Can Putnam’s social capital explain the North- South divide in Italy? The case of the Abruzzi and the independent variable of politics (1945-1993), Guide, Progetti e Ricerche di Storia Economica

Scarica Can Putnam’s social capital explain the North- South divide in Italy? The case of the Abruzzi and the independent variable of politics (1945-1993) e più Guide, Progetti e Ricerche in PDF di Storia Economica solo su Docsity! 0 Exam Candidate Number: 58482 Degree Program: MSc in Global History (Erasmus Munds) Year of Examination: 2011-2012 Title of the dissertation: Can Putnam’s social capital explain the North- South divide in Italy? The case of the Abruzzi and the independent variable of politics (1945-1993) Word count: 9173 1 Abstract The Questione Meridionale, the persistent socio-economic backwardness of the South of Italy, is the central issue in the economic history of the country. Among various interpretations of the North-South divide, cultural explanations have emerged that attributed the causes of the socio-economic delay of the Mezzogiorno to the cultural character of Italian southerners. The most refined research based on a cultural interpretation has been proposed by Putnam. For him the backwardness of the South is caused by a lack of social capital. The scarce level of trust and the non-cooperative behaviour which characterise the cultural structure of the Mezzogiorno negatively affects transaction costs and economic performance. The political system is also a derivative of deep cultural values. The lack of social capital implies the existence of bad politics: clientelism dominates the political life leading to an inefficient use of resources and underdevelopment. To challenge this argument, this paper analyses the case of the southern region of the Abruzzi and the role played by the regional political system in its development after the Second World War. The case study highlights the limits of Putnam’s explanation of the North-South divide as a consequence of deep cultural structures and his conclusion that a great socio-economic transformation of the southern territories can only be conceived in the long term. Politics is not only a consequence of deep cultural structures, but it also works as an autonomous sphere. The independent role of politics can be effective in promoting development despite a supposed deficit of social capital. 4 1 INTRODUCTION The Questione Meridionale, the persistent socio-economic backwardness of the South of Italy, is the central issue in the economic and social history of Italy since its unification in 1861 and still represents a unique case of regional economic imbalance in Europe 1 . Among various interpretations of the North-South divide, cultural explanations have emerged that attributed the causes of the socio-economic delay of the Mezzogiorno to the cultural character of the Italian southerners 2 . In the academic literature, the most refined research based on a cultural interpretation has been proposed by Robert Putnam in his famous book, “Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in modern Italy” published in 1993 3 . Putnam uses the concept of social capital, defined by him as “features of social organization such as networks, norms, and social trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit”, as the main explanatory factor for the great difference in economic development between the North and the South of Italy 4 . For Putnam the backwardness of the South of Italy is caused by the lack of social capital, or “civic-ness”, due to the different institutional and historical processes that have characterized the two Italian macro-regions since the Middle-Ages 5 . After Putnam’s empirical research on Italy, other scholars have used social capital to explain Italian regional divides 6 . However, they often considered uncritically the approach to social capital proposed by Putnam. In particular, his interpretation on social capital has neglected the importance of the independent role of political factors on the formation of 1 Iuzzolino, G. (2009), pp.427-477 2 Mezzogiorno is the traditional term for southern Italy. It coincides with the administrative regions of Basilicata, Campania, Calabria, Apulia, Abruzzi, Molise, Sicily and Sardinia. These regions encompass territories that were part of the Kingdom of the two Sicilies. 3 Putnam ,R. (1993) 4 Putnam, R. (1995), p.67 5 Putnam, R. (1993), p.130 6 See for instance Cartocci R. ( 2007) or De Blasio, G. and Nuzzo, G. (2011) 5 social capital and more generally on economic development 7 . For Putnam the political system is a derivative of deep social and cultural values. The lack of trust and non- cooperative behaviour which characterize the cultural structure of the South of Italy implies the existence of bad politics: clientelism dominates the political life leading to an inefficient use of resources and underdevelopment. However, politics is not only a consequence of deep cultural structures, but it works also as an autonomous sphere. The role of politics can be in fact very relevant in affecting the level of cooperation among social and economic actors and more generally development prospects. Politics, defined as capacity to govern and solve collective problems, can avoid inefficient use or seizure of public resources by networks of criminal agents and corrupt politicians. A more efficient politics can improve the efficacy and the performance of the public administration and promote the common interest against particularistic advantages of smaller and more powerful groups. A cleaner and more transparent politics may also successfully address problems of lack of trust in the citizenry, favour cooperation among the population and promote economic growth. Regional policies can stimulate economic activities for instance