Cuban Political Opposition: Role and Impact, Apuntes de Relaciones Internacionales

¡Descarga Cuban Political Opposition: Role and Impact y más Apuntes en PDF de Relaciones Internacionales solo en Docsity! DATE 2009-04-15 13:33:00 SOURCE US Interests Section Havana CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL C O N F I D E N T I A L HAVANA 000221 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/08/2019 TAGS: PGOV, PINR, PREL, PHUM, CU SUBJECT: THE U.S. AND THE ROLE OF THE OPPOSITION IN CUBA Classified By: COM Jonathan Farrar for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 1. (C) SUMMARY: As the Raul Castro government of Cuba (GOC) appears to have settled into a position of undisputed authority internally, it is worth asking what the Cuban political opposition is doing and the role it may play in the future. Two recent op-ed pieces in the international press that have infuriated dissident leaders argue that the answers are: not much and none. Though the op-ed pieces do not mention it, this assessment should carry the caveat that part of the reason for the relative inaction of the opposition is that the GOC is taking active steps to undermine it. Many opposition groups are prone to dominance by individuals with strong egos who do not work well together and are therefore easy targets for manipulation by the Cuban security services. The Agenda para la Transicion, which was launched with much promise one year ago, is on the verge of breaking apart. Oswaldo Paya's Dialogo Nacional has picked up some stray dissidents, but has not taken any significant action in months. Though dissidents have reacted very negatively to the articles in the international press, the fact is that they contain more than a grain of truth and it would have been better if the criticism had been taken as a wake-up call. 2. (C) Without some true epiphany among the opposition leadership and a lessening in official repression of its activities, the traditional dissident movement is not likely to supplant the Cuban government. The dissidents have, and will continue to perform, a key role in acting as the conscience of Cuba and deserve our support in that role. But we will need to look elsewhere, including within the government itself, to spot the most likely successors to the Castro regime. End Summary. Public Criticism Touches a Nerve in the Dissident Community --------------------------------------------- -------------- 3. (C) Two recent op-ed pieces that ran in the Miami press, one by Ivette Leyva Martinez entitled "the Wall of Dissidence," and the other by Fernando Ravsberg entitled "Cuba, the Dissidents and the World," argued that the dissident movement in Cuba has become as old and as out of touch with the lives of ordinary Cubans as the regime itself. The articles represented comprehensive and fairly balanced critiques of the dissident movement, and appeared at a time when the dissidents are under more pressure than ever from the Cuban government. As such, they might have generated a reform debate among the dissident leaders, but instead they simply focused dissident frustration with the Cuban exile community. 4. (C) In general, we would make the same criticisms of most of the official dissident movement that we have contact with in Havana. In fairness to the dissidents we would add--as the op-ed pieces did not--that being an anti-GOC activist in Cuba is enormously difficult, and that any effort to move beyond small meetings in private homes would almost certainly be quickly and firmly repressed by the security services. That said, we see very little evidence that the mainline dissident organizations have much resonance among ordinary Cubans. Informal polls we have carried out among visa and refugee applicants have shown virtually no awareness of dissident personalities or agendas. Judging from the reactions we have heard from our dissident contacts, the most painful accusation made by the commentators was that the dissidents are old and out of touch. Many of the leaders of the dissident movement are indeed comparatively old. Long-time dissidents like Martha Beatriz Roque, Vladimiro Roca, Felix Bonne, Roberto de Miranda, Oscar Espinosa Chepe, Elizardo Sanchez and Hector Palacios are in their 60s. Others such as Francisco Chaviano and wife Ana Aguililla, Rene Gomez Manzano and Oswaldo Paya are well into their 50s. They have little contact with younger Cubans and, to the extent they have a message that is getting out, it does not appeal to that segment of society. Their very valid focus on the plight of friends and relatives being held as prisoners of conscience, and on the government's failure to uphold basic human rights, does not address the interests of Cubans who are more concerned about having greater opportunities to travel freely and live comfortably. Dissident Movement Not a Coherent Whole --------------------------------------- 5. (C) Whether or not the opposition organizations have agendas that can be made to appeal to a broad range of interests on the island, they must first begin to achieve some level of unity of purpose as an opposition, or at least stop spending so much energy trying to undercut one another. 10. (C) A consistent problem, and one that is becoming more acute as the eventual end of the Castro brothers' regime comes into sight, is the relationship between the on-island opposition and the exile community. Even though much of their resources continues to come from exile groups, opposition members of all stripes complain that the intention of the exiles is to undercut local opposition groups so that they can move into power when the Castros leave. The islanders accuse Miami and Madrid-based exiles of trying to orchestrate their activities from afar, and of misrepresenting their views to policy makers in Washington. Ironically, the "exile community" in many cases includes former dissidents who only just recently were able to get off the island. Their closeness to the remaining dissidents on the island does not appear to keep them in the latter's good graces. Instead, they are almost immediately lumped into the "them" that defines the exile community for the on-island opposition. COMMENT ------- 11. (C) COMMENT: Various dissident leaders have maintained their focus on specific issues like treatment of political prisoners, and such work is valuable and worthwhile. This is especially true of groups like the Damas de Blanco, whose very narrow focus on the plight of their imprisoned family members has made it one of the most effective organizations on the island. It is the dissident movement that holds the GOC accountable for its violations of basic human and civil rights. From our standpoint, however, there are few if any dissidents who have a political vision that could be applied to future governance. Though the dissidents will not acknowledge it, they are not widely known in Cuba outside the foreign diplomatic and press corps. A key factor that contributes to this is the GOC's focused effort to keep dissidents divided and unable to reach out to ordinary Cubans. We have no doubt that, as alleged, the dissident movement is heavily penetrated by state security. This penetration allows the government to play on the egos and personal feuds that are normal in any society, and exacerbate the divisions that would exist naturally among the dissidents. Unless the GOC relaxes its suppression of opposition organizations, and the dissidents themselves become more capable of cooperative behavior, it is unlikely that they will play any significant role in whatever government succeeds the Castro brothers. Nevertheless, we should continue to support the good work being done by the dissident movement in promoting observation of internationally recognized human rights and making public the plight of political prisoners. 