zimbabwe national unity accord, Study notes of History

Download zimbabwe national unity accord and more Study notes History in PDF only on Docsity! 4 The 1987 Zimbabwe National Unity Accord and its Aftermath: A Case of Peace without Reconciliation? Terence M. Mashingaidze Introduction When Zimbabwe attained independence in 1980, socialism was dominant in the Third World and the ruling party embraced this doctrine as its governmental ideology. Socialism was viewed as the most appropriate method for achieving socio-economic equity, justice and prosperity. The recently ended war had caused massive destruction of infrastructure and the population had swelled beyond the capacity of the existing facilities. In the aftermath of the struggle for independence, the government had to move fast in dealing with the popular demands that informed the struggle. Anyang’ Nyong’o (1987:18) aptly noted that: It was observed that the appropriate response to popular demands was developed; that development could be planned for; that planning essentially involved the optimum utilisation of available domestic and foreign resources to achieve certain growth targets; and that for the majority of popular masses to benefit, these growth targets had to be in the rural areas, hence rural development. All sections of society were to contribute to development under the tutelage of the socialist state. The immediate post-colonial era witnessed phenomenal growth. Many schools, clinics, veterinary and crop marketing facilities were constructed, uplifting the standard of living of the general populace. However, in the political arena, the dispensation that emerged had no room for diversity. Zeleza (1997:412-13) observed that: 4.Mashingaidze.pmd 31/10/2005, 12:5482 83Mashingaidze: The 1987 Zimbabwe National Unity Accord and Its Aftermath With the attainment of uhuru there was the institutionalisation of the independence contract in which all, the people, the masses, were supposed to pray at the altar of nation building and development, and the articulation of sectional class, social, community, ethnic and gender interests was frowned upon as selfish and subversive. Herein lies the paradox of post-colonial governance: liberation movements, under whose banner independence was attained, fought for plurality of the political space, but upon assuming the portals of power, sought to obliterate difference. This chapter examines this dynamic in the case of Zimbabwe. In particular it focuses on the Matabeleland crisis and highlights the inadequacies of the Unity Accord established to end the violence. These have spilt over into the present tensions and contradictions within Zimbabwe. The Matabeleland crisis: 1982–1987 Incapacity to tolerate political difference and/or the lack of tolerance to share political space by the ruling elite marred Africa’s post-colonial nation building processes. Zimbabwe’s civil war of 1982 to 1987 was an outcome of the homogenous conceptualisation and practice of nation-building in Africa. Close to twenty thousand people perished in what became known as the Matabeleland crisis (see the report by the Catholic Commission for Justice and Alexander, McGregor and Ranger 2000 for a detailed critique on the history of violence in Matabeleland). The war pitted the newly formed (Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front, ZANU-PF) government against its liberation ally, Zimbabwe African People's Union Patriotic Front (ZAPU-PF). The war was a spill-over from the nationalist politics of the 1960s and 1970s. Nationalism had the ambiguity of being both exclusionary and all-embracing. It subsumed class, ethnic and religious differences, and, at the same time, tried to use these cleavages for its sustenance. Alexander observed that the escalation of violence after the end of the liberation war built on the two guerrilla armies’ (Zanla for ZANU and Zipra for ZAPU) regional patterns of recruitment and operation during the 1970s, and the history of animosity and the distrust between the two armies and their political leaders (Alexander, McGregor and Ranger 2000: 181). These patterns left Zipra forces dominated by Ndebele speakers from Matabeleland, while Zanla was predominantly Shona-speaking. Operational areas maintained significance in terms of political loyalties: voting largely, though not completely, followed ethnic and regional divisions, creating the possibility of conflict along these lines (Cliffe, Mpofu and Munslow; cited in Alexander et al 2000: 181). Zipra’s capacity for conventional warfare was also a source of friction. Following ZANU-PF’s victory in the February 1980 4.Mashingaidze.pmd 31/10/2005, 12:5483 86 From National Liberation to Democratic Renaissance in Southern Africa and had ultimately gone into exile. A blanket amnesty was given to the dissidents and many surrendered mostly after assurances from their leadership. A critique of the 1987 Unity Accord The best way to bring peace and reconciliation in communities is through truth telling and a shared willingness to reconcile by all the major actors in a war. Civil wars and systematic repression need to end and the keyword in post-conflict reconstruction is ‘reconciliation’. The government, social organisations, the churches, and the entire population have to come to terms with the past in one way or the other. All cultural and religious traditions have forms of reconciliation. Each of these traditions also puts forward certain requirements regarding reconciliation. For example, the truth is to be established ‘officially’, damages are to be paid, the guilty are to be recognised publicly, the victims are to be restored their honour, or the guilty persons are to be submitted to real or symbolic punishment (Gatsheni-Ndlovu 2003). These are also manifest in international law. The preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states, ‘that it is of utmost importance that the human rights are protected by the