Effectiveness of TURFs in Controlling Fishing Effort: Lake Titicaca Case Study, Resúmenes de Cálculo

¡Descarga Effectiveness of TURFs in Controlling Fishing Effort: Lake Titicaca Case Study y más Resúmenes en PDF de Cálculo solo en Docsity! TERRITORIAL USE-RIGHTS IN FISHING (TURFS) AND THE MANAGEMENT OF SMALL-SCALE FISHERIES: THE CASE OF LAKE TITICACA (PERU). By DOMINIQUE P. LEVIEIL DEUVG, Institut National Agronomique Paris-Grignon, 1974 Ing. Agro-Halieute, Institut National Agronomique, Paris-Grignon, 1977 M.A. (Marine Affair), University of Washington, 1979 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE -0F DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY in THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES (School of Community and Regional Planning) We accept this thesis as conforming to the required standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA June 1987 O Dominique P. Levieil, 1987 46 In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, 1 agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. 1 further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by: the head of my department or by his or her representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission. Department of Qiemesiciiho Le Elgienelo Vlmccnicca The University of British Columbia 1956 Main Mall Vancouver, Canada VET 1Y3 Date 07-10. $7. DE-6(3/81) TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 1.1. Objectives and rationale 1.2. Need for appropriate forms of fisheries management 1.3. Territorial Use-Rights in Fishing (TURFs) 1.4, Effectiveness of existing TURFs. CHAPTER 2: CONTEXT, MATERIAL AND METHODS OF THE STUDY 2.1. Natural and human environment of Lake Titicaca 2.2. Lake Titicaca Fisheries 2.3. Material and methods CHAPTER 3: EXISTENCE, DISTRIBUTION AND DIMENSIONS OF TURFS 3.1. Existence and distribution of Lake Titicaca TURFs 3.2. Spatial dimension 3.3. Resources dimension 3.4. Demographic dimension 3.5. Cultural dimension CHAPTER 4: ENFORCEMENT OF TURFS 4.1. TURFs Legal and administrative environment 4.2, TURF-related forms of ownership 4.3. Enforcement of TURFs CHAPTER 5: EVALUATION OF FISHING RENTS 5.1. Fishing costs and fishing returns 5.2. Fishing rents 5.3. Discussion CHAPTER 6: TURFS AND THE CAPTURE OF FISHING RENTS 6.1. Exclusion of inland dwellers from lake Titicaca fisheries 6.2. Communal constraints on individual fishing effort 6.3. Discussion of alternative constraints CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 7.1. Conclusions 7,2. Interpretation of the effectiveness of TURFs 7.3. TURFs and the management of Lake Titicaca fisheries SIBLIOGRAPHY APPENDIX A: Orestias species of Lake Titicaca watershed APPENDIX B: History of Lake Titicaca fisheries APPENDIX C: Research methods - APPENDIX D: Calculations of fishing costs and revenues iv Table Table Table Table Table Table Table Table Table - PS > 7 co 9. Table 10. Table 11. Table 12. LIST OF TABLES Types of Fishing Economic Units (FEUs) encountered on Lake Titicaca Distribution of answers to question: "Do you encounter difficulties when operating in other fishing areas?" Distribution of relative frequencies for the number of fishing sites by group of fishermen Shore communities of Lake Titicaca for which there is evidence of the existence of TURFs Frequency distribution of proportion of shore length to perimeter for Lake Titicaca shore communities Distribution of freguencies for the number of fishing sites per interviewed fisherman from Lake Titicaca Material and labour costs for Lake Titicaca smal1scale Fisheries Returns to fishing and fishingrelated Tabour per FEU type in Lake Titicaca smal1-scale fisheries Profitabiblity and availability of cashgenerating activities for the shore dwellers of Lake Titicaca Relative difference (%) between hourly returns to labour for fishing on Lake Titicaca and alternative activities available to shore dwellers according to FEU type Relative difference (%) between the return to fishing Tabour and ¡its opportunity cost, with or without granting a lower opportunity cost to fishing-related activities Labour requirements for agricultural production in various shore communities of Lake Titicaca page 26 40 40 42 49 84 122 123 125 130 133 144 LIST OF FIGURES Fig. 1. Basic economic model of a single species fishery Fig. 2. Distribution of Lake Titicaca shore communities Fig. + Sources of evidence of the existence of TURFs on Lake Titicaca Fig. +. Facsimile of the map of the community of Ramis, Taraco Fig. 5. Facsimile of the map of the community of Requena, Taraco Fig. . Shore communities of the Lago Sur and Lago Pequeno Fig. 3 4 5 Fig. 6. Facsimile of the map of the community of Sajo, Pomata 7 8. Distribution of the three types of TURFs aroung Lake Titicaca 9 Fig. . TURF types 1, 11, and III Fig. 10. Facsimile of the map of the totora reed beds of the communities of Huerta and MilTojachi Huaraya Fig. 11. Facsimile of the map of the community of LLachon Fig. 12. Resource dimension of Lake Titicaca TURFs Fig. 13. Access to Lake Titicaca TURFs by birth or by marriage Fig. 14. Map of the "Liga de defensa de la totora de Catura Pampa" Fig. 15. Changes in annual price indices of fish and fishing gear on _ the Peruvian Altiplano between 1975 and 1982 Fig. 16. Agricultural work requirements ín a shore community of Lake Titicaca, Peru Fig. 17. Organization of fisheries management on Lake Titicaca vi page 20 43 26 47 48 50 52 53 58 61 64 82 104 137 145 167 4. Evaluatimg the contribution of TURFs to the generation of these rents, The research addresses the general need for appropriate forms of fisheries management by documenting the potential of TURFs for the management of small-scale fisheries. The selection of Lake Titicaca TURFs for study is specially useful because of their potential contribution to the economy of the Peruvian. Altiplano surrounding Lake Titicaca. 1.2. NEED FOR APPROPRIATE FORMS OF FISHERIES MANAGEMENT 1.2.1. Need for fisheries management Fisheries resources have to be managed because, although renewable, they are vulnerable. They can be destroyed by pollution particularly in shal1ow coastal areas and inland waters where most small-scale fishing takes place (Scudder and ConeTly 1985). And, because of their common property status, they can be can be overexploited and eventual ly decimated by the very people whose welfare depends upon them (Gordon 1954), a phenomenon popularly known as the tragedy of the commons (Hardin 1968). According to common property theory, fishing effort within an unregulated fishery tends to increase until average fishing revenue becomes equal to average fishing cost (Gordon 1954). As long as the expected revenues from participating in this fishery (AR) are greater than the costs faced by an average fishing unit (AC), new fishing units have an economic incentive to enter this fishery, unless physical1y or legally prevented from doing so (Figure 1). Once average revenue equals average cost, this incentive dissappears, the resource rents represented by the difference between average revenue and average cost are said to have been dissipated, and the fishery is said to have reached its bionomic equilibrium (Ibid.). FIGURE |: BASIC ECONOMIC MODEL OF A SINGLE SPECIES FISHERY (from Gordon 1954). YIELD VALUE (in £) : TOTAL MSYE. ii L=: COSTS MEN. LS TOTAL REVENUE MO ooo nooo. EFFORT : mey msy =t E bionomic mPp====- ===> mio MC = AC | | l l l l l | | l | pro = Resource rent at time't E bionomic EFFORT l | | l l l l l An unregulated fishery which has reached ¡its bionomic equilibrium is said to be exploited beyond its social optimum (1.e. overfished) because some of the resources al located to fishing could have generated higher returns in other sectors of the economy [Gordon 1954). Within such a fishery regulation is needed to control Fishing effort in order to prevent the dissipation of fishing rents and therefore to promote a more efficient allocation of society's resources (Ibid.). The regulation of fishing effort is only one form of fisheries management, because fisheries management includes a11 activities designed to increase the utility that accrues to society from its fisheries resources (Carlander 1969; Rothschild and Forney 1979). However, l use the terms regulation and management interchangeably, following a practice common in the literature of fishery economics which is more specifically concerned with legistative or regulatory techniques of fisheries management (Anderson 1977; Panayotou 1982). Given the predictions of common property theory, the only way to determine whether a regulation or management technique is effective in controlling fishing effort within a particular fishery is to demonstrate that this technique is responsible for the capture of fishing rents within this fishery. Fisheries management techniques could also be evaluated in terms of other criteria such as their ability to promote an equitable distribution of the benefits from a fishery (Christy 1982). However, 1 have not considered these additional criteria here, because they may be promoted independently of effort control and without an'increase of the economic yield from the fishery considered. Furthermore, trade-offs may have to be made between them and economic efficiency, as in the case of social equity (Ibid.). Following Gordon's (1954) seminal analysis, the occurrence of overfishing However, property rights are likely to involve lower administrative costs than taxes (Maloney and Pearse 1979; Scott 1979). One should thus try to determine which of the various systems of property rights would be most effective. In his theoretical comparison of various forms of property rights, Pearse (1980) shows that the more exclusive fishing rights such as sole property are Tikely to be more effective in control1ing fishing effort, but that the less exclusive ones such as group property would minimize administrative costs. A regime of property rights of intermediate exclusivity between the extremes of no property and sole property would therefore be optimal, because ¡it would give the best trade-off between economic efficiency and administrative costs (Pearse 1980; Runge 1986). Existing systems of water tenure and customary fishing rutes, including Territorial Use-Rights in Fishing (TURFs) are among the forms that such a regime could take. 1.3. TERRITORIAL USE-RIGHTS IN FISHING (TURFS) 1.3.1. Definition of TURFs In the last decade, a large number of studies have documented the existence of territorial fishing rights. These rights have alternately been referred to as native possessory rights (Goldschmidt and Haas 1946), traditional or customary fishing rights (Lawson 1984), territorial fishing rights (Acheson 1975; 1979; Panayotou 1982), sea tenure (Alexander 1977), sea ownership (Petit-Skinner 1983) or sea territoriality (Pal1son 1982; Levine 1984), and traditional fisheries conservation or management practices (Kapetsky 1981), until the term of Territorial Use-Ríghts in Fishing (TURFs) was coined by Christy (1982), and gained some currency (Panayotou 1982; 1984; McGoodwin 1984). For the purpose of this study, 1 