12. (C) COMMENT CONTINUED: We believe it is the younger generation of "non-traditional dissidents," XXXXXXXXXXXX that is likely to have a greater long term impact on post-Castro Cuba. However, the most likely immediate successors to the Castro regime will probably come from within the middle ranks of the government itself. We do not know yet who might eventually rise to leadership positions in place of the old guard from within the government. The recent purge of younger officials like former Vice President Lage and former Foreign Minister Perez Roque must have given pause to any in that cadre who had considered thinking out loud about the future. Still, we believe we must try to expand ou contacts within Cuban society on leadership and democracy initiatives as broadly as possible. We also must continue to open up Cuba to the information age through measures such as those announced on April 13, to facilitate and encourage the younger generations of Cubans seeking greater freedom and opportunity. End Comment FARRAR DESTINATION VZCZCXYZ0001 PP RUEHWEB DE RUEHUB #0221/01 1051333 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 151333Z APR 09 FM USINT HAVANA TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4310 INFO RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC RHMFISS/COGARD INTELCOORDCEN WASHINGTON DC RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC RHMFISS/NAVINTELOFC GUANTANAMO BAY CU ATE 2009-12-05 16:15:00 SOURCE US Interests Section Havana CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HAVANA 000726 SIPDIS STATE FOR WHA/CCA AND WHA/PD STATE FOR DRL CNEWLING E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/03/2019 TAGS: PREL, PHUM, PGOV, CU SUBJECT: SPAIN ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND DIALOGUE WITH CUBA REF: A. HAVANA 683 ("SPAIN ON THE LOOKOUT FOR SIGNS OF CHANGE") B. MADRID 1146 C. MADRID 1157 HAVANA 00000726 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: Principal Office Jonathan Farrar for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 1. (C) COM met December 2 with Spanish ambassador to Cuba Manuel Cacho at the latter,s request to discuss Spain,s plans vis--vis Cuba during Spain,s EU Presidency and the upcoming meeting between the Secretary and Spanish FM Moratinos. P/E Counselor separately met December 3 with his Spanish counterpart. A preview of issues that Moratinos may raise with the Secretary and other major points from both meetings follow. CONVERGING VIEWS, BUT NOT CONVERGENCE ------------------------------------- 2. (C) Ambassador Cacho stated that the USG and the Government of Spain (GOS) used to differ on both strategy and objectives for Cuba policy, with Spain seeking engagement and gradual liberalization and the USG seeking confrontation and regime change. COM noted that the United States is engaging with the GOC in a low-key manner on issues where we believe we can make progress, and continues to focus on improving respect for human rights. He agreed that there is opportunity for closer collaboration between the EU and United States on Cuba such as the recent (successful) approaches to the GOC to allow the travel to Spain of Elsa Morejon, wife of prominent political prisoner Oscar Biscet. CLOSELY WATCHING U.S. MOVES --------------------------- 3. (C) The Spanish Polcouns told his USINT counterpart that Spain and all of the EU countries were closely watching U.S. moves in Cuba, but dismissed that the EU would wait for further developments in the U.S.-Cuba relationship. "We have been traditionally ahead of you in engaging with Cuba," he said, "we can't afford to fall behind." He dismissed reports of new EU Foreign Minister Ashton's comments on the need to wait for U.S.-Cuba developments as "rookie misstatements." skeptical he would obtain a positive response. The ambassador asked if Perez O,Conor and Salanueva, wives of two of the Cuban Five, would receive visas to visit their husbands. COM described the history of their ineligibilities and the differences between the two cases. The ambassador noted the GOC,s interest in swapping the Cuban FIVE for political prisoners in Cuba. COM responded that the vast majority of the Damas and their imprisoned relatives were opposed to any such offer. HAVANA 00000726 003.2 OF 003 DOWNWARD ECONOMIC SPIRAL ------------------------ 10. (C) The ambassador said Cuban imports from Spain were down 38% in August, similar to the decline from other trading partners. Some Spanish exporters recently had been able to access and transfer funds previously frozen in their Cuban bank accounts but only if they agreed to invest some of these proceeds in new exports to Cuba. (Spanish demands for payment during the International Trade Fair were not well taken, and other contacts tell us that the head of the Spanish Chamber of Commerce had fallen from grace with the GOC after publicly criticizing Cuba for letting unpaid bills pile up.) Ambassador Cacho observed that the Cuban economy is in a downward spiral with no sign of when or how it might recover. His GOC interlocutors a year ago talked of increasing opportunities for small scale enterprises (paladares, etc.) and even timeshare developments, but such talk has ceased. COMMENT: VALUE IN COORDINATION ------------------------------ 11. (C) Despite differences in our views, we see value in coordinating with the GOS on human rights issues in Cuba both in capitals and on the ground in Havana. Spain leads a substantial bloc within the EU that favors engagement with the GOC at almost any cost but will raise human rights- related issues privately with the GOC when persuaded to do so XXXXXXXXXXXX. Spain desires to speak for the entire EU when it comes to Cuba policy and is quick to reinterpret the public statements of other EU interlocutors, e.g., European Commissioner for Development and Humanitarian Assistance de Gucht and EU Foreign Minister Ashton, when they don't fit the Spanish line. 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