EU Policy Towards Africa: Unlocking Potential through Migration, Security, and Trade - Pro, Apuntes de Sociología

¡Descarga EU Policy Towards Africa: Unlocking Potential through Migration, Security, and Trade - Pro y más Apuntes en PDF de Sociología solo en Docsity! The European Union in a changing global environment A more connected, contested and complex world 1. A Changing Global Environment A more connected world: Globalisation has been the dominant force shaping our world for the best part of the last century. Today it is giving rise to an unprecedented degree of global connectivity, with a surge in human mobility, compelling us to rethink migration, citizenship, development and health. The exponential spread of webs not only opens opportunities for political participation, it also favours economic and financial crime, terrorism and trafficking. Markets too are increasingly connected, as shown by China’s efforts to develop infrastructural ties with Central and Southeast Asia (as well as Europe) or the Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations. Greater connectivity is a European phenomenon too: the Eurozone crisis has highlighted both the density of interconnections within the Union and the need to tackle the resulting economic problems through deeper integration. A more contested world: Fragile states and ungoverned spaces are spreading. To the east, the EU’s neighbours suffer from economic, political and energy supply fragilities. Across the Mediterranean, the spread of ungoverned spaces has enabled criminals and terrorists to thrive. Further south, instability and violence are the product of poverty, lawlessness, corruption and conflict-ridden electoral politics. More than 50 million people are now displaced. Ideology and identity drive tensions on different continents. In Europe and beyond, new narratives challenge the open society model. In the Middle East, identity politics fuels old and new cleavages. Demographic trends and growing inequalities also threaten more conflict, despite the emergence of a global middle class. Climate change and resource scarcity drive conflicts across Asia, the Middle East and Africa. Finally, technological progress is changing the nature of conflict, revolutionising the defence industry while generating new threats. The EU too is more contested, as internal forces increasingly challenge the European project. Yet a more contested Union can also spur decision-makers to better connect foreign policy with citizens’ expectations and inject fresh momentum in the European debate. Executive Summary Since the 2003 Security Strategy, the EU’s strategic environment has changed radically. While much has been achieved over the last decade, today an arc of instability surrounds the Union. Further afield, we see conflicts in Africa and security tensions in Asia, while climate change and scarce natural resources harbour the risk of more conflict. At the same time, global growth, interdependence and technological progress enable ever more people to escape poverty and live longer, healthier and freer lives. The EU must confront both the challenges and the opportunities that come with its changed environment. We have a responsibility to protect our citizens while promoting our interests and universal values. The very nature of our Union – a construct of intertwined polities – gives us a unique advantage to steer the way in a more complex, more connected, but also more contested world. The very nature of our Union – a construct of intertwined polities – gives us a unique advantage to steer the way in a more complex, more connected, but also more contested world. A more complex world: We live in an age of global power shifts and power diffusion. In the years to come, the United States will still enjoy a comprehensive global reach, and the EU is set to retain one of the highest per capita incomes in the world. Still, the age of dominance by any single country is over. Prime amongst the ‘new’ powers is China. Across all continents, emerging powers are rising in global rankings, but they are unlikely to form a single and cohesive bloc. Moreover, different regions display different configurations of power, while globally power is diffusing beyond the nation state towards a network of state, non-state, inter-state and transnational actors. Traditional multilateralism is losing steam as emerging countries want to reform the post-World War II architecture – yet opposing existing global governance mechanisms has been easier than creating new ones. 2. Challenges and Opportunities for the EU In the emerging global environment, the EU faces five broad sets of challenges and opportunities. European Neighbours: The EU needs to continue to support reform in the Western Balkans, Turkey and the Eastern partners through integration and association policies, respectively. We also need to develop foreign policies that engage Turkey on issues of common interest; that strengthen the statehood of our Eastern partners; that respond firmly to destabilising actions on our borders, while also engaging Russia to restore a sustainable European security architecture and address global challenges. North Africa and the Middle East: The EU needs to tackle the immediate challenges in its South by sharpening its tools in the internal-external security nexus and addressing immediate humanitarian crises. We