Comparative History of Political system, Appunti di Storia Politica Sociale Contemporanea

Scarica Comparative History of Political system e più Appunti in PDF di Storia Politica Sociale Contemporanea solo su Docsity! Comparative History of Political Systems Readings: https://www.dropbox.com/sh/zgrh36g7chsgbdj/AADf5T7y30bonmZRvxcXKwYSa?dl=0 Course Outline:  Week 1 -- 9/20-9/23: Introduction to Course and Political Framework of Modernity o Gauchet o Orsina - “Europeripheralism”  Week 2 -- 9/27-9/30: Re-founding Democracy after 1945 o Ruggie o Orsina - “European Liberalism in the Age of Totalitarianism” o Maier o Conway  Week 3 -- 10/4-10/7: Post-War Reconstruction in Germany o Nicholls o Judt, Postwar Ch. 2 o Nuremberg Trials Film  Week 4 -- 10/11-10/14: Post-War Reconstruction in France o Corduwener – Intro & Ch. 1 o Cartier o 4th French Republic Constitution  Week 5 -- 10/18-10/21: Party Democracy in the 1950s o Corduwener – Ch. 2 o Orsina - Party Democracy and Its Enemies o Camus – The Rebel  Week 6 -- 10/25-10/28: French Fifth Republic o Atkin o 5th French Republic Constitution  Week 7 -- 11/4: Continuation of Fifth Republic & beginning of 60s o Judt – Ill Fares the Land  Week 8 -- 11/8-11/11: Sixties as a Watershed for Democracy o Corduwener – Ch. 3 & 4 o Gassert o Del Noce o Marcuse – One Dimensional Man  Week 9 --11/15-11/18: 1970s and Crisis of Political in Western Europe o Corduwener – Ch. 4 & Conclusion o Wolfe o Crozier, Huntington, Watanuki  Week 10 -- 11/22-11/25: 1970s and Crisis of Political in Western Europe pt. 2 o Judt Postwar Ch 18 o Kaldor o Havel – Power of the Powerless  Week 11 -- 11/29-12/2: 1980s Neoliberal Moment and Triumph of Democracy o Maier o Vinen o Atkin o Fukuyama 1 Course Intro & Political Framework of Modernity 9/20 Lesson: The political framework of modernity (1789-1945): we are in a post-historical world. The elements of past events don't apply to today because things are changing so fast, and they don't relate to the past. However, two recent events have showed us that we are still in the middle of history and the events that take place today can relate to past events: 1. The economic crisis: recessions are not a thing of the past and studying past recessions can show us how to confront the present. Events like an economic crisis are cyclical, so studying history can show us what was done in the past cycles and how to confront future cycles when they arrive 2. The pandemic: e.g. Spanish flu Social Sciences seek to explain rational human behavior; however, there is a large proportion of human behavior that is irrational/emotional. To understand irrational behavior, you must "enhance your sensibilities" instead of only looking to rules/norms/regularities to explain behavior. How? By studying history (e.g. specific human behavior in specific situations), reading literature and poetry, studying art, etc. The modern study of history: to answer questions about contemporary society Methodology of Political History:  Traditional study of political history was invented in the 19th century by a prominent German philosopher Leopold von Ranke: his argument is that history should be told exactly how it happened; events should be constructed in their individuality, not compared to the past. Study the great figures, not the common people. This was a critique to popular philosophers like Hegel. An idea for legitimizing the nation-state as the most important actor in history: study events as it relates to the nation-state  However, this began to be strongly criticized after 1945, post-WW2, Cold War, etc. when the nation-state was undergoing a crisis (it was less important than before). Why bother having political history centered around the nation-state?  The study of political history began to change with the French school Les Annales: reconstructing the events themselves was less important; studying the effects of the events was key. The focus was less on the "happenings", not just the ripples on the surface but the deep currents below (e.g. transformation of the culture, impact on the economy, the climate, morality, the family, etc.)  It takes a while for the discipline of political history to become hegemonic. By the 1980's, political historians were rethinking how to study history: not just the single events, but what led to the event and the impact afterwards. Not just studying the greats, but also commoners, women, peasants, etc. Comparing events across nation-states, long term phenomena, etc.  There was also a need to reconsider: what is politics? The boundaries of politics were not very clear: where do politics begin and end when it comes to society, morality, religion, etc. For example, in Italy, they are debating homosexuality and how it should be protected under the law. In the 1950s, this would not have been considered a political issue. But the boundaries of politics are shrinking. 9/23 Lesson In traditional political history, politics was narrowly defined: it’s what happens in the apparitions of a nation-state, and it’s done by professional politicians (statesmen, men)  Written documents: the internal workings of the state leave written traces (letters, minutes of the meetings, briefs, etc.) The writing the history of the state = legitimizing the state  Public archives: the state keeps the memory of itself by preserving written documents in public archives 2 But history is no longer circular; it’s vertical: human beings are crucial in changing and making history. Humans are no longer observers of reality; they are makers of reality. There is no longer a barrier between creation and man. If humans can create, they become creators. Orsina, Europeripheralism Eurocentrism is a product of modernity. On the one hand the temporal and spatial shrinking down of the Earth, on the other the political, economic and cultural take-off of a global centre and the reactions of the global peripheries. Only the north-western corner of Europe is geographically proximate to that centre. The Anglo-Saxon centre could be disassembled in at least two cores, one of which is European only in its origins, while the other is European indeed, but entertains a notoriously complicated relationship with the continent. The Anglo-Saxon and French models have often created resentment in southern, central and eastern Europe precisely because there they could be perceived (and envied) as different and more successful versions of a common tradition. Another possible way to confront modernity is to refuse it altogether, but modernity’s traction is so powerful that opting out of it has proven to be possible only temporarily. Devising an alternative form of modernity and trying to displace the centre from the north Atlantic to Moscow, Rome or Berlin has been a third and historically significant reaction of the vast and diverse European peripheries. The memory of the country’s (Italy) relevance in European history and culture, from antiquity until the early Modern Age, has fuelled the desire to become a modern European democracy. The anxious Italian desire to be a “normal” country has generated a number of consequences. It has made the relationship between political institutions and society even more tense and complicated than it “normally” is. A country literally obsessed with the desire to be European has produced an intelligentsia literally obsessed with the supposed failure to fulfil that desire. When writing about Italy, and especially on the post-1945 period, Anglo-Saxon observers emphasise the supposed inadequacy of the country to abide by the standards of modernity of which they themselves are. The word “Europe” was often used as shorthand for what was in fact its north-western corner, and served to identify an ideal model, a goal toward which Italy ought to strive with all its forces. Gauchet  Democracy is in crisis → undermining its original goals of individual and collective autonomy.  Modern liberal democracy →outcome of an inversion of the values of tradition, hierarchy and political incorporation  mixt regime.  MLD organizes power around political/juridical/historical dimensions.  The balance we had found after WW2 (liberal democracy) has been lost. Economic activity and its innovation prevail over political autonomy.  Before democracy = self-government / now = personal freedom  Juridical dimension is now more important than the political one.  This depolitisation of democracy has facilitated the rise to dominance of a new form of oligarchy.  Its difficult to associate the term crisis to democracy bc democracy is a form of a government in which discord, protest and the questioning of what has been established cannot ever cease.  Nowadays democracy doesn’t have self-proclaimed enemies (totalitarian parties), BUT does not prevent it from being challenged by an internal form of adversity/threat of losing its effectiveness → much subtler and difficult to analyze.  The democracy of the moderns → understood as the expression of a disengagement from religion  3 steps for autonomy: 1) new type of power, no more heaven and evil, the state replace god, rationality. 2) Law is no more found in God, slides to the state of nature. 3) history is not about the past but the fact that human can handle their future.  19th century  more democratic societies thanks to suffrage universel but was accompagnied by the first developmental crisis of democracy (WW1 and then in 1930 totalitarianism).  In parallel of fascism, regimes of stabilized liberal democracy entered a phase of internal transformations. 5  New phase of expansion of social organization oriented toward autonomy. New development of the 3 drivers of the autonomy  upset the combinations and compromises previously established  1990s  Nothing stands in the way of rights which man possesses as a consequence of his nature. Origin of the « Democracy Against Itself » (bc the 3 drivers are not balance, law is superior to the others)  BEFORE = Democracy used to designate the power of the collective, sovereignty of the people and the capacity for self-government. NOW = refers to personal freedoms, sovereignty of the individual  The present crisis deserves to be called a crisis in the foundations of democracy  essence is the promotion of democracy’s juridical foundations (juridical foundations against its historical and political foundations)  The unilateral hegemony of the legal element is not the end but a moment of imbalance calling for the reestablishment of equilibrium between the three elements that must work together for democracy to function coherently. 