International Law and Treaties: An Overview, Apuntes de Derecho

¡Descarga International Law and Treaties: An Overview y más Apuntes en PDF de Derecho solo en Docsity! PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW – Final Exam UNIT 1 What is Public Interna1onal Law? à Way to solve disputes between countries and IOs to ensure peace. “Law created a*er the 19th c. when diplomacy was not enough between countries and IOs in order to maintain peace”. • This Law can be enforced. Has binding rules. • Is fragmented in areas which respect the general rules or trea@es. Even though, there are differences between them. • Started from philosophical debates or discussions à CUSTOMS are a result. PHASES: • Intellectual infrastructure –theore@cal discussion–, but no poli@cal will. • Starts with the crea@on of IOs aLer WWII. • Between WWI-WWII à Starts emerging. Even if it was not effec@ve, was useful. • 30 years ago à All globaliza@on is based on Public Interna@onal Law. Basic ideas: 1. Interna@onal law is based on NATURAL LAW (there is a universal “jus naturale”) à Rules have existed even when they were not created ac@vely. 2. It is based on the gradual development of universal principles of jus@ce that develop via human agency. 3. The “CONSENT OF NATIONS” (consent of states) plays a key role in interna@onal law. Everything that happens in IL (interna@onal law) is agreed within states, has consent à All rules become binding via consent. 4. Absence of a centralised legislator/authority –who ensures the Law is followed and respected– and adjudica@on system à Absence of a centralized power. 5. Obliga@ons can emerge through state prac@ce even in the absence of legisla@on à It does not have to be wri_en to be binding. a. CUSTOMS à Exists through the con@nuous prac@ce within the states. It is not less important than wri_en rules because it has the same value, making the system more complex. 6. STATEHOOD “Categoría de ESTADO” means that a state has sovereignty which means that it is able to act on the interna@onal scene. a. The states also have sovereignty over their territory (sea and air space included). b. Therefore, a STATE is considered as such when is able to act in the interna@onal scene and when it has sovereignty over certain territories. ENFORCEMENT à Mechanisms that ensure the rule –the Law– is being followed. When a rule is binding, generally, the rule is enforced. Therefore, has ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS. However, in Public Interna@onal Law is more complex. Because the rules are binding but, in some cases, are not enforceable (have no enforcement procedure). Despite that, they are always binding regardless being enforceable or not. IOs à Is a crea@on of states in form of ins@tu@on through a treaty which is an expression of consent of states. They can have legal capacity. In other words, they are a product of states. Actors in Interna@onal Law: • STATES • IOs Sources of interna@onal law (Where to find the Interna@onal Law?): 1. Interna1onal conven1ons (trea1es) à Synonyms. “WriIen agreement between states where obligaJons and rights are created, also IO’s. There are no limits in what a treaty can create as long as is within legality and does not confront states”. § They must have the consent of states so they can conserve their sovereignty. They are difficult to be done because states must agree. § Can be done between two or more states. § ALer WWII has become the most important tool even if it is not more valuable than the other sources. UNIVERSAL TREATY à Contains rules that are binding for all or most states in the world. 2. Interna1onal custom à They are not less important even though they are not wri_en. Described as a con@nuous prac@ce that is perceived as binding. § Discussion à Applicable for countries that do not have that custom? 3. General principles of law à Different from INTERNATIONAL CUSTOMS. 4. Judicial decisions and teaching of most qualified publicists à Only applicable to the ones implicated in the case. 5. Other sources: a. Conclusions of interna@onal conferences: The final act or other statement of conclusions of a conference of States may be a form of NORTH SEA CONTINENTAL SHELF à “Although the passage of only a short period of Jme (in this case, 3 – 5 years) is not necessarily, or of itself, a bar to the formaJon of a new rule of customary internaJonal law on the basis of what was originally a purely convenJonal rule, an indispensable requirement would be that within the period in quesJon, short though it might be, State pracJce, including that of States whose interests are specially affected, should have been both extensive and virtually uniform in the sense of the provision invoked and should moreover have occurred in such a way as to show a general recogniJon that a rule of law or legal obligaJon is involved.” OVERVIEW OF THE CASE: These cases concerned the delimita@on of the con@nental shelf of the North Sea as between Denmark and the Federal Republic of Germany, and as between the Netherlands and the Federal Republic, and were submi_ed to the Court by Special Agreement. The Par@es asked the Court to state the principles and rules of interna@onal law applicable and undertook thereaLer to carry out the delimita@ons on that basis. By an Order of 26 April 1968, the Court, having found Denmark and the Netherlands to be in the same interest, joined the proceedings in the two cases. In its Judgment, delivered on 20 February 1969, the Court found that the boundary lines in ques@on were to be drawn by agreement between the Par@es and in accordance with equitable principles in such a way as to leave to each Party those areas of the con@nental shelf which cons@tuted the natural prolonga@on of its land territory under the sea, and it indicated certain factors to be taken into considera@on for that purpose. The Court rejected the conten@on that the delimita@ons in ques@on had to be carried out in accordance with the principle of equidistance as defined in the 1958 Geneva Conven@on on the Con@nental Shelf. The Court took account of the fact that the Federal Republic had not ra@fied that Conven@on and held that the equidistance principle was not inherent in the basic concept of con@nental shelf rights, and that this principle was not a rule of customary interna@onal law. 2. Generality of prac1ce à Most of the countries accept it. Complete consistency is not necessary, oLen the real problem is to dis@nguish between mere absten@on from protest by a number of States in the face of a prac@ce followed by others. REGIONAL CUSTOM –only applicable in the region– can differ from INTERNATIONAL CUSTOM or vice versa. REGIONAL CUSTOM can become INTERNATIONAL CUSTOM at some point (it can last decades). 