also need to respond to old and new conflicts and help address the root causes of resentment through tailor-made responses. Africa: The EU can help unlock Africa’s potential by developing the right mix of migration and mobility policies; by bolstering security cooperation with the United Nations, the African Union and other African partners; and by bridging fair trade and economic integration objectives. Atlantic Partnerships: The EU needs to continue investing in a strong and sound privileged relationship across the Atlantic through closer cooperation between the EU and NATO and through the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership. At the same time, we need to deepen relations with Latin America and the Caribbean through bilateral partnerships and inter-regional arrangements. Asia: The EU can offer consistent but also customised support to regional cooperation efforts in Asia. We also need to foster a rules-based approach to conflict management and respond to the opportunity presented by various developments in Asian connectivity. 3. Implications The EU needs to tackle the challenges and seize the opportunities which the global environment presents. An effective response depends on the Union’s ability to make choices and prioritise areas where it is willing and able to make a difference. It also depends on whether the EU’s external action instruments are fit for purpose. Five key issues need to be addressed in this context: Direction: In recent years the EU has started updating the direction of its external engagement: in several areas, however, adaptations are necessary. In the Common Foreign and Security Policy, the EU has lost salience and momentum in a few areas – for instance, the ‘strategic partnerships’. In disarmament and arms control, the EU’s approach, conceived in a post-Cold War environment, needs to respond to 21st century realities. Similarly, in the Common Security and Defence Policy, although the December 2013 European Council Figure 1: Global migration flows Figure 2: Percentage of individuals using the Internet Source: EUISS (from Eurostat data; IOM World Migration Report 2013) Source: International Telecommunication Union data, 2013 A more connected world also comes as a result of the exponential surge and spread of webs. By 2030, Internet users are expected to near 5 billion. By then, 80% of the world’s population will have mobile connectivity and 60% will enjoy broadband access. Big data, data mining, cloud computing and the Internet of Things will shape the pace and contours of how we live, work and consume. The digital age offers tremendous benefits to billions of people in terms of wealth, knowledge and freedom. As such, the security and stability of the net, as well as the integrity of data flows, is of growing importance to our economies and our societies. Communication technologies have already had profound political impact, mobilising millions in Tahrir and Maidan. The fight to protect the freedom of and on the net is thus becoming increasingly critical for the protection and promotion of human rights throughout the world. However, technology also creates new vulnerabilities, including opportunities for jihadists and traffickers of arms, drugs and human beings, as well as for public and private actors to engage in counterfeiting and financial and economic crime. Globalisation empowers individuals – for good or ill. Globalisation empowers individuals – for good or ill. Markets too are increasingly connected. Geo-economics – the global competition for access to markets and resources – has become a key driver of international relations. Examples include China’s efforts to develop infrastructural ties with Central and Southeast Asia as well as Europe, the growth of regional and sub-regional groupings in East Asia and sub- Saharan Africa, or the Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations. A rising Asia is now the most dynamic element of the global economy. At the same time, we face an ‘Asian paradox’: while the region’s economy is buoyed by integration and sense of optimism, strategic competition among regional powers is feeding concern about a fragmented security environment. Similar paradoxes also exist in other parts of the world. If the world is more connected than at any point in the past, the same is true for the European Union. The EU has expanded from 15 to 28 Member States, and the Lisbon Treaty has generated opportunities to better integrate EU security and defence policies with external relations policies. The Eurozone crisis has highlighted the interconnections and asymmetries within the Union, and demonstrated that the crisis could only be addressed through greater integration. The last five years have seen steps forward in economic governance which were previously unthinkable. At the same time, the EU is moving towards building an Energy Union to tackle fragmented energy markets through more effective coordination of energy policies and new investments in critical infrastructure. Likewise, the EU is making progress in creating a digital single market, and deepening integration and investment in R&D. These developments have profound implications for the Union’s foreign policy. The Eurozone crisis temporarily tarnished the EU’s international reputation, and took a toll on its self-confidence and openness to the outside world. Europeans have since been concerned with jobs and growth, while developing less of an appetite for expensive endeavours abroad. At the same time, steps forward in economic governance are putting the crisis behind us, and the European way of life continues to attract tourists, businesses, students and migrants. Efforts to build an Energy Union will help rebalance relations with Russia, the Caucasus and the Middle East. The political economy of defence, coupled with security crises beyond the EU’s borders, could lead to deeper cooperation between Member States, and thereby boost the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). This, in turn, would help bolster partnerships with the UN, NATO and regional organisations. 