factors influencing conflict, Apuntes de Derecho Cambiario

¡Descarga factors influencing conflict y más Apuntes en PDF de Derecho Cambiario solo en Docsity! FACTORS INFLUENCING CONFLICT IN THE 21ST CENTURY n his treatise On War, Clausewitz famously introduced war as phenomenon which, left to its own devices, would go to extremes. In his Chapter 1 he said that “war is an act of force, and there is no logical limit to the application of that force. Each side, therefore, compels its opponent to follow suit; a reciprocal action is started which must lead, in theory, to extremes.” Right after this statement, though, he went on to say that drifting to uncontrolled violence did never occur in practice, among other things because of the political nature of war. “The political object -the original motive for the war- will thus determine the military objective to be reached and the amount of effort it requires.” Politics, then, acts as a moderating factor of violence in war. Clausewitz also alluded to the existence of other elements which limit the exercise of force like international law and custom. He ascribes them, however, only a limited role in weakening the use of force. Nevertheless, the useful point in this discussion is the realization that war is not a theoretical exercise performed under ideal conditions in a laboratory. Rather, it takes place in real life and is, therefore, subject to the influence of some factors which act as a restraint to the use of force or to war itself, or as a catalyst of violence, exacerbating it in war. The first limitation to violence rests on the very finitude of the available human and material resources a power may commit to war and in their destructive power. From the point of view of this lesson, however, the following limitative factors will be considered: I 2 • The International System, its nature and its rules • The moral and values system of the parties in conflict • The perception the stakeholders have of self, others, and of the conflict and its causes THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM: THE NOTION OF SYSTEM Human societies have been growing in complexity and size since the beginning of rational life. Modern societies are composed of many individual entities -states, organizations, transnational groups, coalitions, supra-state institutions, etc.- which interact with one another to shape the whole and to produce a synergistic effect. Based on these facts, since the 1950s, the behavioral revolution in the social sciences and growing acceptance of political realism in international relations led scholars to conceptualize international politics as a system, using the language of systems theory. A system is an assemblage of units, objects, or parts united by some form of regular interaction, so that “the whole is more than the sum of its parts,” or “an organized whole made up of components that interact in a way distinct from their interaction with other entities and which endures over some period of time.” In 1894, Durkheim explained that in highly organized systems, the division of labor contributed to the maintenance of societies. Systems have a dynamic behavior and evolve because of internal and external pressures and influence on the system. Talcott Parsons (1951), promoter of “structural functionalism,” delineated four functional states -not mutually exclusive- of social systems: • Adaptation (to the external environment): the system adjusts to external pressures. The system and the environment interact and both change • Goal attainment or growth • Integration with other social systems • Latency (homeostasis) or pattern maintenance. Systems, therefore, tend to a state of stability or equilibrium. Absent any kind of external influence, and if the parts in the system were internally static, then the system would perpetuate the pattern of interactions. Because this is not the case, then systems live in a constant process of change-adaptation to change-equilibrium-change. If the balance is broken, then the system will adapt to restore that balance, usually at a different place. Systems have boundaries, marked by the intensity of the interactions, that differentiate them from other systems. Systems may be closed, or self-contained or, more often, may have porous boundaries and be open to interaction with other systems, or be a part of a broader system; or with the environment. In the case of the International System, its members -the nodes- are systems in themselves (think, for example, on a nation-state which, internally, consists of many interrelated elements) open to interaction with other similar entities. For this reason, the International System is often referred to as a System of Systems. In it, entities at different levels are the nodes of the system. Within that system, they are linked by many different functional interactions of which Conflict is but one of the Subsystems within the International System. 5 Constructivism: Claims that aggressive power politics does not necessarily flow from anarchy. They are a result of state identity and the process of interstate interactions. While power remains an important factor in IIRR, what states do about it varies based on their cultures, identities, and interests. For example, USA does not see as threatening the rise of the EU because both share culture and interests, and identities. Something different to what happens with China. POWER DISTRIBUTION IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM. POLARITY From the theoretical point of view, International Systems may be defined based on how power is distributed within them. It must be remembered that, at the system level of analysis, how power is distributed among the members of the system is one of the main causes of conflict and war. From this point of view, we analyzed here the following models: • Unipolar or hegemonic: One state commands influence in the international system (USA in 1991). Unipolarity is not the same as EMPIRE. It presupposes the