Rebuilding Middle Class Security in Post-Pro-Growth Progressivism - Prof. 365, Apuntes de Ciencia Política

¡Descarga Rebuilding Middle Class Security in Post-Pro-Growth Progressivism - Prof. 365 y más Apuntes en PDF de Ciencia Política solo en Docsity! Distributional conflicts in the US and Europe Michael McTernan The Emergence of a New Transatlantic Agenda for Progressive Politics Policy Network Third floor 11 Tufton Street London SW1P 3QB United Kingdom t: +44 (0)20 7340 2200 f: +44 (0)20 7340 2211 e: info@policy-network.net www.policy-network.net po lic y ne tw or k pa pe r po lic y ne tw or k pa pe r | www.policy-network.net *This synthesis paper is part of a joint Policy Network/FEPs research initiative. Warm thanks and credit are due to a number of individuals: Olaf Cramme gave the paper direction and very valuable input; Roger Liddle and Patrick Diamond provided helpful comments and support; Seamus Nevin and Renaud Thillaye helped with early drafts and comments; Ania Skrzypek and Ernst Stetter of FEPs guided and richly informed the process which resulted in the Oxford conference ; and finally to the presenters and discussants at Oxford who provided the stimulat- ing material and ideas presented here. All inaccuracies are the responsibility of the author. ABSTRACT The political environment for progressive politics on both sides of the Atlantic is being shaped by three key overarching trends: firstly, flaws in the capitalist settlement have created widespread economic insecurity, which now also signifcantly affects the middle-class base of society; secondly, and as a knock-on-effect, solutions to this problem must now be advanced in an economically insecure climate of “sauve qui peut politics” – a politics in which people, worried about clinging on to what they have, become more resistant to measures that redistribute resources to others, both vertically to other groups within the income distribution, and horizontally to other generational cohorts; and thirdly, changing demographics and a more competitive global era seem to necessitate the expansion of some government programmes, which in turn would require public money, but public money is already scarce. This discussion paper makes the case that after a period of idleness the space and common ground for a serious transatlantic agenda is emerging once again in the form of these economic and political dilemmas. OXFORD TRANSATLANTIC DIALOGUE This paper is based on discussions and presentations at a two day transatlantic dialogue organised by Policy Network, the Next Left research programme of the Foundation for European Progressive Studies (FEPS), Nuffield College, University of Oxford and the Institute for Global Law and Policy (IGLP), Harvard. The conference brought together leading academics, senior politicians, policymakers and thinktank experts from across Europe and the US. The papers from the conference will be published in the Policy Network/FEPs’ Next Left edited volume, “Progressive Politics After the Crisis: European Social Democracy and American Progressive- Liberalism”, I.B Tauris, forthcoming 2013. ABOUT THE AUTHOR * Michael McTernan is editor and senior researcher at Policy Network. He coordinates Policy Network’s research on The Future of Social Democracy and Populism and Electoral Politics. He is editor of the Policy Network Observatory and the thinktank’s monthly “State of the Left” report. The set of neoliberal assumptions which defined a political epoch stretching from the 1980s right up to the present day continue to persist.3 To be sure, events have conspired against these assumptions and voters are increasingly sceptical of the solutions put forward by conservative and centre- right governments. But it is far from evident what will fill the vacuum and whether European social democrats and American progressives can fashion an effective governing strategy to cope with the current economic crisis and build from it an enduring electoral coalition. Barack Obama may have been reelected, but he now faces an uphill battle against an obstructionist House of Representatives, a wounded Republican party, and a reactionary tea party movement. As Peter Hall argues, the distinctiveness of what social democracy and American progressive-liberalism offers and who supports it has become less clear than at many points in history: “American liberals and European social democrats are seen at best as competent managers of liberal capitalism, more humane than their opponents, but not animated by an especially powerful vision.” 4 At worst, left-of-centre parties are seen to fundamentally lack credibility: there is a gap between what they promise and what they can deliver.5 This point is firmly put across by Francis Fukuyama: “when existing social democratic parties come to power, they no longer aspire to be more than custodians of a welfare state that was created decades ago; none has a new, exciting agenda around which to rally the masses…It has been several decades since anyone on the left has been able to articulate, first, a coherent analysis of what happens to the structure of advanced societies as they undergo economic change and, second, a realistic agenda that has any hope of protecting a middle class society.” 