3. Accepted as law à Also known as PSYCHOLOGICAL ELEMENT (idea within the state that something is LAW). The expression generally u@lised is “opinio juris sive necessitates” (The STATE behaves on a certain way because it is perceived as law, as an obliga@on). The idea is that norma@vity is required for the emergence of custom. States must consider the prac@ce to have a NORMATIVE ELEMENT. Nicaragua Interna@onal Court of Jus@ce Case à “In considering the instances of the conduct above described, the Court has to emphasize that, as was observed in the North Sea ConJnental Shelf cases, for a new customary rule to be formed, not only must the acts concerned "amount to a seIled pracJce", but they must be accompanied by the “opinio juris sive necessitaJs”. Either the States taking such acJon or other States in a posiJon to react to it, must have behaved so that their conduct is evidence of a belief that this pracJce is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it. The need for such a belief, i.e., the existence of a subjecJve element, is implicit in the very noJon of the “opinio juris sive necessitaJs”." (I.C.J. Reports 1969, p. 44, para. 77.). CUSTOMS can be GENERAL or UNIVERSAL (applied to everyone, however, if a country constantly objects, it could not be applied). A rule of interna@onal law which a state has not expressly or by implica@on accepted may not be opposable to that State. o PERSISTENT OBJECTOR à Sovereign state which has consistently and clearly objected to a norm of customary interna@onal law since the norm's emergence and considers itself not bound to observe the norm. Therefore, is a rule that allows a State to exempt itself from the applica@on of a new customary rule if it can be demonstrated that it had objected persistently, and explicitly, during the period in which that norm was emerging. “A State may exempt itself from the applicaJon of a new customary rule by persistent objecJon during the norm formaJon”. o SUBSEQUENT OBJECTOR à Has adhered to an original rule, but objects to proposed changes to that rule. Accordingly, where a State demonstrably objects to the emergence of a new rule—or to the subsequent modifica@on of an exis@ng rule—and provided other States appear to acquiesce to that protest, the objector will not be bound by the scope of the new rule. “SomeJmes States depart from an accepted rule and other States acquiesce with the new pracJce. This is a more complex issue of how customs might change in internaJonal law. The mere departure of a State from an accepted custom does not excuse it from having to respect the custom”. An unresolved ques@on remains as regards new States and exis@ng customary interna@onal law. In general, a new State will be bound by all exis@ng customary law from the date of its independence. A rule can be invented in the treaty and then become a CUSTOMARY LAW even in countries that did not sign the treaty. TREATIES/CONVENTIONS “Any internaJonal agreement in wriIen form, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its parJcular designaJon… concluded between two or more States or other subjects of internaJonal law and governed by internaJonal law” à ILC DraT 1962 • Trea@es are binding only on the par@es. • Non-par@es might accept by their conduct the provisions of a treaty as cons@tu@ng customary interna@onal law. • OLen trea@es have a law-making effect going beyond their par@es’ specific objec@ves. • Trea@es can include enforcement procedures that apply only to the par@es. • The EU trea@es are trea@es under interna@onal law. Types of trea@es: o MULTILATERAL à All or most states. Or trea@es that are open to anyone even if not everyone sign. o BILATERAL o PLURILATERAL à More than two. States are mostly free to draL trea@es as they wish and include the obliga@ons they prefer. They can also be used to create interna@onal organisa@ons. LAW-MAKING TREATIES à Create legal obliga@ons that remain mandatory in @me. The one-@me observance of which does not discharge the obliga@on. TREATIES FOR THE JOINT CARRYING-OUT OF A SINGLE ENTERPRISE à Is not law making and fulfilment of the treaty’s objects will discharge the obliga@on. VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE TREATIES à It is an interna@onal conven@on containing rules generally recognised by the interna@onal community on treaty making, interpreta@on and all different aspects of what a treaty is and of how trea@es work à SEE NOTES PAPER–BASED. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW Situa@ons where the Court reu@lize principles that are brought of domes@c legisla@ons of the states. When there is no provision in an interna@onal treaty or statute nor any UNIT 2: Enforcing Interna@onal Law à Different from when INTERNATIONAL LAW is BINDING! DIFFERENCE BETWEEN “BINDING” AND “ENFORCEABLE” “BINDING” means that a norm of interna@onal law (e.g., right or obliga@on) is in force and States and Interna@onal organisa@ons must respect it. If it has direct effect than the norm is binding also inside na@onal legal systems. “ENFORCEABLE” means that a binding norm of interna@onal law is subject to a mechanism of enforcement in case of non-compliance. This can be an interna@onal court such as the Interna@onal Court of Jus@ce or the WTO Appellate Body or a different interna@onal procedure. If the norm has direct effect enforcement of interna@onal law happens also via domes@c courts (e.g., the tribunal of Barcelona enforcing European Union law). THIS DISTINCTION IS CRUCIAL. MANY NORMS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW INCLUDED IN TREATIES OR BASED ON CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW ARE 100% BINDING BUT THEY ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY AN ENFORCEMENT MECHANISM. There is no general obliga@on in INTERNATIONAL LAW (except: SUSPEND or TERMINATE in trea@es ONLY à Is a special case). ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS are available but require CONSENT à In trea@es, for example. Where enforcement mechanisms can be included and not necessarily, they must be an interna@onal court or related to it. HOW CAN INTERNATIONAL LAW BE ENFORCED? 1. INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE (the Court of the United Na@ons). a. If the treaty connects. b. If States agree. CONSENT is needed. They go for specific reasons. c. Organ of the UNITED NATIONS. § Conten@ous cases à Only disputes between states! General jurisdic@on but States must agree to appear before it (ad hoc or via an interna@onal treaty). No appeal, judgements are finals. States must comply with the judgement, if they don’t the UN Security Council can under Ar@cle 94 of the UN Charter decide to take enforcement measures (e.g., sanc@ons, or even authorise military ac@ons). § Advisory proceeding on interpreta@on of interna@onal law (Advisory opinions) These are requested by UN organs and agencies mainly by the General Assembly of the UN. 15 judges elected by the UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY and the UN SECURITY COUNCIL (term of 9 years). 2. Other interna@onal courts, tribunals and arbitra@on panels included in interna@onal trea@es (e.g., enforcement panels in free trade agreements, arbitra@on procedures in interna@onal investment law). EXAMPLES: ICC, CIEU, ECHR, IACHR, WTO, ITLOS… They can enforce their jurisdic@on on a certain sec@on. When States draL interna@onal trea@es, they are free to: 1. Design different mechanisms of enforcement. 