1.2 A more contested world We used to think that greater interdependence would automatically bring about peace and prevent war. Now we know that while a more connected world is full of opportunities, it is also putting the nation state under unprecedented strain. By generating vulnerabilities and fragmented identities, this is giving rise to tensions and, at times, leading to more conflict. It is becoming a more dangerous world. Fragile states and ungoverned spaces are becoming more widespread. Nowhere is this clearer than closest to home. To the east, our neighbours suffer from economic, political and energy-related vulnerabilities. Russia has actively destabilised some of them by undermining their freedom, sovereignty and security. Beyond the imperative of fostering democracy, human rights (including the rights of minorities) and good governance, the conflict over Ukraine underlines the need to bolster the statehood prerogatives of our neighbours. These include recognised and protected borders, a sustainable fiscal capacity, as well as functioning customs services and police and military forces. What is at stake is peace on our continent. Across the Mediterranean, the spread of ungoverned spaces from Libya to Syria and Iraq has enabled criminals, extremists and terrorists to thrive. Yet a repressive state is no recipe for long-term stability. The value of the few fragile democracies in the region, with Tunisia in the lead, should not be underestimated. It is crucial to recall that political change does not happen overnight, and that progress is often accompanied by setbacks. Further south – from the Sahel to the Horn, from the Great Lakes to the Gulf of Guinea – instability and violence are the products of poverty, corruption, human rights abuses and conflict-ridden electoral politics. If the world is more connected than at any point in the past, the same is true for the European Union. Although casualties on the battlefield have decreased significantly over time, we have seen a dramatic rise in civilian victims and refugees: more than 50 million people are displaced worldwide. The consequences of this human tragedy will reverberate across regions and generations – including within the EU. Identity and ideology fuel tensions on different continents. Both in Europe and in the wider world, the model of an open society is being questioned and other concepts put forward. In the Middle East, identity politics makes for an explosive mix – from the deeply entrenched Israeli-Palestinian conflict to the rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran, which is aggravating sectarianism across the region. Moreover, a crisis of unprecedented magnitude has broken out inside the Sunni world, revolving around different interpretations of political Islam. And violent extremism – in various incarnations and franchises – feeds on grievances, repression and despair across the Middle East, North Africa, and large swathes of sub-Saharan Africa and Asia. There is also a growing danger of proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and advanced conventional weapons across the Middle East and Asia. Demographic trends threaten to increase the risk of conflict in years to come. The global population, standing at 7.2 billion today, is expected to grow to 9.6 billion by 2050. More than half of the world’s demographic growth will come from Africa. At the same time, Africa’s GDP is expected to remain five times lower than China’s and half that of India, which will exacerbate poverty and could raise the risk of mass displacement and radicalisation. While Africa’s natural resources and growing workforce create ample opportunities, the continent’s potential will only be realised if efforts related to job creation, good governance, human rights protection and conflict resolution become more effective. By 2030, the global middle class is expected to rise to 5 billion. But inequalities are set to rise too, in both the developed and the developing worlds, potentially triggering social discontent. The new global middle class is likely to be less homogenous and more volatile than the Western middle classes of the past. Disparities in wealth, education, digital connectivity and employment opportunities (notably for the young) harbour the potential for greater social mobility, as well as conflict. Climate change and resource scarcity, coupled with demographic growth, contribute to international conflicts and are expected to do so even more in the future. Climate-induced floods, droughts, desertification and farmland destruction have triggered migration and conflict from Darfur to Mali. Food price hikes in the 