6 This intellectual failure has become all the more pronounced in light of the short-term challenges of the debt crisis, rising unemployment and the decline in relative income and living standards of the middle-class - and, in the longer-term, by the towering fiscal challenges of ageing populations and heightened global economic competition. Moreover, the solutions to these problems must be advanced in what Peter Hall describes as an economically insecure climate of “sauve-qui-peut politics” – a politics in which people, worried about clinging on to what they have, become more resistant to measures that redistribute resources to others, both vertically to other groups within the income distribution, and horizontally to other generational cohorts.7 In Europe, the emergence of a substantial creditor-debtor political conflict further hampers debate about the need for redistribution at the supranational level whilst there is also evidence of falling support for redistribution within member states: in the UK, for example, the annual British Attitudes Survey showed the percentage of people agreeing that “government should redistribute income from the better-off to those who are less well-off” has fallen in recent years to 37% whilst a Prospect/You Gov poll found 74 per cent of UK voters agreed that welfare payment levels should be cut.8 Likewise in America, surveys reveal that moderate income earning Democrats are increasingly drawn across to the Republican Party not by religious or moral concerns associated with the ‘culture wars’, but by their strong stance on redistribution. 9 A large proportion of middle America now acutely have a ‘fear of falling’; they are worried about losing the standard of living they became accustomed to in past decades. po lic y ne tw or k pa pe r 3 | Distributional conflicts in the US and Europe | Michael McTernan | Nov 2012 People, worried about clinging on to what they have, become more resistant to measures that redistribute resources to others www.policy-network.net 3. Colin Crouch, “The Strange Non- Death of Neo-Liberalism”, Polity Press, 2011 4. Peter. A. Hall in his presentaion, “Social Democracy Past and Future: Its Politics and Paradigms”, Oxford Univeristy, Policy Network/FEPS, 2-3 July 2012. See also Hall,Peter. “Social Democracy Past and Future: Its Politics and Paradigms”, in “Progressive Politics After the Crash”, I.B Tauris, forthcoming 2013 5. See The Amsterdam Process, “A Centre-Left Project for New Times”, Policy Network & Wiardi Beckman Stichting, 2012 6. See Francis Fukuyama, “The Future of History: Can Liberal Democracy Survive the Decline of the Middle Class?”, Foreign Affairs 91. 1 (Jan/Feb 2012): 53-61. 7. Hall, Peter. Ibid 8. See British Social Attitudes 29th Report, National Centre for Social Research, UK; and Maddox, Bronwen. “Britain’s quiet revolution”, Prospect Magazine, February 23, 2012 1. Sauve qui peut politics Finally, many European countries are on the edge of an intergenerational conflict which could hit home forcefully in the coming years. Inter-generational distribution and redistribution are at the heart of many of today’s pressing policy problems, such as ageing and pension policy, the national debt, funding for education and training and climate change.10 Most EU countries are experiencing rising gini co-efficients, while evidence indicates that younger generations have been most acutely affected both by the crisis itself, and the consequent squeeze on public spending. 11 The increasingly overlapping challenge for US and European policymakers is formulating a political strategy which addresses the erosion of economic security and living standards in a climate of sauve qui peut politics where money is scarce. The next two sections will focus on how this distinctive climate plays out in relation to economics and politics, proceeding to offer examples of how political economy and political strategy might be rethought. The crisis is the result of a decade of debt-financed consumption. In some countries the public sector overstretched, in others private borrowing and credit binges firmly led the way; in many cases it was a heady combination of both. The perception of ‘ever rising’ living standards was fuelled by the evasion of frank debates on redistribution as alluded to in the previous section, especially in the US, whereby policymakers allowed the rampant availability of cheap credit and subsidised mortgages to prevail, giving low-income households the illusion of increasing prosperity. The expansion of consumption led to a bubble, which spectacularly burst. This is not a typical cyclical recession. The mix of state led borrowing in countries like Greece, private sector borrowing - typically by or through the financial system - in Spain, and a mix of both in the US and UK, has resulted in a complex series of inter-related debt crises - and debt crises are different from cyclical recessions, for both economic and political reasons.12 Furthermore, the institutionalised nature of EMU further complicates matters in Europe. The UK, for example, had a higher debt to GDP ratio than Spain at the start of the crisis, but Spain’s default risk is deemed much higher because Spain cannot issue debt in its own currency. 