9/27 Lesson – REFOUNDING DEMOCRACY AFTER 1945 Crisis of modernity: if there is no longer a God-given trajectory of history, then how confront the future? How do we confront the anguish of the openness of the future?  For example: imagine a person in the 19th century, born in a small village, used to traditional values and norms, the community, a farmer/peasant with a clear job for the rest of their life. Now, this person moves to the big city with new opportunities but also the fear that comes with an open possibility for the future. Now imagine a member of the Socialist party comes to talk to this person, offering a secure future. You can see how they could accept this ideology as the answer to their questions and uncertainty. Liberal democracy tries to be the hegemonic solution to all the questions. But it’s a complicated solution that failed at times. And when it failed, it opened up the way for other solutions (e.g. authoritarianism, totalitarianism). Liberalism is the answer of the political and social order:  Who governs? No longer the God-given King/Queen, but the person who wins the election and represents public will  Legitimacy is created from public opinion: from here, the debate is created: how should we represent public opinion?  How do we shape the boundaries of a community? Boundaries are public opinion: what history, culture, and language tells us. o Communities should be based on some form of historical/cultural similarities of the people, but also on the expressed desire of the people Liberalism is the answer of the international order:  Free trade: no need to take resources from other lands since there is free trade  Diplomacy: dialogue to solve disputes Institutional solution: countries become nation-states. People govern themselves with a representative government. They’re happy to live within the boundaries of their community. They freely trade with another, so everyone has access to the resources of the globe, and they solve disputes by rational communication & discussions to find solutions that are universally accepted. But the issue is not just creating a set of institutions that are able to give birth to legitimacy to political and social order. It’s also about providing a solution to the openness of history and the challenges of history:  Liberals have always been enthusiastic about the openness of history: humans can do whatever they want, be whoever they want, build their own future. But this can also create anguish and dangers that other solutions (e.g. totalitarianism) are happy to solve with a more closed/defined future.  When the individual was invented, the anti-individual was also created: those who were worried about individual freedom and wanted to create a set of institutions that created a more closed future. Liberalism as a political ideology must confront the anti-individual. 6 Contradiction / Issue #1: Liberalism cannot promise the content of the future (that's Marxism). It doesn’t control individual liberty, so liberals can’t say exactly what will happen, but they can guarantee that there will be progress.  A free society will create progress. If you let humans be free, ideas/innovation will flow freely, they are able to cooperate; but humans can also be violent, selfish, rebellious, evil at times  But this is not a scientific statement: it cannot be demonstrated scientifically or philosophically, but it can be historically. o Free societies have tended to be progressive. But during this time when liberalism was being invented (mid-19th century), they had no historical examples. So, they were acting on credit.  Liberalism as a self-fulfilling prophecy: if you believe in it, if you stick with it, it will work. If you lose faith; humans are "too stupid to stick with it", it will not work. How do you keep the faith in progress alive? Contradiction / Issue #2: The more liberalism grows, the more it opens up problems in automatic improvement. It developed in a rather stable society (in the mid-19th society, the "earthquake" of modernity hadn't yet arrived), in a specific area of Europe (civil society was already ripe/mature enough for liberalism)  What happens when it grows socially (vertically; internally within the country hierarchies) and geographically (horizontally; other counties, including those not mature enough for liberalism)?  Can we have progress in Italy (with many peasants; no advanced civil society yet) like in Britain?  Can there be progress when liberalism has arrived from outside instead of grown internally?  Is liberalism able to survive in mass society? Contradiction / Issue #3: underestimated power of internal existential competition between human beings. Liberalism says that if everyone has what they need materially, then they should be happy. But happiness is relative. People are mimetic—they look at each other and they want what others have; there's always something better. Contradiction / Issue #4: the society that liberalism was aiming to transform was formed in a traditional society . Liberalism cannot create people who are ready to be free. In order to create people ready to be free, you have to educate them and have strong constraints. But then this is not a free society  political correctness. Liberalism starts to crumble. Maybe progress is not granted after all… maybe we need a different system, an alternative, like authoritarianism… All political ideologies must address the problems of modernity. Communism and fascism also promise progress and happiness, but they confront the problem through political action. Liberalism promises progress through individual liberty. History may falsify its predictions and liberals are convinced that all will go well in the long run. But what do we do in the short term, and how do we convince human beings to believe in the long term? The market creates the perfect allocation of resources for time. The answer of liberalism is weak in the short term. Individuals rely on the short term, so long run is not relevant to them. Liberalism says that the long run is composed by many short terms, so time is key to liberalism. Liberalism was created on the shores of the North Atlantic (UK, US) between the late 17 th and early 18th centuries. It is both historical and geographical: it can live in certain parts of the world within certain circumstances (certain economic well-being, literacy, certain religion aka Christianity, certain "morality").  For example: Italy was on the periphery. But it was decided that Italy should be "liberalized". Liberalism was imported, but Italy didn't quite have the conditions for a liberal society (9/10 people were illiterate, low level of social capital, low reciprocal trust, economically backwards). The elites tried to impose liberalism from above, but the society was totally detached from the elite. First, we need a nation-state, then we force liberalism down your throat through the state (compulsory military service, compulsory education, military service to enforce). But can you use the state to enforce liberalism? State = authority; liberalism = liberty. Can you order people to be free? That's a contradiction. 7  Make developing countries pay: export your problems onto weaker countries; but with the end of empires, the mobilization of developing countries, etc., the "third world countries" said we are not willing to pay for your mistakes anymore In the 1970s, all the problems of embedded liberalism came to light. Ruggie was seeing at the end that there was changing in the social purpose = the dis-embedding of liberalism. Becomes very clear in the 80s and 90s. The economy becomes dis-embedded once again; nation-states' role to make the rule is diminished. Maier:Rationalization Capitalism & the workplace: the Great War opens up a gap in the capitalist movement. Worker mobilization & rebellion, mass strikes, presence of communism. The problem for capitalism is how to bring that rebellion under control. How? Rationalization was a concept that comprised market-sharing agreements across frontiers and within domestic economies plus parallel efforts to lower the burden of wages and other costs through investment, technical improvements, and mergers. At the same time industrial leaders sought legitimation for their power. Maier is describing two step for of recreation of order in Europe:  The recreation of discipline in the workplace: in the early 1920s this idea is killed, the hypothesis of the communist revolution is dead (a workplace that allows for individual freedom). Do as your told, obey, and we'll pay you. Every year, you’ll make more money than the last.  Professionalization of the workplace: production procedures entrusted to manager, technologization of production; experts as managers (e.g. Taylorization). After WW1, the professionalization of organization of work place which is making discipline stricter.  After 1945: material wellbeing. The workplace is disciplined, the work in menial/repetitive, but you will have money to buy a fridge, a washing machine, maybe a car. The idea that mass production, thanks to rationalization, leads to mass consumption, which leads to material wellbeing. What is the price of all this? A very governable democracy. People have already accepted disciple, already accepted material wellbeing is the payment for their behavior. They are depoliticized; they won't connect a political revolution to their frustration for the bad jobs/workplace they have.  The rebellion in the 50s and 60s: okay once I get the fridge I've never had, the washing machine, and the car, why would I keep accepting working conditions in the factory, why should I obey? Rebellion against neocapitalism, rationalization, and the constriction of liberty began Conway Parliamentary democracy became the standard model of political organization after 1945. WHY ? by Discrediting of authoritarian alternatives after the war, Free-market capitalism and the Influence of the USA. Also ppl were exhausted by the war and passively accepted it. The model of Postwar democracy : 1. Reassertion of the authority and responsibilities of the nation-state 2. The supremacy of parliaments : didn’t want to repeat the failures of interwar democracy that gave way to the electoral rise of anti-democratic movements. Aimed to be inclusive rather than exclusive, respectful of diversity in their societies 3. A governed democracy : top-down 4. Reliance on individualist and negative definitions of freedom developed by Communist liberals and propagated by Cold War organizations Comparative History of European Democracies (Post-1945) 10/4 POST-WAR RESCONTRUCTION IN GERMANY 10 Was there a fascist period & was it domestic vs. imported?  