define Territorial Use-Rights in Fishing (TURFs) as systems of aquatic tenure which involve the holding of exclusive and limited rights by spatially or cultural ly defined communities of shore dwellers over fishing resources found in specific parts of their aquatic environment, This definition disqualifies both national1y held Exclusive Economic Zones and privately owned fishing areas (Panayotou 1983). It expands on previous definitions (Christy 1982; Panayotou 1984) because ¡it does not restrict the types of rights involved to exclusive use rights. Finally, it underscores the need for caution in a survey of the literature in which the existence of TURFs ¡is documented, Studies in which the existence of TURFs is documented have often focussed upon particular fishing resources, for example Jobster (Acheson 1975; 1979), crayfish (Levine 1984) or cod (Andersen and Stiles 1973). However, TURFs are generally more site-specific than resource-specific (Christy 1982). They can involve any type or combination of aquatic resources including fish, algae (Arzel 1984), shellfishes and crustaceans (Asada et al. 1983), irrespective of whether they are used for food, medicinal or decorative purposes (Petit- Skinner 1983). Contrary to resource rights which cover the whole range of a particular resource, they may cover only part of the range or habitat of the resources they involve, as in the case of highly mobile or migratory species. Such studies have also often focused upon particular fishing methods, such as fixed fishing traps (Martin 1979) or beach seines (Alexander 1977), although TURFs aré not method-specific. They often concern a range of fishing methods used by local fishermen (Johannes 1977; 1978), even if they do not affect a11 of them to the same extent. For instance less effective fishing methods, such as the smalj gear used by foot fishermen (Andersen 1979; Labby 1976: 86) or hand collection by women and children may not be subject to the restrictions of TURFs (Allan et al. 1948; 118). Finally, many of these studies have dea1t with specific ecological or fishing zones, such as brackish coastal lJagoons (Cattarinussi 1973; Demestre et al. 1977) or river estuaries (Cordel11 1974; 1978), although TURFs can affect any part of the aquatic environment surrounding a fishing community (Berkes 1977; Davis 1984). Many fishing communities actually hold a series of fishing rights over various parts of their aquatic environment defined by such criteria as water depth, distance from shore (Andersen 1979; Petit-Skinner 1983) or distance from the community (Johannes 1977; 1978). 1.3.2. Dimensions of TURFs Because some authors have focussed on the spatial dimension of TURFs, we tend to think of TURF as a unidimensional concept. However, as a system of water tenure, TURF is a multidimensional social concept which, like a land tenure system, can be characterized in terms of four major dimensions: spatial, temporal, demographic and cultural. The spatial dimension refers to the physical boundaries of the territory to which a TURF system applies. The temporal dimension refers to the period during which it is in force. Implicit in the spatial and temporal dimensions is a resource dimension, which córresponds to the proportion of the resource involved. The presence of resources within a TURF area may be temporary, as with migratory resources, or permanent but only a small proportion of the resources concerned is found within any given TURF area. The demographic dimension classes individuals and groups according to their inclusion or exclusion from a particular set of rights and obligations. Tt indicates how exclusive the rights involved are by describing the referent group. Finally, the cultural dimension refers to the legal (formal) or customary (informal) conditions under which the distribution, transfer and exercise of rights apply, thus to the kind of rights TURF holders can exercise desired result (Panayotou 1982: 155). The implementation of fishing rules within these communities may also be necessary to reduce interferences and conflicts between fishermen, Second, TURFs could promote administrative efficiency in at least three different ways. They would allow for adjustments to social or economic change by introducing flexibility into the control of fishing effort since TURF holders could adapt their management objectives to new social or economic circumstances almost instantaneously (Panayotou 1982). They would also a11ow for the introduction of necessary on-line revisions of management objectives to adapt to environmental variability (Scott and Neher 1981). Finally, they would transfer a large share of organizational costs to TURF holders themselves (Pearse 1980). In particular, they would reduce implementation costs wherever TURFs already exist (Kapetsky 1981), simply because Formalized management regimes based on them would be more readily acceptable than alternative forms of fisheries management. And since TURFs are so common in small-scale fisheries as to be almost ubiquitous, such strategies could be used in many parts of the world. Third, TURFs couTd promote an increase in the physical productivity of exploited fish resources, because they would give their holders the incentive to invest in their resources for increased future returns. They would also allow for the collection of more appropriate and more reliable technical information, since under a TURF-based management regimé fishermen are both the principal producers and beneficiaries of such information. This could in turn allow for a reduction in the security margins of catch 1imitations, which would permit the utilization of fisheries resources at a level closer to their actual potential. This could be further reinforced by the possibility of engaging in an active process of adaptive management (Walters and HiTborn 12 1975; 1978) since harvesting experiments could be undertaken in the discrete management units corresponding to different TURF areas. Fourth, TURFs could promote social equity because traditional sea tenure and customary fishing practices often lead to an equitable distribution of fish catches (Alexander 1980). The corresponding joint ríghts of access could also promote a more equitable distribution of aquatic resources among users than a system of private rights (Runge 1986). And a TURF-based management strategy would also reduce the bureaucratic complexities associated with centralized fisheries management (Neal 1982) which tend to discriminate against the disadvantaged, the least educated or the poorest (Ward 1982). Fina11y, ¡it would instil1 greater accountability into the present system of fisheries management which has already lent itself to accusations of despotism (Scott and Neher 1981) and insensitivity to fishermen's needs (Davis 1984). Because of these benefits some authors do not hesitate to advocate the granting of a formal status to traditional sea tenure and customary fishing rules (Johannes 1982), or their incorporation into fisheries management practices (Pollnac and Littlefield 1983; Davis 1984), Most contributors, however, are more cautious in their recommendations. They acknowledge the potential benefits of TURFs, but they also recognize the paucity of relevant information, and suggest careful examination of traditional TURFs and of their appropriateness for Fisheries management purposes (Acheson 1981; Pearse 1980; ICLARM 1981; Kapetsky 1981; Christy 1982; Panayotou 1982; 1983; Lamson and Cohen 1984; Lawson 1984). AYVY this confirms that 1t is indeed critical to determine whether the "many kinds of norms and institutions fishermen (have) invented to control access and fishing procedures could be used as a basis for successful resource management" (Acheson 1981: 307-308). Such an investigation would lead to the 13 elaboration of new institutions which would capitalize upon the advantages of traditional fisheries management practices (Alexander 1980). It would thus contribute to the emergence of a new model of resource management similar to those proposed by various contributors: resource self-management (Berkes 1985), community-based resource management (Lamson and Cohen: 1984) and fishery co-management (Pinkerton 1986), 1.4. EFFECTIVENESS OF EXISTING TURFS 1.4.1, Limitations on the effectiveness of TURFs It has been argued that the theoretical effectiveness of TURFs in controlling fishing effort is not translated into practice. For example, these systems result in án allocation of space, rather than of resources (Andersen and Stiles 1973; McCay 1980; 1981), and they provide rules for the conduct: of fishing, rather than for the conservation of fisheries resources (Acheson 1981; Pallsson 1982). Although these objections do not necessarily invalidate TURFs for fisheries management purposes, they raise the issue of whether existing TURFs actually lead to a control of fishing effort. The effectiveness of TURFs in contro1ling fishing effort depends in part -On the ability of their holders to coordinate their fishing practices, both within and between TURF holding communities. Coordination within TURF holding communities js necessary, because the creation of incentives for individual fishermen to take the external effects of their fishing activities into account is not an automatic consequence of the existence of TURFs. Internal mechanisms control1ling TURF holders' fishing activities have to be devised to induce them to incorporate these externalities into their decision-making processes. As Gordon himself stated: "In cases of group tenure where the numbers of the group are large, there is still the necessity of coordinating 14 that both biological and economic productivity are higher in the contro11ed areas of the Maine lobster fishery (Acheson 1975; Wilson 1977). However, they end up demonstrating that privately-held fishing rights are more effective than communal1y-held TURFs. Fernando, Munasinghe, Panayotou and their collaborators demonstrate that smal1-scale fishermen in Sri Lanka are able to capture substantial economic rents, and argue that local TURFs are responsible for this (Fernando 1984a; 1984b; Fernando et al. 1984; Munasinghe 1984; Panayotou 1984). Unfortunately, they provide no information on the dimensions, distribution or enforcement of these TURFs about which, with one exception (Alexander 1975; 1977), little is known. Finally, Smith and Panayotou (1984) demonstrate that the system of municipal concessions in the milkfish fry gathering fisheries of the Philippines al]ow the TURF-holding municipalities to capture the corresponding rents through competitive bidding over annual concessions. Only those studies which determine whether a fishery is operated at an economically efficient level, and also assess the role of TURFs in preventing this fishery from reaching ¡its bionomic equilibrium, actually assess the effectiveness of TURFs in control1ing total fishing effort. Therefore, to be complete, an empirical evaluation of the effectiveness of TURFs should include four successive steps. First, 1t should document the existence of Tocal TURFs; second, 1t should demonstrate that TURF holders are actually able to enforce their TURFs, in spite of any official opposition resulting from the informal and eventually 111egal character of TURFs; third, 1t should show that substantial rents are being captured by TURF holders (1.e. that local fisheries have not reached their bionomic equilibrium yet); and fourth, ¡t should provide evidence that these rents result from the active enforcement of local TURFs rather than from some technological or economic Timitations on 17 total fishing effort. 