2. Just refer to the ICJ or even do not include any mechanism of enforcement at all. There are numerous trea@es in interna@onal law that include mechanisms of enforcement separate from the ICJ. Some examples: - FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS oLen provide for the crea@on of panels of experts to assess viola@ons of the obliga@ons included in these trea@es this can also lead to suspension of the treaty against the non- complying state. - INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT TREATIES oLen provide for the crea@on of an arbitra@on panel and the possibility of making non-complying states pay compensa@on in case of viola@on of the obliga@ons. - INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES some@me provide for “Commi_ees” to assess poten@al viola@on of the human rights included. OLen this is not served by addi@onal sanc@ons. 3. Other interna@onal courts, tribunals and arbitra@on panels included in interna@onal organisa@ons (e.g., WTO panels and Appellate Body, European Court of Human Rights, European Court of Jus@ce…). These OTHER INTERNATIONAL COURTS are created by trea@es which tell their part of Interna@onal Law –what they can enforce–. Being a member to an interna@onal organisa@on oLen means that obliga@ons must be respected. For instance, being a member to the World Trade Organisa@on entails respec@ng numerous obliga@ons on the liberalisa@on of interna@onal trade. Examples: § WTO Panels and Appellate Body § European Court of Human Rights § Court of Jus@ce of the European Union 4. Suspension of interna@onal trea@es in case of material breach (under the VIENNA CONVENTION). As you know by now the Vienna Conven@on on the Law of Trea@es allows suspension of trea@es in case of a “material breach”. This can be used to put pressure on a non-complying State but only if the State is gevng some benefit from the treaty. This system works quite well with economic and trade trea@es since the State is gevng some economic benefits from being a party to the treaty. Their suspension damages the non-complying State. This is a simple mechanism of “self-help” that exists in interna@onal law and that does not require the involvement of a court. (This can lead however to a dispute between states if the allegedly non-complying State disagrees with the measure or it does not think it is breaching interna@onal law). 5. Sanc@ons and fines (oLen aLer a judgement see 1, 2 and 3, but not necessarily). States can be subject in certain situa@ons to sanc@ons and fines for non- complying under interna@onal law. There is no general system in interna@onal law about sanc@ons except from the possibility of suspending interna@onal trea@es and those imposed by the UN Security Council. Accordingly, more elaborate systems of sanc@ons and fines are included in interna@onal trea@es or in the trea@es crea@ng interna@onal organisa@ons. E.g., EU law provides that EU Member States can be fined in case of non- compliance with EU law. E.g., the WTO and trade agreements provide for retalia@on against non- complying states. 6. SoTer mechanisms of enforcement of Interna@onal Law (such as supervisory mechanisms, Reports, peer review, recommenda@ons etc..). This generally does not lead to sanc@ons or fines à States create mechanisms to supervise the applica@on of a treaty without the need of the courts. We can define as soL enforcement all kinds of mechanisms of supervision of State compliance that do not lead to any type of sanc@ons or even that do not include a judgement of a court. In interna@onal law all kinds of soLer mechanisms of enforcement exist and some of them are really inven@ve. This is because States generally do not like to be taken in front of a court or to be subject to sanc@ons. So even when they agree on obliga@ons under a treaty, they oLen prefer different ways of supervising compliance. Examples are: UNIT 3: The Law of the Sea INTERNATIONAL LAW is rela@vely new. INTRODUCTION Three centuries ago: “The wind of freedom versus the wind of sovereignty” à Historically, there has been a fight between these two winds. Parts of the sea: Þ HIGH SEA à There is freedom. All members of the Interna@onal Community can navigate. Þ TERRITORIAL SEA (Narrow space) à Extension of the land. Coastal states want to have sovereignty over this to trade, have control over its resources, gain security –was very important in the past (s@ll is)– à 3 nau@cal miles as the limit of the territorial sea in the past because that was the maximum distance that could be reached from a canyon (Professor BYNKERSHOEK, Dutch)–. TRADITIONAL LAW OF THE SEA à Right to navigate freely (Hugo Gro@us, Mare Liberum, 1609) à High seas may be used by any states and the use of the sea three centuries ago was a use related to the surface (transport people and goods) à LAW OF MOVEMENT. Þ SURFACE RIGHTS Þ RIGHT OF USE MODERN LAW OF THE SEA Þ Influenced by technological progress à Allow to find natural resources. Þ Mul@-dimensional law à Not only the surface. Þ The winds of sovereignty have invaded the sea à Coastal states are claiming an increasing space in the sea. Þ Territorial Sea of maximum 12 miles. When is adjacent, there is not enough space for both countries to have 12 miles. LEGAL REGIME UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA (“UNCLOS”) 1982, in force since 16th November 1994. ENFORCEMENT MECHANISM à The military. MILES = NAUTICAL MILES. CONCEPTS 1. INTERNAL WATERS à Is part of the territory. The coastal state has almost the same jurisdic@on than in the land. Almost 100% of jurisdic@on –not absolute, because there are excep@ons and because when a crime takes place on board of the ship the jurisdic@on belongs to the state of the flag of the ship–. Is the inner part of the sea. Coastal state can deny foreign ships from naviga@ng and these ships must adapt to the regula@ons of the coastal state. Þ Ports, anchorages, bays belonging to only one State, etc. Þ Full sovereignty of coastal state. Þ Coastal state can deny access to foreign ships. Þ Foreign ships are subject coastal state regula@ons (tax, health, technical, etc.). Þ Foreign ships are subject to jurisdic@on of coastal state courts only in specific cases à EXCEPTIONS where the coastal state has jurisdic@on over the jurisdic@on of the country that the ship’s flag belongs: o A crime has been commi_ed aboard the ship by a person who is not a crewmember. o The captain requests interven@on by local authori@es. o The act disturbs the peace of the port (French Council of State in the decision on THE SALLY AND THE NEWTON OF 20-11-1806 à Who introduced these excep@ons). Þ Warships (special regime) à In case of submarines when they enter internal waters, they must navigate in the surface, so the coastal state is able to iden@fy its flag. The sovereignty of the coastal state is almost complete. Almost 100%. 