Germany, Italy, and France all had a period of authoritarian regime, internally introduced (vs. external like other European countries who were occupied by these 3 countries) o France is a debated exception: it is argued that the Vichy was an outcome of the defeat of France by the Germans, but some historians say that it was grown internally.  You obviously couldn't explain Nazism/fascism in this way in Germany and Italy: it was a direct outcome of nationalism o After 1945, there was an attempt to argue that these regimes were a "parenthesis"; didn’t have deep national roots; came out of the blue. Everywhere, there was an attempt to put fascism in brackets and put it away and forget Duration of regime?  The longer a regime lasts, the harder it is to reconnect to ruling elite of previous period (e.g. people from the previous period before the war) o Short duration = viable elites from before who can rule o Long duration = harder to connect the two periods, there’s more discontinuity. For example: in Italy after 1945, there were people from the pre-fascism regime who ruled, but they were already middle aged when they were ruling pre-fascism, so after the war they were quite old.  The ability of the post-1945 regime to reconnect to the previous condition is a very relevant legacy. To what extent can we argue that the new regime is really new vs. a transformation of the previous regime? o No such thing as the "zero hour" (stunde null): There is never a fresh start in human history; in the personnel, in the bureaucracy, in the professors, the doctors, lawyers—these people were the people who were living & governing the previous regime that led to the war Continuity?  France: new Republic but always remained inside the republican tradition. The argument = the French Republic has always been there; it never ceased to be o Less institutional & territorial discontinuity o Vichy pretended to be the continuation of the French Republic, but that claim was strongly contested, especially by de Gaulle, so there were 2 centers of power. But the French Republic remained. When France is liberated in 1944, powers are given back to de Gaulle, and he asserted continuity of his govt + pre-war govt o No external control, no Allied occupation in France  Germany: complete & total discontinuity o Territorial discontinuity: Germany was completely different territorially postwar vs. prewar; physical signs that the war deeply changed the country o Institutional discontinuity: destruction of old institutions & traditions, no German government, no German head of state o Complete external control: Germany is entirely governed by foreign powers  Italy o Territorially: not as serious as Germany, but they lose territory on Eastern border o Institutional discontinuity: presence the Allied forces & govt; no longer a sovereign nation; switch from monarchy to rep  There's an argument that there was always a legitimate institutional continuity with the presence of the head of state and head of government; but you also have the invasion of foreign governments + the Allied govt postwar  United Kingdom o No territorial or institutional discontinuity but there were political & economic transformations  Political: the success of the Labor party (the Labor party sees itself as revolutionary, but it does not touch the institutional powers/practices at all)  Economic: the creation of the welfare state 11 Was there a resistance movement and how long did it last?  A sign of mass resistance shows that many people were rebelling against fascism, that there was moral resistance: we are not nazis/fascists, we fought against it and we deserve to be given back our sovereignty  The desire for revolution is connected to a resistance movement = we need to create an entirely new Italy, a new France, to break every tie with the past to enter into a new revolutionized world  In France: yes there is a resistance movement and it lasted for 4 years: it was a long time to think about "what should we do next?"  Italy: resistance only in some parts; shorter period of time (Sept 1943-April 1945; 18 months); no resistance movement that could claim to be mass movement  Germany: weak resistance movement Impact of Cold War  UK: huge foreign policy issue  Germany: in Western Germany, not irrelevant initially, but not that strong; becomes irrelevant very quickly. But the Cold War has a very strong impact on Eastern Germany obviously as it owned the other half of the country  France & Italy: Communist parties are very significant and very strong; element of Soviet bloc inside Germany: Post-War Reconstruction Germany: In 1947, the Allies dissolve Prussia: absolute surrender, refusal of short term government, and a complete occupation of foreign powers. The Allies wanted to create a strong discontinuity of the past as the basis for the creation of a more balanced federal system.  The creation of a new Länder that is more balanced: the Länder was created before the new federation by the Länder itself: a number of states that creates a federated system; not "top-down", but "bottom-up" Starting from summer of 1945, the occupying powers start their reconstruction of Germany and immediately it sets Eastern Germany (Soviets) on a different path (despite all the agreements, Postdam). Originally, the occupying powers had NOT decided to separate Germany for good (only temporary), with the idea to manage Germany all together to make it stronger. Reparations to the Soviets would be managed jointly, and Germany should be rebuilt as a single country as agreed by occupying powers all together. However, Soviet (Stalin) leadership had the belief that WW3 was inevitable, so post-1945 arrangements should be a preparation for WW3  Stalin used Eastern Germany as preparation for the incoming WW3 by extracting resources. With the “impending WW3”, they would need men, factories, arms, etc. He was unwilling to give up control of Eastern Europe and installed a Soviet style socioeconomic & political system. It was a hegemonic move done by creating an anti-fascist alliance between the Communist & Socialist parties On the other hand, the Allies/US started implemented a Western style socioeconomic & political system in Western Europe. It began with a cooperation between Western Germany & other Western countries because their economic system was destroyed. The industrial apparatus of Western Germany was not totally destroyed by the bombings (80% still intact), but the infrastructure was destroyed, as well as the ability of Germany to act as a single economic unit (trade flows, unions, etc.). Also, Germans didn’t have a currency; inflation destroyed the value of the German currency  If you are paid with pieces of paper money that are worth nothing, then you don't work. So, Germany had very low productivity and the shops were empty. Even if you had money to buy things, no one really accepted it. If you had valuable material goods (oil, meat, milk), you could barter for goods. How can you recreate the currency if you don’t have a state? Currency gets its value from the state (or the institutional creature) that issues it. Dilemma: the Allies couldn't recreate a unified Germany with the Eastern part because the relationship with the Soviet bloc was rocky. But they didn't want to recreate a separate Western country. However, without that then you couldn't rebuild the economy. You had to feed the people, without rebuilding an economy they were going to starve. 12  French Revolution: central problem (Jacobian, unity vs. Rousseavian, diversity)  Napoleon: answer to inability of French Revolution to rebuild unity  Entire 19th century: pendulum swinging from revolutions that put the assembly at the center/collective representation of public opinion and the counter-revolution that put a single individual at the center of the political system  Bonapartism: representing the idea that democracy is unable to govern the country and government should be entrusted into the hands of a single individual that will embody the common will 3rd Republic of France 1870: end of the 2nd Empire and birth of the 3rd republic. France is finding some kind of equilibrium. It’s strongly centered on Parliament and representation of diversity of French public opinion. The price that the 3rd republic pays is great instability in the government. The more you represent public opinion in its diversity, the more you have struggles in a strong decision-making executive government. Republican government that creates a republican culture, but not a strong & stable political regime.  Culturally strong: strong effort in education of republican values (republican = rights of individual). Liberal in outlook, representative government, primacy of parliament, idea of social progress, separation of church & state, afraid of strong governments  Politically weak: inefficient because Parliament cannot create a stable and effective government. France cannot find the balance for the problem of democracy (unity & diversity) In the 3rd Republic, all the attempts to change the system, to make government more effective, were failing. This gives way to radical right-wing parties criticizing the inefficiency of the government. Even the moderate right is very aware of the fact that this regime is too feeble, and the ineffectiveness is dangerous for democracy in a particularly difficult part of history. The debate centered on the balance between Parliament and the power of a strong individual leader . But also, the problem of plebiscites: a charismatic individual uses the plebiscite to reinforce his power (Bonapartist). There is a difference in representing the popular will through a referendum or through a direct election of Parliament.  