13 The complex and uncertain nature of this crisis means that recovery has been slow and limited. Such a debt crisis leaves a very difficult and distinctive economic and political residue. Economically, it saddles society with serious debt overhang problems that hamper recovery. Politically, the asymmetry of the adjustment burden leads to conflict over who should pay – leading to a climate of sauve qui peut politics. Fiscal pressures on governments are likely to become more binding due to the impending demographic problem of how to square retirement and health-care commitments; but future prosperity in a competitive global era will also depend upon expanding other important government programmes, and these in turn are sure to require more spending. Developed countries need substantial increases in the quality of their educational systems and economic infrastructures. This concern is particularly pressing as the pace of international competition quickens. Economic growth will require substantial productivity advances, which in turn requires a more highly skilled labour force, a more efficient economic infrastructure, and a more welcoming environment for technological innovation – all things that cost money, including public money. 14 As Jeffry Frieden has underlined, the loss of the economic gains of 2001-2007 have already resulted in one lost decade; if governments are to stave off another lost decade, macroeconomic policies are po lic y ne tw or k pa pe r 4 | Distributional conflicts in the US and Europe | Michael McTernan | Nov 2012 www.policy-network.net 9. Hall, Peter. Ibid 10. Atkinson,Tony. Oxford presentation, “European aspirations: GDP and beyond”, Policy Network/FEPS, 2-3 July 2012. See also forthcoming Atkinson chapter in “Progressive Politics After the Crash”, I.B Tauris, forthcoming 2013; and Palier, Bruno. Oxford presentation, “The emerging intergenerational conflict: Re‐writing the social contract between generations”, Policy Network/FEPS, 2-3 July 2012. See also forthcoming Palier chapter in “Progressive Politics After the Crash”, I.B Tauris, forthcoming 2013 11. Diamond, Patrick, “Governing as Social Democrats”, Policy Network paper, Oct 2012 12. The above analysis draws heavily on Frieden, Jeffry. Oxford presentation, “Is the West headed for a lost decade, and what can be done about it?” Policy Network/ FEPS, 2-3 July 2012. See also forthcoming Frieden chapter in “Progressive Politics After the Crash”, I.B Tauris, forthcoming 2013 13. De Grauwe, Paul. Oxford Presentation, “The financial crisis 2: Political economy after pro-growth progressivism needed to restore acceptable levels of economic activity, and public investment is needed to power sustained, inclusive and productive growth.15 The problem in the current climate is that the political right has been adept at criticising the left for fiscal profligacy and “big government”, hammering home that they only excel at compiling expensive shopping lists and raising taxation. On the basis of these developments and constraints, a predominant concern of centre-left socio- economic policy is what comes after “pro-growth progressivism” and the third way period in which the centre-left in the US and Europe settled on an approach to socio-economic policy which aimed to reconcile the pursuit of high economic growth and competitiveness with traditional concerns for social justice and fairness.16 Despite some notable achievements, a superior route to economic growth and progressive social policy was never clearly identified. A number of alternative avenues and constructive debates are emerging: Pay attention to pre-distribution Instead of focusing exclusively on redistribution – government taxes and transfers that take from some and give to others – progressives should also look at how the market distributes rewards in the first place. As Jacob Hacker has prominently argued in championing “pre-distribution”, there is a need to focus on market reforms that encourage a more equal distribution of economic power and rewards even before government collects taxes or pays out benefits. 17 A pre-distribution agenda can encompass several elements and different states will need to pursue different pre-distribution strategies depending on institutional context, history and traditions. The list of policy areas such an agenda might encompass include: effective and more appropriate regulation of financial markets and corporate governance; facilitating greater workplace democracy; special emphasis on SMEs and start-up entrepreneurs; and ensuring the educational opportunities are broadly distributed with a special emphasis on early childhood education, youth guarantees, vocational training, and adequate support for college completion for less advantaged students. Important ground is also being opened-up for progressives in the US and Europe on the relationship between innovation, redistribution and labour-absorbing services18 and the relationship between innovation and inequality19 , both of which can be situated under the pre-distribution banner. Take tax reform seriously In Oxford, Jane Jensen made the argument that one of the pernicious legacies of neo-liberalism is the notion that taxes should be kept as low as possible in recognition of the effort of the majority of “good responsible citizens”. 