supremacy of law’. A government is, therefore, obliged to investigate all accusations of violations of human rights, and report the violations from the past (Gatsheni-Ndlovu 2003). In Rwanda, the government built memorials to remember victims of the genocide and revived the traditional gacaca system of justice as a way of healing the nation in the aftermath of the 1994 genocide. Helen Vesperini (2002: 20) noted that: [T]he Rwandan government has revamped a traditional style of community justice known as the gacaca court system. The dual aim of the courts is to deal with the backlog of genocide suspects crammed into the country’s prison, and heal the deep scars left by the 1994 genocide that killed at least half a million Tutsis and moderate Hutus. The 1987 Unity Accord ended the war but did not bring peace and reconciliation. It was elitist and embodied a top-down approach to governance. Nkomo and Mugabe signed the Accord and then sold it to the people. The grassroots were never consulted in the peace-making process and no reconciliation efforts were made. According to Gatsheni-Ndlovu (2003), the foundation of reconciliation is the recognition of suffering. This distinguishes reconciliation from a process which does not go beyond political negotiations and compromises. Recognition of individual suffering may be shaped by extensive official reports with a 4.Mashingaidze.pmd 31/10/2005, 12:5486 87Mashingaidze: The 1987 Zimbabwe National Unity Accord and Its Aftermath great deal of attention to individual cases or by measures of compensation and redress which benefit the victims, by remembering the names of the victims, as in religious celebrations, on memorial stones, in literature, etc., or by lasting public recognition of the pain and grief the victims and dependents have to live with. Reconciliation is the first step towards a society which can give a lasting guarantee for dignity and justice. The 1987 Accord resulted in the cessation of hostilities but brought no peace and unity. Victims of the violence have not been compensated. Neither have those who perpetrated the violence been tried nor have they sought the forgiveness of their victims, at least through acknowledging their roles in the crisis. The Zimbabwean Unity Accord is viewed, perceived and analysed in personality terms rather than as a communal and national undertaking. Many saw the passing away of Nkomo, in july 1999, as the death knell of the Accord. Bulawayo Human Rights Lawyer David Coltart (2000) noted that: [J]ust as the President Robert Mugabe is the cement that holds ZANU (PF) together, Nkomo was the cement that held PF ZAPU together and those former (PF) ZAPU members who are now ZANU PF. I think there is a possibility that his death will unleash some political battle to get his mantle. It could speed up the disintegration of the party in the region but much will depend on the public who respected him because of his history. Former ZANU-PF Central Committee member, Norman Mabhena, who noted that after Nkomo the ruling party had no chance of dominating the Matabeleland region echoed the above sentiments by observing that ‘there is no way ZANU-PF can rise again in Matabeleland. It won in the last elections (1995/6) because people respected Nkomo’ (see Sunday Mail, 2 July 2000 and also the Financial Gazette, 13 March 2002). The people of Matabeleland and the Midlands have survived two terrible civil wars in as many decades, and they have received no guarantee that it will not happen again. In spite of apparent state and dissident atrocities there has been no official apology. In fact, the war episode is spoken of in muffled voices by officialdom. The Ndebele ethnic communities in Matabeleland and the Midlands are still hostile towards the ruling ZANU-PF party and its government (Gatsheni-Ndlovu 2003:2). This was indicated by their overwhelming votes for the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) in the parliamentary and presidential elections of 2000 and 2002. Some of the weaknesses of the Unity Accord are that it was crafted in a minimalist way that did not go beyond a power-sharing formula between the leading political elites in ZAPU-PF and ZANU-PF. The dominant post-Unity Accord politics in Matabeleland and the Midlands regions revolved around 4.Mashingaidze.pmd 31/10/2005, 12:5487 88 From National Liberation to Democratic Renaissance in Southern Africa the issues of marginalisation, state accountability, and quest for an apology, as well as compensation for the victims of the state sanctioned violence of the 1980s. These demands proved that the Unity Accord had a poor post- conflict peace-building framework that encompassed the aspirations and demands of the grassroots (see Gatsheni-Ndlovu 2003:2). The post-Unity Accord scenario in Zimbabwe did not embrace pre- requisites for reconciliation and durable peace. Lasting peace can be established through a number of mechanisms which include some of the factors raised below. 1. The establishment of all-embracing political system through power-sharing arrangements between erstwhile protagonists. This was partly achieved in Zimbabwe because (PF) ZAPU assumed posts in government and Joshua Nkomo became one of the country’s two Vice-Presidents, a post that he held until his death in July 1999. Democratic rebuilding involving eradication of fear among citizens, and enhancing accountability, transparency, legitimacy, human security, and social peace is also necessary. 