Political Regimes: A Comparative Analysis of Dictatorships - Lavezzolo's Course Materials, Apuntes de Sociología

¡Descarga Political Regimes: A Comparative Analysis of Dictatorships - Lavezzolo's Course Materials y más Apuntes en PDF de Sociología solo en Docsity! TOPIC 5. POLITICAL REGIMES: DICTATORSHIPS Sebastián Lavezzolo Comparative Politics Course 2017-18 Comparative Politics: Topic 5 The concept of dictatorship » Dictatorships are regimes in which rulers acquire power by means other than competitive elections + Waysto become a dictator: - Coup d'etat — Palace putsch (internal, bloodless coup) — Revolution » Isthere a legal way through which a democracy is transformed into a dictatorship? Comparative Politics: Topic 5 The case of Nazi Germany (3/3) » Basic chronology: July 1932: elections, defeat of the SPD (22%), success of the Nazi party (NSDAP, 37%, as opposed to 18% in 1930) No government was formed, elections were called for November November 1932: elections (the Nazis lose support, 33%) New parliamentary stalemate, von Papen resigns and is replaced by Hindenburg Hindenburg appoints a military (Schleicher) as new chancellor. He is unable to form goverment Hindenburg appoints Hitler as chancellor on January 1933 Burning of the Reichstag on 27 February 1933; Hitler issues an emergency decree that abolishes civil rights (wide powers of imprisonment and execution) Hitlers calls elections for March (the Nazis get 45% of the vote) » The Law for the Relief of the People and of the Reich is passed by the Parliament in March 1933 (it required a 2/3 majority): government power to enact legislation government power to change the constitution Comparative Politics: Topic 5 The evolution of dictatorships, 1946-2008 S 88 E 8 R3 2 a 58 35 = > 8 85 2 3 nl an o Sol] » li Aer 8. I 1946 1955 1964 1973 1982 1991 2000 Year MA Number of dictatorships (left axis) MIA Change in the number of dictatorships Dictatorships as a percentage of all countries (right axis) FIGURE 2.1. The number and change in the number of dictatorships, 1946-2008. Comparative Politics: Topic 5 Traditional classifications (1/2) 53 A Typology of Dictatorships DICTATORSHIPS MONARCHY CIVILIAN Po] DOMINANT PARTY PERSONALISTIC MILITARY Comparative Politics: Topic 5 Four dimensions of dictatorships (2/3) Military AMAN]: None (Iran, 1979-) Indirect (Turkey) Personal (Spain, 1937-1977) Corporate (Chile, 1977-1990) Al) parties Parties banned (Argentina, 1976-82) Single party (Cuba) Multiple parties (Mexico) Legislative selection None (Saudi Arabia 1946-2008) Unelected (Indonesia 1960-65) One candidate per seat (Romania 1947-1989) Largest party controls > 75% seats (Mexico 1946-1975) Largest party controls <75% seats (Mexico 1976-1993) Nonpartisan legislature (Kuwait) SONES) Unelected (Saudi Arabia, 1946-2008) One party / candidate (Syria, 1971-2008) Selected by an unelected body (Brazil (1964-1979) Elected by more than 75% of the vote (Singapore) Elected by less than 75% of the vote (Peru, 1992-2000) Comparative Politics: Topic 5 Four dimensions of dictatorships (3/3) rama air Deterbabica of Lepedative ud Executive Selection, 1946-2008 Exccutive Selection Elected by Legislativo Unelected Once Small a Selection Executive Party Body >75% <75% Total No legistatre. 681 17 135 24 9 866 (15%) (<1%) (3%) (<1%) (<1%) (19%) Unelected or 392 $4 46 13 4 509 appointed (9%) (1%) (1%) (<1%) (<1%) (11%) One party or 267 1,309 66 63 31 1,736 candidate (6%) (29%) (1%) (1%) (1%) (39%) Largest more 48 85 19 345 102 599 than 75% (1%) (Q%) (<1%) (3%) (2%) (13%) Largest less 116 49 40 105 455 T6S than 75% (3%) (1%) (1%) 2%) (10%) ¿(17%)> TOTAL 1,504 1,514 306 550 601 4,475 (34%) (34%) (7%) (12%) (13%) (100%) Note: The unitof observation is a country-year. Cell percentages are in parentheses. The legislative- selection category, “nonpartisan legislature,” is excluded, Comparative Politics: Topic 5 The two problems of dictatorships + Thetwo problems that have to be solved in every dictatorship according to Svolik: — The problem of authoritarian power sharing: how dictators cope with the challenges mounted by those with whom they share power: » Contested autocracy: there is a balance of power between the dictator and his allies » Established autocracy: the autocrat becomes so powerful that allies cannot credibly threaten with rebellion (full monopoly of power) — The problem of authoritarian control: how to control society, two mechanisms: + Repression » Cooption Comparative Politics: Topic 5 The power-sharing problem (3/5) rabir 4.2, Legislatures and the Survival o 1946-2008 f Autboritarian Ruling Coalitions, Duration of AN Ruling Coalition Spells Duration of Multileader Ruling Coalition Spells Legislature Median Mcan N Median Mean No 6.91 11.69 60 8,75 18.52 (3.91,8.21) (7.06,16.32) (6,.91,14.45) (9,94,27.10) Yes 16.07 25.87 231 39,64 41.17 (12.02,20,58) (22.04,29.66) (32.47,46.01) (35.04,47.29) Log-rank test 24,83** 22,85"** Wilcoxon test 24.21** 29,95" Note: The unit of observation is an authoritarian raling coalition; 95 parentheses. Longest ruling coalition durations are mated, right-censored; % confidence intervals are in means therefore are underesti- Comparative Politics: Topic 5 The power-sharing problem (4/4) Foreign intervention Assassination Popular uprising Transition to democracy 40 20 0 20 40 Percentage of all exits from office No Legistature | Legislature ricure 4.4. Nonconstitutional-leader exits from office in dictatorships with and with- out legislatures, 1946-2008. Note: Exits of interim leaders are not included. Unambigu- ous determination of exit was not possible for 13 leaders. Comparative Politics: Topic 5 The problem of authoritarian control: military intervention (1/2) In the period 1946-2008, the military were involved in about 30% of all authoritarian regimes Dictators resort to the military when there is some social threat. In response, the military ask for power, benefits, or participation in government Hypothesis: the relationship between military intervention and levels of social threat is a no-linear one (concave): — 1. When the threat is low, the dictator does not need the military — 2. When the threat is high, the military is the key actor and gets de facto a lot of power (military tutelage) — 3. When the threat is intermediate, the dictator negotiates with the military. Bargaining failure leads to military open intervention.