through industrial incentives and development of infrastructure. The purpose of this paper is to assess whether the concept of social capital, as defined by Robert Putnam, can be effective in explaining the North-South socio-economic divide without considering the role that politics can play in promoting development. In order to do so, the dissertation will use the case study of the southern region of the Abruzzi, an extraordinary example of a successful development of an area of the Mezzogiorno from the post Second World War until 1990s, to consider the role of the local political class in its socio-economic transformation during the second half of the last century. The paper will 7 The undervaluation of the role of politics in the analysis of Putnam has been outlined by different authors, see for instance Levi, M. (1996), Trigilia, C. (2001), Tarrow, S. (1996) 6 show the achievements of the Abruzzi’s political class in the infrastructural and industrial development of this region. Then it will investigate the causes of the better performance of its political class as compared to other regions of the Mezzogiorno. Finally, some conclusions will be drawn on the importance of this case study to show the limits of Putnam’s explanation of the North-South divide as a consequence of deep cultural structures and his conclusions regarding the fact that a great socio-economic transformation of the Southern territories can only be conceived in the long term because of its scarce endowment of social capital 8 . 8 Putnam, R. (1993), p. 183 9 2.2 Putnam’s social capital: civic-ness as explanation of the Italian North- South divide The work of Banfield has undoubtedly exercised a great influence on Putnam, as he reached similar conclusions regarding cultural structures in the South, where he noted the prevalence of familiar relations over more complex types of relations that make more likely the development of modern form of associations and solidarity 19 . As stated before, for Putnam the socio-economic dualism of Italy was due to the lack of the horizontal fabric of civic collaboration, defined as civic-ness, which characterized the Mezzogiorno 20 . In the South, the endowment of norms, networks and trust that favour broad cooperation is scarce, and this inevitably affects transaction costs, the efficiency of the political institutions and the economic performance 21 . Putnam measured the social capital of each Italian region through four indicators of the level of social participation: the number of voluntary associations, the number of newspaper readers, an index of the turnout for referendum, and an index of preference voting in general elections, interpreted as a sign of backwardness of the community 22 . He finds empirically that there exists a positive correlation between social participation and efficiency of the regional administrative institutions, as the democratic institutions are strengthened by a vigorous civic community with broad relations of trust and well-established norms of reciprocity 23 . Moreover, according to his research the role of social capital is not only critical in determining the institutional performance, but it is also the best indicator of the future socio-economic development of a region. His empirical research shows that the correlation between 19 Petraccone, C (2005), p.279 20 Putnam, R. (1993), p.91 21 Ibid. 22 Ibid., usually only a minority of voters choose to indicate a particular candidate from the party list, that is to use the preference vote. An high incidence of preference voting is usually characteristic of areas where clientelist politics is stronger because, as Putnam states, the preference vote is crucial for patron-client exchange relationship Putnam, R. (1993), p. 94 23 Ibid., p.157 10 indicators of civic-ness and economic development is stronger than the correlation between indicators of economic development of the past and those of the present 24 . In short, the sphere of economic relations appears to be dependent on the sphere of social relations and cultural structures. For Putnam, the level of economic development can be derived from the evolution of the civic traditions, based on the respect of the rules and of reciprocal collaboration, in a unidirectional manner. Putnam also argues that the explanation of the different degree of civic-ness between the North and the South is due to history, which divided the Italian peninsula in two regions with different institutional regimes since 1100: the centralized and authoritarian Norman state which suppressed all forms of self-government in the South and the experience of the republican and egalitarian governments of the Comuni in the North. While the absolutist Norman domination was characterized by the prevalence of vertical and hierarchical relations, the Italy of the Comuni was more open to broader participation, sharing of power, and associative institutions of the horizontal type, such as corporations. In the long-run, this different institutional history shaped a divergence in the cultural attitudes of the southern and northern people 25 . The social capital based approach proposed by Putnam to explain the North-South divide maintains a predominant role in the debate over regional imbalances in Italy. As Emanuele Felice underlines, the degree of systematic coverage of Putnam’s research is not reached by any other regional analysis and his conclusions need to be taken seriously into account 26 . Indeed, other researchers have confirmed the different endowment of social capital between northern and southern regions, and its relevance for explaining the Italian economic divide. For instance, Roberto Cartocci updates and expands the analysis of Putnam by building a map of social capital using similar indicators to those adopted by the 24 Ibid., p.157 