2000s triggered riots from Cameroon to Bangladesh and were a factor behind the 2011 Arab uprisings. Meanwhile, water management has become more contentious, with projects such as the Grand Renaissance Dam in Ethiopia and the Rogun Dam in Tajikistan causing regional tensions. By 2025, climate change is expected to slash harvests and water supplies, affecting some 1.4 billion people. Climate change, coupled with demographic growth, will therefore require innovative agricultural solutions: agricultural output will have to increase by 70% in order to feed the planet in 2050. Rising temperatures are also accelerating the melting of glaciers. This could have devastating consequences for coastal regions which are inhabited by 60% of the global population lives. At the same time, the thawing of the glaciers will bring access to new energy, mineral and fishing resources, calling for collective responses to manage access to shipping routes and prevent irreversible environmental damage. New energy discoveries and technologies can both help address scarcities and bolster efforts to mitigate climate change. Today, we live in times of significant oil over-supply. While the current drop in oil prices is a boon for consumers and energy importers, it threatens the sustainability of many energy producing countries. By 2035, however, energy consumption is expected to rise by over 40% compared to 2012, with 95% coming from emerging economies. Energy security and climate change will thus remain a global challenge for years to come. Technological progress is also changing the nature of conflict. Big data and cloud technology are revolutionising the defence industry and may open new avenues for crisis management. Dual-use technology has been critical in advancing scientific research and The rise of other powers is undeniable. Less certain is whether they will form a single cohesive alternative bloc. The creation of the BRICS Development Bank and China’s Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank, the current Sino-Russian rapprochement, and the sensitivities of some large democracies at the UN regarding atrocity prevention and the international promotion of human rights seem to corroborate this prospect. But the reality is messier. Rising powers argue that the post-World War II order needs to be reformed, but they are divided or uncertain about the precise changes they would like to see. They share a pragmatic approach to foreign policy, but each rising power is following its own path to modernity. Profound divergences between their political systems remain, and in many respects they are strategic competitors. In short, emerging powers lack a key ingredient of lasting cooperation: a common system of values or interests to bind them into a cohesive force. Moreover, different regions display different configurations of powers that do not add up to a single coherent whole. In the Middle East, Russia and China are increasingly active, but the real game changer is the central role played by the Gulf States, Iran and Turkey. The competition between regional actors stretches into the Horn of Africa in what has become an interdependent Red Sea sub-region. In Asia, a China-only focus does not fully capture regional dynamics: the strategic landscape is more complicated. In Africa, growth has reduced the continent’s willingness to import rules, norms and practices passively from outside. While global powers – notably the US, the EU and China – play prominent roles, Africans increasingly steer the continent’s affairs. In Latin America, Brazil and Mexico are the major economic players, but Argentina, Colombia and others could form a ‘middle class’ of powers, albeit not united in purpose yet. Across regional theatres, there is no single set of powers with roughly equal influence everywhere – nor are regional hegemons determining dynamics on their own. Power configurations change across time and place, making regions themselves dynamic concepts. The world system is no longer bipolar, unipolar or even multipolar: the very notion of ‘polarity’ is in question. Adding to such complexity is the shift from a world of nation states to a networked globe of state, non-state, inter-state and transnational actors – from civil society, media and business to regional, sub-regional and mini-lateral groupings. While nation states will remain the basic building blocks of the international system, their national sovereignty is increasingly contested and constrained by the connectivity and complexity within and across different world regions. We live in a world of multiple players and layers bound by complex interdependence. We live in a world of overlapping webs, in which power no longer resides within actors but circulates among them. We know that variable geometries of state and non-state actors will shape the world in new ways. What we do not know are the rules of global interaction and who will set them. The global power shift and power diffusion are challenging traditional multilateralism. While the UN remains the principal guarantor of the sovereign equality among states, the composition of its Security Council and the distribution of voting rights in the International Financial Institutions no longer reflect current realities. The World Trade Organisation has grown in membership (and thus legitimacy) but not in ability to achieve consensus or