There is a discontinuity of the statist model of France: a strong state & executive power expression of unity = a danger to democracy. Parliament must prevail over government, diversity must prevail over unity, because if unity prevails that is a danger for democracy. Parliament: paramount, wields power, center of institutions, very republican, very liberal, very democratic, but not particularly stable or efficient. This criticism becomes particularly strong in the 1920s and 30s. After WWI, the 3rd Republic becomes even weaker and unstable. Liberalism was going through a crisis throughout Europe, and this crisis was hitting the liberal culture of the French hard. There was a lot of debate around reforming the Constitution to make the government stronger. But Republican popular culture was so strong that it was able to block any attempt to make the executive power stronger. When France is defeated by Germany in 1940, this debate comes to the surface. The defeat demonstrates that the 3rd Republic was in fact weak and unable to defend the public interest. When the system that was centered on diversity and fragmentation came up against conflict, it was unable to defend the people. The credibility of the 3rd Republic was destroyed in the eyes of everyone. France 1940—1944: the defeat in 1940 (emergency)  entrust power to a dictator (Pétain). The only way democratic culture accepts giving power to a strong individual is in emergency. French culture can accept dictatorship if there is an emergency: there is not time to think it through, we can only rely on a strong leader, a dictator. But the dictator must be watched lest he becomes a tyrant (e.g. Georges Clemenceau after WWI). Pétain, a military figure, receives the full powers of the state. He posits the defeat in a moral sense: the inefficiencies of the government are what led to the defeat. The prevailing of the individual sectional interests over the national interest. Parliamentarism, party interests, etc. has weakened the nation. And when it came to the final confrontation 15 with Germany, France was weak and failed. This discredited the 3rd Republic (but ultimately the war discredited the Vichy & the authoritarian model).  Petain's address in 1940: "The people has known its defeat. But the real strength of the people is how it reacts to the defeat. After the victory in WWI, the spirit of enjoyment has prevailed over the spirit of sacrifice. We have asked for things more than we have put ourselves the center of the nature, and now we've paid the price." o Republic culture was a culture of individual enjoyment. Everyone is only looking out for themselves. Society has lost its unity. Now we must rebuild an institutional system that's able to represent France in its entirely and individuals must sacrifice themselves for the Republic. Charles De Gaulle (CDG) created another alternative to the Vichy while exiled in the UK. He was pretending to be the continuation of the French Republic in exile. Whereas Petain accepted the defeat, De Gaulle wanted France to keep fighting alongside the Allies. But he also accepted the failure of the 3rd Republic (its feebleness, its weakness, its inability).  CDG was a military leader, not a political leader. He brought an alternative idea: a referendum. This is a crucial moment: it limited the sovereignty of the Assembly. In 1944, it's clear that CDG has won this battle and his government is legitimate. He becomes the embodiment of the continuity of France; better, the French Republic was never discontinued; it never stopped existing. Now we need a new 4th Republic. Everyone agrees on this: 95% of French vote in favor of a new republic. How do we get back to a different form of Republicanism? What kind of republic? Do we reproduce the 3rd Republic in all its defects? Or create something in line with Republican culture, but institutionally efficient? 3 options on the table: 1. Go American (or Weimar Republic): move towards some form of presidentialism, strengthening the figure of the President of the Republic. Create counterbalancing elements with parliamentary fragmentation. Dualism. o However, Republicanism was fearful of a strong individual figure as a threat to democracy. 2. Go British: Center all powers in Parliament with strong organized political parties that would create a stable majority that would give birth to a stable government. Stabilization of government thanks to strong political parties that organized the political opinion. 3. Go Communist: a system that leave an important role to the opposition party; strongly based on Parliament; assemblarism. This would leave the Communist party a role/opportunity to have more power & influence over other parties o At this historical point, Communists don't have a strong idea of institutions. They’re only focused on political power and how much power they can get 1945: France must rewrite its Constitution and this debate comes to the table. During this time, CDG is the man who has rebuilt continuity of French state. He has a huge personal charisma, expressing the spirit of the resistance. After 1944 when France is liberated, he's the head of the provisional French government, so he has an important central institutional role. This conditioned French democracy. In Republican culture, this is a problem as they are suspicious of individual political charisma + the fact that he's a military general (the military is the strongest population to penetrate). Referendum: the decision for the type of government should be taken by a referendum. Plebiscite. Defeat for political parties, victory for CDG. First move in the game of chess of creating a new French Republic.  First, do they want to get back to the 3rd Republic or begin a 4th Republic?  Second, should the constitutional writing process be conditioned by limitations? Where does sovereignty lie? In Parliament? Should sovereignty be limited? CDG won the referendum, but a majority was given to the Socialists & Communists, the radical left, in the parliamentary election (1945). The French say that CDG was right in wanting a new referendum, and they endorsed it. 16 However, they voted for an absolute majority of Communists and Socialists: left-wing Parliamentary logic and plebiscitary logic based on individual charismatic leaders (in perspective, is right wing). The new constitution is similar to what the Communists wanted (as they were the majority in the government). An assemblarist Constitution:  Centered on parliamentary assembly, leave strong role to president of the republic, weak position of the government.  Unicameral government: idea that the National Assembly expresses the unity of general will, the general will cannot be divided  Christian democrats want bicameral for checks and balances. Link between sovereignty and the National Assembly: "French people exert their sovereignty through their deputies in the National Assembly."  President of Republic does not even have the power to appoint the PM, the PM (President of the Council of Ministers) is elected, then creates their cabinet. But then you need a vote of confidence.  Vote of no confidence is very weak  Dissolution: very difficult to dissolve Parliament; dissolution of Parliament is a stabilizing power (if the President can dissolve Parliament, it could be a form of blackmail) President of the provisional government, de Gaulle quickly found himself at odds with the Constituent Assembly on the conception of the state and the role of parties. January 1946: CDG resigns as Head of Government due to clashes with political parties. The new constitution is rejected in May 1946—French voters did not want it. In June, CDG gives a speech in Bayeux saying that the executive power cannot depend on Parliament, that is a confusion of powers, and the government of France must guarantee unity, cohesion, and discipline as those are scared things. CDG thinks that there should be a very strong executive power and that power should be strengthened. The presence of CDG in the transition is crucial in creating an alternative to political parties, an element that opens up trouble for the parties. A second referendum takes place to vote on the constitution: they are forced to vote a second time for a second assembly which should write a second constitution. In October 1946, the second Assembly votes for a second constitution, and it's finally approved by referendum. The problem is, only 2/3 of people voted, and only a narrow majority voted yes. So basically, the Constitution was approved by 1/3 of voters, rejected by 1/3, and 1/3 neither approved nor rejected. This model from the beginning was born as a weak Constitution. CDG’s alternative was always in the background to stand in opposition to this new constitution. 10/18 Lesson – Party Democracy and its Enemies The way that democracies were reshaped during the 1950s/1960s conditions the trajectory of these democracies even until today. One could argue that starting with the 1960s and 70s, European democracies begin to face new challenges. It is relevant whether the previous challenges were solved and successfully confronted during the 50s. If not, then the new challenges of 60s and 70s confront systems that have not yet solved their previous problems. A "traffic jam" of issues that tended to overburden political systems. For example, Germany was able to settle basic problems in 50s and 60s and were stronger when confronting new issues in 60s and 70s. 3 models of democracy battling after 1945: 1. Competitive Liberal Democracy: Anglo-Saxon style; representative government o Centered on Parliament with strong political parties that will create a majority, Parliament creates government, full blocks (left and right) competition for power o Liberal foundations: differences in opinion of voters, competition, representation 2. Progressive Democracy: democracy upheld by Communists; no competition between political parties, but a convergence of all parties o Democracy based on a near unanimity of all anti-fascist parties 17 the 3rd Republic) leads to interpretation similar to the 3 rd. Written constitution, politics, and the political system institutions do not solve the problems. 2 major problems in 4th Republic: 1. Charles de Gaulle providing a strong alternative 2. A quasi-anti-party political party bringing a strong alternative to the political system 3 strong parties: Christian Democrats, Socialists, Communists. After an election (got 75% of the votes) they sit around a table, they devise program, a prime minister, the ministerial team. For 5 years there is a strong stable coalition with a clearly defined program. This is what happens in Germany. It was a dream in France: it was utopian because the party game was much more complicated.  With the outbreak of the Cold War, the Communist party was excluded from the government: a party connected to the Soviet Union can no longer govern in France, Italy, Germany, etc. It broke the idea of rebuilding the political system around a mass coalition.  