25 Ibid., p.130 26 Felice, E. (2007), p.58 11 American scholar, such as the level of diffusion of newspapers, the level of electoral participation, the diffusion of sportive associations and the diffusion of blood donations. His research confirms Putnam’s findings of the territorial fractures between the two Italian macro-regions in social capital endowment and its strict connection to economic development, giving strength to the argument that “culture does count” 27 . On the same line of argument, Guido de Blasio and Giorgio Rizzo not only confirm the great regional disparities in the distribution of social capital, their empirical research shows that social capital significantly explains the territorial economic performance in Italy 28 . In a similar manner, Tabellini analyses the influence of cultural differences on the economic development of 69 European regions, and his results highlight that in the case of the Italian regions the correlation is particularly significant 29 . In a recent workshop promoted by the Bank of Italy on the Mezzogiorno and the political economy of Italy, Putnam’s social capital appear to be extensively used in the discussion of the economic conditions of the South 30 . 2.3 Criticisms to Putnam, the Questione Meridionale and the missing variable of politics Despite its continuing popularity in the academic and political world, Putnam’s social capital and his work on Italy have received many criticisms, in particular the historiographical aspects of his research on the history of the Mezzogiorno before the Italian unification. Samuel Cohn writes that “The South of Putnam is an undifferentiated whole, from the Arab-settled western coast of Sicily up to the region of Rome, despite the fact that the southern regions presented very different situations in terms of the level of urbanization, agrarian systems, industrial development, the diffusion of banditism and the 27 Cartocci, Mappe del tesoro: Atlante del capitale sociale in Italia, p.15 28 De Blasio and Nunzio (2011), pp.123-135 29 Tabellini, G. (2010), pp.677-716 30 Banca d”Italia (2010) 14 intervention in the South after 1950 are linked to the perverse role played by the local and national political class in promoting a use of public resources in contrast with the objective of the growth of an autonomous development. The low degree of legitimization of the southern political class and the high competition internal to the political class in power at the central government contributed to a “distributional drift” of the state intervention. The economic resources provided by the central state had not been used to increase the supply of collective services or to create conditions for an endogenous development, but only to redistribute resources for electoral advantages. Because of its low degree of legitimisation, the southern political class had strong incentives to give immediate answers for electoral ends to particularistic pressures derived from short-term interests. The consequences were a consolidation of a process of selection of the political class relying on protections and clientelistic links; the development of political micro-activities to obtain favours, pensions and procurements; major opportunity of infiltration of organised crime. This interlink of negative factors hindered the growth of production and of collective welfare and created the conditions for a “development without autonomy” 41 . Clearly, this type of politics fostered distrust among the citizens in the political action, increased opportunism and depressed the social capital and the development. In light of these studies on the Questione Meridionale, Putnam’s research on social capital reveals an overreliance on the role played by the civic society, a bottom-up approach, in determining the level of the socio-economic conditions of the southern regions. As Levi underlines, his approach is too society-centred 42 . As she points out, it seems that for Putnam “all the important action come from the citizenry” 43 . Tarrow outlines that there is not any specific reference to how practically the regions are 41 Trigilia, C. (1994), pp. 80-85 42 Levi, M.(1996), pp.49-50. 43 Ibid., p.50 15 governed 44 . Indeed, it has been shown how an important part of the literature on the Questione Meridionale underlines the negative implications of the state policy and the political elites behind the backwardness of the South. The critical point is thus the undervaluation of the autonomous role (positive or negative) that politics and policies can play on the economic development and also on the process of formation of social trust and cooperation within the society. It is logical to believe that an efficient government with a low degree of corruption will encourage the citizenry to increase their level of trust towards the state institutions and will favour positive forms of economic cooperation among the citizens, while an inefficient government with a high level of criminal infiltration will produce opposite effects. 