advance multilateral trade liberalisation. The G20 has emerged as a major informal forum, reflecting global power realignments. But while it played a key role in short-term crisis management during the 2008 financial crisis, it has failed so far to tackle structural global challenges in economic growth, financial markets and development. No effective global institutions are in place to confront other pressing challenges such as migration, cyber security, arms control or natural resource management. Opposing existing global governance mechanisms has been easier than creating new ones. Historically, major power transitions have been accompanied by military conflict. The current challenge is to facilitate a peaceful transition towards a new global order which reflects universal values and in which the interests of all stakeholders are respected within the confines of agreed rules. This new system needs to take into account the global power shift and power diffusion. It will need to tackle a world which is at once more integrated and In a world of incalculable risk and opportunity, crafting effective responses will hinge on the Union’s ability to adjust, react and innovate in partnership with others. connected, but also more fragmented and contested. While remaining anchored in the UN, the new system is likely to be more flexible and multifaceted than envisaged by the aspirations which underpinned the post-World War II architecture. In a world of incalculable risk and opportunity, crafting effective responses will hinge on the Union’s ability to adjust, react and innovate in partnership with others. 2. CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE EU A more connected, contested and complex global environment has different regional manifestations. In the emerging global environment, the EU is faced with five broad sets of challenges and opportunities. 2.1 Redoubling commitment to our European neighbours In eastern and south-eastern Europe, the EU retains substantial influence and is able to generate positive change. Enlargement produced remarkable transformations in acceding Member States. The EU has been instrumental in bringing about the stabilisation and demilitarisation of the Western Balkans and the Serbia-Kosovo dialogue. It was also critical in fostering reforms in Turkey. Beyond enlargement, the EU’s power of attraction persists in parts of the eastern neighbourhood. But the EU’s ‘soft power’ is waning as the memory of the ‘big bang’ enlargement recedes and other actors strive for influence in its neighbourhood. Today’s challenge is to revive the reform momentum through credible policies of integration and association. In the Western Balkans, promoting economic integration and development are essential to counter de- industrialisation, unemployment and low investment. In Turkey, the task is to rekindle a positive political reform dynamic and move forward on structural economic reforms. In those eastern neighbours seeking closer ties with the EU, the Union has a unique role to play to support political, economic, governance and broader societal reform. At the same time, the conflict over Ukraine, Russia’s hybrid destabilisation tactics, Europe’s energy security challenges, and Turkey’s rise as a regional power all highlight – in different ways and to different degrees – the imperative of forging a genuine common foreign policy that includes but is not limited to an accession or association policy. The EU must indeed ‘develop a special relationship with neighbouring countries’. But this does not necessarily mean that enlargement and the European Neighbourhood Policy are the only ways of doing so. Our approach to Turkey cannot neglect issues of common interest, including trade, migration, energy and security in the region. Our approach towards our eastern partners needs to include robust policies to prevent and resolve conflict, bolster statehood along with economic development, and foster energy and transport connectivity. And our policy towards Russia needs to prevent new dividing lines by combining a firm response to destabilising actions at and within our borders with engagement to rebuild a sustainable European security order with which all are at ease, while seeking common approaches to global issues. 2.2 Rethinking the EU’s approach towards North Africa and the Middle East (MENA) The positive human energy unleashed by the 2011 Arab uprisings has given way to a wave of upheavals in the region, featuring collapsing states, thriving terrorist networks, burgeoning transnational crime, millions of refugees, and intolerable violence. All this, too, is happening at our doorstep, just a few kilometres from our shores. The most immediate task is that of stemming the tide of terrorists and criminal networks by enhancing the coherence between internal and external security policies. We also have to address the humanitarian crises in war-torn and refugee-hosting countries through humanitarian assistance, asylum policies and development cooperation. In doing so, we must insist on the full application of international humanitarian law, the protection of civilians and the respect of human rights in conflict situations. Our diplomatic, economic, migration, asylum and security policies need to account for the deep connections between Europe’s southern neighbours and their neighbours in the Gulf and sub-Saharan