1.4.4, Evaluation of the effectiveness of Lake Titicaca TURFs There were several advantages to selecting the communal fishing rights traditionally enforced by Lake Titicaca shore dwellers as a case study. First, there was preliminary evidence that the territorial fishing rights of Lake Titicaca fit the definition of TURFs (Leviei] 1986). Second, 4t was clear that one could calculate the economic value of Lake Titicaca fishermen's catch, since they exchange about 83% of ¡t through barter andtrade (Orlove 1986), which is not always possible with subsistence-oriented fisheries. Third, a large amount of information on the social and economic structures of local populations was already available, which is not usual11y the case for small-scale fishing populations of the Third Wor1d. A11 this information was necessary for the completion of the tasks involved in the assessment of local the effectiveness of TURFs, Finally, there is ample evidence that Lake Titicaca fisheries did contribute to the economy of the Peruvian Altiplano surrounding Lake Titicaca, and that their effective management might preserve and eventually increase this contribution over the long term. Lake Titicaca fisheries represent a major source of income and protein for more than 3,000 shore-dwelling families (Bustamante and Trevino 1976; Alfaro et al. 1981) and a supplementary source of protein for the population of the rest of the Altiplano (Ferroni 1980), Appropriate management of these Fisheries is thus highly necessary given the poverty of the Altiplano relative to the rest of Peru (Amat y Leon 1981), the failure of numerous Jocal development projects [Sanchez 1983), the dramatic depletion of some of the local fish resources (Appendix B), and the inability of the Tocal fisheries administration to assume ¡ts management responsibilities (Laba 1979). 13 CHAPTER 2 CONTEXT, MATERIAL AND METHODS OF THE STUDY 2.1 NATURAL AND HUMAN ENVIRONMENT OF LAKE TITICACA 2.1.1. Natural environment Lake Titicaca [Figure 2) is a large (8,559 km2), high altitude (3,808m), tropical (15 degrees south) lake which lies on the border between Peru and Bolivia. According. to the offical map of the Peruano-Bo1ivian hydrographic comission, ¡ts maximum length is approximately 250km, its maximum width 60km and its perimeter 1,850 km. It includes three connected basins: the Large Lake or Lago Grande (6,542 km2, 284 m deep), the Puno Bay or Bahia de Puno (589 km2, 25 m deep), and the Sma1l Lake or Lago Pequeno (1,367 km2, 40 m deep) (Boulange and Aquize 1981). Two smaller lJakes, Arapa (195 km2) and Umayo (46 km2) are intermittently connected with Lake Titicaca through the floodplains of the Ramis and 111pa Rivers respectively (Figure 2). The Peruvian portion of Lake Titicaca represents about 60% of ¡ts total area. 1t includes about 65% of the total 'shoreline, five of the seven main tributaries to the lake, and half of its only outlet, the Rio Desaguadero, which marks the boundary between Peru and Bolivia (Figure 2). Most of the 57,340km2 (Ibid.) of Lake Titicaca's watershed corresponds to a high altitude plateau, the Altiplano, which 1ies between the western and the eastern Andean ranges. The Altiplano is covered with rolling hills of alluvial and lacustrine origin. Low average temperatures (6 to 12 degrees Celsius) with frequeng night frosts, and low annual precipitation (500 to 1,000 mm in the cirumlacustrine area, 200 to 500 mm further inland) are responsible for ¡ts semi-arid mountain climate (Ibid.). Precipitation is 19 divided into Districts, 21 of wnich are adjacent to the lake (Figure 2). Fina11y, these Districts comprise a number of human settlements with various administrative statutes: agrarian cooperatives, municipalities, communities and parcialities. Only a minor part:of the shoreline belongs to collectively owned agrarian cooperatives, or to municipalities such as the City of Puno. The majority belong to peasant communities (Comunidades Campesinas) and to parcialities (parcialidades). Peasant communities and parcialities are territorial groups of families exploiting both privately owned or usufructed lands for continuous production, and collectively owned lands for fallow cultivation. They are not only characterized by the sharing of a common residence and territory, but also by their social, political and religious organization, a11 of which result in their solidarity and maintenance (Casaverde 1978; Fioravanti-Molinie 1978). The major difference between them is that land is by law collectively owned in communities and privately in parcialities. In practice, however, the distinction is blurred, In peasant communities, individuals actually own the land customaril y inheriting, exchanging or-sel1ing it, even though the Jatter is ¡111egal. In parcialities, the group of residents retains traditional rights of control over ¡its members' agricultura? activities (Mayer 1985), Since parcialities and peasant communities operate in the same way as social, political and administrative institutions, l treat them as equivalents for the purpose of this study. Unless specific reference to official status is reguired, 1 wil1 refer to them both as communities, and 1 wi11 indicate the district to which each belongs because they are often difficult to Tocate. 22 2.2. LAKE TITICACA FISHERIES 2.2.1. Aquatic resources al Fish resources Lake Titicaca fish resources include native species and exotic species. The former are endemic to the lake and include the cyprinodont genus Orestias, which represented 67% of the fish harvested from Lake Titicaca in 1980 (Alfaro et al. 1982), and the catfish genus Trichomycterus which represented 6.7% of this harvest (Ibid.). Exotic species include the rainbow trout (SaTmo gairdneri) introduced to the lake in the early 1940s, which contributed 14.2% of the total catch in 1980 (Ibid.), and the silverside or pejerrey (Basilichthys bonariensis) introduced in the mid 19505 and which contributed 15.2% of the total 1980 catch (Ibid.). According to the latest taxonomic revision (Parenti 1984), the genus Orestias consists of 43 species grouped in four complexes, 29 of which can be found in Lake Titicaca itself, and 33 in its watershed (Appendix A). Local fishermen commonly identify four major types of Orestias, the umanto, the boga, the ispis and the carachis. They also distinguish five types of carachis, according to their size, shape and coloration (Appendix A), but often give the same names to various species, or different names to the same species. For example, they refer indifferently to a11 small Orestias as ispis, and to a11 yellowish carachis as carachis amarillos. Conversely, they refer to O, agassii as fish (ch'aulla), white, grey or black carachi [carachi blanco, gris, negro). The remaining two types of carachis, the dwarf (carchi enano) and the greenish one (carachi gringo), are only of marginal economic importance. As for the genus Trichomycterus, it is represented by only one species on the Altiplano (Tchernavin 1944b), although fishermen common] y 23 distinguish the mauri, a small Tittoral form, from a larger one usual 1y Found in deeper waters, the suche. b) Other lacustrine resources Apart from the fish resources, shore-dwellers extract two other types of aquatic resources from Lake Titicaca: waterfowl and lake-plants (or aquatic macrophytes). About 14 species of migratory waterfowl are harvested when they come to the lake for nesting (CENFOR-Puno 1979). Aquatic macrophytes are represented by a variety of plants found in associations, depending upon depth and other 1imnological parameters (Col1lot 1981). Two associations are of particular economic importance, the totora (Scirpus or Schoenoplectus sp) and the llachu, an association of three genera of aquatic plants (Myriophy11um, Elodea and Potamogeton). Finally, aquatic toads from the Telmatobius genus are sometimes accidental ly caught in gil11 nets and may be used in the elaboration of traditional remedies. 2.2.2. Fishing operations Fishing on Lake Titicaca involves smal1-scale operations, with simple technology and sma11 “fishing crafts, often single-handed. Fishing operations are short range, rarely lasting for more than an.overnight trip, although some fishing involves daylight operations. Gillnets are set late in-the afternoon and checked or retrieved early the following morning. Individuals, usually from the male gender, go fishing with their close relatives, sometimes with those of their wives (1.e. their affines) and share the catch. Fishing infrastructures are minimal, although a few tiny harbours have been built on exposed parts of the shoreline. About half of the fishermen operate from a balsa reed boat (48%), and the other half from a wooden boat propelled with oars (48.5%). A few use a motorized wooden boat (3%) with a greater range of 24 a) Demersal gillnet fishery for native species The demersal gillnet fishery for native species targets on the black carachi (0. agassii), although yellow carachis (0. luteus) and a few mauris (Trichomycterus) may also be caught. Fishermen set multifilament nylon 9i11nets with mesh sizes between 38 and 63 mm along the lake bottom, not deeper than 30 meters (littoral zone) in the late afternoon, and check them at dawn the following morning. Those who use balsa reed-boats for this fishery (FEU type 1) own an average of 6.9 nets, thus somewhat less than the 9.7 nets owned by those who use wooden boats (FEU type 4). b) Trawl (huayunaccana) fishery for native species The trawl (huayunaccana)) fishery for native species previously targeted the boga (0. pentlandii), but nowadays yields mostly black carachis (0. agassit). It is practiced in the littoral zone of the Small Lake where the conditions required for safe and efficient operations are met, t.e. a flat bottom with Jittle or no macrophytes and protected waters. It involves two craft, ideal1y two Tight rowing boats with one or two rowers each, though a relatively heavy sail boat may be operated in conjunction with a small row boat, or even a balsa. The corresponding FEU (type 10) thus includes one trawl, two fishing vessels, and two to four fishermen. Trawling usually takes place from dawn to midday, for an average of twenty tows, each lasting fifteen to twenty minutes (Trevino et al. 1980; Franc et al. 1986). c) Pelagic gil1net fishery for introduced species Fishermen from the northern and southern ends of the Lago Grande practice a pelagic gilinet fishery for introduced species using nylon gilInets of meshsizes between 63 and 152 mm. Those from type 5 FEUs use rowing boats, while those from type 8 