2. Psychological rebuilding is imperative to communities that have survived the ravages of violence. The CCJP report noted that part of the process of psychological healing for any victim of abuse is being given the opportunity to recount that suffering to a supportive, non-judgmental audience. While the signing of the National Unity Accord was positive for reconciliation, there are many other experiences that the national leadership need to hear and take account of if they wish to prevent similar clashes. The process of opening up involves not just the victims but also the perpetrators of violence. They need an atmosphere of truth telling in order to purge themselves of their memories of events. National exorcism is imperative. In African cultures those who do injustice to others need to compensate their victims in order to avoid the wrath of avenging spirits. It is in this spirit that Truth Commissions have been set up in many parts of the world, notably South Africa and Rwanda. 3. The establishment of effective and impartial systems of justice is crucial to reconciliation. The state should also regard court verdicts in order to establish citizen confidence in the judicial system. In the context of the 1982-1987 crisis the government showed a pathetic disregard of the verdicts of the courts. In 1982, Zipra commanders Lookout Masuku, Dumiso Dabengwa and others were arraigned before the courts for treason and the evidence against them failed to convince a high court judge, but they remained in jail until 1986 (Alexander et al 2000:188). 4. Reconciliation also entails reconstruction and economic development. According to international treaties, victims have a right to material compensation. 4.Mashingaidze.pmd 31/10/2005, 12:5488 91Mashingaidze: The 1987 Zimbabwe National Unity Accord and Its Aftermath two elections, the parliamentary elections of 2000 and the presidential elections of 2002, this dichotomy emerged. However, the MDC is extremely popular in the rural provinces of Matabeleland and the Midlands. It scored emphatic victories in the two elections. This is quite different from other Shona- dominated constituencies where ZANU-PF.) has apparent hegemony. The popularity of the MDC in these rural areas is because of the people’s memory of what the ZANU government did to them in the 1980s and its failure to develop their areas in the years after. This displeasure partly explains the emergence of sectarian and opportunistic parties that have emerged with the aim of riding on the crest of this antagonism. Among these are ZAPU (different from the nationalist one of the 1960s) and the Liberty Party of Zimbabwe, whose policies advocate a federal system of government. They hoped to divide Zimbabwe into five provinces with each having its own regional government, parliament and budget, but occasionally reporting to the central government. Conclusion The Zimbabwean government is aware of the grievances of the people of Matabeleland and some parts of the Midlands but there is little it can do considering the poor state of the economy. Again, acknowledging the injustices of the past in the current harsh macroeconomic environment for which it is largely to blame, would further antagonise the people. This means that the culture of silence will continue for some time to come. The government is more concerned with keeping its hold on power than on any meaningful peace-building projects. The ruling party has co-opted many sections of society, youths, women’s groups and intellectuals, into the political realm in the past five years in scenes analogous to the 1980s when ZANU-PF was still a hegemonic, commandist-cum-para-militaristic party, with no regard for dissenting ideas. Notably the participation of youth in the Zimbabwean body politic has been viewed with scepticism. Some have castigated the process for creating social and political banditry (see The Daily News, 6 September 2003). Youths have been involved in both pre-and post-election violence. Much of the violence in Zimbabwe’s highly polarised political terrain is ascribed to the youths. Youths have contributed to the shrinkage of democratic space in the recent past. In an attempt to win support the ZANU-PF, government revived the Youth Service programmes of the 1980s in the form of the National Youth Service. Ostensibly, the National Youth Service was introduced to reorient Zimbabwean youths into patriotic and self-reliant young men and women, but, in reality, was designed to woo the young back into the fold. The compulsory national service programme was introduced in early 2000. This 4.Mashingaidze.pmd 31/10/2005, 12:5491 92 From National Liberation to Democratic Renaissance in Southern Africa acute desire to keep power at all costs by the ruling party has resulted in violence, intolerance and the victimisation of truth. Such a scenario does not provide an enabling environment for what happened in Matabeleland and the Midlands in the 1980s to be heard. References Alexander N. J., McGregor, J. and Ranger, T., 2000, Violence and Memory: One Hundred Years in the Dark Forests of Matabeleland, London: James Currey. Anyang’ Nyong’o, P., ed., 1987, Popular Struggles for Democracy in Africa, London: Zed Books. Falola, T., 2002, African Politics in Post-Imperial Times: The Essays of Richard L Sklar, New Jersey: Africa World Press. Financial Gazette, 13 March 2002 Gatsheni-Ndlovu, S., 2003, ‘Zimbabwe’s Failed Peace Building Projects: An Analysis of Lancaster House Agreement of 1979 and the Unity Accord of 1987’, paper presented at the Department of History and Development Studies, Midlands State University, May. Also available at http://home.planet.nl/~loz/maneng77.htm Sunday Mail, 2 July 2000. The Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace and The Legal Resources Foundation, 1997, Breaking the Silence–Building True Peace. A Report on the Disturbances in Matabeleland and the Midlands 1980–1988. Raftopoulos, B., 2001, ‘The Labour Movement and the Emergence of Opposition Politics in Zimbabwe’ in B. Raftopoulos and L.M. Sachikonye (eds) Striking Back: The Labour Movement and the Post-Colonial State in Zimbabwe, 1980–2000, Harare: Weaver Press. The Daily News, 6 September 2003 Vesperin, H., 2002, ‘Justice on the Grass’, in BBC Focus on Africa, January–March. www. zimbabwesituation.com Zeleza, T. P., 1997, Manufacturing African Studies and Crises, Dakar: CODESRIA. 4.Mashingaidze.pmd 31/10/2005, 12:5492