US v Lopez: Supreme Court Limits Congress' Power to Regulate Gun-Free School Zones, Study notes of Business

Download US v Lopez: Supreme Court Limits Congress' Power to Regulate Gun-Free School Zones and more Study notes Business in PDF only on Docsity! AP American Government Required Supreme Court Cases United States v Lopez, 1995 S y n o p s i s o f t h e C a s e Alfonso Lopez, Jr., was a 12th-grade student at Edison High School in San Antonio, Texas. On March 10, 1992, he carried a concealed .38 caliber revolver, along with five cartridges, into the school. The gun was not loaded; Lopez claimed that he was to deliver the weapon to another person, a service for which he would receive $44. He was confronted by school authorities – the school had received anonymous tips that Lopez was carrying the weapon – and admitted to having the weapon. The next day, he was charged with violating the federal Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 (the "Act”) Lopez moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground that the Act was "unconstitutional as it is beyond the power of Congress to legislate control over our public schools." The trial court denied the motion, ruling that the Act was "a constitutional exercise of Congress' well defined power to regulate activities in and affecting commerce, and the 'business' of elementary, middle and high schools...affects interstate commerce". Lopez was tried and convicted. He appealed to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, claiming that the Act exceeded Congress' power to legislate under the Commerce Clause. The Fifth Circuit agreed and reversed his conviction, holding that the Act “in the full reach of its terms, is invalid as beyond the power of Congress under the Commerce Clause." The Court of Appeals noted that the legislative history of the Act did not justify it as an exercise of the Commerce Clause power of Congress, suggesting that a new version of the Act which recited more of a nexus with interstate commerce might be devised, although what that nexus might be, is difficult to harmonize with the text of the decision, as the Court clearly stated that the situation posed only a "trivial impact" upon commerce. The United States government filed a petition for certiorari, whereby the Court has discretion to hear or to decline a particular case, for Supreme Court review and the Court accepted the case. To sustain the Act, the government was obligated to show that the Act was a valid exercise of the Congressional Commerce Clause power, i.e. that the section regulated a matter which "affected" (or "substantially affected") interstate commerce. J u d g e m e n t: In a 5 – 4 decision, the Court held that possession of a handgun near school is not an economic activity nor has a substantial effect on interstate commerce, and therefore cannot be regulated by Congress. C o u r t J u d i c i a l I n t e r p r e t a t i o n ➢ The government's principal argument was that the possession of a firearm in an educational environment would most likely lead to a violent crime, which in turn would affect the general economic condition in two ways. First, because violent crime causes harm and creates expense, it raises insurance costs, which are spread throughout the economy; and second, by limiting the willingness to travel in the area perceived to be unsafe. The government also argued that the presence of firearms within a school would be seen as dangerous, resulting in students' being scared and disturbed; this would, in turn, inhibit learning; and this, in turn, would lead to a weaker national economy since education is clearly a crucial element of the nation's financial health. ➢ The Court, however, found these arguments to create a dangerous slippery slope: what would prevent the federal government from then regulating any activity that might lead to violent crime, regardless of its connection to interstate commerce, because it imposed social costs? What would prevent Congress from regulating any activity that might bear on a person's economic productivity? ➢ The Court held that while Congress had broad lawmaking authority under the Commerce Clause, the power was limited, and did not extend so far from "commerce" as to authorize the regulation of the carrying of handguns, especially when there was no evidence that carrying them affected the economy on a massive scale. ➢ Chief Justice Rehnquist, delivering the opinion of the Court, identified the three broad categories of activity that Congress could regulate under the Commerce Clause: • The channels of interstate commerce • The instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce • Activities that substantially affect or substantially relate to interstate commerce • He said they had summarily dismissed any consideration of the first two categories and concluded that the resolution of the case depended only on consideration of the third category—regulation of activities that substantially affect interstate commerce. The Court essentially concluded that in no way was the carrying of handguns a commercial activity or even related to any sort of economic enterprise, even under the most extravagant definitions. ➢ The opinion rejected the government's argument that because crime negatively impacted education, Congress might have reasonably concluded that crime in schools substantially affects commerce.