FEUs use boats powered by outboard engines. All set 27 their nets overnight in the pelagic zone of the lake, and most spend the night in their boats dríifting with their nets. During the rainy season, they set their gil1nets closer to, or directly into the mouth of the major tributaries of the lake, to catch the adult trout migrating upstream for spawning. d) Mixed species gil1net fishery A number .of fishermen participate simultaneously in the demersal fishery for native species and in the pelagic fishery for introduced species, because they use a combination of gillnets of meshsizes both smaller and larger than 63 mm. Although they could use a balsa (FEU type 3), almost a11 of them use a wooden boat (FEU type 6). e) Ispi fishery Fishermen involved in the ispi fishery, harvest ispis at night with beach seines or with sma11 trawls (Bustamante and Trevino 1976) when the fish come close to shore to spawn or to the surface to feed (Nunez 1982). . Few ispi fishermen fish for other species, and most come from only four shore communities: Jacantaya (Moho) in the Lago Norte, Llachon (Capachica) in the Bahia de Puno, Cachi Pucara (Pilcuyo) in the Lago Sur and Vilurcuní (Yunguyo) in the Lago Pequeno., f) Exploitation of other lacustrine resources Lake Titicaca shore dwellers frequently hunt waterfowl, collect their eggs, and harvest aguatic macrophytes. These activities are most important in the economy of shore communities with access to large areas of totora beds (i.e. totorales) and 1lachu beds (1.e. 1lachales). Sometimes they catch waterfowl accidental1y in their fishing nets, but they usually hunt them and collect their eggs-on the way back from fishing trips. They harvest aquatic macrophytes when stjl1 green as cattle fodder, and as material for roofing, 28 balsa making, or for handicrafts when dry and yellow (Levieil et al. 1985). 2.2.4. Status of lake Titicaca fisheries Since World War 11 some major changes have affected Lake Titicaca fisheries which historical ly had been quite simple until then (Appendix B). Exotic fish species were introduced into the lake: the trout in the early 1940s and the silverside in the late 19505. Subsequently, a successful rainbow trout fishery developed in the 1960's. This fishery supported up to five artisanal canneries and reached a peak production of 400 mt in 1965, Overfishing apparently brought about its collapse and forced the canneries to close down in 1969 (Everett 1971a), however, recent evidence indicates that this fishery has recovered (Alfaro et al. 1982). In the early 1970s, the silverside became the object of a 1imited Fishery (Wurtsbaugh 1974) which has increased ever since (Alfaro et al. 1982; Avila et al. 1985). In the same period Lake Titicaca fishermen have adopted a number of technical innovations. They have abandonned cotton gil1nets and fish traps Made of totora reeds in favor of nylon gillnets. Many have replaced their balsa reed boats with wooden boats, and some have even adopted outboard engines to propel their boats (Appendix B). Finally, fish marketing has changed considerably during this period. Urbanization, transportation improvements and the multiplication of markets on the Altiplano have opened new opportunities for fish traders, with a consequent increase in their number, and in the amount of fish they trade (Ibid.). Data collected for this study indicate a total catch in the Peruvian portion of Lake Titicaca of 8,160 mt in 1980 (95% confidence interval: 6,490 to 9,830 mt), which is much higher than official catch figures of about 1,000 mt for Peru (MIPE 1980), and of 500 mt for the Bolivian portion (Vergara 29 to accuse TURF holders of stealing nets, and because the latter were equal] y willing to complain of the former's misbehaviour when they did not have to mention their own illegal enforcement activities. 2.3.3. Rent Capture To demonstrate that rents were captured within Lake Titicaca fisheries, 1 had to demonstrate that fishing revenues per FEU were greater than fishing costs, which include material costs and the opportunity cost of fishermen's labor (see inequality below). The latter cost is defined as the income that fishermen could have earned in the best employment alternative available to them. For this purpose 1 had to select an appropriate time period. Because employment alternatives cover periods of a day to a few months, 1 had to base my comparison on a shorter time period. I have thus evaluated economic returns to fishing Tabour on an hourly basis, and compared the latter with the income per hour that fishermen could have earned in the most financially rewarding occupation available to them (irrespective of the legality of this occupation). An additional advantage of this method is that it allows me to account for the Tabour invested by fishermen and their households in the construction and maintenance of their craft and gear, or in fish retailing (which I generical1y refer to as fishing-related activities) without assuming, a priori, an opportunity cost for this labor. The inequality l therefore demonstrated for an average FEU on an annual basis is: FR > MC + (Lx 00) or its equivalent: (FR - MC)J/ L > 00. where: FR = Fishing revenue MC = Material costs of fishing craft and gear per year L =Total labour involved in fishing and related activities 0C = Hourly opportunity cost of fishing 1abour L(ER - MC)/ L] = Hourly return to fishing 32 Because most available statistics were either unreliable or invalid, to evaluate fishing cost and revenues 1 had to collect data on fishing yields and on the time and resources invested in fishing and fishing-related activities. For this purpose 1 used three different surveys, all described in the methodological appendix (Appendix C): a Catch Assessment Survey, a Coverage Check Survey, and a socio-economic survey. To estimate fishing revenues 1 needed fish price figures and catch estimates. For the former, 1 have used the official fish price list of the Ministry of Fisheries (hereafter MIPE) because jt provides a conservative estimate of fish prices (Appendix C). For the latter 1 have used a Catch Assessment Survey (CAS) for which 50 collaborating fishermen reported their respective catches and daily fishing activities from August 1979 to July 1980 for a smal11 fee (Ibid.). In addition to this CAS, I have used a Coverage Check Survey ([CCS) which was conducted twice during this same year, approximately at six month intervals to test for misreporting and for biases (Ibid.). To estimate fishing costs such as investments in fishing craft and gear, 1 have used a socio-economic survey (Ibid.). For variable fishing costs, 1 have used data from the CAS survey which, in addition to information on catch levels, provided information on fishing effort levels (e.g.: duration of fishing trips, number of nets used, number of crew members involved). 23.4. Contribution of TURFs to rent capture To' demonstrate the contribution of TURFs to rent capture, 1 had to show that their control over fishing and Tanding space is transformed into a control over fishing effort. This required demonstrating that TURF holders are not only able to exclude outsiders, but also to control their own fishing effort. 1 have done the former by demonstrating that shore dwel lers were successful in preventing inland dwellers from fishing on the lake, and the 33 latter by demonstrating that the obligations entailed by community membership constrained the amount of household labour that shore dwellers could dedicate to fishing. For this latter purpose 1 have evaluated how much Tabour was required by communal obligations including agricultural production, using information available from the above-mentioned questionnaires, from a number of monographs on shore communities (Hickman 1963; Lewellen 1977; Brown 1978; Verliat 1978; Collins 1982; Painter 1982) and from studies of the economy of agriculture in various communities (Ccama 1981; Lescano et al. 1982; Figueroa 1984; Gonzales 1984). 34 Moche group of fishermen from Northern Peru to the shores of Lake Titicaca and to the Marañon River (Buse 1981) are likely to have resulted in the establishment of fishing zones, either through the granting of fishing rights by the Inca administrators, or through the transfer of the ensuing custom by the transferred populations themselves. Alternatively, the existence of Altiplano colonies on the Southern Pacific Coast of Peru, since the Tiahuanuco period preceeding the Tahuantinsuyo, and the extensive contacts between these colonies and the Altiplano (Hyslop 1976; Mujica 1985) lead to the hypothesis that centrifugal influences for the organization of fishing may have come from the Altiplano to the coastal area, instead of the reverse. During the colonial period, the Spanish administration reorganized the territories of the ayllus. It stripped many of them of their most distant sections. 1t also forced them to regroup in single settlements, or reducciones. However, the number of human settlements along the shores of Lake Titicaca was not modified then, as the correspondance between traditional ayllus and modern administrative units demonstrates (Martinez 1981), This suggests that the boundaries of local aquatic territories were not drastically modified. The Spanish rulers also tried to open fishing to a11, irrespective of ethnic or geographical origins, and to promote the development of commercial fisheries. Apparently they met with little success at first. In 1566, the Spanish administrator Gregorio Gonzales de Cuenca, for example, had to revoke his initial decision to open ocean fisheries access to a11, when confronted with the strong opposition of indigenous fishermen of the northern coast of Peru (Rostworowski 1981). It was not until the early 1770's, that repeated conflicts between neighboring fishing communities eventual ly Teading to judicial actions 37 provided the Spanish colonial government with a justification to open access to landing spots (caletas) to al11, and to allow everyone to fish (Flores- Galindo 1981:160-1; Rostworowski 1981:85-86). Customary access rights to landing spots and fishing zones must have persisted for decades after that, since in 1786 the Gobierno Superior del Peru had to reafirm the "libertad de pescar" decreed by the Visitador Escobedo (Flores-Galindo 1981:160-161), and since lawsuits opposed various fishing communities at least until the late 1790s (Rostworowskj 1981: 85). A1T this suggests that territorial fishing rights were formal ly recognized on Lake Titicaca's shores for more than 250 years (1500's to 1770's). Evidence that Uros people were the only one required to pay their tribute to the Spanish crown in dried fish suggests that informal respect of these rights may have persisted until the beginning of this century, as ¡it did on the Pacific coast [Fiedler 1944), To determine whether they have persisted until the present requires additional information. b) Bibliographical evidence. The existence of TURFs over exclusive fishing areas along Lake Titicaca shores has been mentioned by various contemporaneous authors. Most of them have claimed that fishing on Lake Titicaca and ¡ts tributaries was an activity undertaken by shore dwellers exclusively (Romero 1925: 438; Martinez 1962: 55; Galdo 1962a; 92; 1962b: 66; 1967: 188; Poe 1979: 213; Collins 1982: 106). Some of them have referred to the ownership of landing spots (Pacori 1976: 15) and of fishing weirs by individuals (Tschopik 1946: 525; Solc 1969: 51) or by extended families (Vellard 1949: 180). Others have indicated that fishing places (Negener 1934, quoted in La Barre 1948: 184-185), or fishing zones (Tschopik 1946: 521; Galdo 1962a: 92; Solc 1969: 53) were owned by the immediately adjacent fishing communities. 