44 Tarrow, S. (1996), p.394 16 3 THE CASE STUDY OF THE ABRUZZI 3.1 An exceptional development In order to demonstrate that the lack of social capital, produced by deep historical processes, is not the ultimate factor that determines the hopes of development for the Mezzogiorno and that politics can have an autonomous role in improving the socio- economic conditions of a territory, this paper considers the case study of southern Italian region of the Abruzzi and its development after the Second World War. The aim is to consider the role played by politics, defined in terms of the capacity of local political elites to deliver collective goods and promote the economic development of this Italian region. The choice of the southern region of the Abruzzi as a case study is of course not random. This region represents a case of extraordinary interest. In the second half of the last century this region underwent a radical and deep economic transformation. In the immediate post-war period the majority of the socio-economic indicators positioned this region into the “deep South”: today it is considered as the region “less” southern of the peninsula: an area which is now among the most developed and dynamic of Italy 45 . Especially during the 70s and the 80s, its growth rates were not reached by any other Italian region 46 . It is not a coincidence that the Abruzzi has been the first region of the Mezzogiorno to overtake, according to Eurostat data, the structural delays of its own development and to leave the European scheme of incentive known as the Objective 1 in the mid-90s 47 . The outstanding socio-economic performance of this region is already first evidence that there is not such a homogeneous culturally backward South or that there is such a cultural barrier defined by the scarce level of social capital that can hinder the development 45 Mutti, A. (2001), p. 45 46 Felice, C. (2005), p.6. 47 Carboni, C. (2001), p. 6. The Objective 1 of Europe’s regional policy is to promote the structural adjustment of the European regions whose development is lagging behind 19 1951 the Abruzzi was, among the regions of the Mezzogiorno, at the third position considering the amount of road kilometres related to the population. In 1991, the Abruzzi even reached the first position in the Mezzogiorno, as it can be seen in the Table 2. For these results, Costantino Felice highlights that a great merit has to be given to the regional political class of the Christian Democracy (DC), the ruling party in this region until its collapse in 1993 due to corruption scandals. Felice points out that especially with reference to the modernization of the roads system, the Abruzzi’s Christian Democrat class showed a great capacity of governance 56 . For instance, the issue of the highways remained critical for the Abruzzi’s DC during the 50s and the 60s, with the concomitant advance of mass motorization. Indeed, as Felice outlines, the infrastructural program of the highways was neither planned in the Ministry of Labour nor in a meeting of the highways company. It was in the party headquarters of the Christian Democracy that Remo Gaspari and Lorenzo Natali, the two main regional leaders of the DC in the Abruzzi, took the decision in 1960 regarding the construction of a new highway connecting Rome and the Adriatic Sea through the mountains of the Abruzzi. Finally, the solution proposed by the two Abruzzi politicians was approved by the parliament in 1961 57 . Moreover, considering the continuing hesitations of the IRI (Institute for Industrial Reconstruction) to bear the expensive costs of this new highway, the regional DC mobilized other public and private agencies to constitute a Society of the Roman and Abruzzi highways to promote the project 58 . In the end, because of the political pressure from different cities of the Abruzzi, Pescara and Chieti on one side and L’Aquila and Teramo on the other side, even two different highways were built as each city could get its own connection with Rome 59 . 56 Felice, C. (2008), p.368 57 Ibid., pp.369-370 58 Felice, C. (2008), p.372 59 Mutti, A. (2001), pp. 49-50 20 A clear evidence of the successful political activism of the Abruzzi’s political elites to attract funds and investment for the infrastructural developments is given by an analysis of the resources spent in this region by the Cassa per il Mezzogiorno. The Cassa per il Mezzogiorno acted incisively to improve the transport system 60 . Indeed, its expenditures for the road improvements were higher than in other southern regions: from 1950 to 1957 the Abruzzi and the Molise received 18.25 per cent of the total expenses on road improvements, despite their population representing only 9 per cent of the southern Italy. This quota augmented in the subsequent years. Between 1957 and 1965 it was around 23.12 per cent while during the period 1965-1970 it even reached 37.44 per cent 61 . With regard to the construction of new roads, the quota was higher in the Abruzzi than in the rest of the Mezzogiorno during the 50s, and in the 70s the expenses even became one third of the southern total 62 . The development of the transportation system was essential for the Abruzzi, especially for its potentiality of hinge region between the North and the South. As Carboni highlights, the geographical position was a key to Abruzzi’s economic success of the region 63 . The development of the transport infrastructure allowed the main centres of the region to be greatly connected with important cities and richest markets of the Centre, North and South of Italy. As Carboni states, from L’Aquila, the capital of the region, it takes only one hour to reach Rome. From Pescara it is possible to be in an hour in Ancona and in almost three hours in Bologna or Bari. Moreover, from the national park of the Abruzzi, Naples is reachable within one hour 64 . The improvement of the transport system was not the only achievement of the political class in the Abruzzi. For instance, a great effort was put on the upgrading of water 60 See Felice, E. (2003), pp. 85-107 61 Ibid., p.239 62 Ibid., p.239 63 Carboni, C. (1998), pp. 46-52 64 Carboni, C. (2001), p.8 21 infrastructures. Viesti, Peri and Helg state that in this regard the support of the Cassa per il Mezzogiorno, under local political pressure, was critical 65 . Emanuele Felice underlines that during the 50s, 43 per cent of the Abruzzi’s villages needed a complete intervention, while the rest of the inhabited centres also necessitated some improvements, as the existing water supply structures were generally inadequate 66 . The bold CASMEZ’s