In France, a third force was created: an alliance between Christian Democrats, Socialists, and parties that came from 3rd Republic (moderates and radicals). But these groups were very fragmented within themselves, so it was very unstable alliance, and it was delegitimated from all sides: the Gaullists on the right and the Communists on the left.  1951: attempt to stabilize the coalition by changing electoral law, creating majority prize for coalitions. The idea was that centrist parties could enter in coalition, but Gaullists & Communists could never enter into coalition. When there’s a tri-polar system, by definition the coalition will favor the parties at the center (the third force). Comparable to the Italian system: systems with many parties & great fragmentation and polarization. Strong anti- system opposition to the right and left, and necessary to govern at the center. Fragmentation + polarization = limited possibility to govern. The idea of creating an electoral system that favor coalitions is a possible solution  Unlike in Italy, the electoral reform in France is devised differently. Electoral reform in France works and is able to strengthen the center. Centrist parties are over-represented and extreme parties are underrepresented.  The problem was this was not enough: in the 2nd Legislature it was already demonstrating that it was insufficient and inefficient. The Fourth Republic drifts into a serious crisis because of its ministerial instability and its powerlessness in the face of the Algerian war which broke out on November 1, 1954. Some political leaders come to wish the General's return. During the 2nd Legislature in 1951-1956, the external challenges to the 4th French Republic started to grow:  Decolonization (Indochina, North Africa): France is no longer the same superpower it used to be. It was losing its place in the world that it had since Napoleon. Should they decolonize? How? These divisions were cutting through political parties – no one agreed o Indochina/Diem bien phu (1946-1954) o North Africa/Suez Crisis: the world is changing (1956) o Algeria’s Secession (1954-1962): not quite decolonization; a French territory considered part of France; a substantial amount of people in Algeria who did not want to detach from France.  Economic issue : to keep colonies, you need money to mobilize armies, to wage wars, to spend to keep colonies happy. Economic growth is happening very fast at France's border (Italy, Germany). Why not in France? One answer is it was burdened by colonies, it may be time to let them go. o There were strong divisions on the economic issues: very different ideologies in the coalition: Socialists & welfare, liberals & capitalism, Christian Democrats in the middle.  European Defense Community (1950-1954): Europe should create a defense community, which would also lead to establishing a European political community. This is the French idea to solve for German rearmament. Germany should be rearmed because of the threat of the Cold War, but France was scared that Germany would then be a threat to them again. But a defense community would be a major devolution of sovereignty. The French state losing the power of defense, and then entering a political community—an incredible number of 20 divisions in the parties created a huge mess. Communists against = an anti-Soviet move; Gaullists against = dissolution of power; CD and Socialists divided. This traffic jam of external crises was showing the system’s inability to handle this pressure. Governments of all kinds in Europe, but no one is able to really solve these problems. Pierre Mendes-France was a leader of the radical party, and he became PM in 1954 when France was facing two major crises: 1) the defeat of the Dien Bien Phuu in Indochina and 2) the final decision on the European Defense Community. The inability of the system to deal with these crises led to a Roman-style dictator : a strong charismatic leader who takes control during an emergency. He was a man of the 3rd Republic and he believed in the centrality of Parliament, but he also was also starting the acceleration of modernization of French political system. He started radio talks to the people, directly speaking to the French, creation of the myth of personality, etc. And in fact, once Mendes-France had solved the emergency (ended the Indo-China situation and killed the EDC), Parliament & the political parties got rid of him and take the upper hand once again. Mendes-France couldn't dissolve parliament and ask the people to grant him the majority (given his direct relationships with the people) because the rules for dissolution in the 4th Constitution were too complicated and the conditions for dissolving weren't there. The elections of 1956, when finally the Parliament expired after 5 years, didn’t solve the problem of fragmentation and instability. Gaullism had entered into crisis, and the party was dissolved. The presence of the Gaullist threat was an element that was keeping the majority together against Gaullism. The dissolution of Gaullism led to a great weakness of the political system. The Algerian emergency (1954-1962): worse than any other crisis France had to face. Put enormous pressure on the French political system. A problem of a confrontation between military and parties. Algeria was basically run by the military, and they had no intention of letting it go. It was a sense of humiliation for the French military; the credibility and prestige of the French military had been battered over the last 20 years in a series of defeats it had suffered (lost in 1940, lost in 1954 in Indochina, 1956 in Suez). But political parties were divided among themselves, and there was a part of the governing parties that was willing to let Algeria go for a number of reasons (ideology, against colonialism, self-determination of people, wanted to free economic resources, etc.). 1958: creation of a new government led by Pierre Pflimlin and the cooperation between the military and the French government collapses. The military considered Pflimlin & his government too pro-Algerian by the military and they create a Committee of Public Safety in Algeria and called for the return of CDG. Basically, a threat of a coup d'état, the military rebelling against the government, but they were careful not to fully escalate the tension into a full coup d'état. CDG declared to be ready “to assume the powers of the republic” but aimed to do so in a formally legal way . The political parties reacted by forming a “republican front” to safeguard French democracy from CDG. At the height of the crisis, there were 3 centers of power: 1) the legal power of the Fourth Republic government in France, 2) the military in Algeria, and 3) the moral power of CDG.  As tensions rose, CDG carefully played off politicians and the army against each other. Not saying he’s in favor of either side, but he skillfully understands that he’s valuable exactly because he’s considered a compromise: neither a person of the military or the political parties.  Another element of the game was the Communist party. During a major emergency and basically a coup d’état of the military, the government could have been obliged to open up to the Communist party in order to be as strong as possible as a government (need all the political strength you can muster). But in 1958, they’re in the middle of the Cold War and this would basically mean to revert to progressive democracy/the great alliance and bring the Communists into power once again. Would jeopardize France’s position in the Western bloc.  President of the Republic, René Coty, also played a mediating role. René Coty, fait appel “ au plus illustre des Français”. Le 1er juin, le général de Gaulle devient ainsi le dernier président du Conseil de la IVe République. Il reçoit des députés les pleins pouvoirs et œuvre pendant l’été 1958 à la rédaction d’une nouvelle Constitution, qui s’avère très proche des propositions avancées à Bayeux (exécutif fort). CDG was then elected 21 President of the Council (PM) and commanded a majority in the Chamber. The Communists were against him, CD were in his favor, Socialist & radicals split evenly as they understand that he was the only other compromise, the other alternative being a military coup d’état. 11/4 Lesson: France in the 5th Republic: completing the argument on the stabilization of the 5th Republic RECAP: After 1960s, post-war political systems find their own form of stability:  Germany --> parliamentary democracy in continuity  France --> fifth republic  Italy --> unstable stability centered on party democracy These systems have reached a certain point of stabilization, what now? What is happening to politics: how is democracy changing? What are the student movements of 1968? Why is the embedded liberal compromise under stress in the 70s? Why is politics moving to technocracies? Communism is always in the background. It is the real alternative to liberalism after 1945. It’s the embodiment of the political dream. The idea is that humans must use politics to govern history: you cannot leave the politics of history to individuals, to the market, etc. It must be politics. Camus reading: the very early expression of the crisis of Communism. Havel reading = crisis of the political in Eastern Europe. From Eastern Europe, it passes to Western Europe. We cannot understand the history of Western political systems without considering the Eastern European (and Communist) "other".  When after 1989 when Communism disappears, then the West needs to find another "other". Who is the West without the “other”? Bush with the War on Terror: finding the other in radical Islamism. Now, the other is China. These may be real “enemies”; the issue is how you use the “enemy” to build yourself Cont’d – a new Constitution for the French 5th Republic: After Algeria, de Gaulle is appointed President of the Council and becomes a Roman-style dictator. He imposes a new Constitution in order to institutionalize a strong leader that’s not only connected to emergencies. He connects the emergency to a structural transformation. Overall, CDG uses the emergency to pull the compromise on his side: making his own model prevail over the others using the referenda. 