38 However, little information is available regarding the extension, distribution and characteristics of the corresponding TURFs. After indicating the existence of fishing territories within one particular community, such as Chucuito in Peru (Tschopik 1946: 521) or Suriqui in Bolivia (Solc 1969), or within a group of communities unevenly distributed around the Lake (Galdo 1962a), most contributors have claimed that TURFs were enforced al] along Lake Titicaca's shores (Tschopik 1946, Solc 1969) and those of its major tributaries (Galdo 1962a). Even if cumulatively the number of communities surveyed gives some credibility to such a statement, these authors fail to provide sufficient evidence to support their claim. Fortunately, information from a survey of fishing settlements carried out in 1976 along more than 90% of Lake Titicaca's Peruvian shores confirms the TURFs' ubiquity. c) Empirical evidence. In 1976, the scientists from the Peruvian Marine Institute (IMARPE) carried a comprehensive survey of Lake Titicaca fishing settlements. They enumerated 3,040 fishermen and personally registered more than 60% of them, all residents of onshore communities (E. Bustamante and H. Trevino 1984; pers. com,). During this survey, they used a structured questionnaire to interview 8.2% of the fishermen censused. They asked each informant whether he had encountered difficulties when operating in other areas, and recorded the type of problems reported if any. 1 have summarized informants' answers in Table 2 and 3 (IMARPE-Puno 1976: Unpublished data). In Table 2, 1 have classified the 251 interviewed fishermen according to whether they claim to encounter difficulties when operating.in other areas or not. The 40.6% informants (Group 1) who claim to have problems both confirm TURFs existence and their active enforcement. 39 evidence either way. Not a single one of the 251 informants denied the existence of local TURFs, irrespective of his own attitude towards them, An analysis of the same data in terms of fishing communities rather than fishermen, also demonstrates that for all but two communities (94%), at least one fisherman confirms TURFs existence. As for the remaining two, other sources indicate that for the first one, Jasincoya (Huancane), local fishermen do restrict fishing to their own bay (Bustamante and Trevino 1976: fieldnotes), and that for the second one, Isani (Huancane), TURFs were actually enforced in previous years (Galdo 1962a). 3.1.2, Distribution of TURFs along the shoreline A sample of 80% of the shore communities shows that virtually al11 of them hold TURFs over the portion of the lake immediately adjacent to their shoreline (Table 4). Furthermore, by locating these communities along the shoreline (Figure 3), l was able to verify that there is no gap in their distribution. Each shore section corresponds to a TURF area, and no gap is left open for inland dwellers to get access to aquatic resources (even 1f in some areas TURF holders rarely fish). TABLE 4: SHORE COMMUNITIES OF LAKE TITICACA FOR WHICH THERE 1S EVIDENCE OF THE EXISTENCE OF TURFS Lake area Number of shore Communities sampled communities Number Proportion Bahia de Puno 50 44 88 Lago Norte 43 35 81.4 Lago Sur 43 28 65.1 Lago Pequeno 29 25 86.2 Total 165 132 80 FIGURE 3: SOURCES OF EVIDENCE OF THE EXISTENCE OF TURFS ON LAKE TITICACA. (709 /HUAN | VILQUE- IAS Te9- 0 -CANE /-CHICO, - BOLIVIA CHUCUITO 2 ACORA A OEA Nr 2 y e AN é pe 010 20 30 40 50km ( “=<ZEPITA [6 2 SCALE 2 ¿8 1702 1 DESAGUADERO Bibliographical sources En IMARPE:1976 fieldwork 1980-81 81984 fieldwork 43 3.2. SPATIAL DIMENSIONS So far the evidence provided suggests that most of Lake Titicaca shore dwellers are members of territorial communities who hold TURFs over part of the aquatic space adjacent to their Tand territory. These communities .have well defined terrestrial boundaries formally recognized by the administration. Their terrestrial boundaries extend into the lake, either perpendicularly to the shore, or following some irregular but clearly defined trajectory, with the same types of visual markers often being used to delineate both aquatic and terrestrial boundaries. The physical extension of the aquatic territory delineated by these aquatic boundaries corresponds to TURFs spatial dimension. To describe the spatial dimensions of Lake Titicaca TURFs, 1 use -evidence gathered during field work in 1979-81 and 1984, data collected in the field by scientists from the IMARPE, documents from the Ministry of (Agriculture in Puno such as maps drawn by shore dwellers of the territory of their communities, and a few bibliographical references (Bustamante and Trevino 1976; Nunez 1982). 1 consider first the lateral or intercommunal boundaries which separate the TURF areas of neighbouring communities and determine the width of : the shoreline corresponding to each shore community. Later, 1 consider the position of the offshore boundaries which determine the distance from shore to which TURFs apply (which 1 call the length of the TURF areas) and the few cases where offshore boundaries turn into intercommunal boundaries. Finally, l turn to the visual markers used to delineate aquatic boundaries, because of their influence on the amount of overtap between neighbouring TURF areas. 3.2.1. Lateral boundarjies. Members of Lake Titicaca shore communities consider the aquatic space immediately adjacent to their land as their collective aguatic property. The 44 FIGURE 5: FACSIMILE OF THE MAP OF THE COMMUNI- TY OF REQUENA, TARACO (Direccion de Comunidades Campesinas, MINA-PUNO), * No scale on original. D house . boundary marker =—"s boundory 1 NORTE JALANA, PEA Mbereo PARAMUELEAS e 2co o r 97 a 3 3ie IR yA ye. 33 SÉ ES i y *R LoS 2... Ñ] me ó a E SÉ Se > ar Ñ . $ EN z 1 E y , - 2 3 4,2 e q e dosced ¿60 77 7b coto FIGURE 6: FACSIMILE OF THE MAP OF THE COMMU- NITY OF SAJO, POMATA (Direccion de Comunidades Campesinas, MINA-Puno). * Noscole given on original Redrown by the author ALICIA EDUARDO VIUDA DE COLPO to na 3 $ 3 5 »> Y S 3 $ R o Boundary 48 many ecological levels as possible, from the Takeshore to the top of a nearby mountain range, a physical impossibility for the communities of the vast plains of Ilave, Pilcuyo, Ramis or Taraco. This allows community members to combine a variety of agricultural zones and practices, thus spreading the risks of poor environmental conditions. Agricultural ists with widely dispersed plots of land are less likely to suffer a catastrophic crop failure, than those whose plots are concentrated in one ecological area (Brush 1977). In a region where frost is a serious risk (Morlon 1978; Figueroa 1984) this is an important consideration for agricultural practice. The territories of a sample of 32 communities distributed along the shores of the Lago Sur and Lago Pequeno actually verify this prediction. They Took like elongated triangles whose bases correspond to the shoreline, and apices to the summit of the Cerro Ccapia (Figure 7). Computing the ratio of the length of their shoreline to that of their boundary perimeter (Table 5) shows that for a majority (78%) of them, it is smaller than 30%, and for half of them smaller than 15%. TABLE 5: FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF PROPORTION OF SHORE LENGTH TO PERIMETER FOR LAKE TITICACA SHORE COMMUNITIES, (SOURCE: PLANO CADASTRAL, MINA-PUNO, 1973) Range of values Absolute Relative Cumulative frequency frequency frequency 0 to5 3 9.4 9.4 5 to 10 7 21.9 31.2 10 to 15 6 18.8 50 15 to 20 3 9.4 59.4 20 to 25 3 9.4 67.8 25 to 30 3 9.4 78.1 over 30 7 21.9 100 Total 32 100 FIGURE 8: TURF TYPES: 1, 8 1I A 50 100 NOTE: Diagrams not to scale. 52 FIGURE 9: DISTRIBUTION OF THE THREE TYPES OF TURFS AROUND LAKE TITICACA, PERU. : 'Vilque chil o JHuancanej É, 7 Y 22M Ln Y 1 É A S A BOLIVIA C , pa ito / s Chucuito. f Ácara ” A pera / £ (Yun guyd / omata>—. o 10 20 30 40 5Okm P SCALE o 1 1 Desaguadero 53 Type 1 TURFs are common in the southeast part of Laguna Arapa, in the northwest of the Lago Grande between the Ramis delta and Capachica peninsula, in the northern ha1f of Puno Bay, and al1 along the western shores of the Lago Grande between Socca island and Juli [Figure 9). In the latter case, however, the outer edge of the totora reed beds is demarcated by a Jittoral dune or shicata which is cultivated during the rainy season. Local community members stil1 claim the open water space on the outer edge of the dune as part of their exclusive fishing zone, even if they rarely exploit it, since they would need two craft for that purpose: one to cross the lagoon between the main land and the dune, and the other one to go fishing on the Take. Alternative solutions could be used too, such as carrying the fishing craft over the dune, as done by the fishermen from Balsapata in the Lago Norte (Bustamante and Trevino, field notes 1976) or a small ferry service for fishermen to cross the lagoon. But this requires some organization and cooperation on the part of the fishermen [between at least six of them in the case of Balsapata). Another solution tried in 1983 by some fishermen from the community of Santa Rosa de Yanaque (Acora), is to move into a temporary dwelling on the dune. However, this experiment came to a rapid end, because it required too much specialization on the part of the fishermen involved who, lacking flexibility, could not continue their normal agricultural practices on the mainland b) Type 11 TURFS For the second type of TURFs, a steeper bottom slope brings the outer edge of the totora reed beds within a few hundred meters from shore. In such cases, local community members claim the totora beds in the shal1low waters and an area of open and deeper water at least a few hundred meters wide, as theirs. Given that totora reeds rarely grow in water deeper than 4 meters 54 3.2.3, Visual markers According to shore dwellers, the lateral boundaries of Lake Titicaca TURFs are extended in direct prolongation of the terrestrial boundaries which separate neighbouring communities and, tf necessary, visual markers or hitos are used to delineate them. The latter are relatively simple natural or man- made features of the landscape, which are used to delineate TURFs lateral boundaries rather than their outer edges. The.only type of visual markers used to delineate TURFs outer edge are the totora beds and the natural channels dividing them, which can be found in type 1 and type 11 TURFs. Environmental conditions determine to a large degree what type of visual markers can be used in specific circumstances, either because it is best suited for a given area or TURF type, or because appropriate material is Tocal1yavailable. For type 1 TURFs, the presence of totora reeds in shallow waters greatly simplify the problem of boundary marking. The natural channels crisscrossing the totora beds can be used and, ¡if necessary artificially enlarged, both for atera? and offshore boundaries. In the case of Huerta and Millojachi Huaraya in the Bahia de Puno, for example, the Rio Huile, a large natural channel, del ineates TURFs outer edge, while the smaller channels of the Ranja Mayo and Sanja Mayo separate the areas of tnis community from those of the neighbouring communities of Jirata Huaraya and Chincheros respectively. A few islets Tike that of Lampa K'ara are also used as boundary markers along these channels (Figure 10). Closer to shore, in very shal1ow waters, man-made markers persisting from the times in wnich the lake Tevel was Tower, such as lanes, ridges, trenches and wide furrows or sanjas are used. Stones are rarely used in those areas, simply because they are not locally available in sufficient quantities. 