program to guarantee the water supply to the great majority of the population was successful. Even in this sector, the expenses for the Abruzzi were higher as compared to the average of the southern regions. During the 50s, the cost of the projects approved for the Abruzzi was around 19 per cent of the expenses in the South, and until 1970 it was still around 13 per cent. The share of cities in the Mezzogiorno for which the CASMEZ provided water works was elevated, around 17 per cent. At the end of the 70s, the share of the population in the Abruzzi that was supplied by water infrastructures provided by the CASMEZ was around 73, as compared to 60 per cent in the total South 67 . Indeed, in the 80s the Abruzzi, had the most developed water infrastructure as compared to all other southern regions, Molise excluded 68 . The capacity of the local political class to mobilise to attract funds from public institutions is also evident in the dispute against the European Economic Community (EEC) that in 1990 wanted the Abruzzi the leave the program of structural funds, as described by Mutti. In this occasion, Gaspari exercised strong pressure on the Italian Prime Minister Andreotti and commissioned several studies to demonstrate the negative effects of the cessation of the economic aid of the EEC on the industrial fabric of the region. Finally, this strong mobilization induced the EEC in 1991 to keep the Abruzzi within the Objective 65 Viesti, G., Peri, G. and Helg, R. (2001), p.176 66 Felice, E. (2003) p.114 67 Ibid, pp.149-153 68 See Table 1 24 formation of GDP was around 22.5 per cent, slightly below the average of the Mezzogiorno (22.6 per cent), and significantly below the national average (11.5 per cent). In the following decades, there was an accelerated process of growth of the industrial product that promoted the catching up of the Abruzzi. Indeed, Manna shows that already in 1977 the sector reached the share of the 30.8 per cent of the GDP, closing the gap with the average Italian share (34.4 per cent) 73 . As Mutti states, the ruling political class in the Abruzzi, and in particular its leader Remo Gaspari played a crucial role for the industrial success, thanks to its capacity to attract funds and investment from the national governments and from national and foreign investors. During the 60s he convinced Siemens and Siv to build two great industrial complexes in L’Aquila and San Salvo. In the 70s, he pressed the minister Taviano to favour the realisation of two Fiat industries in Sulmona for the production of mechanic parts and in San Salvo for the production of electronic components. Even more important, he obtained the support from the national government to promote the settlement of the Fiat auto industry in the depressed area of the Val di Sangro. His action in favour of industrial development continued in the 80s when he supported Texas Instruments to settle in Avezzano, by guaranteeing to the company the realization of necessary infrastructures such as the construction of an airport, the supply of water and electric energy and the completion of the works of the roads Avezzano-Sora and Avezzano-Rieti 74 . The effort of the Abruzzi’s political class in attracting resources from industrialisation is also visible in the action of the Cassa per il Mezzogiorno. Especially from 1957, the policy of the Cassa per il Mezzogiorno was oriented towards the direct support to the industrialisation of the Mezzogiorno, through grants and soft loans given to private firms in well-defined territories, industrial centres or populated areas of development, but also 73 Manna, D. ( 1979) p.154 74 Mutti, A. (2001), pp.54-58 25 through national companies such as IRI. As in the case of the infrastructural aid, the CASMEZ gave a more substantial support to the Abruzzi in terms of loans and grants as compared to the rest of the Mezzogiorno. This support was particularly considerable during the years 1977-1984, when the grants given were around 17 per cent of those given to the Mezzogiorno 75 . According to Servidio, Abruzzi’s share of industrial incentives reached even more than 30per cent of the total towards the end of the 80s 76 . 75 Felice, E. (2003), pp. 209-232 76 Servidio, G. (1992), pp. 817-852 26 4 WHY THE POLITICAL CLASS IN THE ABRUZZI WAS MORE EFFICIENT THAN IN THE REST OF THE MEZZOGIORNO? 4.1 A virtuous clientelism In the previous chapter the substantial progresses made by the Abruzzi in its industrial and infrastructural development has been shown, while suggesting that the political class played a relevant role in these exceptional achievements in the more disappointing context of the Mezzogiorno. In this chapter the causes of this exceptionality of the Abruzzi’s political system in relation to the rest of the South are explored. In order to analyse the particularity of the functioning the Abruzzi’s political system, it is appropriate to refer to the analysis proposed by Simona Piattoni on clientelism 77 . In the main literature, clientelism is defined as one of the principal reasons for which politics has been unable to promote economic development in the South. Putnam opposes the concept of civic-ness to clientelism, as two opposing modalities of understanding social and political relations. Civic are the horizontal relationships where everyone is equal and trusts each other. Patron-client relationships are the personal, vertical relations in which the patron is much more powerful than the client and in which both clients and patrons are trying to extract as much resources as possible from each other. In the North citizens have built their interaction with power and the authority through the strengthening of horizontal ties, trust and collaborative enterprise, while southerners interacted with politics through the strengthening of their