aggregates of individuals. They possess their own norms and social rules that guide and constrain human behavior. The libertarian emphasis in the first instance on individual liberties and rights is destined to overlook our associative duties to others, duties we have simply in virtue of being a sibling, a neighbor, or a fellow citizen. It would be one thing if these associations—with their demands on us of obedience and allegiance—were somehow accidental to human society. But such associations are necessary to human social life. They are also the objects of affection and provide the foundation for social trust, cooperation, and peace. Any political philosophy that begins by eliminating them is bound to be a political philosophy for beings unlike us. “I have in my contemplation” Burke wrote, “the civil social man, and no other” (1990, p. 112).22 This difference between conservatives and libertarians comes to the fore on the issue of open borders and immigration. Libertarians, by and large, reject immigration restrictions. Such laws impermissibly restrict the freedom of individuals to move, reside, and associate with whomever they please. Conservatives think this unduly emphasizes individual freedom at the cost of preserving local traditions and culture. For under a system of open borders, the libertarian cannot ensure that those who move from one place will adopt the cultural norms and values of the culture they enter. Indeed, this will often be unlikely, for there are tens—perhaps hundreds—of millions of illiberal people who would be eager to join liberal societies for their higher standard of living. Libertarians believe these individuals have a right to so immigrate, even if their doing so destroys the existing culture, attachments, and sources of communal value in those liberal societies. Imagine tens of millions of American progressives migrating to Ghana and thereby transforming the local traditional cultures. Conservatives think Ghanaians are within their rights to prevent this. Individual freedom is important, but it doesn’t dominate every other value. Societies have a right to exclude to preserve their cultures. This doesn’t mean that conservatives want closed societies. 22 As quoted in (Levin, 2014, p. 54). “Conservative Critiques,” 2022, Routledge Companion to Libertarianism, eds. Ben Ferguson and Matt Zwolinski, Routledge, 579-592. 15 Similarly, libertarianism correctly identifies freedom as an important value, but emphasizes it at the cost of other values that are as important, and sometimes even more important. Finally, like other ideologies with strong rationalist components, libertarianism is too quick to dismiss stable social and political arrangements that conflict with its regimented vision of an ideal society. 26 26 We thank Benjamin Ferguson and Matt Zwolinski for their invitation to contribute to this volume and for helpful comments. We are also grateful to Kevin Vallier for conservations about these topics before we started on the paper, and to David McPherson who commented a penultimate draft. “Conservative Critiques,” 2022, Routledge Companion to Libertarianism, eds. 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