2. TERRITORIAL SEA à Difference in legal regime with internal waters. Because in the territorial sea foreign ships have the RIGHT OF INNOCENT PASSAGE (any foreign ship is en@tled to navigate but they do not have this right in internal waters, where the coastal state can prevent these ships from naviga@ng). Þ Historically, this was the space between internal waters and the high sea. Þ Breadth: o BYNKERSHOEK, De Dominio Maris (1702) → 3 nau@cal miles. In the past. o Different breadth for tax control, security reasons and fishing (e.g. France, since 1817: 20, 6 and 3 miles, respec@vely) à In the past, each country has its own regula@ons. Þ Art. 3 UNCLOS 1982 → Maximum of 12 nau@cal miles. Nowadays. Not all states can enjoy the maximum of 12 miles because there is not enough space between the coast between both countries. Normally, in this case is applied the EQUIDISTANCE PRINCIPLE –each country has 10 nau@cal miles–. Þ METHOD OF MEASUREMENT (of the max. 12 nau@cal miles): o “NORMAL” BASELINE METHOD à States are allowed to use a baseline from the seashore where @es are at the lowest. o “STRAIGHT” BASELINE METHOD à To simplify the delimita@on, is draw in straight lines to link the islands in places where the coast is irregular. What remains outside the line is where you delimit the 12 miles from, not from the coast. When the straight line does not depart to far from the original form of the coast (therefore, cannot be used in islands). Þ Full sovereignty of coastal state, with limita@ons. Þ MAIN LIMITATION à RIGHT OF INNOCENT PASSAGE OF ALL FOREIGN SHIPS (art. 17 UNCLOS). It was CUSTOMARY LAW before. o Including warships (Discussed aLer WWII à JUDGMENT OF ICJ IN CORFU CHANNEL CASE 1949). The right includes all type of ships. o Subject to certain condi@ons for submarines. o Has EXCEPTIONS à If the coastal states have reasons to suspect that the passage is not innocent (espionage, military exercises, use of force…), then can prevent the ship from naviga@ng). o You cannot remain there, you can only cross it (unless there is an accident, for example). Þ GENERAL CONDITIONS FOR ALL SHIPS: o Passage must be con@nuous and expedi@ous. o Passage is no longer innocent if acts of espionage, propaganda, military exercises, threats of use of force, etc. o Foreign nuclear-powered foreign ships and ships carrying nuclear, or other dangerous or noxious substances must observe special precau@onary measures (art. 23 UNCLOS), must comply with the regula@ons of the coastal state. Þ Coastal state must support and facilitate naviga@on of foreign ships. Þ Jurisdic@on of coastal state is subject to similar limita@ons than in internal waters (art. 27 UNCLOS). Þ Coastal state also has jurisdic@on for the suppression of illicit traffic in narco@c drugs or psychotropic substances à Addi@onal event where coastal state has jurisdic@on. Þ Coastal state has right of HOT PURSUIT à Foreign ships is carrying out illegal ac@vi@es. They can con@nue to pursuit them in the High seas. Condi@ons: o Immediate. o Uninterrupted. o Excep@on to the principle of free naviga@on in the High Seas (art. 111 UNCLOS). shelf. INADEQUATE with the progress of technology à “Abandoned” in the 80s. Because therefore, the CONTINENTAL SHELF would not have limits at all. Þ DELIMITATION UNCLOS 1982: o Geological concept of the CONTINENTAL SHELF (Art. 76 UNCLOS). o DISTANCE à 200 nau@cal miles. Þ OUTER LIMIT à Change of methods (each state can choose their method): § 350 nau@cal miles (from the coast). § 100 nau@cal miles from the 2,500 metres isobath à 100 miles from the point where water reaches 2500 meters isobath. Þ COMMISSION ON THE LIMITS OF THE CONTINENTAL SHELF (art. 76.8 and Annex II UNCLOS) à Organ aimed at trying to help states to delimitate their CONTINENTAL SHELF, to reach an agreement. Does not make resolu@ons as such. Þ RIGHTS OF THE COASTAL STATE REGARDING THE CONTINENTAL SHELF (art. 77 UNCLOS): o Sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring it and exploi@ng its natural resources. o Exclusive explora@on and exploita@on rights. o Mineral and other non-living resources of the seabed and subsoil together with living organisms belonging to sedentary species. o Coastal state has the right to choose if other countries can explore their Con@nental shelf. o They must share their resources with those that do not have sea. Because those ones complained because they felt that states that do have a coast are benefited and in comparison, they were not gevng anything. Therefore, the coastal state must share with them. Þ Coastal state must respect naviga@on rights of other states, both in the air and in the sea (art. 78 UNCLOS). o Rights of the coastal state are limited à Do not have a Monopoly. Þ SUBMARINE CABLES AND PIPELINES –more dangerous than cables. For pollu@on– (art. 79 UNCLOS): o All states are en@tled to lay submarine cables and pipelines. o The coastal state may take reasonable measures to prevent, reduce and control pollu@on from pipelines. Þ DRILLING (art. 81 UNCLOS): o The coastal state has the exclusive right to authorize and regulate drilling. Þ PAYMENTS AND CONTRIBUTIONS (art. 82 UNCLOS): Legal regime where the coastal state must make payment and contribu@ons. o Coastal state must make payments and contribu@ons in kind in respect of the exploita@on of the non-living resources beyond 200 miles (art. 82 UNCLOS). Share with countries that do not have a sea and in par@cular, the poorest countries. o Distributed by “THE INTERNATIONAL AUTHORITY” à Interna@onal organisa@on responsible from distribu@ng this resources bout also responsible for exploi@ng the seabed of the oceans (sea beyond the Exclusive economic zone and Con@nental shelf). 6. HIGH SEAS Þ RIGHTS OF ALL STATES (art. 87 UNCLOS): o Freedom of naviga@on. o Freedom of overflight. o Freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines, subject to Part VI. o Freedom to construct ar@ficial islands and other installa@ons, subject to Part VI. o Freedom of fishing. o Freedom of scien@fic research. Þ Goes beyond the EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE and CONTINENTAL SHELF. Þ Is only good if it is used in a responsible way by the states. Þ OBLIGATIONS OF ALL STATES: o Duty to render assistance (art. 98 UNCLOS) à If someone has a problem, countries must help between each other. o Prevent and punish the transport of slaves (art. 99 UNCLOS). o Repression of piracy (art. 100 UNCLOS). o Repression of traffic in narco@c drugs and psychotropic substances (art. 108 UNCLOS). o Repression of unauthorized broadcas@ng (art. 109 UNCLOS). Þ THE FUTURE? à “UN HIGH SEAS TREATY” (2023): Many years to states to decide if they want to be bound by this treaty. To come into force 60 ra@fica@ons are needed. o Treaty would introduce binding obliga@ons for ships. o Less pollu@on and more costs (transporta@on systems would become more expensive). o MAIN ASPECTS OF THE PROPOSED “UN HIGH SEAS TREATY” (2023): § Marine Protected Areas (MPAs). § Gene@c Resources. § Capacity-Building and Technology Transfer. § Fishing. § Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs). § Marine Pollu@on. § Liability. § Dispute se_lement. § 60 ra@fica@ons required for the entry into force. 7. SEABED Þ 5/7 of the planet's surface. Þ Common heritage of mankind. Þ Polymetallic nodules. Þ REGIME GOVERNING EXPLOITATION: o LEGAL REGIME à Conven@on in the 80s à Trea@ng by the states the seabed as a common territory of humankind à “RES COMMUNIS”. Revolu@onary legal regime that was also adopted in the OUTERSPACE. o In prac@ce, the UNCLOS established an interna@onal organisa@on called the AUTHORITY which is responsible for giving licenses and permissions to exploit the seabed. UNCLOS (“UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA”) HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND LEGAL REGIME Þ THE “AREA” and its resources are the “COMMON HERITAGE OF MANKIND” (Art. 136). o “SEABED” à The seabed and subsoil thereof beyond the limits of na@onal jurisdic@on. AREAS TO BE EXPLORED MAIN ACHIEVEMENTS Þ The adop@on of the Regula@ons governing the explora@on of polymetallic nodules. Þ First contracts signed in 2000 – 2001 (15 – year contracts). Þ ENDOWMENT FUND TO SUPPORT COLLABORATIVE MARINE SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH ON THE INTERNATIONAL SEABED AREA (2006). UNIT 4: Law of the airspace and outer space AIRSPACE CONCEPT à The space lying above the earth or above a certain area of land or water. UPPER AND