personal links to the authority in order to ensure their living 78 . For Tarrow clientelism describes “the pattern of political integration” in the South, and it is “characteristic of fragmented system passing from a traditional to a modern organization of social roles” 79 . In a clientelist system politics is “nonideological, broad functional interests 77 See Piattoni, S. (2005) 78 Putnam, R. (1993), pp.99-105 79 Tarrow, S. (1967), pp.74-75 29 In the Abruzzi, the party of the Christian Democracy (DC) has been predominant from the 1950s to the end of the “Italian First Republic” 87 . The Parliamentary elections of the 50s gave the Christian Democrats more than 40 per cent of the vote. In the following decades, similar electoral results were achieved, with the share of the vote for the DC always above 40 per cent. This means that in the Abruzzi there was one of the most powerful regional parties of the DC. In the Mezzogiorno, only in the small regions of Basilicata and Molise the DC had more electoral success than in the Abruzzi 88 . Considering the electoral results between 1972 and 1992, which corresponds to the period of greater economic divergence between the Abruzzi and the rest of Mezzogiorno, in the Abruzzi the DC was clearly the predominant party within the government coalition, controlling between 70 and 80 per cent of the votes, while the Italian Communist Party had between 80 and 90 per cent of the votes for the opposition 89 . Cohesive government factions opposed by a cohesive opposition represents two key conditions for the development of a virtuous clientelism. Moreover, Mutti shows that Remo Gaspari, the main political leader of the Abruzzi in the post-war period, managed to centralize most of the party power in his hands. Regional congresses of the DC are an indicator of a high level of cohesion, strength and discipline of his faction. From 1969 to 1989, his political faction within the party always obtained more than 50 per cent of the votes in the DC regional congresses. In 1989, his list even obtained 89 per cent of the congressional votes, highlighting the centralisation of the Christian Democrat power in this region 90 . Another factor that gave Abruzzi a privileged position in the national political system was that the Abruzzi’s Christian Democracy was characterized by the presence of political leaders, very influential within 87 It refers to the political system of the Italian Republic between 1948 and 1992. This period was characterized by the rule of an anti-communist coalition led by the Christian Democracy. At the beginning of the 90s this political system collapsed under corruption scandals. 88 See Table 3 89 See Table 4 and 5 90 Mutti, A. (2001), p. 66. 30 the DC and the national governments. The aforementioned Gaspari, during his long and striking political career, has been the head of 10 different ministries, among which the most important positions held were Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications (1981- 1983), Ministry of Transports (1962), Ministry of Public Administration (1972 and 1987), Ministry of Health (1976). But he was not the only important politician of the Abruzzi who assumed very important political positions in the national governments, Giuseppe Spataro and Lorenzo Natali also held key positions in the central government. Spataro has been Minister of Posts and Telecommunications (1950-1953 and 1959-1960), Minister of the Marine (1958-1959), Interior Minister (1960) and Minister of Transports (1960-1962). Lorenzo Natali also had a long and successful political career, as he was already in the 50s undersecretary of the prime minister, Minister of Public Works in the 60s and even vice- president of the CEE from 1977 to 1988. This particular strength of the Christian Democracy in the region of the Abruzzi created favourable conditions for attracting more resources from the central government, as we have seen in the case of the Cassa per il Mezzogiorno. It is also important to highlight the contribution that the active and combative opposition in the Abruzzi gave to the development of the region. Indeed, Piattoni suggests that a strong opposition is crucial for avoiding the degeneration of clientelistic practices. In the Abruzzi, during the 70s and the 80s the Italian Communist Party had more electoral success than in the rest of the Mezzogiorno, with the exception of Sardinia in 1976 and 1979 91 . As Luigi Sandirocco states, great mass movements guided by the forces of left, played a decisive role for the fight against the economic and social backwardness of the region. 92 A very significant example of the vitality of the opposition movements in the Abruzzi were the victorious peasant struggles in the 50s in the area of Fucino, which 91 Ibid., p.46 92 Sandirocco, L. (2010), pp. 204-207 31 obtained the expropriation of the latifundia (large estates) of the family of Torlonia and an agrarian reform for a fairer distribution of land. Another historical episode which demonstrates the importance of a strong social opposition in the development of the Abruzzi was the struggle against the chemical industrial plant projected in the Val di Sangro at the beginning of the 70s. In this occasion, despite the government’s approval of the investments in the petrochemical refinery, a strong movement of the valley organised around the PCI and the most important unions prevented the installation of an industry that would have compromised the environment of the entire area 93 . The defeat of the project of a massive chemical industry was important because it meant the failure of the top-down approach to industrialisation represented by the big basic industry, which was instead pursued often with negative consequences in the rest of the South 94 . If we consider three other main regions of the