1958 Referendum on the Constitution: 82% vote in favor of the Constitution  CDG elected President of the Republic with an important majority, not directly (no direct election, a compromise that CDG must accept)  Gaullists are creating parties for CDG, but he does not want to be considered a party leader. He wants to be a national leader = the embodiment of the national leader. He wants a presidential system, not a party system. o “Because I am a man alone, I do not compound to any party, any organization…I am a man who belongs to no one to everyone.”  The referendum is the instrument to put the president in touch with public opinion directly, and to collect a vast majority of public opinion. Constitution of the French 5th Republic: 1. Aimed to provide government stability and authority of the state by protecting institutions from party strife & political divisions. This stability was provided for by a two-tier electoral system which should prevent fragmentation of parliament, a constitutional council, but most of all a powerful president who appoints the prime minister, dissolved parliament, and exerted extensive powers in case of an emergency. 22 nowhere. Reagan and Thatcher changed the world bc the compromise wasn’t working anymore. Maybe the neoliberal way wasn’t good? Did we go too far? 11/8 LESSON – Sixties as a watershed for democracy Stabilization of the fifth republic (semi-presidential), parliamentarian system in Germany and unstable stability around party systems in Italy. Third phase in Europe - set of new challenges opens up around the mid-1960s: more democracies, expansion of individual freedom, greater social rights, which will lead to the crisis of the post-war embedded liberal arrangement and also connected with changes in the international political situation. Mimetic relation between the East & the West and how it’s affecting the post-war world. How democracy is coping with the end of Communism: Communism provided the “enemy other” which helped build the strength of Western democracy. Once the Soviet bloc is gone, there is no real alternative, so the question becomes, “why should we remain a democracy”. The search for another alternative appears. Self-determination: real freedom. The ability to be & do whatever you want. This is what liberal democracy offers: the realization of your authentic identity. In order to express your identity, you have to be fully self-determined. This includes the absence of any kind of control. A very hard promise for liberal democracy to fulfill. This is a part of the rebellion of the 1960s (and 1968). You promised that we would be free, but we are not. We grow up, go to school, go to college, find a job, wake up early and work every day. Disciplinary capitalism. We are not free; we cannot do whatever we want. The question is: how to build order in a liberal democracy? How to you keep it from degenerating into a negative anarchy?  The dream of a liberal democracy: people are self-determined; communities are self-determined and will not lead to anarchy. Spontaneous order: leave humans free but build their interaction that leads to coordinated activity. You enter the market, following your own individual behavior (you want to get rich, you want this kind of career, etc.), but the invisible hand of the market (Adam Smith) inserts your ego into the mechanism that produces the spontaneous interaction of human beings. But to have individuals live in a free and orderly way you need to educate people, but how can you educate individuals for a liberal society? In the 60s, people were rebelling against the fact that they were being educated to be good soldiers in a liberal democracy. The protestors were students; they were centered on how universities are organized = universities are critical to capitalism. They’re not teaching us how to think, how to realize our own potential, to determine ourselves. They’re forming us to be cogs in the machine of capitalism, technocratic leaders of a machine. In the 70s, Foucault theorizes all of this: biopolitics/the notion of governmentality = since the 18th century, liberalism has been building a morality that is imposed on individuals and meant to make them able to govern themselves.  Not self-determination, but self-government. Limit yourself so you are not limited by the government. Liberal democracy does not constrain them bc they are already self-governed.  You will not desire things that you cannot have, desires that would be damaging for a liberal democratic system, bc you have been educated that you need to protect the system and you govern yourself to not put the system in danger.  In Marxism, it’s poverty. You rebel against the system bc you’re starving. The engine of history is materiality. I have a problem of material poverty and that’s the instrument you use to become a revolutionary. Fascist dimension: a similarity between 1968 and 1918/1919. The desire to act and to break the rules and the way in which society works. Destroying the system bc you hate what exists, even if you don’t have an alternative in mind.  The Outcast book: the extreme right-wing after WWII: for what are we fighting? We don’t know. But we know that we must destroy bourgeois society. The rebellion against tradition that doesn’t have an alternative, but you must 25 act: protest, destroy, refuse. You don’t know what you’re going to build after the destruction. The idea of fascism: we must destroy society/tradition “for the sake of the nation”. But what is the nation? By destroying, then in the destruction you will build something new. You discover the plan during/after the destruction. The post-war political systems need to find the new challenges of the late 50s/early 60s. The roots are there for the earthquakes of the 1970s. Critical juncture: late 60s/early 70s usher in our modern world today. We enter a different period of history: late modernity. How do these political systems interact with this critical juncture? The interaction in Germany is successful, France somewhat successful, but in Italy it fails. Corduwener: 1960s as a turning point: the turn of the 60s brought political change which was inextricably linked to the changing conceptions of democracy among the major parties. The establishment of the Fifth Republic in France, the formation of the first center-left government between PSI and DC in Italy, and the coalition talks between SPD and CDU which ultimately led to the Grand Coalition in Germany, meant an overhaul of the political constellation. Political actors were only able to form political alliances after they had accepted each other as democrats who shared broadly similar notions of democracy.  The PSI and SPD adjusted their ideas on the relationship between democracy and capitalism  endorsed the market economy as democratic and expressed unconditional support for individual freedoms (so against communism). o This emphasis on freedom also clearly delineating the difference between the Socialist and Communism; the Socialists abandoned their previous ambivalence towards Marxism. o After the crackdown on the Hungarian uprising, the PSI distant itself from the Communism and denounced it as undemocratic.  The Christian Democrats were forced to reconsider the rejection of both (SPD-PSI) parties’ democratic legitimacy. This paved the way for government collaboration between the two forces. o In Germany, the CDU was soon forced to come to terms with the SPD’s newly established Democratic credentials and its competition for the political center. o In Italy, the PSI and DC accepted each other as democrats too in 1963, but their reconciliation was much harder than in West Germany. In the eyes of the left, the DC government supported by neo-fascists that crackdown on popular protest was the culmination of a decade of the Christian Democratic assaults on democracy. The DC claimed to be both popular and antifascist but seemed to be neither in the summer of 1960. A decisive push in the direction of socialists now seemed the only option to strengthen the party’s democratic credentials and secure Italian democracy. The bloodshed of July 1960 tipped the balance in favor of a Christian Democratic alliance with the Socialists, the DC eventually compromised and Tambroni step down. A centrist government was formed and the MSI (neo-fascist) was discredited and excluded from government.  Establishment of consensus on the principles of democracy in West Germany and Italy was marked by Crucial differences : 1. Balance of power and how this determined which party had to compromise its principles. In West Germany, the convergence of conceptions of democracy entailed SPD’s acceptance of the two principles on which it had most vocally contested the democratic credential of the CDU in 1950s: the market economy and the alignment of a rearmed West Germany with the West. In Italy, it was more a process of ‘parallel convergence’. This involved the ‘democratization’ of the education system, a relaxation on censorship laws and the nationalization of electric energy sector. 2. How convergence influence the political constellation in each country. In West Germany the three parties represented in parliament now saw each other as ‘democratic’. In Italy the new center-left government wanted to resolve the old antagonism between the DC and the Left and the gap between the working class and the state. PSI called the collaboration with the DC. The PCI argued that Italian governments, with or without the PSI, were undemocratic bc capitalist system. The communists slowly toned down their resistance to the government economic programmes in the 26 1960s, and finally acknowledged that in Italy ‘a democratic order existed’. In this way the PCI relinquished its vehement opposition to the DC and became part of the mainstream party-political constellation. Thus, reinforcement of antifascist sentiments, reinforced the consensus among the major parties and underlined the importance of the political parties as heirs of the antifascist resistance. The growing consensus among West Germany and Italy's political elites on the meaning of democracy led to coalitions with greater political power. In Italy, the new power relations mean that the old division between the Marxist left and DC was replaced by an equally deep divide between the center left and the PCI. West German government and parliamentary opposition fully accepted each other as Democrats. L'alliance entre DC et PSI se concrétise en 1963. Cependant, l'isolement du PCI conduit à en faire la seule opposition aux démocrates-chrétiens, et donc à augmenter ses scores au détriment du PSI. Ainsi se manifeste à partir de 1953 une progression communiste continue aux élections générales, avec plus de 25 % des voix en 1963. Avec la mort de Togliatti et l’arrivée d’un communiste plus modéré, et condamne les printemps de prague. Changes in the 60s and 70s that open this critical juncture:  Significant transformation in the international situation: destabilization of the Cold War in Western Europe. The building of the Berlin War as a critical juncture. The Cold War is not going away, it’s a relatively stable “mountain” in the landscape of Europe.  