57 FIGURE 10: FACSIMILE OF THE MAP OF THE TOTORA REED BEDS OF THE COMMUNITIES OF HUERTA AND MILLOJACHI HUARAYAYCENFOR-Puno) PARCIBLIDA LES DE HUERTA 7 HVARATA x* No scale given on original Redrawn by the _outhor 58 As for natural markers, they are rarely visible on a low shore line hidden behind tall reeds. When they are high enough to be visible, whether in the form of hills, islands, as in Huerta and Millojachi Huaraya, or in the form sand dunes as in Ramis and Requena in the Lago Norte, people incorporate them into their system of boundary marking (Figure 10, 4 and 5). In the case of type II TURFs, a steeper shoreline and relief make land marks much more readily available for boundary identification. Natural features such as prominent rocks, hills or promontories on shore, and small islands offshore are often used for that purpose. in various communities of the southeastern shores of the Peninsula of Chucuito, such as Perca, Sihuicani and Huincalla for example, local fishermen consider that their respective fishing areas correspond to the open bays facing their communities which are limited by small peninsulas on both sides. Although it may occur much more frequently in TURFs of type 11 than in those of type 1, simply because of shore reTiet, onshore promontories may also play a role in the delineation of type 1 TURFs. In Huerta and Millohachi Huaraya, for example, TURFs lateral boundaries follow natural channels within the totora beds, but they also correspond to the onshore promontories of Cerro Ch'uri and Jallo Pata (Figure 10). When natural features are missing, TURFs holders rely upon material available locally to delineate their boundaries. Rocks and stones for example are found in such abundance in areas corresponding to type 11 TURFs that it is often a problem for local farmers to get rid of those they pull out of their fields. Rocks are piled up on the side of agricultural plots, or used to build terraces and sma11 wa11s to delineate private plots and communal boundaries. Submerged walls reminiscent of times of lower lake levels can be seen in many areas of type 11 TURFs . Most corrrespond to private rather than 59 delineation in TURFs of type 1 and 11, while they are almost always absent in those of type III. Lateral boundaries are also often better defined in TURFs of the first two types than in those of the third type, for the same reason. Because of this, variations may be expected in the degree of overlap between neighbouring TURFs according to their type. Finally, despite their crucial role as boundary markers, totora beds are more properly considered as resources. As informal questioning during fieldwork revealed, outsiders are well aware that they have to stay at least a couple of hundred meters away from them, not to become suspect of any wrongdoing. This leads me to consider the aquatic resources included within TURFs areas, thus TURFs resource dimension. 3.3. RESOURCES DIMENSION Lake Titicaca shore dwellers believe that aquatic boundaries apply to the aquatic space and al1 the resources therein, just as terrestrial boundaries do to land space and resources. Aquatic resources are of two types: biological and physical. Biological resources of economic interest include fish, aquatic macrophytes, and both waterfowl and their eggs. Physical resources include the land and shallow waters of the shoreline, both of which are used by shore dwellers for craft storage, navigation, fishing, macrophyte harvesting, live fish storage, waterfow! hunting and egg collection. The objective of this section is to determine which aquatic resources are likely to be affected by TURFs' existence. Since these resources are heterogenously distributed along and across the littoral zone, and since the outer edge of most TURF area coincides roughly with the 50 m isobath or with a distance of 1 km from shore (whichever comes first), the question is what proportion of each type of aquatic resources is found within the corresponding 62 Tittoral zone. This raises the question of fish horizontal migrations whether perpendicular to shore from the TURF-control1ed littoral fringe to the "no man's land" beyond it, or parallel to it from the fishing. zone of one community to that of another one, 3.3.1. Fish Resources. For this section, 1 have had to rely upon fishermen's accounts whenever published information was unavailable, or when the latter was of doubtful scientific value. The relevant information is summarized in graphical form in Figure 12. For this figure 1 have used the ecological zonation of Loubens, Osorio aná Sarmiento (1984) because it uses the same criteria as those upon which my distinction between TURF types ¡is based: depth, topography and the presence of aquatic macrophytes. The six zones considered are: the deep zone (zone 1: 50 to 284 m deep), the medium depth zone (zone 2: 10 to 50 m deep) with no bottom vegetation, the Chara zone which bottom is blanketed by Chara and and other lake plants collectively referred to as 1lachu by the shore dwellers (zone 3: about 2 to 10 m deep), the totora zone characterized by the presence of beds of Scirpus called totora by the shoe dwellers (zone 4), the littoral zone characterized by its shallowness, muddy bottom and the presence of llachu (zone 5), and the rocky zone which corresponds to steep rocky shores with 1ittle or no macrophytic vegetation (zone 6) (Loubens, et al. 1984; 155). A simple comparison of the characteristics of these zones and those of the three types of TURFs demonstrates a close correspondance. Areas of type 111 TURFs coincide with zone 6, while those of type 11 encompass zone 2 to 5, and those of type l encompass zone 5 and either part of zone 4, or the whole of zone 4 and part of zone 3 (Figure 8 and 12). 63: FIGURE 12: RESOURCE TITICACA TURFS Fig. l3a: Orestias agassii E juvenile form EZA pelagic form Ej demersal form 284 Fig.l3c: Orestias penilandii Spawning on “LLachu" Fig.l3e: Basilichthys bonariensis EE fingerlings Exmjuveniles EMoadults DIMENSION OF LAKE Fig.13b: O. luteus, olivaceus, mulleri Om 2-3| LO E O. luteus A 50 O. olivaceus MER O. mulleri 284| Fig. l3d: O. ispi, O. forgeti 21] Pm Type 1] 413 2 l 6 l Pl ll h Om 2-3 Spawning on shore 284 Fig.13f: S. gairdneri, Trichomyct. MEEAS. gaird- HEN Trichomyc- 64 This suggests that the boga spends most of its life cycle outside of the TURF- controlled littoral area (Figure 12c), except for spawning migrations which bring adult bogas to the macrophytes of zone 3 and 4 (Ibid.). c) Suche and Mauri The mauri and the suche are two forms of the same benthic species (Trichomycterus dispar) whose ecology is as poorly understood as that of the carachis. Mauris and carachis are often captured in the same nets, in zone 3 to 5 and in the lake's tributaries, while suches are caught at greater depths, in zone 1 and 2, and in the lake's largest tributaries (Figure 12f). Suches and mauris are caught at night and thought to spawn at the end of the dry season in zone 3 (Bustamante and Trevino 1976; DIREPE 1981), but there is no indication that spawning migrations occur. 1t has been claimed that the mauri is very sedentary, and that the suche roams much larger areas (DIREPE 1981) though Tittle is actual 1y known of the movements of either type of catfish. Given that suches are found further than the outer edge of the TURF-control1ed littoral area, ¡it may be suggested that they are unlikely to be much affected by the existence of TURFs, while mauris are as likely to be as the carachis. d) ispi. The commercia1ly exploited ispis are small pelagic fish (0. ispi and 0. forgeti), which live in relatively large schools in zone 1 or 2, and come to spawn on the macrophytes of zone 3 to 5 (Figure 12d) throughout the year, but mostly during the dry season (Bustamante and Trevino 1976; Loubens et al. 1984; Trevino et al. 1984). Echo-traces indicate large concentrations of fish thought to be ispi, at 30m depth (Johannesson et al. 1981), and as deep as 50m (Vaux et al. 1986: 8). Most ispi captures in zone 1 and 2 occur at night when, according to fishermen, ispis come closer to the surface (Nunez 1982). 67 This has led to the suggestion that ispis follow a diurnal pattern of vertical migration which has not yet been confirmed by experimental fishing or echo- sounding (Vaux et al. 1986). Large quantities of ispis are also harvested at night with beach seines and col lanchas in zone 4 and 5, when they come closer to shore (Bustamante and Trevino 1976; Levieil 1981: fieldnotes; Trevino et al. 1984). Ispi fishermen often underscore the unpredictability of ispi availability. In August 1984, for example, fishermen from Llachon were complaining that for the past two years, the ispis had stayed out of their reach around the islands of Taquili and Amantani. Similarly, those from Vilurcuni in the Lago Pequeno were complaining that in the previous six years, the ispis had come only twice to their area. The common belief among them is that ispis represent a large but elusive and unpredictable resource which should be taken advantage of whenever available, lest they disappear, or worse, lest they move into someone else's fishing area. Because ispis spend most of their 1ife cycle outside of the TURF- controlled littoral area, one could think that they are unlikely to be much affected by existing TURFs. However, the opposite is actual Ty more 1ikely to occur because the ispi fishing locations known so far, whether spawning beaches (in zone 4 or 5) or open water areas (in zone 1, 2 or 6), are few and because most of them are actually found within TURF-controTled areas. Only in those Tocations do ispis appear often enough for local fishermen to invest in gear appropriate for ispi fishing. e) Sil verside The silverside or pejerrey (B. bonariensis) is found at less than 5 m from the surface of all six identified zones (Figure 12e). The adults are 68 Found predominantly in zone 6, 1 and 2, and may come to zone 3 to spawn, the