LOWER BOUNDARIES Þ UPPER AIRSPACE is the space above a specific flight level, dedicated to overflight. Þ LOWER AIRSPACE is the space below that flight level, dedicated to airport approaches. LEGAL NATURE Þ FREEDOM o PAUL FAUCHILLE (1901) à Influen@al lawyer and professor. First in stablishing limits in the outerspace. o IDI DECLARATION (1906) à “The air is free. States do not have, either in Jmes of peace or in Jmes of war, any more rights over the air than those necessary for its conservaJon”. o First airplane took over à 1903. Þ SOVEREIGNTY à Opoose to freedom. o MEYER, ANZILOTTI, ZITELMAN. § PARIS CONVENTION (1919) à “The High ContracJng ParJes recognise that every Power has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the air space above its territory” à No dis@nc@on of air space à Where airspace was introduced. o CHICAGO CONVENTION (1944) à Is what mainly governs the airspace. Adopted some of principles of LAW OF THE SEA (applied in High Seas). Þ INTERMEDIATE STANCES à Sovereignty up to –defending different methods–: o 1,500 meters àMaximum distance to take a photo. o 300 meters. § RIVIERT à Defended the same as Law of The Sea. States have sovereignity up to distance they could be shot. Maximum height of the Tower Eiffel. ALer the past debate, actually there is not an exact limit between airspace and outerspace. LEGAL REGIME à Sources: Þ MULTILATERAL TREATIES o PARIS CONVENTION (1919) § Principle of sovereignty over airspace. § 32 states. o CHICAGO CONVENTION (1944) § Principle of sovereignty limited by the five freedoms: à Freedom to fly over only civil aircraL. Not military. à Freedom to make technical stops. à Freedom to carry passengers and cargo from the airline’s own country to another country. à Freedom to carry passengers and cargo from another country to the airline’s own country. à Freedom to transport passengers and cargo between two foreign countries. à 3rd, 4th and 5th freedoms are known as “TRAFFIC RIGHTS”. § AircraL must follow the regula@ons of the states whose territory they fly over. § Appendices about technical aspects, aeronau@cal charters, telecommunica@ons, environmental protec@on, safety, etc. o INTERNATIONAL SAFETY REGULATIONS –over the years auxiliary mandates have been made–: § Introduc@on: Possible jurisdic@ons. à CASE OF U.S. V. CÓRDOBA & SANTANO (1940) à Plane from córdoba to US and a gentleman got drunk and caused trouble when flying the high seas and when it landed in NY the guy was arrested à There was no legal revision à Tried to aplied law of the sea (Flag), judge denied and said there was a lack of jurisdic@on à Interna@onal community felt the need to create jurisdic@on. o TOKYO CONVENTION (1963) § General principle à State where aircraL is registered has jurisdic@on. Same solu@on as the Law of the Sea. § EXCEPCIONS: à If the offence has an effect on the territory of a state à two countries have jurisdic@on à Where the vic@m filed the case first (depends on the facts of the case) à States negociate. à If the offence has been commi_ed by or against a na@onal of a state. à If the offence is against the na@onal security of a state. à If the offence consists of a breach of a state’s rules and regula@ons rela@ng to flight. à If the exercise of jurisdic@on is necessary to ensure the observance of a state’s obliga@ons under interna@onal agreements. o HAGUE CONVENTION (1970) § Defines hijacking as an interna@onal offence. o MONTREAL CONVENTION (1971) § Outlaws other acts commi_ed outside of the aircraL that could compromise air safety à Dangerous ac@vi@es are out carried out SPACE LIABILITY CONVENTION OF 1972 Þ “ResJtuJo in integrum” à Restora@on of an injured party to the situa@on which would have prevailed had no injury been sustained; restora@on to the original or pre-contractual posi@on. Þ Compensa@on determined in accordance with interna@onal law and principles of jus@ce and equity. Þ Dual liability system: o In space (FAULT LIABILITY) à The vic@m should established it was the other’s fault. o On land or on aircraL in flight (STRICT LIABILITY) à The state will be always responsible. AGREEMENT ON THE RESCUE OF ASTRONAUTS, THE RETURN OF ASTRONAUTS AND THE RETURN OF OBJECTS LAUNCHED INTO OUTER SPACE (1968) à Return to the registra@on, to know the country. Þ Inspired by The Law of The Sea. Þ Obliga@on to no@fy: o Launching state o UN Secretary-General Þ Obliga@on to rescue, shelter and return. Þ KOSMOS 954 (1978) à Between Soviet Union, Canada and the US à Was a reconnaissance satellite launched by the Soviet Union in 1977. A malfunc@on prevented safe separa@on of its onboard nuclear reactor; when the satellite reentered the Earth's atmosphere the following year, it sca_ered radioac@ve debris over northern Canada, some of the debris landing in the Great Slave Lake next to Fort Resolu@on, NWT. This prompted an extensive mul@year cleanup opera@on known as Opera@on Morning Light, which the Canadian government billed the Soviet Union for over $6 million, and for which the USSR eventually paid just $3 million in compensa@on. REGISTRATION CONVENTION OF 1975 Þ INTRODUCTION à Obliges all countries to register na@onally and in the UN all objects sent to outerspace –to have order in it–. Þ REGISTERED WITH THE UNITED NATIONS: o Name of launching state o Registra@on number o Date and loca@on of launch o Orbital parameters o General func@on of the object MOON TREATY (1979) Þ INTRODUCTION à When americans landed, they planted a flag. Not ra@fied by the US. Introduced legal regime for the moon. Has developed further from 1967 treaty. Þ “Res communis” à Common heritage of humankind un@l a legal regime is nego@ated (Art. 11) à Paragraph 5 à How resources should be exploited. Þ Reaffirma@on of the “principles” of 1967. Þ Not widely accepted à Has not been ra@fied by the main powers. Þ ARTEMIS ACCORDS à Not interna@onal treaty –binding– but a GENTLEMAN AGREEMENT –poli@cal agreement and not binding–. PROBLEM OF EUROPEAN UNION BORDERS AND THE USE OF GEOSTATIONARY ORBIT BOGOTÁ DECLARATION (3RD DECEMBER 1976) à Associated with the legal principles governing the ac@vi@es of states in outer space. CONFLICTS WITH THE OUTER SPACE TREATY OF 1967? UNIT 5: Elements of Interna@onal Economic Law THE WORLD BANK World Bank –ini@ally called interna@onal bank for development and reconstruc@on– IBRD (Interna@onal monetary bank). Þ BACKGROUND o WASHINGTON CONFERENCE (1943) o BRETTON WOODS CONFERENCE (1944) à Where the economic regime (WB and IMF) was established. It was nego@ated aLer World War II. o Ra@fica@on of IBRD ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT (27-12-1945) by 28 States à WB (World Bank) Treaty. Head Quarters shared with IMF. o UN-IBRD AGREEMENT (1947) à Specialized agency of the UN. o Headquartered in Washington, D.C. Þ PURPOSES (Art. 1 Ar@cles of Agreement) o Channel the USA's efforts to rebuild Europe and Japan. o Aid in the reconstruc@on and development of Member States. o Foster private investment through guarantees or par@cipa@on in loans. o Promote interna@onal trade and balance of payments equilibrium à Promote peace. Complement to UN organiza@on. o Coordinate loans granted or guaranteed by the Bank with other interna@onal loans. o Facilitate the transi@on from war@me economy to peace@me economy. Þ MEASURES TO ACHIEVE THE OBJECTIVES: o Gran@ng of loans guaranteed by the Bank to States and to public or private companies. o