20 In this sense, centre-left parties have accepted this vision of society, and the goal of minimizing taxes but this vision has created a gulf between “good responsible citizens” who pay tax and those who receive tax credits and thus do not. However, pressure on the public finances has been exacerbated by declining tax revenues and the fragility of the tax base. A lack of attention to the resilience of tax systems; complacency about the persistent problem of personal and corporate tax evasion; and inattention to the overall ‘tax take’ has severely compromised public finances. These fiscal problems are all the more acute because the crisis is accentuating the impact of long-term structural trends, including our ageing societies, soaring health costs, and rising demands for public and social care services. Given this is the case, a pertinent question is how the centre-left should balance the pre-distribution agenda, trying to confront the acquired negative image of ‘tax-and-spend socialists’, whilst also trying to increase the resilience of (i.e. widen) the tax base by shifting the focus from the taxation of incomes po lic y ne tw or k pa pe r 5 | Distributional conflicts in the US and Europe | Michael McTernan | Nov 2012 www.policy-network.net 15. See Chinn, Menzie D. & Frieden, Jeffry A. “Lost Decades: The Making of America’s Debt Crisis and the Long Recovery”, W.W Norton & Company, New York, 2012 16. See Sperling, Gene. “The Pro-Growth Progressive”, Simon & Schuster, 2005. 17. See Hacker, Jacob. Oxford presentation, “The politics of predistribution”, Policy Network/ FEPS, 2-3 July 2012. See also forthcoming Hacker chapter in “Progressive Politics After the Crash”, I.B Tauris, forthcoming 2013. 18. Carlin, Wendy, “A Progressive Economic Strategy: Innovation, redistribution and labour- absorbing services”, Policy Network paper, Oct 2012 19. Lazonick, William. & Mazzucato, Mariana. “The Risk- Reward Nexus in the Innovation- Inequality Relationship: Who Takes the Risks? Who Gets the Rewards?”, Policy Network discussion paper, forthcoming Nov 2012 20. See Jenson, Jane. Oxford presentation, “Recreating solidarity: Social citizenship and participation”, Policy Network/ Despite some notable achievements, a superior route to economic growth and progressive social policy was never clearly identified Furthermore, Norris adds that the pervasive assumption that the public have become terminally disillusioned with the state, with government and with political institutions in the US and western Europe is disturbing: over-hyped claims about the decline of trust in democracy and politics have become fashionable. Recent polls on trust in both the EU and US might appear to be plummeting, but time series survey analyses reveal that fluctuations over time are far more common than straightforward linear or uniform downward trends.30 This analysis of political agency suggests that there is little evidence of long-term decline across the board and by implication that the practice of politics retains the capacity to engender trust and democratic support. Nonetheless, in a more fragmented playing field, parties have to find new ways to articulate and be identified with the interests of a sufficient bloc of voters to stand any chance in elections. In the US, Obama’s campaign strategy has proved successful in tandem with the use of new technologies and campaigning models. In Europe, however, it is less clear what replaces class as an electoral mobiliser and bridge between the higher and lower segments of society. Political competitors on the far left and right, positioning themselves along new cleavages and conflict lines, provide a stiff challenge for European centre-left ‘catch-all’ parties, in particular within systems of proportional representation.31 The EU represents a key battleground in this sense with Eurosceptic ‘political entrepreneurs’ lending a populist edge to both the economic and cultural ramifications of the project.32 On the left this takes the form of economic attacks on the neo-liberal character of European integration, and on the right it manifests in grievance politics linked to national identity. The emergence of a ‘cosmopolitan-communitarian’ 33 cleavage has also convinced many that centre- left parties are losing out by focusing exclusively on economic concerns and ceding ground on culture, values and identity to political competitors. 34 Culturally this new cleavage focuses on the policy issues of immigration, citizenship and multiculturalism; economically it revolves around protecting labour markets and identifying or constructing losers and winners of globalisation and/or Europeanisation. The sum of these developments is that the position of European social democrats as catch-all parties has been imperilled. The importance of coalition-building and developing stronger alliances with progressive liberalism and new social and ecological movements has grown. At the same time innovations and communications technology (ICT) are changing the nature of political engagement and there is much that can be learned from transatlantic dialogue in this regard. In addition, political energy, especially among younger generations, increasingly lies within new social movements and protest parties. A side point to this is that electoral politics remains the lead avenue for societal change. The last year in the US is instructive: the Occupy movement chose to challenge politics from the outside, with its lasting impact still to be defined, whilst the Tea Party mobilised within the system and has made a radical mark on Republican Party politics.35 Important questions therefore