existence of sovereign nations. It is inherently peaceful: absence of war among great powers; low level of competition for security or prestige. Example is the post-Cold War system immediately after the demise of the USSR. There may be wars among small actors, but only as tolerated by the great power, and with little to no impact on the stability of the system, at least on the short run. • Bipolar: Two powers of similar weight balance each other (Athens and Sparta). Both powers generate own spheres of influence. The possibility of war among the powers is low, particularly if they are nuclear, because the stakes are high; on the contrary, there is possibility for lower intensity war by proxies. • Multipolar: More than two powers have similar level of influence on the international system (Europe in the XIX century). This model may also be referred to as balance of power system. There is no full agreement as to whether multipolarity is more or less stable than bipolarity. Classic realists argue that they are more stable because multipolarity creates a greater number of possible coalitions that might form against any possible aggressor, thus reinforcing deterrence against aggression. In bipolarity, by contrast, the allies of the leading powers are too weak to play a significant role in balancing against an aggressor. In addition, with several strong powers in multipolarity, each was less likely to focus all of its energies on a single rival, and cross-cutting cleavages over multiple issues tended to diffuse conflicts from escalating along a single axis. Neo-realists disagree on the argument that multipolar systems are more uncertain and that, for this very reason, there are higher possibilities of miscalculation in them than in bipolar ones. Historical evidence on this is mixed (Levy & Thompson, 2010; 33). International systems may change due to its internal dynamics and evolution (for example the long years of the Peloponnesian War gave way to a different era that overcame the city-state framework and replaced that order with an Empire-based one (first, the Persians; then the 6 Hellenism of Alexander the Great), or due to sudden cataclysms like war or even natural catastrophes (arrival of Europeans to America, for instance). THE THEORY OF THE “DEMOCRATIC PEACE” Kant formulated the idea in On Perpetual Peace. Simply stated, the theory posits that democracies do not fight each other. The idea bases its arguments on the idea that: • Democratic leaders are accountable to the electors. Decisionmakers must answer to the voters for war, and therefore have an incentive to seek alternatives • Such statesmen have practice settling matters by discussion, not by arms, and do the same in foreign policy • Democracies view non-democracies or their people as threatening, and go to war with them over issues which would have been settled peacefully between democracies; • Democracies tend to be wealthier than other countries, and the wealthy tend to avoid war, having more to lose. This is an untested theory and will remain so until all states on Earth become democratic. Evidence seems to show, however, that this is not necessarily the case. At the end of the 19th century, for instance, Spain and the United States fought against each other in the Spanish- American War for the Spanish possessions in America and the Philippines. Both were democracies, albeit imperfect, it may be argued. THE INTERNATIONAL ORDER TODAY The USA has instituted today’s international order. It has its origin in Wilsonianism and President Wilson’s 14 points, declared at the end of WW I to support negotiations and in an effort to attain lasting peace. It was a form of liberal order. The cornerstone of the system was the League of Nations, predecessor of the UN. The League eventually failed because it did not prevent WW II. Design flaws and, above all, lack of commitment from the USA were the main causes of its failure. The end of WW II brought the redefinition of the International System in a world order ruled by the power of the United States, which held the nuclear monopoly. The USA created an institutionalized system based on the UN, the IMF and the World Bank. It supported the economic resurgence of Europe with the Marshall Plan. Soon, the system developed as a Bipolar one with the Soviet Union elevated to the rank of superpower, particularly after having broken the US nuclear monopoly. This situation remained stable, with nuclear power as the linchpin of the system’s stability, after the implosion of the Soviet Union. After that, the world lived a truly unipolar moment in which the USA raised to the level of only superpower, “hyper-power”, in the words of Hubert Vèdrine, a French politician. Under the US umbrella, a dense network of international/supranational organizations have grown, some of them within the so-called UN-system to set rules on virtually any area of activity: UNESCO, WTO, ICC, NATO, EU… 7 9/11 shook the foundations of the international system. The USA awakened to the fact that maybe it was not as safe at home as she believed. The country engaged in two military operations (Iraq and Afghanistan) against Islamic terrorism, which did not enjoy the same kind of consensus Desert Storm deserved. Meanwhile, other powers, -China, Russia, India, etc- began to emerge, or reemerged as alternative sources of power, not challenging, but slowly closing the gap between them and the USA. Today, the system has a broad range of actors: nation-states; non-state actors; empowered individuals; failed or failing states; ungoverned regions; IO/NGOs; MNCs; … In that sense, it is a MULTIPOLAR system although it is strongly dominated by the United States. The system is threatened by a plethora of different threats like transnational terrorism; conventional; WMD, organized crime; pandemics; natural catastrophes and global warming; taking place among the unstoppable forces of globalization, information revolution, or wholesale urbanization. It has a variable architecture in which