Changing relationship between US and Western Europe: Western Europe doesn’t need the US as much as there is no immediate threat of WWIII. The US is focused on other parts of the world where this Cold War stabilization has not yet occurred, and they decide that Western Europe is not an economic community that must be held. o 1971: end of Bretton Woods; beginning of this transformation of the relationship  Changing memory of the War. This begins to happen in the late 50s and early 60s (in France in the 70s). The memory of fascism was interpreted in a certain way in the late 40s and early 50s which put fascism into brackets , to explain fascism as a parenthesis that could be closed and isolated. An interpret fascism and antifascism in a way that could safeguard the national identity. o Was fascism nationalism (something that comes from tradition) or was it revolutionary (enemy of traditionalism)? This leads to ambiguity in interpretation. If fascism is interpreted as revolutionary by antifascists, then they want to get back to tradition. Vice versa with the opposite view: if fascism was nationalism, then you must defend the nation from traditionalism. o In France, the Vichy is interpreted as something exported from Germans, it has nothing to do with French national tradition. o In Italy, Benedetto Croce interprets fascism as a parenthesis, an explosion of revolutionaries, but nothing to do with the Italian traditions that are fundamentally sound. o In Germany, the memory of the disasters of the war were certainly there but it wasn’t connected to any specific political alternative. There is a memory, but there’s an attempt to safeguard the national tradition.  Re-politicization of the memory of fascism : In the 60s, this interpretation changed. Fascism starts to be seen as something that comes out of tradition, out of historical roots of the nation-state. In order to have real antifascism, you must destroy those roots and build something entirely new. So, antifascism becomes a radical transformation of all the elements that built European democracies. o In 1945, we got out of fascism, but we did not destroy the roots of fascism. Those roots are in our institutions, in Catholicism, in capitalism, etc. Now we must get rid of those roots  a very strong left-wing interpretation of the memories of the war  A generational change : the coming of age of the Baby Boomers. These were people who had no personal memory of the disasters of the war but had a clear memory of the promises of the post-war liberal democracy. These promises were connected to the revolutionary desires of a deep transformation of society (1945, 46, 47): millions of people died in the fight against fascism and the building of a new society. These promises were frozen by the Cold War, 27 poverty is no longer a revolutionary tool (because society is “no longer poor”), but the idea that civilization is repressing our instincts is a strong tool. But Del Noce says that this is also not right, because political revolutions need sacrifice, they need human beings to subordinate their own interests to the collective task. If you want to have a revolution with a bunch of people who want to follow their own instincts, you’ll have bloody chaos and you’ll never get anything done. Liberation in the name of individual will/instincts will never work. You’ll only have a bunch of unruly, undisciplined people who will eventually dissolve and they’ll go in their own personal individual direction. Each liberated self will say, “I’m liberated, who should I obey you” and they’ll go their own way. This is exactly what happens post-1968.  Lotta Continua: a far-left extra-parliamentary organization in Italy. It was founded in autumn 1969 by a split in the student-worker movement of Turin, which had started militant activity at the universities and factories such as Fiat. [look at how this related to Del Noce, how it fails] 1968 as a total success and a total failure: success = completed the destruction of tradition. Its negative part was extremely effective. Why should we obey bourgeois values if they’re only relative to bourgeois society? The idea is that we must destroy your inheritance bc it’s all wrong, that fascism is the culminating part of that inheritance , and that it’s all relative. We’re free to build our own free society. Every generation can build its own values. Whatever values that were given to the new generation are dead; they were the values of the past. Failure = what is the solution? Only the expression of subjectivity. We don’t have common values. Each individual must be free to express their own subjectivity. If this is case, then politics is dead. How can you have any collective political action? There’s no objectivity/element that keeps humans together. So, according to Del Noce, 1968 has a huge cultural impact, it changes it completely. But it does not have a political element bc it makes collective political action impossible. Gassert : 1968, the year of global revolt halfway between the end of World War II and the end of the Cold War, looked like a failed revolution. None of the protests led to the overthrow of existing orders.  In France, Charles de Gaulle succeeded in upstaging the Paris May by calling an early election, which produced a political landslide in favor of the right. Despite these, Herbert Marcuse thought that the events of 1968 had shown that revolutionary change was in the wings. Calls for freedom, self-determination, and democracy were heard through- out East Central Europe as well. Although political democracy was restored in 1945 in most Western European countries the social fabric of Western Europe was not yet democratic in the broader meaning of the term. Class privileges persisted throughout Western Europe; family and gender relationships were modeled along patriarchal, authoritarian lines. Morality was still being regulated by traditional authority, namely, through church dogma in Catholic Southern Europe and through illiberal civil and criminal codes in Republican France and Protestant Northern Europe. By the second half of the 1970s, however, this old Europe had practically vanished. People were now linked to the realms of national and international culture by new means of communication, especially television. The postwar economic boom was the prime catalyst for social change. Plus, the unusually large population bulge of the baby boom generation, which made both Eastern and Western Europe younger than ever before in history. The movements of 1968 were part of these long-term transformations. The Western New Left and Participatory Democracy This new branch of Marxism was a reaction to disillusionment over Stalinism after the Hungarian uprising of 1956, it was an intellectual reaction to postwar prosperity and the changing nature of Western societies and economies. The “new working classes” showed an interest in topics beyond workplace democracy. They were more inclined to focus on larger social and cultural concerns. Quality-of-life questions and cultural concerns became more prominent. 30 The question of democracy became more pressing, as it was no longer seen merely as a way to govern, as conservative defenders of parliamentary democracy interpreted it. Rather, democracy was a social system in which human beings enjoyed more personal autonomy and better chances of participating in decision-making processes. Terms such as “participatory democracy,” combined ideas of personal autonomy and fulfillment. Among the Western European protest movements, the term “democracy” thus acquired a very specific meaning that was strikingly different from liberal and conservative usage. These demands for an anti-institutional participatory democracy did not lead to an outright transformation of Western European political systems. Still, the question has been asked to what extent the movements of 1968 made democracy a more acceptable proposition for society at large. PARADOX : The radical left moved away from democratic models into highly authoritarian Maoist, Trotskyite, and Leninist splinter groups, while at the same time conservative critics of the movements of 1968 overcame their uneasiness about Western-style democracy. In Western Europe, 1968 was thus the product of long-term social and cultural transformation, which for a brief historic moment seemed to blaze the path toward a new revolution. The revolutionary impulse of 1968 might even have been counterproductive. Yet in the cultural realm, its radical tendencies spilled over into traditional societies and helped to further democratize the West in the larger societal sense of the term. East Central European Workers’ Democracy According to Dutschke, the Prague Spring had kindled the hope of creating a “producers’ democracy” leading to a true “democratic self-organization of the masses.” East Central European critical intellectuals had by no means been original adherents of Western-style democracy. In fact, it was precisely because Dubček tried to square the circle by envisioning a less centralized, open, and liberal form of socialism that the Prague Spring turned out to be so contagious throughout the Eastern bloc, including in the GDR. Whereas Communist regimes managed to suppress civic unrest for almost two more decades, their critics lost faith in communism’s ability to reform itself. Although the democratic impulse of 1968 had not led to an immediate overthrow of the existing order, its long-term consequences were nonetheless remarkable. During the 1980s, the dissidents of the Polish March and the Prague Spring would emerge as the voices that kept the democratic dream alive. Although 1968 was about democracy, neither East Central nor Western European movements came out in support of centrist liberal, Western-style, representative democracy. Therefore, the democratic idea of 1968 was opposed to the real, existing, parliamentary, representative democracy of the West. Although the movements of 1968 did not immediately democratize existing institutions. In the long run they contributed to strengthening the democratic impulse all over Europe. 