surround how social democrats can build alliances outside of electoral politics, drawing new energy into the political arena. The argument here is that democratic politics is not in terminal decline. Although at a low-ebb, it retains the capacity to inspire change and wrestle back the power to shape society. The challenge is to put forward political values and narratives which can carry some of the socio-economic reforms alluded to in the previous section, many of which fly in the face of sauve qui peut politics. In this regard, the overarching issue is the left’s relationship with capitalism: the key challenge for left-of-centre parties is recapturing how they want to reform capitalism beyond the redistributional model of the state.36 po lic y ne tw or k pa pe r 8 | Distributional conflicts in the US and Europe | Michael McTernan | Nov 2012 www.policy-network.net 30. Norris, Pippa. “The United States and Western Europe:Trust in government”, Forthcoming in Parliamentary Affairs 31. See Cramme, Olaf. Diamond, Patrick. & Liddle, Roger. “Challenging the Politics of Evasion”, Policy Network paper, 2009 32. De Vries, Catherine. Oxford presentation, “Taking Europe to Its extremes? The politicisation of European integration and immigration in Western Europe”,Policy Network/FEPS, 2-3 July 2012. 33. For detailed analysis on this cleavage see Merkel, Wolfgang. Oxford presentation, “The political sociology of cosmopolitanism and communitarianism and its impact on present and future of social democracy”, Policy Network/FEPS, 2-3 July 2012. See also WZB project 34. See The Amsterdam Process, “Exploring the Cultural Challenges to Social Democracy”, Policy Network & Wiardi Beckman Stichting, 2011 35. Hall, Peter. Ibid A case-in-point is the Obama campaign model - widely tipped as the most impressive model in political history - it targeted an inevitable “emerging Democratic majority” based on minorities, women and young people The points below touch on elements of a political strategy - narratives, principles and priorities - on which centre-left driven political and economic reform might be hooked: The public household The centre-left has struggled to find convincing ways to talk about the economic crisis and to engage in the politics of austerity. As Andrew Gamble argues, the right has been much more adept in “pairing a discourse about the international market system which must obey the impersonal rules of ‘market forces’ alongside a discourse about the public household”. The left is portrayed as the careless actor that has irresponsibly abused the household credit card. In a stroke “the public household is equated with a private household (which must subordinate everything to balance its income with its expenditure) or to a corporate household (which subordinates everything to the bottom line and the pursuit of efficiency).”37 The challenge is to set-out a distinctive centre-left political economy of capitalism within the idea of a public household, which, “not only involves the budget, but also the institutions and processes which define the overarching rules for private and corporate households and for the market order itself.” This means reasserting the supremacy of democratic politics over economics and the legitimacy of government to set socially and politically constructed rules for market economics, financial capital and the exercise of corporate power. A political economy narrative based around a “public household” also has to be anchored in a distinctive combination of political economy with moral economy; a strong vision or philosophy of how the centre-left defines itself against the current form of capitalism in moral and human terms and what kind of society and economy it values.38 Middle-class economic security In America and large parts of Europe, voters are haunted by national decline and squeezed living standards. Progressive emphasis on a new politics of production and active industrial policies should be emphasised as part of a plan to rebuild middle class opportunity and economic security, focusing on innovation and new sources of jobs and growth in the “data-driven economy”, as well as boosting competitiveness in more traditional sectors, including manufacturing.39 Such policies should be widely framed within a commitment to public investment, understood broadly to mean investment in human as well as material resources and infrastructure with a view to improving the nation’s future prospects for growth and development. These kinds of investments can also be anchored in a story of national renewal which rallies publics around protecting their economic future. Fairness In describing the climate of sauve qui peut politics, Peter Hall maintained that the longstanding principle of social democracy most likely to have popular appeal is its commitment to fairness.40 ‘Social justice’ comes with overtones of redistribution but ‘fairness’, understood as equal treatment, fair dealing and equal opportunity has cross political appeal in the current environment. The emphasis should therefore be on equality in life chances in a fair society. Fairness dovetails with the need for a new set of socially and politically constructed rules and regulations in the market economy and the rebuilding of the “public household.” Fairness also speaks to the need to tackle inter-generational distributional