Africa in order to help put out the fires ravaging the region, from Libya to Syria, and Iraq to Yemen. But the biggest challenge is reminding ourselves that stability is no substitute for sustainability and that the root causes of resentment – from repression and deprivation to the ‘old’ Israeli-Palestinian conflict – have deepened across the region. We need to devise policies that, without preaching, support human dignity, social inclusiveness, political responsiveness, educational modernisation and the rule of law across the region. In this respect, devising tailor-made policies in the fields of economic development, social protection and youth inclusion, as well as political accountability, justice and security is key. Equally important is to encourage inclusive and rules-bound reconciliation in old and new conflicts embedded within a new regional security architecture in the wider Middle Eastern space. 2.3 Redefining our relationship with Africa As in large parts of the MENA region, poverty, food insecurity, ill-governance and conflict continue to plague parts of Africa today. But Africa is also a continent of opportunity and growth, rich in natural resources and agricultural potential. Representative and accountable government is becoming more the norm, and the call for strong institutions, not strong men, is reflected in increasingly credible, albeit in some cases contested, elections. In a world in which key universal values are being questioned, Africa’s potential is significant. The secret of success in Africa lies in triggering a virtuous circle in the development-security-migration nexus, bearing in mind the tight interconnections between North and sub-Saharan Africa, as well as between the Horn and the Persian Gulf. For the EU, Africa has a huge potential for trade, energy and investment, which at the same time is what the continent needs. Likewise, while Europe is facing a daunting demographic predicament, Africa is living through a youth bulge which is expected to persist for most of this century. The resulting equilibrium between demand and supply of migratory forces could either benefit both continents or generate economic strain and political unrest. The EU can help unlock Africa’s potential by developing the right mix of migration, mobility and integration policies; by bolstering security cooperation with the UN, the African Union and other African partners; by supporting education and sustainable development; by bridging fair trade and economic integration objectives; and by favouring sustainable agriculture and green growth. This can drive Africa’s entrepreneurial spirit, and unleash faster, more balanced and sustainable growth while offering more attractive prospects than those provided by other external players. The post-2015 agenda and the 2015 global climate deal could help the EU establish a fairer partnership with Africa, together with a revised post-2020 EU-ACP Partnership. 2.4 Reviving Atlantic partnerships The global power shift highlights the risk of a structural transatlantic drift. Yet there is an unprecedented presence and demand for more European engagement across world regions, most of all in the Americas. As an overall middle-income region, the successful efforts to overcome entrenched conflicts, the march to democracy, socio-economic progress, and the fundamental values we share make the countries of the Americas partners of choice for Europe when tackling global challenges. The complexity and connectivity of our times are enhancing interactions in the wider Atlantic space, and the EU has only to tap this potential. much of the answer lies within the EU. But the internal-external nexus in the energy security puzzle is critical, too. Hence the imperative to diversify energy sources and routes through partnerships with suppliers and transit states. • A review of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) is underway in light of the developments to the EU’s east and south. Two major questions stand out. Geographically, the ENP is confronted with the differences between and within each region, as well as the tight interlinkages – for good or ill – between the EU’s neighbours and the neighbours’ own neighbouring countries and regions. Conceptually, the ENP was premised on the notion of ‘enlargement lite’, the relevance and effectiveness of which are now being called into question. • Enlargement has been one of the EU’s most successful endeavours. In the early 1990s, the predicament of many eastern neighbours was no different from that of most central and eastern European Member States: within a generation, the gap between them has widened dramatically. Today, enlargement remains central in EU policy towards the Western Balkans and Turkey. 