stable, decades-long coalitions or Treaties now have to compete with other short-lived ones. There are bi-lateral, multi-lateral alliances and coalitions, both formal and informal, among states and non-state actors. ETHICS IN CONFLICT At this moment, after all we have said already about war, it has to be clear that it is limited by its political nature. War is not a butchery, but a rational activity subordinated to the objectives of politics based on a calculation of costs and benefits.1 Other reasons of practical nature cooperate to exercise restraint in war. Here we may refer to the deliberate intention of limiting a retribution or vengeance that might end up sinking man into the abyss of primitive barbarism. More importantly, there are ethical reasons behind efforts at limiting violence in war. Man is a moral being with an ethical conscience that enables him to distinguish between good and evil, and to choose the former over the latter. Concepts like human dignity, respect of life, etc., being part of natural law, are etched in that ethical conscience. In the Christian tradition we may hark back to the Book of Exodus. On this, the Ten Commandments say: “You shall not murder.” “ You shall not covet your neighbor's house. You shall not covet your neighbor's wife, or his manservant or maidservant, his ox or donkey, or anything that belongs to your neighbor." Ethical considerations in war serve, therefore, the double objective of establishing criteria to sanction the use of violence in the name of the state and of society, and to distinguish just exercise of warfare from sheer butchery, and that of minimizing its undesirable consequences, limiting its field of action to spare civilian population and to preserve individual or public property (of cultural interest, for example), not directly linked to the war objectives. 1 Having said that, irrationality of individuals with responsibilities in war cannot be ruled out altogether. In such cases, irrational violence or cruelty is a possibility. 10 Ius in Bello Ius in Bello seeks to limit the suffering war inflicts both to soldiers and civilians. Not everything is permissible in war. This is what this branch of International Law regulates: what conducts are permissible and what are not. There are two main subdivisions in Ius in Bello, based on the “Geneva” and “The Hague” Conventions. “Geneva” law is mainly concerned with the protection of victims of armed conflict. “Hague” war is concerned with the methods and means of warfare, including control of weapons type and usage, and on tactics and the general conduct of hostilities. Both Laws fall under the rubric of International Humanitarian Law (IHL). THE HAGUE LAW Hague Convention 1899 Hague Convention 1907 Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Convention GENEVA LAW 4 Geneva Conventions (1949): I Wounded and Sick on Land II Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked at Sea III Prisoners of War IV Civilians Ius in Bello follows the principles of proportionality (the level of force employed in an action must be proportional to the importance of the target and to the means employed by the enemy) in the understanding that the minimum use of force should be done in any case; discrimination (differentiating between combatants and non-combatants in a way to preserve the latter from the negative effects of the use of force in war); and due care (constant care to avoid or minimize any loss of civilian life). This conceptual framework is a guiding light, not a prescriptive manual, to orient action in warfare. Its application depends on the individuals, and on the interpretation they make of the specific situation. Even if the basic rules in IHL are well settled, its application remains problematic and inconsistent. This is due, on the one hand, to human capacity to inflict great suffering to other beings in times of stress and conflict and, on the other hand, to disputes about its applicability, and about the degree to which it is based upon reciprocal obligation. Does its application require or assume reciprocity? Is it inapplicable without this reciprocity? There is always a tension in warfare between ethical principles and the demands of the mission. International Law rules offer only guidelines to orient individual conscience. At the end, its application does not exonerate from individual responsibility for own action or lack thereof. It has to be done on a case by case basis. Although universal in contents, the norms cannot be applied always in the same way. It is necessary to consider the particular circumstances of each case. Ethical behavior is an individual, non-transferable responsibility. Commanders, at every level, must ensure all personnel to them subordinated behaves ethically. That begins from peacetime. The increase of intra-state wars, many of them in the developing world does not bide well in what concerns application of IHL as the cases of Rwanda and Srebrenica show. This does not mean that nation-states, even democratic ones, are free from committing crimes against IHL, as the massacre of My Lai (1968) or the episode of Abu Ghraib in 2004 show. 11 Part of the problem today has to do with the new character of “war among the people.” In such an environment, frontlines and rearguards are not clearly defined; frequently, it is impossible to tell combatants from non-combatants. This has legal implications because detainees may be deprived of the Prisoner of War (POW) status. Leaving aside the issue of the immorality of certain of these behaviors, they may have a negative impact on the legitimacy of a cause and complicate the building of alliances or coalitions of the willing. Potential allies may hesitate to join a coalition if they perceived the legitimacy of the cause is or may get tainted by human rights violations, when not by outright war crimes. A major advance in IHL was the introduction in 2002 of the International Criminal Court (ICC). The Court is competent to prosecute cases