South during this period, such as Sicily, Apulia and Campania, the political conditions necessary for the development of a virtuous clientelism were not present. If we look at the region of Campania and Apulia, the cohesiveness of government forces was low, in this way the patrons had the incentives to use the resources to distribute selective goods for their clients to increase their relative strength in relation to other patrons, sacrificing the public interest. In Apulia, in both electoral districts, the indicators of cohesion are between 67 and 75 during the 70s and between 57 and 65 during the 80s 95 . In Campania, government cohesion is also low, between 60 and 70 per cent in electoral district XXII, and between 55 and 73 in electoral district XXIII 96 . In Sicily, the internal cohesion both in the coalition government and in the opposition was not particularly high, but the DC had a preponderant electoral strength in 93 Felice, C (2008), pp. 463-465 94 Felice, E. (2007), p. 207 95 See Tables 6,7,8 and 9. 96 See Tables 10, 11, 12 and 13 34 PCI/PDS 29,5 27,2 32,6 27,1 25,7 23,0 12,3 PSI - 10,3 9,0 10,2 15,0 15,3 19,3 PSDI - 4,1 3,4 4,2 5,7 4,6 3,7 PSU 13,0 - - - - - - PRI 1,0 1,4 1,8 1,9 3,0 3,9 3,5 DC 43,8 40,0 40,6 42,2 34,4 37,8 36,8 PLI 2,9 2,8 2,0 4,6 3,4 5,0 6,3 MSI 5,3 12,2 9,8 8,3 10,5 7,8 9,0 OTHERS 4,5 2,0 0,8 1,5 2,3 3,6 3,3 Table 7. Cohesion of government and opposition forces, electoral district XXIV 1968 1972 1976 1979 1983 1987 1992 Government cohesion 72,1 68,3 71,5 66,9 56,1 56,7 52,9 Opposition cohesion 84,8 69,0 76,9 76,5 71,0 74,7 66,9 Table 8. National elections, electoral district XXV (Lecce, Brindisi, Taranto), Apulia Party 1968 1972 1976 1979 1983 1987 1992 RC - - - - - - 4,5 PCI/PDS 24,5 23,2 30,6 26,3 25,2 23,7 15,6 PSI - 9,8 9,3 10,2 13,5 15,2 16,1 PSDI - 3,1 2,8 3,5 4,3 3,4 4,7 PSU 12,8 - - - - - - PRI 1,9 2,5 2,1 2,0 3,4 4,3 4,5 DC 44,7 43,6 43,0 43,6 38,6 38,9 34,5 PLI 3,4 2,1 0,6 1,1 1,9 2,0 1,8 MSI 8,2 12,9 9,6 9,0 9,7 8,8 9,5 OTHERS 4,4 5,8 2,0 4,3 3,4 3,7 8,8 35 Table 9. Cohesion of government and opposition forces, electoral district XXV 1968 1972 1976 1979 1983 1987 1992 Government cohesion 72,2 75,0 74,4 72,2 62,6 61,0 56,0 Opposition cohesion 74,7 64,3 76,1 74,5 72,2 72,9 66,9 Table 10. National elections, electoral district XXII (Naples and Caserta), Campania Party 1968 1972 1976 1979 1983 1987 1992 RC - - - - - - 4,5 PCI/PDS 26,5 25,5 35,8 27,1 26,6 22,5 13,3 PSI - 7,6 7,2 8,6 11,9 14,2 17,3 PSDI - 4,6 2,9 4,1 5,1 4,7 3,2 PSU 12,1 - - - - - - PRI 2,4 2,6 2,6 2,9 3,2 2,9 3,1 DC 37,3 35,5 36,3 39 32,6 40,0 39,9 PLI 4,2 2,3 1,1 1,2 2,6 2,1 4,4 MSI 7,1 18,6 11,5 10,1 13,7 8,0 7,2 OTHERS 10,7 3,3 2,6 7,0 4,3 5,6 7,1 Table 11. Cohesion of government and opposition forces, electoral district XXII 1968 1972 1976 1979 1983 1987 1992 Government cohesion 66,6 67,5 64,7 69,9 58,8 62,6 71,2 Opposition cohesion 79,8 57,7 75,7 72,8 66,0 73,8 58,7 36 Table 12. National elections, electoral district XXIII ( Benevento, Avellino, Salerno), Campania Party 1968 1972 1976 1979 1983 1987 1992 RC - - - - - - 3,0 PCI/PDS 17,8 17,2 25,3 20,6 19,6 18,1 10,1 PSI - 9,0 8,8 10,9 15,8 16,2 24,0 PSDI - 4,7 4,2 4,4 5,9 3,7 4,4 PSU 15,3 - - - - - - PRI 2,3 2,7 2,4 1,9 2,8 3,1 4,2 DC 43,3 46,4 46,0 48,6 43,5 45,9 43,4 PLI 5,0 3,2 1,7 1,3 2,0 2,1 2,3 MSI 6,9 13,1 9,8 7,3 8,2 6,3 5,8 OTHERS 9,4 3,7 8,6 5,9 3,2 4,6 2,8 Table 13. Cohesion of government and opposition forces, electoral district XXIII 1968 1972 1976 1979 1983 1987 1992 Government cohesion 65,7 70,3 72,9 72,0 63,0 64,6 55,4 Opposition cohesion 72,1 56,7 71,1 73,8 70,5 74,2 69,3 Table 14. National elections, electoral district XXIX ( Palermo, Trapani, Agrigento, Caltanissetta), Sicily Party 1968 1972 1976 1979 1983 1987 1992 RC - - - - - - 2,9 PCI/PDS 22,8 21,9 27,4 20,4 21,9 19,9 9,2 PSI - 9,6 9,7 10,0 13,2 15,5 12,5 PSDI - 4,0 3,3 4,3 4,6 5,0 7,8 PSU 12,1 - - - - - - PRI 5,1 3,3 3,3 4,6 4,7 4,3 3,2 39 Table 18. Re-election rate of deputies and senators of all parties, for each region, 1976- 1992103 Regions 1976 Regions 1979 Regions 1983 Regions 1987 Regions 1992 Sardinia 74 Basilicata 86 Sicily 68 Molise 100 Basilicata 69 Sicily 61 Sardinia 76 Molise 67 Campania 62 Molise 57 Basilicata 60 Abruzzi 67 Basilicata 64 Sicily 59 Calabria 57 Apulia 56 Molise 67 Campania 59 Abruzzi 59 Apulia 56 Calabria 56 Apulia 64 Abruzzi 57 Apulia 56 Sicily 52 Campania 54 Campania 64 Sardinia 54 Sardinia 56 Abruzzi 52 Abruzzi 52 Calabria 62 Calabria 50 Calabria 49 Campania 51 Molise 40 Sicily 61 Apulia 49 Basilicata 43 Sardinia 46 Table 19. Re-election rate of DC deputies and senators, 1976-1992 Regions 1976 Regions 1979 Regions 1983 Regions 1987 Regions 1992 Sardinia 73 Basilicata 87 Sicily 81 Molise 100 Basilicata 75 Sicily 71 Sardinia 82 Molise 80 Abruzzi 73 Molise 75 Basilicata 71 Sicily 78 Basilicata 75 Sardinia 73 Calabria 71 Calabria 67 Apulia 75 Campania 74 Campania 69 Apulia 71 Molise 67 Campania 74 Apulia 64 Basilicata 63 Sardinia 64 Apulia 65 Abruzzi 73 Abruzzi 63 Sicily 59 Calabria 61 Campania 61 Calabria 67 Calabria 62 Calabria 54 Abruzzi 60 Abruzzi 55 Molise 60 Sardinia 60 Apulia 50 Molise 56 Table 20. Re-election rate of regional deputies for all parties, for each region 1975-1990 Regions 1975 Regions 1980 Regions 1985 Regions 1990 Apulia 74 Molise 73 Sicily 56 Abruzzi 60 Sicily 54 Basilicata 60 Sardinia 47 Basilicata 60 103 From table 18 to table 21, Data from Guida delle regioni d’Italia, various years 40 Calabria 53 Sicily 59 Molise 47 Sardinia 54 Sardinia 49 Abruzzi 55 Basilicata 40 Molise 53 Campania 48 Calabria 50 Calabria 40 Apulia 48 Abruzzi 48 Sardinia 49 Apulia 40 Sicily 47 Molise 47 Apulia 48 Abruzzi 38 Calabria 45 Basilicata 40 Calabria 42 Campania 30 Campania 38 Table 21. Re-election rate for DC regional deputies, for each region, 1975-1990 Regions 1975 