inequalities and the formulation of a new pact between grandchildren and grandparents. po lic y ne tw or k pa pe r 9 | Distributional conflicts in the US and Europe | Michael McTernan | Nov 2012 www.policy-network.net 36. Gamble, Andrew. Oxford presentation, “Political economy and the next centre‐left century”, Policy Network/FEPS, 2-3 July 2012. F; and Berman, Sherie. “The past and future of social Democracy and American progressive‐ liberalism”. Both forthcoming in “Progressive Politics After the Crash” 37. Gamble, Andrew. Ibid 38. For a discussion on combining political and moral economy see “Gamble, Andrew. “Debt and Deficits: The Quest for Economic Competence”, in Cramme, Olaf. & Diamond, Patrick (eds), “After the Third Way: The Future of Social Democracy in Europe”, I.B Tauris, London 2011 39. This draws on Oxford Presenation of Marshall, Will. “The New Politics of Production”. Forthcoming in “Progressive Politics After the Crash”. See also the Progressive Policy Institute (PPI) project on “A New Production Economy”. 40. Hall, Peter. Ibid The challenge is to set-out a distinctive centre-left political economy of capitalism within the idea of a public household A narrative of public investment and intergenerational fairness must entail an emphasis on social investment. As Raghuram Rajan points out, the challenge of a new political compact between grandchildren and grandparents is to frame tough decisions in a way that allows the disadvantaged to see the “ladder of programmes that help their children climb to a better future”. 41 This corresponds with a commitment to improve life chances and public investment in the nation’s future. Social citizenship Social democracy has to rebuild a sense of cohesion and common citizenship based on reciprocal rights and duties. Social citizenship as advanced by T.H Marhsall means every individual contributing to the common good as well as benefiting from it according to ability and need. 42 The lack of democratic control over top-down bureaucracies in both public and private sectors, and the disruptive effects of “winner takes all” capitalism, have knawed away the fabric which binds society together. In this sense, the “big society” project of the Conservative-led government in the UK, with its emphasis on empowering communities and decentralising power, might be much maligned but it contains important genealogies from the left that cannot be ignored. 43 As Will Marshall has argued, the New Democrats under Bill Clinton, for example, consciously sought to reclaim ‘big citizenship’ and the civic-republican tradition in the early 1990s, with concepts like mutual obligation, community, national service and balancing citizens’ rights with their responsibilities.414The rich tapestry of initiatives in this mould has been put down to ‘third way triangulation’, driving progressives away from “resonant civic concepts and language that can help them mobilise public support for progressive goals”. The backsliding to a plain ‘markets vs government’ debate ignores the need to make the case for a broader mobilisation of civic energies. This speaks to the need to strengthen the pillars of representative democracy and to find new ways of practicing democratic politics that dissolve and disperse power as widely as possible. Internationalism Action at the state level is no longer sufficient, on its own, to achieve centre-left objectives: regulation of market capitalism, social justice, and the creation of public goods. Market forces have become transnational and are beyond the control of the existing institutions of global governance. 45 To have a future, the centre-left needs to be at the forefront of creating mechanisms for multi-level governance and a new regulatory architecture to stabilise the international financial system, as well as in areas such as corporate governance, trade and environment. The task is to reform the existing institutions of global governance so that the rules which they uphold and enforce can provide support for national governments pursuing centre-left programmes. 43 This is difficult in an age of insecurity and uncertainty which leaves little space for cultivating values such as international solidarity that run in the opposite direction of sauve que peut politics. Gaining political agreement for reform at this level is also painful and slow – and as we have seen with the eurozone crisis, electorates grow impatient with gridlock and the elite status quo. The default is always the existing international order. Nevertheless, it is a debate that cannot be shirked: progressives have to set out a political argument, together with credible and incremental steps, for creating new space to strengthen and reform the mechanisms of multi-level governance. This involves both a moral appeal and an appeal hard-wired in realism and the national interest. po lic y ne tw or k pa pe r 10 | Distributional conflicts in the US and Europe | Michael McTernan | Nov 2012 www.policy-network.net 41. Rajan, Raghuram. Ibid 42. Jenson, Jane. Ibid 44. Marshall, Will, “The Forgotten Communitarian”, Democracy Journal, Issue #25, Summer 2012 45. See “The Amsterdam Process: A Centre-left Project for New Times” 46. Gamble, Andrew. Ibid The backsliding to a plain ‘markets vs government’ debate ignores the need to make the case for a broader mobilisation of civic energies