Supply of experts. o Training of high-level officials à Economic Development Ins@tute (1956). Þ MEMBERS o ORIGINAL MEMBERS: IMF members that ra@fied the IBRD Ar@cles of Agreement before 31-12-1945. o SUCCESSIVE MEMBERS: IMF members that joined at a later date. Þ ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE o BOARD OF GOVERNORS à Plenary organ. Makes the big decisions. § 1 per Member State. § Supreme delibera@ve organ. o EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS à Runs the ins@tu@on on a daily basis. § 25 members. § 5 are appointed by the 5 largest shareholders (USA, Japan, Germany, UK, and France). § The rest are elected by the governors of the other Member States. § Very broad powers, § Based in Paris (Château de la Mue_e). Þ PURPOSES: o Economic and employment growth. o Improve the standard of living of Member States. o Contribute to economic expansion in Member and non-Member States in the process of economic development. o Contribute to the expansion of world trade on a mul@lateral, non- discriminatory basis. Þ MEMBERS o 18 from the OEEC. o USA and Canada (1961). o Japan (1964), Finland (1969), Australia (1971), New Zealand (1973), Mexico (1994), Czech Republic (1995) South Korea (1996), Hungary (1996), Poland (1996), Slovenia (2010), Slovak Republic (2000), Chile (2010), Estonia (2010), Israel (2010), Slovenia (2010), Latvia (2016), Lithuania (2018), and Costa Rica (2021) o Open Interna@onal Organisa@on. Þ ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE o COUNCIL à Plenary organ. All members represented. o EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE à Day to day ac@vi@es. § Composed of representa@ves from 10 Member States. § Meets every month. § Carries out func@ons delegated by the Council + Preparatory work for Council. Þ LEGAL STATUS o Intergovernmental organisa@on. o Tradi@onal à Unanimity (“Old–Fashion”). Nowadays à MAJORITY PRINCIPLE. Easier to reach agreements. o Sole aim is harmonisa@on of economic policy. THE GATT (now WTO ORGANIZATION) Þ ORIGIN: 1947 – 1995. Þ PRINCIPLES: o FREEDOM TO TRADE § Elimina@on of quan@ta@ve restric@ons (Art. XI) à Because they are detrimental to efficiency and trade. § Reduc@on of customs tariffs (Art. XXVIII bis) à Not exactly a tax but let assume it. It is applied to imported goods. Du@es have been reduced drama@cally. o NON-DISCRIMINATION à Also court principle of European law. A GATT principle taken to European law. § MOST FAVOURED NATION CLAUSE (Art. I) à Give the best treatment to a country à Most preferred treatment. All members of GATT are obligated to apply this treatment to the others. § NATIONAL TREATMENT CLAUSE (Art. III) à Products from foreign suppliers cannot be discriminated from products/services coming from na@onal suppliers. o TRANSPARENCY (Art. X) à Regula@ons that govern the requirements for trade must be public, published. o RECIPROCITY (Art. XXVIII bis). ADAM SMITH à Each country should specialise in what they are most efficient à FREE TRADE for increasing global wealth à PHILOSOPHY to nego@ate GATT à Increase global wealth and reduce risk of wars if trade is facilitated (reduce barriers). Þ EXCEPTIONS TO THE PRINCIPLES: o CUSTOMS UNIONS AND FREE-TRADE AREAS (Art. XXIV) à European Union (custom union that started as a free trade area), for example. When countries simply eliminate internal commercial borders à FREE TRADE AREA (products can freely circulate) à COMMON COMERCIAL POLICY. § DIFFERENCE à CUSTOM UNION: Free trade area where in addi@on they apply a common commercial policy à No damaging for the countries. o Differen@al treatment in favour of less-developed countries (Part IV) à Unfair to expect developed countries to apply GATT Principles to developing and less developed countries. Then, there is a more flexible legal regime. Þ ROUNDS OF NEGOTIATIONS à Interna@onal conferences called round of nego@a@ons. o Geneva (1947) o Annecy (1949) o Torquay (1951) o Geneva (1956) o Geneva (1960-61) o Geneva (1964-67) (KENNEDY ROUND) o Tokyo-Geneva (1973-79) (TOKYO ROUND) o Uruguay-Geneva (1986-1994) (URUGUAY ROUND) à MOST IMPORTANT. § CONSEQUENCES à First, expand the scope of GATT to services because it was only dealing with goods. Second, introduc@on of intellectual property. Third, the transforma@on of GATT that was a de facto organiza@on into the WTO (1/01/1995). o Qatar-Geneva (2001-) (DOHA DEVELOPMENT ROUND). 6 first rounds à Successful at reducing tariff barriers. 3 last rounds à Address non-tariff barriers. THE WTO à Ins@tu@onal framework that manages all the trea@es (compulsory and not compulsory). Þ ORIGIN à 1995. o GATT was “transformed” into WTO. o A “de facto” Interna@onal Organiza@on (i.e. GATT) became a “de iure” Interna@onal Organiza@on (i.e. WTO) filled gap TTO leL aLer WWII in 1948. Þ DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROCEDURE: o DISPUTE SETTLEMENT BODY à Arbitra@on tribunal with three experts in IL that would study the case and issue a report, not judgement. The losing party could file the appeal and send it. § Special groups or “panels”. § Appellate Body. Þ SCOPE OF THE WTO o MULTILATERAL TRADE AGREEMENTS (Mandatory. Unless you applied it, you cannot be a member). § AGREEMENT ON TRADE IN GOODS § AGREEMENT ON TRADE IN SERVICES (introduced in 1995) à Telecommunica@ons, insurance, legal protec@on… § TRADE-RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AGREEMENT (“TRIPS”) (also introduced in 1995). o WTO members agree to provide at least the minimum level of intellectual property protec@on introduced by TRIPS (Art. 1). o NON-DISCRIMINATION PRINCIPLE. o SCOPE OF APPLICATION: Copyright, trademarks, geographical indica@ons, industrial designs, patents, layout designs of integrated circuits (e.g. electronic “chips”) and undisclosed informa@on (e.g. trade secrets). o Patents on inven@ons in all fields of technology (including the pharmaceu@cal sector) must be allowed and protected (Art. 27). o India and Bangladesh did not want to protect intellectual property à Therefore, they this this treaty mandatory so they must comply. Therefore, the WTO force them and it worked. o As an EXCEPTION, WTO members may order “compulsory licenses” on patented inven@ons, which must fulfill the condi@ons set out in Art. 30 and 31. § DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES OR UNDERSTANDING. o AGREEMENT ON SAFEGUARDS § It sets forth the rules for applica@on of safeguard measures pursuant to Ar@cle XIX of GATT 1994. § Safeguard measures are defined as “emergency” ac@ons with respect to increased imports of par@cular products, where such imports have caused or threaten to cause serious injury to the impor@ng Member's domes@c industry. § Ex. Turkey v. EU, Safeguard Measures on Certain Steel Products (2020). § MULTILATERALISM (US champion aLer World War II, but they dislike it aLer reason why they changed from MTO to WTO) AND REGIONALISM à Conflict. EFTA-EEA Þ THE EFTA CONVENTION OF 4/1/1960 o OBJECTIVE à “European free trade area”. o MEMBERS: ICELAND, NORWAY and SWITZERLAND. Þ THE EEA AGREEMENT OF 17-3-1993 à Larger than EFTA. o OBJECTIVE à Extend the EU’s core 4 “freedoms” throughout Europe (free circula@on of persons, goods, services and capital). o Agriculture and Fisheries common policies excluded. o MEMBERS: MERCOSUR Þ ASUNCIÓN TREATY (1991) Þ FREE TRADE AGREEMENT à Agreed to maintain their external policies. Not custom, but agreement. Þ MEMBERS: ANDEAN COMMUNITY Þ CARTAGENA DE INDIAS AGREEMENT (1969) Þ FREE TRADE à But each country maintains their external policies. Þ MEMBERS: NAFTA, NOW USMCA Þ CANADA-US FREE TRADE AGREEMENT (1988) Þ THE NORTH AMERICA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT (“NAFTA”) OF 1992 Þ The new “USMCA”, which came into force on 1 July 2020 à Renego@ate to terms more useful for US à Trump renego@ate. Not custom union, but free trade area agreement. y ÍN b. CORFU CHANNEL CASE (1949) c. LANOS LAKE CASE (1956) à dispute between Spain and France, since the French built a dam in the lake causing lack of water in Puigcerdà. 8. DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. 9. DUTY OF DISCLOSURE AND COOPERATION (CHERNOBYL NUCLEAR ACCIDENT). 10. PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE (The absence of scien@fic certainty does not jus@fy lack of ac@on). 11. PRINCIPLE THAT THE POLLUTER PAYS (E.g. Principle 16 of Rio Declara@on). 12. Principles of: a. EMPLOY THE BEST TECHNOLOGY AVAILABLE b. USING THE BEST ENVIRONMENTAL PRACTICES (“BEST PRACTICES”) ROLE OF NON–STATE ACTORS Þ UN Þ COUNCIL OF EUROPE Þ OECD Þ ILO Þ EU: o Community environmental policy Þ NGOS: o Greenpeace o Interna@onal Union for Conserva@on of Nature o Ac@vists (such as: Greta Thunberg). MAIN AREAS à Special problems: Þ OZONE LAYER à Crucial for life on Earth. o Ozein (“to smell”). o Colourless gas poisonous to bio@c life. o 90 % of ozone is concentrated between 15-35 km in the stratosphere: o Between 1957 and 1979, ozone measurements dropped by 30 %. o Mario J. Molina & Sherwood Rowland suggested in 1974 that Chlorofluorcarbons (CFCs) used in aerosol products and as a refrigerants could pose a threat to the ozone layer à However, is s@ll not demonstrated. o First conflict between environmentalists and industry representa@ves: Because they always discussed if evidence was necessary to create restric@ons. Environmentalists expressed the importance of taking ac@on. o UNEP 1977 mee@ng → WORLD PLAN ACTION ON THE OZONE LAWYER. o CFCs use in aerosols was banned in the U.S, Canada, Norway and Sweden in 1977. o In 1982, the EU restricted the use of CFCs in aerosols at the level of 30 % from 1976 levels. o In 1985, the so-called “OZONE HOLE” is discovered in the Bri@sh Antar@c Survey à Finally it was SCIENTIFICALLY PROVEN that the Ozone layer was being damaged. o The 1986 report Atmospheric Ozone (the “Blue Book”) revealed that the deple@on of the ozone layer had almost doubled between 1969 and 1986. o The 1985 Vienna Conven@on (example of SOFT LAW) → Vague agreement to take appropriate ac@on to ensure the protec@on of the ozone layer (first example of “PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE”). o The US vs. the EU à The US wanted to introduce hard norms, but the EU wanted to keep the soL norms. o THE 1987 MONTREAL PROTOCOL à First @me countries agreed to introduce an element of hard law in environmental protec@on. They introduced objec@ves of CFCs reduc@ons, that countries agreed upon and even agreed in an enforcement mechanism à Annually reports on the number used. § It required each individual state party to reach collec@vely agreed targets. § It called for a freeze on the use of 5 types of fluorocarbons and 3 types of halons for three years based on the na@onal 1986 level of produc@on and consump@on of CFCs. § As of 1/7/1989, global consump@on of CFCs could not be greater than the 1986 output levels, with levels to drop to 80 % of 1986 consump@on by 1993 and 50 % by the end of 1998 à Introduc@on of LIMITS. § By 1/7/1993, each member state was to reduce produc@on and use by an addi@onal 20 %. § Art. 7 requires states to provide an annual report to the Secretariat of the UNEP. § “COMMON BUT DIFFERENTIATED RESPONSIBILITY PRINCIPLE” (developing states received greater leniency à More flexible regime). § Many amendments since then. o A SUCCES HISTORY: § The latest UN study shows the ozone holes over both poles are slowly closing at the rate of 1 % to 3 % per decade and will have completely closed in the North by 2030 and in the South by 2060. § It has protected 47.000.000 pairs of eyes and over 200.000.000 people from skin cancer. Þ CLIMATE CHANGE o “Climate change is an issue determining our desJny as humankind” (German Chancellor Angela Merkel). o The altera@on of our climate resul@ng from the increase in atmospheric concentra@ons of a number of gases (carbon dioxide, methane, and others). o On 21/12/1990, the UN General Assembly adopted RESOLUTION 45/212, establishing the Interna@onal Nego@a@ng Commi_ee for a Framework Conven@on on Climate Change (INC). o The INC would operate under the auspices of the General Assembly, supported by WMO and UNEP. o THE UNFCC (1992), RIO DE JANEIRO (The Rio Summit): § 197 par@es. § Climate change as “COMMON CONCERN OF MANKIND”. § It endorsed the “PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE”. § “To […] achieve […] stabilizaJon of greenhouse concentraJons in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system”. § Art. 4 • “Commitments” set out in an “Annex”. • All par@es commi_ed to no@fy “naJonal inventories of anthropogenic emissions […] of all greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol”. § Art. 7 à It established the Conference of the Par@es (COP) as the “SUPREME BODY” of the UNFCCC, with authority to adopt Protocols to the Conven@on. o THE 1997 KYOTO PROTOCOL § 192 par@es (but rejected by the U.S and Australia). § U.S. Vice President Gore, Earth in the Balance. § US posi@on: • Targets should be achievable, not quixo@c. • Market mechanisms, such as “emissions trading”, are required à This way countries can trade with the number of emissions allowed to each member. • The agreement must include some “commitment”. § Art. 3 à Commi_ed the “Annex I countries” not to exceed the CO2 emissions defined by quan@fied emissions limita@on and reduc@on commitments (QUELRs), which were recorded in Annex B. § Art. 11 (FUNDING) à Commi_ed the most developed par@es to provide funding and technology transfer to the developing countries. § The “commitment period” extended from 2008 to 2012. o EUROPEAN WATER CHARTER adopted by the Council of Ministers of the Council of Europe –nothing to do with the European Union– (1968) à Even before, there were trea@es that treated the damage of river by pollu@on. o Recommenda@ons 51-55 of THE STOCKHOLM ACTION PLAN. o 1997 UN CONVENTION on Uses of Interna@onal Watercourses for purposes different than naviga@on à Members must adopt the measures of this treaty. o 1992 HELSINKI CONVENTION on the protec@on and use of transboundary watercourses and interna@onal lakes. o Trea@es on interna@onal lakes: § Constance (1960) § Leman (1962) § Maggiore and Lugano (1972) § Great Lakes (1972) o Trea@es on interna@onal rivers: § Danube (1955) § Indo (1960) § Rhine (1963) § Niger (1963) § Senegal (1964) § Chad (1964) § Río de la Plata (1969) § Zambezi (1987) § Council of Europe Conven@on on Limita@on of the Use of certain detergents (1968) Þ MARINE ENVIRONMENT o Torrey Canyon (1967), Amoco Cádiz (1978), Exxon Valdez (1989) and Pres@ge (2002) à Terrible accidents. Prompted the nego@a@ons for interna@onal trea@es in marine environment. o Stockholm Declara@on (Principle number 7). o Interna@onal trea@es: § Geneva Conven@ons (1958) § 1982 Montego Bay Conven@on à Art. 193 ss. § 