of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and, potentially in the future, the crime of aggression. Its jurisdiction extends over nationals of states parties and crimes committed on their territory if they are unable or unwilling to prosecute themselves. With all its deficiencies, the ICC tries to fix, albeit only partially, the issue of the lack of a coercive instrument to punish this kind of heinous crimes, and to prevent its commitment in the first place. Ius Post Bellum This concept was born after WW II as a consequence of the huge reconstruction efforts undertaken in Europe and Japan. Humanitarian interventions at the end of the 20th century – mostly in the Balkans- brought this issue to the Forefront. U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, and the chaos that ensued has increased interest in this issue. There are two main approaches to Ius Post Bellum: • Minimalist Approach: The intention in this approach is to prevent excesses by victors through limiting what they are entitled to do. In this approach, Ius Post Bellum is limited to vindication of rights that gave just cause for war. For this school, the existence of Ius Post Bellum as a separate branch of IHL is unnecessary and redundant because the moral and legal obligations of a victor are subsumed within the doctrinal corpus of Just War. The view in this approach is that victors are NOT entitled to assume the reins of government after victory has been declared. The point here is that such a move could be a way to expand sovereignty at the expense of the vanquished, something not in line with the Law of War and Armed Conflict (LOAC). Conversely, there is no obligation to improve the status quo ante. The validity of this principle may be challenged under the argument that not improving the status quo ante may reproduced the causes that provoked the conflict in the first place. • Maximalist Approach: In this case, the victor acquires special responsibilities toward the vanquished. As the saying goes: ‘If you Break it, you Own it.’ Among the responsibilities of the victors, we may find some like, for example, judging war criminals, govern the vanquished in case of collapse of the civil administrations, or taking measures to avoid sowing the seeds of future war. There are some grey spots in this approach. For example; what happens if the war was not initiated by the victor? Why should he be harnessed with the onus of reconstructing the administration and the economy of the aggressor? Other issues may be that of the legitimacy of the effort, or that of the victor overstepping his legal mandate and, not the least, the fact that the whole idea is totally alien to the long 12 tradition of Just War Doctrine. Finally, it assumes the existence of an international consensus on how to reconstruct the state of the vanquished. PERCEPTIONS IN CONFLICT: ROLE OF MEDIA In Lesson 1 we saw how conflict has a psychological dimension. In Galtung’s Conflict Triangle, the media operate mostly on the “attitude” vortex. Studies done on the media role in armed conflict have come to contradictory conclusions. But most of them agree on certain issues. An overwhelming majority of decision-makers and political elites are convinced of the influence of the media. Their presence and influence cannot, thus, be neglected. There is much emphasis put on technology today, but it is not technology which produces the impact. Media accessibility is the key. In this, the radio has played a determinant role in some conflicts in which the rural environment has been central. In Cambodia, the UN successfully set up radio UNTAC as an alternative source of credible news that eventually made elections possible and led to a 95% turnout (…) In Rwanda, Radio Television des Milles Colliines was a key instrument and catalyst to genocide (…) ISAF distributed radios; or the German Volksempfänger… Media structure usually reflects political structures existing in society at large. This means media are not neutral observers, even if they are impartial and honest. Media have often close ties with the state, political elites and economic decision-makers. Political power may be translated into power over the media. In the run up to a violent conflict a critical role of the media is its ability to mobilize large groups of people. Conflicts are not just about material resources, but also about legitimacy. A credible actor is more likely to mobilize support from a wide audience (for these reasons, most regimes try to show a ‘legitimate’ façade. Media are a key element in this struggle for legitimacy. Media framing gives a basic image of the other actors, as well as defining the incompatibility (the “contradiction”) and interpreting their behavior. Through agenda-setting, the media can be a catalyst to reducing or creating a legitimacy gap. Media can also be an indicator of changes in given situation leading to conflict (for example, when they begin to de-humanize the enemy) The modern communications revolution, creating new decentralized networks of instant and cheap knowledge and information transmission globally, is having a transformative effect, both on the nature of conflict and on that of conflict resolution. Media reports offer a distorted image of reality because of the demands of “frequency” (media dictate what counts as “news”; agenda setting); “threshold” (numbers of death in Africa have to reach a much higher threshold to count as news than numbers of deaths in Europe or the US); and “negativity” (bad news crowds out good news). Mass communications have always been a two-edged sword. On the one hand, they inform and educate, and this can empower and unite; on the other hand, they also divide people and turn them against each other. (Media created mass society and helped to educate and inform; they also fostered nationalism). In conflict, people view others through the prism of pre-formed perceptions, stereotypes, and ‘enemy images.’ The mass media filter the news people receive and influence perceptions of