3.1 Challenges in the EU’s External Action Instruments The EU’s external action instruments are faced with five major challenges: direction, flexibility, leverage, coordination and capability. Meeting these is essential if the EU is to punch its weight in the wider world. First is policy direction. In recent years the EU has started updating the direction of its external engagement, and efforts are underway to bring its status within international organisations in line with the Lisbon Treaty. But much more remains to be done. In CSFP, while in some areas the direction of policy is clear, in others the EU has lost salience and momentum. The ‘strategic partnerships’ require a sharper definition of how to maximise EU influence. In disarmament and arms control, the EU remains anchored to treaty-based commitments and to renewing efforts aimed at revitalising multilateral negotiating bodies. However, the 2005 EU strategy to combat the illicit accumulation and trafficking of small arms and light weapons and their ammunition was conceived in a post-Cold War environment. It is yet to adapt in order to respond to 21st century realities, including the use of conventional weapons by terrorists and criminals, as well as by rebel forces, militias and other non-state actors. Similarly, in CSDP, although the December 2013 European Council underlined that ‘defence matters’, the current level of ambition and capability targets are not tailored to the changing strategic environment, featuring hybrid threats, intertwined internal and external security challenges, and the growing need for Europeans to take responsibility for their own security. Greater clarity and conviction among Member States is needed on what a vigorous and responsive CSDP can and should look like in a more connected, contested and complex global environment. Humanitarian assistance is also a policy that is yet to adapt to changing global circumstances. While the main objective remains to provide an immediate response in order to save lives and reduce suffering, humanitarian actors are faced with humanitarian crises becoming the ‘new normal’, with ever-increasing needs. New policy action therefore aims at enhancing resilience, disaster risk reduction, and bridging more effectively the transition towards development cooperation. Enlargement is a policy whose sense of direction is openly contested. Faith in enlargement policy is declining in the EU and candidate countries alike. At the same time, there is no credible alternative to enlargement policy in the Balkans today, and a fair accession process remains the most promising channel to support reforms in Turkey and the Western Balkans alike. The challenge is to make pre-accession policy more credible, and restore the belief within the EU and the candidate countries that enlargement can be a win-win for all. Elites and publics in the region risk otherwise turning away from the EU, and looking for inspiration and support elsewhere. In trade policy, the EU still needs to find effective ways to manage tensions that may arise between trade and non-trade objectives. And within non-trade objectives, a distinction needs to be made between the general pursuit of fundamental freedoms and specific human rights issues which are tied to trade as such, including labour and health standards and property rights. Furthermore, the balance between multilateral, regional and bilateral trade agreements is changing. While in some cases – notably Asia – bilateralism can pave the way to inter-regionalism, in other cases, there may be trade-offs warranting more careful reflection. The need to manage tensions prevails also in cyber and counter-terrorism policies, which are evolving against the backdrop of the need to balance freedom and security. The EU is committed to achieving both. The discussion on how to go about implementing human rights, international law and the rule of law in the cyber domain warrants increased attention, however, not least through diplomatic action. Likewise, in counter-terrorism, the debate on security versus freedom remains work in progress. Second comes flexibility. As the largest global donor equipped with a wide range of geographically and thematically tailored instruments, the EU and its Member States are collectively a world leader in development cooperation and humanitarian assistance. The EU is also the only actor committed to reaching a 0.7% ODA/GNI target despite difficult budgetary and economic circumstances. But insufficient flexibility hampers effectiveness, notably in light of global shocks. In development cooperation, insufficient versatility, emphasis on results reporting, and a lack of responsiveness to local circumstances all reduce the EU’s impact. The effectiveness of EU development cooperation also hinges on greater awareness of, and responsiveness to, new state and non-state donors, whose funds may or may not have strings attached. Likewise, in counter-terrorism, despite growing attention, implementation is hampered by heavy procedural requirements, insufficient expertise and mainstreaming in programming, and, at times, difficulty in working in concert with Member States and finding suitable implementing partners. Third, leverage. In trade and development policy, the EU potentially wields significant power. In trade policy, the EU represents the largest trading partner for 80 countries and the second largest for a further 40. Yet, the EU’s declining economic dynamism, the high demands it makes of its trading partners, and what it is willing to offer may be hampering its leverage. Proof is the difficulty the EU is facing to conclude negotiations on investment or free trade agreements with several major partners. In addition, new challenges are emerging as the EU seeks to move beyond the elimination of tariffs to cover non-tariff barriers as well – as in the case of TTIP. Negotiations over non-tariff barriers often entail regulatory convergence, which require a thorough understanding of the needs, interests