juvenile forms are found in zone 2 to 4, and the smallest juveniles in zone 5 (Wurtsbaugh 1974; Loubens et al. 1984; Trevino et al. 1984). Fishermen catch adult silversides offshore with surface gillnets less than two meters deep, and juveniles inshore with surface gi1lnets, beach seines or hooks. The silverside is known to migrate both horizonta11ly and vertical1y on daily and seasonal time scales. The pattern of these migrations is not yet wel1 understood, although it has been shown that the silverside moves inshore in the afternoons (Hurtsbaugh 1974; Trevino et al. 1984). Considering the speed and distance of the silverside's migrations, the latter is unlikely to remain within the TURF-contro1led littoral area during much of its life cycle. Moreover, and contrary to the ispi, the silverside can be caught almost anywhere in the Take, including some highly polluted areas (Trevino et al. 1984). It is thus very unTikely that any group of fishermen could reserve for itself any right of access to the. silverside, f) Rainbow trout The rainbow trout (Salmo gairdneri) is found in most parts of the lake, but more particularly in zone 1 to 3, and in waters shallower than 25 m of zone 6 (Figure 12f), (Everett 1973: 439). The large adults are harvested year round in these 4 zones (Alfaro et al. 1982), and in the mouths of Lake Titicaca's major tributaries, when they migrate upstream for spawníng at the end of the rainy season (Everett 1971; 1973). Because the trout spends most of its adult life roaming in relatively deep offshore waters, ¡dt ¡is most vulnerable at the time of its upstream spawning migration when it passes through narrow river mouthes. Access to the corresponding TURF areas is thus very valuable and severely restricted by their holders (Bustamante and Trevino 1976). 69 3.4. DEMOGRAPHIC DIMENSION In this section, based on fieldwork carried out in 1980, 1981 and 1984, 1 determine who belongs to the TURF holding category. Since only members of a TURF holding community have access to aquatic resources, 1 consider the criteria for community membership, according to which 1 distinguish between three categories of TURF holders: those who have acquired membership in a TURF holding communtty by birth, those who have acquired it by assimilation, and those who have established ritual or fictive kinship ties with members of a TURF holding community. 3.4.1. TURF holding communities ln the previous sections, 1 have demonstrated that al1 the shore communities of Lake Titicaca hold TURF over the area of the lake immediately adjacent to their portion of the shoreline. 1 have also shown that these communities are we11 defined, local ly based socio-political institutions, many of which have the special administrative status of peasant communities. However, the question arises as to whether inland communities could not also hold some TURFs. In this section 1 demonstrate that Lake Titicaca TURFs are held exclusively by shore communities. The application of the verticality principle to the communities of the Altiplano entails that shore communities could have retained access over distant lands and resources, and conversely, that inland communities could have done so over Lake Titicaca shore areas. 1 could find various onshore communities with access to distant inland resources. The members of the community of Maquercota and of Santa Rosa de Yanaque in the Lago Sur, for example, have retained their traditional access rights to small lakes about 100 kilometers further inland (Velasco 1978; Chirapo 1982; Flores 1983). 7 Those of various communities of the Moho and Conima districts still maintain their traditional connections with the Amazonian slopes of the Andes, often combining agricultural practices in both areas (Collins 1982; Painter 1982). However, contrary to the predictions of the verticality model, 1 could not find a single example of an inland community whose members had any rights, even temporary ones, to Lake Titicaca's resources, nor could 1 find any reference of inland dwellers establishing temporary fishing settlements on the lake's shores or on those of a neíghbouring lagoon. Apparently, inTand dwelTers never came to the Take shore to fish but to exchange their products with those of shore dweTlers, including dried fish from the lake. Members of distant communities, such as the 1lama and alpaca herders of Paratia and Vila for example, still come once a year to the shores of the Lago Norte for this purpose (Flores 1977), as confirmed in 1984 by the fishermen of Pusi (Taraco). This result can probably be explained by the predominance of the Altiplano mode of economic integration over the archipelago one, around Lake Titicaca, during most of the Tiahuanaku era, from 200 B.C. to 1000 A.D, approximately (Brownan 1981). In the altiplano model, access to goods from other ecological zones is achieved through trade networks between specialized communities rather than direct exploitation by members of a single, unspecialized community. Thus members of communities specialized in cameloid herding obtained fish from the lake through trading with shore communities, rather than through fishing. Having demonstrated that membership in shore communities determines access to aquatic resources, 1 can now consider the criteria which govern the latter: birth, marriage, and fictive kinship, 3.4.2: Access by birth Community membership is granted to the children of community members, who reside within the community territory, although only periodic residence may be 73 required. Membership in official1y recognized peasant communities is theoretical1y granted to the heirs of former members of either sex, who have reached legal age or who have established a family, who live within the community, but who do not own agricultural premises within or outside the community, nor earn significant income from outside sources, nor belong to another peasant community (Decreto Supremo 37-704: Articulo 23a to 23g). Membership can also be acquired by assimilation, or common law marriage with a community member, providing approval is granted by a majority of the community members present at a General Assembly meeting [Artículo 24a to 24c), However, in practice, the kinship and residency requirements appear to be the only decisive ones. On the other hand community membership may not always be sufficient for an individual to get access to communal TURFs, as when the community is divided into sectors, and the individual considered happens to be from the inland sector. This is ¡l1lustrated by a conflict in the Bolivian community of Compi on the northern shores of the Lago Pequeno, in which the residents of the coastal sector tried to deny traditional rights of access to the shoreline to those from the inland one (Buechler and Buechler 1971: 52-53). However, examples of such conflicts are rare. instead, informants recurrently confirmed the rights of access to the shoreline of the inhabitants of the inland sectors, on the grounds that the Tatter owned land within the onshore sectors, and that they had kinship ties with members of these sectors. Fishermen from Escallani (Capachica), for example, acknowledge that those from the landlocked community of Isanura, a former sector of Escalldani, could and did operate within Escallani's area. Male community members who no longer live within their community may still fish in the TURF area of their original community. This is true if they 74 whether the groom himself belongs to a shore or an inland community. i - A young man from a shore community who marries a woman from another shore community is generally entitled to operate in the TURF area of his wife's original community. Other fishermen are unlikely to-deny him access, although they may resent his competition. One of the collaborating fishermen from Ichu Raya (Puno), for example, reported that he could go fishing in the area of Pallalla [Acora), his wife's original community, but that he felt more comfortable when she would come fishing with him. This right of access is not simply transmitted by a woman to her husband, but also to her household, thus children and grand children. Many fishermen have access to the TURF zone of a neighbouring community, because ¡it was the original community of their mother or grand mother, as demonstrated by fishermen's common indication that "they-can fish in the area of [another [otra comunidad], porque' su mama es de alla”), or "because they have relatives there” ("porque tiene sus parientes -o su parentesco- alla"). Another common expression, though not as self explanatory, to confirm this, is that "they can operate in the fishing area of [another community], because they have guarantees" ("puede ir a pescar en la zona de [otra comunidad] porque hay garantias"), or "because they are (wel1) known" ("porque es conocido). Fishermen do not usually have to travel very far from their community's fishing zone to that of the community from which their mother or grandmother came. They are frequently close together ¡f not almost contiguous. Some fishermen, however, are required to travel over fairy Tong distances. A fisherman from Barco-Chucuito, for example, had to travel out of the Puno Bay and around the Chucuito Peninsula to reach the island of Socca where he had relatives, and where he could fish. 77 ii - A young man from an inland community who marries a woman from a shore community, 1s also entitled to go fishing in the TURF area of his wife's original community. Similarly, this access right is transmitted to this woman's heirs, even ¡if they live in a landlocked community. Individuals from inland communities, whose mother or grand mother origina11y came from a shore communtty, also have access to the latter's fishing zone. 1f they do not own a craft themselves, they may go fishing with their wife's father or one of her brothers, as crew members, and receive a share of the total catch, or the catch of their own nets ¡f they bring any. Since it may be time consuming for them to commute on foot from their own community to the shore every time they want to go fishing, they may move temporarily with some of their shore dwelling relatives. One fisherman from Barco (Chucuito), for example, reported that three of his relatives from the inland community of Laykoma used to come and live in Barco to go fishing almost daily, for up to three months at a time. He also indicated that they would have to purchase a small fishing balsa which would last approximately that long, since they would be not be allowed to harvest totora reeds from the communal beds of $il1amuri. 