1954 London Conven@on for the preven@on of pollu@on of the sea by oil. § 1969 Brussels Conven@on on interven@on on the high seas through propor@onate measures in case of accidents. § 1969 Brussels Conven@on on liability for damage caused by pollu@on of the sea by oil. Þ ENDANGERED NATURAL SPECIES o “Conserva@onist” trea@es à Those that are about the conserva@on of species. § Birds useful to agriculture (1902). § Whales (1946) à Japan does not comply. § Seals and polar bears (1979). § Vicugnas (1979). § Migratory species of wild animals (1979). § 1973 Conven@on on interna@onal trade in endangered species of wild fauna and flora and 1994 Lusaka Accords. o Trea@es with economic objec@ves: § Fisheries trea@es. § Trea@es on the capture of certain species. Þ RADIOACTIVE CONTAMINATION o Accident on the 3 Mile Island (1979), Chernobyl (1986) and Fukushima (2011). o Interna@onal trea@es à Clarify who is responsible and has to take care of the damages. § Conven@ons on Civil Liability for nuclear damage. § Mul@lateral and bilateral trea@es introducing coopera@on obliga@ons. § E. g. 1986 Vienna Conven@on establishing immediate duty of no@fica@on and assistance in case of nuclear accidents and radiological emergencies. Þ PROTECTION OF CERTAIN SPACES o OUTER SPACE: § 1967 Principles Treaty § 1979 Moon Treaty o POLAR SPACES: § 1959 Antar@ca Treaty à Paralyzed all claims of sovereignty over it. Only scien@fical research. § 1991 Arc@c Environmental Protec@on Strategy à Not a very good treaty. But be_er than nothing. Lots of tension between Nordic countries and Russia. o THE INTERNATIONAL SEABED AREA: § 1982 Montego Bay Conven@on o PROTECTION OF BIODIVERSITY: § Biological diversity loss is one of the great challenges of our genera@on. Specially, for DEVELOPING COUNTRIES –because they are the ones that have the most, more specifically 80%–. § Land use change, invasive alien species, overexploita@on, pollu@on and climate change has led to species ex@nc@on at an unprecedented rate. § Biologists talk about the world as living a massive ex@nc@on of diversity comparable in scale to the loss of the dinosaurs. § In 1992, it was es@mated that the next 30 years would result in a loss of 25 % of the planet’s total biodiversity. § Developing countries host 4/5 of the world’s biodiversity. § Over 50 % of the world’s biodiversity exists within the rainforests, most of which is insects and small plants. § BIOPROSPECTING vs. BIOPIRACY. § 1992 Rio Conven@on on Biodiversity à 30.000 delegates. Approved lots of SOFT LAW revisions. First interna@onal treaty in history that focused on biological diversity. States realized they had to do something regarding to it. It called for commitments. However, it has not been really successful, biodiversity has been lost. • “Framework conven@on” that set out an overarching commitment to the preserva@on of biological organisms and was inten@onally loose and flexible to allow the development of protocols over @me. • It is unique in the sense that it was the first interna@onal treaty to address the conserva@on of all biological diversity. • It called for commitments from par@es to conserve biological diversity and commit themselves to the sustainable use of biodiversity, as well as fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising out of the u@lisa@on of the gene@c resources. • The Nagoya Protocol on Access and benefit Sharing (2010). • The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (2000). • The Nagoya – Kuala Lumpur Supplementary Protocol on Liability and Redress (2010) with the objec@ve of preven@ng and remedying damage to biodiversity caused by living modified organisms (LMOs). • TENSION between developing and developed countries. o WETLANDS OF INTERNATIONAL IMPORTANCE: (2004), Slovenia (2004), Spain (1982), Turkey (1952), Estonia (2004), Germany (1955), and Poland (1999). STRUCTURE Þ HEADQUARTERS (in Brussels since 1967) Þ NATO COUNCIL Þ MILITARY COMMITTEE Þ “NATO PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY” Þ SECRETARY GENERAL (1952, Lisbone mee@ng) DECISION–MAKING PROCESS Þ UNANIMITY Þ CONSENSUS LANDMARK EVENTS IN NATO’S HISTORY Þ 1975 Helsinki Summit. Þ The first military opera@ons were prompted by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait (1990- 1991). Þ Deny Flight opera@on to enforce “no-fly zone” over central Bosnia & Herzegovina (UN Security Council Resolu@on 816 of 9/10/1992). Þ Kosovo interven@on: o UN Security Council Resolu@on 1199 of 23/9/1998 demanding a ceasefire. o Nego@a@ons with US’ Special Envoy Richard Holbrooke failed. o On 24/3/1999 NATO started a 78-day bombing campaign without seeking the Security Council’s approval. o Milosevic finally accepted an interna@onal peace plan on 3/6/1999. § Was it legal? § “Graduated reinterpreta@on” by the UN itself of Art. 2(4) UN Charter? § Was it legi@mate? § Nascent right to humanitarian interven@on (Belgium)? § Interna@onal v. internal ma_er? § Responsibility to protect? o Prof. Jane Stromseth – 4 possible approaches: § Viola@on of Art. 2(4). § “Excusable breach” à Technically illegal but morally and poli@cally jus@fied. § Customary law evolu@on. § Codifica@on (e.g. UN Charter amendment). Þ Art. 5 was invoked for the first @me aLer 11/9/2001: o Unanimously approved à ISAF (Interna@onal Security Assistance Force 2003-2014). o Deployment of troops to Afghanistan. o First mission outside the North Atlan@c area Þ Iraq training mission (2004). Þ Protec@on of mari@me traffic in the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean from Somali pirates (2009). Þ Enforcement of “no-fly zone” in Libya following UN Security Council Resolu@on 1973 of 17/3/2011. NATO (ARTICLES) Article 5 The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area. Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security . UN CHARTER (ARTICLES) Article 2 “he Organization and ts Members, in pursut of the Purposes stated in Article, shall ctn accordance vih the folowing Principles 1. — The Organizationis based on the principle of the sovereign equalty of all1ts Members 2. All Members, in orderto ensure to llo them he rights and benefits resulting from membership, shall full in good fath the obligtions assumed by them in accordance with the present Charter, 3. AllMembers shall serie their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner hat international peace and securiy, and justice, are not endangered, 4. — AlMembers shal refran in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial Integrity or political Independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with he Purposes of he United Nations. 5. AllMembers shall give the United Nations every assistance in any action takes in accordance with the present Charter, and shal refran from giving assistance to any state “against which the United Nations is taking preventive or enforcement action, 6. - The Organization shall ensure that states which are not Members of the United Nations actin accordance with these Principles so far as may be necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security. 7. Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to inervene in matters which are essential within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members o submit such matters to setlement under he present Charter; but this principle hall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter IL