and procedures of sectorial regulators and social actors. Likewise, sanctions policy hinges on the EU’s economic strength and the extent to which the EU can embed its efforts within a wider multilateral framework, as well as on the ability of target countries to circumvent EU measures. Leverage is a challenge also within the European Neighbourhood Policy. The ENP helped cultivate a domestic constituency for reform in several neighbours. The Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement negotiations and the Visa Liberalisation Action Plans with Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia spurred progressive reforms in many areas. The ENP facilitated the emergence of a pro-democratic civil society, even in contexts of great repression. At the same time, particularly when it comes to neighbours that have little interest in moving closer to the EU, the ENP has revealed its limits. More tailor-made and reflexive approaches towards each neighbour are required. The ENP alone is also ill-equipped to deal with the hard state-building challenges across the region. Fourth is coordination, both across institutions and with Member States. In EU diplomacy, a number of initiatives by various groups of Member States have accompanied and complemented CFSP efforts. Rather than focusing only on speaking with one voice, there is a need for a multitude of voices speaking in unison. Variable actions and formats can only strengthen the EU’s global role, and reflect the complexity of our times. Provided the EU remains united and well-coordinated, varied diplomatic constellations can also give greater visibility to our common priorities and make our collective efforts more effective. Ranging from development to defence, effectiveness requires coordination amongst Member States. In defence, Member States’ budgets have been cut in an uncoordinated manner. More recent investment plans by some Member States’ are equally uncoordinated. In development policy, Joint Programming is a promising step forward in this regard. In development policy – as in the field of non-proliferation, arms control, disarmament and export control – effective implementation requires overcoming the fragmentation of financial instruments both across Commission services and between the EU and its Member States. In the cyber domain, the EU is ratcheting up its efforts, with several funding instruments focusing in part on building capacity in the areas of cybercrime and cyber security. However, uncertainty still remains over Member State buy-in for a common EU approach. There is also insufficient coordination among EU institutions and inadequate efforts being made to effectively bridge the public-private divide. Coordination and cohesion challenges are perhaps most pressing in the energy domain. Unlike in climate policy, where the EU stands united and plays a global role, the EU is too often unable to speak and act with one voice when it comes to its external energy policy. Internal fragmentation makes the Union a target of divide-and-rule efforts by some supplier countries. Insufficient EU representation in international energy bodies, insufficient Member State coordination of their external energy policies, and insufficient Member State buy-in to the EU’s external energy partnerships hamper efforts to achieve energy security. The effects can be seen in the difficulties encountered in building an integrated energy market in the neighbourhood and in completing the Southern Gas Corridor. Finally, come capability challenges. In the field of migration, mobility partnerships and visa facilitation with our partners remain underexploited. In light of mounting migration challenges, the Commission’s Agenda on Migration aims at strengthening Europe’s capabilities by assigning additional resources to its Agencies and by integrating the external and internal dimensions of migration management, as well as by tackling the root causes of the phenomenon in the long-term. Rising to the migration challenge and doing so in full respect of human rights and international law is a vital interest at the very core of our values. In security and defence, CSDP has been developed from scratch since 2000. The policy is now equipped with planning capabilities, structures, procedures and a wealth of operational experience built up in some thirty missions to date. CSDP’s modus operandi of partnering with international and regional organisations – notably the UN, the AU and NATO – is ever more relevant in an age of complexity. However, launching CSDP operations is getting no easier over time. CSDP still faces difficulties in force generation, and access to early and common financing, enablers, intelligence and logistics. This has often limited the scope, size, strategic depth and escalation management ability of missions. The Battle Groups, although on stand- by, have never been deployed. The Lisbon Treaty’s permanent structured cooperation and Article 44 TEU (on the implementation of a task by a group of Member States) have never been activated. More broadly in the defence field, budgets have been slashed in an uneven manner, with R&T taking the greatest hit. The EU’s capability development process remains mostly bottom-up, relying on voluntary contributions by Member States. The EU is not a military alliance. The Union cannot afford, however, to ignore the ‘D’ in its CSDP.