3.44. Access by fictive kinship The ties of fictive kinship between a fisherman and a family from another shore community when the fisherman becomes co-parent of one of this family's children may allow this fisherman to operate within the TURF area of this family's community. By sponsoring one of this family's children for some of the rituals which the child has to undergo as part of his or her growing up, the co-parent (i.e. compadre) creates a privileged relationship with this family (Michaud 1973; Lambert 1977). Fictive kinship entails a number of reciprocal obligations, just as true 78 kinship does. For example, people are expected to offer the goods they have to exchange or to sell, to their co-parents first, or to reserve some of these goods to meet the latter's needs, and eventual1y to give them a preferential rate of exchange or a better price. Mutual help for tasks requiring a large amount of labour can also be requested from co-parents in critical periods of the agricultural cycle, and so can loans of smal1 amounts of money (Brush 1977; Brown 1978; Hickman and Stuart 1977). Although co-parenthood does not necessarily guarantee access to the TURF area of the co-parents' community, it does so in some of the communities with type Il1 TURFs. Various fishermen from the community of Llachon (Capachica), for example, could operate in the fishing zones of Amantani island and of some communities of the Chucuito peninsula because of their fictive kinship ties with members of those communites. In addition co-parenthood had the advantage of insuring them of a place to stay, should the weather preclude them from sailing back home. Having identified the criteria for community membership and access to TURF area, 1 can now consider the short to Tong term deals which can be worked out between individuals and the members of the communities in whose TURF areas they want to operate. 3.4.5. Strategies to gain access to TURFs a) "Making friends" Short term agreements are easier to enter, because they do not imply a commitment to repeat similar reciprocal exchanges in the future. They can be reached simply, when outsiders offer some coca leaves, alcohol or food, for immediate or later consumption, to the fishermen of the areas where they want to operate for a while (a few nights to a few weeks). Fish or agricultural products such as cereals and tubers can also be given to Jocal shore dwellers. 79 FIGURE 13: ACCESS TO LAKE TITICACA TURF AREAS BY BIRTH AND BY MARRIAGE. FIG.13A: THEORETIÍCAL. ACCESS Ci = Ego's community Ce: Ego's mother's c. Cs 3= Ego's wife's c. -- L- pL-- Cas Ego's fother's o mother's commun. S5= Egos mothers ] mother's commun. PTT C3 1 Á Ego o : O Female relative T A Male relative FIG. 138: EXAMPLE OF INFORMANT FROM BARCO cs, o €s l a Ci= Barco C2z K'api A informant C4= Karina A Male relative C5= Laykoma O Female relatíve 82 series of nearby communities ín addition to his own, as a consequence of his true kinship ties (Figure 13). and eventually of his fictive kinship ties too. He may be allowed to operate within the TURF areas of the communities from which his mother and eventual 1y those from which the mother of his mother and the mother of his father originally came from (C2, C4 and C5 respectively on Figure 13). Finally, he may be allowed to operate within the area of the community from which his wife came from (03 on Figure 13). It is unlikely though not impossible that a fisherman could be lucky enough to get access to five TURF zones. One informant from Barco (Chucuito), for example, had access to Karina on the Chucuito Peninsula where his paternal grandmother was from, to the Uros islands of K'api where his paternal grandfather and his father were from, and of course to Barco where his mother and maternal grandfather were from, Because his maternal grandmother was from the landlocked community of Laykoma, he did not have access to a fourth TURF area, but instead had to facilitate access to the lake for some relatives on his-mother's side. Although one could think that the patterns of access to TURF areas are regulated by a we11 established, and homogeneous set of norms common to a11 shore communities, a number of exceptions demonstrate the limits of these norms. Access to the TURF area of a woman's community may not be granted to the consanguinal relatives of a fisherman who resides uxorilocal1y, for example. Yet an informant from Escallani (Capachica) could fish in the waters of Taquili island where his brother had :settled with his wife. Similarly, by settling in her husband's shore community a woman from an inland community does not normally confer access to the latter's TURF area to her blood relatives. As mentioned earlier, the informant from Camacani whose sister had settled in the shore community of Pallalla wouTd not have been able to fish there on his own, but by crewing for his sister's husband he got access to the 83 aquatic resources of the Jatter's community. I did identify during fieldwork a number of exceptions to general practices, where individuals who normal 1y would not have been entitled to it, had been granted access to TURF areas because of some special circumstances. The reverse also occurs, and individuals may be denied access to which their consanguinal or affinal ties entitles them. But identification of the latter would have required a different approach such as a survey of inland communities. Documenting these exceptions would show how much variability there may be in the way shore dwellers enforce their TURFs. It would be very difficult to estimate the exact proportion of fishermen with access to more than one TURF area because of true or of fictice kinship ties. The number of fishing sites indicated by the fishermen interviewed in 1976 (Table 6) provides some indication of this proportion. TABLE 6: DISTRIBUTION OF FREQUENCIES FOR THE NUMBERS OF FISHING SITES PER INTERVIEWED FISHERMAN FROM LAKE TITICACA (DATA SOURCE: IMARPE-PUNO 1976) Number of sites AbsoTute Relative 1 78 31.8 56.3 2 60 BID 3 57 23.3 4 28 11.4 43.6 5 to? 22 9.0 Total 245 100 100 As underscored earlier (cf. section 3.1.1.), the names of these fishing sites indicate wiether fishermen operate within the TURF areas of more than one shore community. An analysis of these names, for a11 interviewed 84 Chirapo 1982: 11). The same pattern of individual ownership also occurs in the rare parts of type 111 TURF areas where totora can be found (eg sma11 bays). However, in some TURFs areas of type l, the totora beds are divided into two sections, the closest to shore being comprised of individual1y owned patches, and the farthest one being accessible to all community members (Martinez 1962: 22; Hickman 1963:3). The explanation commonTy provided for the privatization of part of the totora beds, is that the individual ly owned patches correspond to the private plots of Tand on which owners have planted totora reeds when these plots were submerged by the rising lake level (Hickman 1963: 3; Gonzales 1979: 87; Chirapo 1982: 11) c) Llachu weeds Any member of the TURF holding community can harvest 11achu weeds without restriction on the location.of the harvest, even on submerged plots of land which are individualiy owned. Informants justify this by indicating that contrary to the totora reeds, the 11lachu weeds cannot be planted. Still, Tiachu weeds do contribute to reinforce shore dwellers' sense of territoriality over nearshore waters, as ¡1 lustrated by some conflicts between neighbouring communities. During the drought of 1983, for example, when competition for cattle fodder was acute, members of the community of Sajo appealed to the Ministry of Agriculture in Puno, to repell trespassers from the neighbouring communities of Chatuma and Villa Santiago de Ccama (Letter of the community of Sajo to the Regional Director of the MINA, July 11, 1983), d) Waterfowl and their eggs Waterfowl hunting and egg collecting are accessible to a11 community members without any restriction of species. Some restriction on where eggs 87 can be collected may occur, because waterfowl nest in the thickest of the totora beds, and eggs seekers avoid the privately owned patches. Juvenile waterfowl captured alive may be raised with domestic fowl, thus becoming the property of the family who raises them. e) Aquatic space Shore dwellers consider both the water column and its bottom as resources. Direct use rights over the bottom are held by the community as a whole or individually by ¡ts members, depending on depth and distance from shore. Outsiders would not be allowed to plant totora reeds on any part of the bottom of a TURF area. The same holds true for the water column even if transit by outsiders across TURF-controlled areas is tolerated in the open water parts of these areas where totora reeds cannot be damaged or stolen. Outsiders are cannot use it for trout aquaculture without compensating the community in whose TURF area the floating pens are located. Failure to do so explains some of the problems which have plagued trout aquacul ture on Lake Titicaca. Because such activities were often imposed on local communities, they were deeply resented by TURF holders except for the few who benefitted directly from them, and sabotage occurred more than once (Levieil and Paz 1984). In conclusion, members of shore communities hold direct use rights over the aquatic resources encountered within TURF areas. These include the rights to harvest and to husband aquatic resources in any location within a TURF area, except for the privately owned patches of totora reeds where these rights belong to the patch owner. 1 found no situation, theoretically possible (Crocombe 1974), in which rights of direct use over different aquatic resources within the same portion of aquatic space were held by different actors. And the only example of subsidiary rights of direct use 1 could 88 identify was that of transit through the open waters of TURF areas. 3.5.2. Rights of indirect economic gain Shore dwellers hold a right to indirect economic gain for the exploitation of some of the aquatic resources encountered in their collective TURF area. There is a 1ot of variety depending of the resources and of the communities considered. a) Fish resources The right of indirect economic gain from the fish resources of a TURF holding is held by the community as a whole. However, it is considered acceptable practice for community members to receive a compensation for allowing outsiders to fish in the TURF area of their community. As indicated earlier, a common expression used by outsiders to refer to this practice is “to make friends" with TURF holders (hacen amistades) by giving them - something, either a ritual gift of coca Jeaves and alcohol, or a more pragmatic gift of fish or agricultural products. * TURF holders may also request compensation in the form of a preferential treatment when purchasing or bartering fish from known trespassors. Fishermen from Socca island, for example, indicated that customers from Santa Rosa de Yanaque always demanded a preferential price, or a more generous overweight, or yapa, for the fish which they claimes had been caught in their TURF area. Similarly, an elderly lady from the outskirts of Puno indicated that she required the fishermen from Chimu to give her a better price for the fish which had been caught in the fishing zone of her community. As she said "we tell the fishermen from these communities (who'trespass) to Tower their prices, because the fish they sell comes from our (area of the) lake" (a esos pescadores [quienes incursionan] le decimos de bajar el precio, porque el 89