Regions 1980 Regions 1985 Regions 1990 Apulia 86 Molise 77 Apulia 60 Calabria 69 Sicily 64 Basilicata 64 Sardinia 59 Abruzzi 65 Campania 61 Sicily 63 Sicily 56 Basilicata 60 Calabria 59 Sardinia 63 Molise 50 Sardinia 55 Sardinia 59 Abruzzi 60 Basilicata 50 Molise 53 Abruzzi 56 Apulia 59 Campania 38 Sicily 48 Basilicata 46 Calabria 47 Calabria 38 Campania 42 Molise 44 Campania 44 Abruzzi 32 Apulia 41 Table 22. Number of regional governments, 1970-1989104 Sardinia 17 Sicily 17 Calabria 15 Molise 14 Apulia 13 Calabria 12 Abruzzi 11 Basilicata 7 104 Fedele , M. (1993). In Italy the regional governments were instituted for the first time in 1970 41 4.3 Organised crime in the Abruzzi When analysing the political system of the Abruzzi in relation to other regions of the Mezzogiorno, it is clearly of great importance to consider the role played by organised crime, which is often considered a decisive factor for the quality of the institutional and economic performance of a territory. A strong presence of mafia in a particular region is a negative indicator of the quality of the political action because of the ability of organised crime to infiltrate in the public institutions. Criminal infiltration in the regional administration will produce disappointing results in the efficiency of the public expenditure, since mafias will tend to use public resources for their own advantages rather than for the common interests of the entire community. As Davigo e Mannozzi points out, the presence of mafias favours the stability of illegal transactions among politicians, businessmen and those belonging to the organization 105 . A study carried out by the Banca d’Italia and commissioned by the Italian Anti-mafia parliamentary committee has highlighted that political corruption is highly linked with the presence of organised crime 106 . It is indeed important to know whether the political class in the Abruzzi was less subjected to criminal pressures and could operate in a safer and less criminally polluted environment. In order to calculate the presence of organised crime in the southern regions of Italy in the post-war period, the method of the Banca d’Italia used in a comparative research on the level of criminal activity in Apulia and Basilicata during the 70s and the 80s will be adopted 107 . This study uses the frequency of serious crime such as homicides, extortions and kidnappings to evaluate the strength of mafia organisation in those regions. These 105 Davigo, P. e Mannozzi, G. (2008) 106 Pinotti, P. (2010) 107 Ibid. 44 5 .CONCLUSIONS The case of the development of the Abruzzi in the post-war period analysed in this paper allow to draw important conclusions on the Questione Meridionale and in particular on cultural interpretations based on the concept of Putnam’s social capital. Despite its supposed deficit of a culture of trust and cooperation that would have made this area of the country poorer and more backward, this region of the South has managed to reduce the socio-economic gap with the most advanced northern territories of the peninsula. While Putnam’s analysis gives a preponderant role to deep cultural structures that would hinder the development of the Mezzogiorno, the case of the Abruzzi shows that politics can have an autonomous role in fostering economic development. The political elites of the ruling party in the Abruzzi, the Christian Democrats, has indeed managed to deliver a successful infrastructural and industrial growth of this region, improving the transport system, the water infrastructures, creating two universities, attracting new industries and considerable industrial incentives from the central government through the agency of the Cassa per il Mezzogiorno. Thanks to these policies, the Abruzzi has managed to take advantage of all its potential of a hinge region between the South and the North of Italy. Politics in the Abruzzi has worked better than in the rest of the South because of the peculiarity of its political system that avoided the most negative effects of clientelism. A strong and cohesive leadership of the DC in the Abruzzi has created the conditions for extracting more resources from the central state than in other regions. At the same time, a particularly powerful and combative opposition led by the PCI has kept pressure on the Christian Democrats to pursue a policy of economic development directed more to the provision of these resources for the all community than to the distribution of selective goods among a restricted number of clients. Furthermore, as compared to the rest of the Mezzogiorno, the political system in the Abruzzi appears to be the least threatened by 45 criminal infiltration of mafias’ organizations. This is of particular importance since a strong presence of organised crime in the South is often linked to a high level of political corruption and to an inefficient and wasteful use of public resources. This paper has also shown that the higher efficiency of the political system in the Abruzzi cannot be linked to a greater stability and professionalization of its political class as compared to other regions of the South. The case of the Abruzzi shows finally that contrary to Putnam’s approach to the Questione Meridionale, neglecting the independent role that politics can have in fostering or hindering social and economic development is equal to condemning the Mezzogiorno to a pessimistic and fatalist vision of an hopeless and homogeneous backward area of the country. Its successful development demonstrates the limit of the interpretation that historically rooted cultural structures have the power to limit any socio-economic progress and to frustrate any sort of policy action intended to reduce the regional divide in Italy in the short-medium term. 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