11/15 – 1970s & the Crisis of the Political in Western Europe What is the legacy of the 60s ?  The end of traditional society, the idea that the legacy of traditional society is not good, should be abandoned. The 1960s provide a further move away from traditional society, a further refusal of traditions and move towards modernisation. Fascism is a child of tradition, an anti-modern attempt to make traditions survive. Therefore, anti-fascism must be anti-traditional, progress and modernity are a necessary part of any anti-fascist effort.  Refusal of the technocratic illusion, desire for a new political management of collective values, but there are no values for collective action. Del Noce: Technocracy has its limits. Technology is very important, but the problem is the substitution of technology for every other way of thinking and looking for the truth for human beings. 31 Marcuse: inability of human beings to have any other meaningful discourse that is not a scientific discourse on reality. The relation between politics, science and technology is represented in the 1960s: political rebellion against any form of reduction of debate about aims to debate on means (technocracy).  Refusal of embedded liberal democracy, request of a democracy that can fulfil its promises. Not only the promise of democracy is reduced to voting every 5 years, and when voting, people feel like they don't have a real choice. DC locked into power in Italy, no real opposition in Germany because of Grand Coalition. They refuse the embedded liberalism compromise (democracy without limit).  Deep transformation of the international arena 1960s conditioned by the change in the Cold War, it was become more stable. The presence of the communist other was crucial for Europeans to accept liberal democracy, even with its imperfections, to defend themselves. When the Cold War crystallises, this pressure diminishes, and people start asking for more democratic values and liberties.  Changing organisation of the Western World Together with the détente, there is a disarticulation of the West: the opening up of a transatlantic rift between Europe and the US. Embedded liberalism was already shaking in the 1950s, because the embedded liberal compromise was instrumental to a Europe that was in the process of being rebuilt and defending it in the Cold War. This need in the 1960s was not there. The idea that the US should keep supporting Western Europe was starting to disappear. Post-war arrangements and the solidarity of the West was starting to shake, the US was not interested in Europe any longer because it has become a stabilised place. -> background for the decision to end the Gold Standard in 1971: this is underlying the evolution and transformation of political systems in the 1970s. In 1971 we have the end of the post-war embedded liberal arrangement. Political systems witness a pressure from below (1960s desire for individual liberation legacy - overload) and pressure from above (need to rebuild an international economic order with its demands, and how to grow out of the 1970s problems of public expenditure). How do European systems address these kinds of demands? A left-wing move:  E.g. Germany: 1969, there is a Social Liberal government. For the first time since 1949, the CDs are in the opposition and the new govt is centered on a coalition between Liberals & Social Democrats who had moved more to the left. New Chancellor is a charismatic left figure. Uses rhetoric of the 1960s to give the Germans the impression that something must change and is changing. Greater democratic participation of citizens in institutions; power back into the hands of the people.  France is still governed by Gaullists/right-wing. Between 1969-1972, the PM is a strange kind of Gaullist (a left- wing Gaullist coming from Mendes-France). He invents the same kind of idea as Germany: a new progress, open society. The left wing was still not quite ready to govern. But a liberal center right wing wins who calls for an advanced liberal democracy. Two important institutional changes/reforms to meet these demands (not just with slogans):  Referendum: the only solution to answer the demand of more democratic participation. Students are no longer happy with representative democracy. o First nation-wide referendum in the UK; had always been used in France; introduction of referendum in Italy; diffusion of referenda worldwide. o Supposed to strengthen representative democracy, but can be used against it  Devolution: devolution of power to regions (answer to pb of greater demo) o But not sure if it was effective: multi-level governance can be very complicated o Cannot give direct democracy 32 State, the municipalities blame region, or the State blames the EU. The end product of blame shifting is that all institutions are losing credibility in the eyes of the citizens. Also, frequent elections don’t necessarily strengthen democracy; it could lead to low voter turnout. If people are voting frequently for institutions, they don’t believe to be strong enough to solve their problems, then they believe their vote is lost and they end up not voting. Individual self-determination: greater individual freedoms. This is what the protestors of the 1960s are calling for – they want complete fulfillment, autonomy, and determination. This leads to an explosion of individual and social rights (all across Europe and the US):  Liberalization about the ruling in the family: more rights to women to make decisions within the family, family allowances, allowances for children, maternity leave, greater parity between men and women, divorce, abortion (not quite liberalization, but de-penalized to a certain point in the pregnancy)  Freedoms of speech, greater leniency in criminal law, less strictness in jails  Social rights: pension, unemployment benefits, welfare o For example, in France: 1974: adulthood at 18 years old, creation of a position under the Secretary of State for “the female question” ; 1975: abortion, liberalization in the jail system, law in favor of handicapped people, egality between men and women in administrative work, liberalization of divorce, lowering of retirement age; 1976: allowance for single parents; 1977: subsidy for renting apartments, (further) liberalization of the press; 1978: greater maternity allowance, liberalization of private radios, etc. o Looking at this from 2021, these are the basis of the world we live in. Now it’s about taking steps further, or further corrections to the system, widening the area of self-government, self-development, and autonomy of individuals. This is all happening on the international level as well. The Helsinki Accords take place in the 1970s, agreements meant to put pressure on Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, as well as to put individual rights in writing in the international system. Before my individual rights come from being a citizen of the State and they are granted by the State. But after 1945, there is a rebirth of the concept of “natural law” as an instrument that can counter totalitarianism. Nazism/fascism/totalitarianism is connected to juridical positivism: the law is never wrong bc connected to a system of power, not to a system of universal values. But if you take the stance of natural law, you can say the racist laws of fascism are wrong because they go against the natural rights of every individual (including the Jews). In order to counter this post-war thoughts, liberals rediscovered the idea of natural law/rights.  Juridical positivism: evaluating a law not based on its morality but on its consistency & respect of internal procedures. The law of Nazism can be perfectly coherent with the internal system and respect all procedures, so it’s fine.  Jus naturale: natural law; there is a natural law, and you can confront a legal system in terms of if it respects or does not respect natural law. o Problem: if you’re a liberal, you believe in relativism which allows for the possibility of competing value systems. But then, you don’t have a natural law. So then how do you evaluate legal systems? So, it can end up in relative positivism: every system has its own values, and your function is only to evaluate the law only in its respect of that system’s procedures. After 1945, there is not yet a strong notion of human rights as something that belongs to the international sphere. Human rights are concepts rooted in the West, protected by Western systems and institutions. So Western citizens can enjoy individual rights, the West used this idea to put pressure on the Eastern bloc (to a certain extent). 1970s: the notion of human rights begins to change. No longer a notion connected to citizenship, but to humanity/the fact of being a human being, and it must be protected by international institutions. Multiplication of international treaties and NGOs starting from the 70s. For example, in the late 1970s, Amnesty International is awarded a Nobel Peace prize which is a sign of the changing atmosphere. This also puts a lot of pressure on and begins to reduce the power of individual nation-states. The more you multiply human rights, the more power you give to the Courts, the 35 more power is transmitted from representative institutions (Parliament) to the Courts (constitutional and international). Judges are ever more important. The space of the political becomes compressed by the expansion of the juridical. Overload of political systems due to growth in social expenditure: social rights cost a lot of money. Explosion of bureaucracy bc all these rights must be administered. Explosion of social expenses: for example, US spending on defense decreases in comparison to spend on human resources. The amount of public budget managed by the State is great. But the possibility of politicians to use this budget to their discretion is decreasing. This budget is already allocated (retirement, pensions, unemployment, etc.). The discretion of politics is greatly reduced. This is all at the roots of the crisis of the political in contemporary times: the reduction of the possibility of the political to govern societies and the power of politics to influence individuals. Rise of technocracy, depolitization of the economy(less power to allocate the public budget), more power to the law and the courts. The space of the political is compressed by all that. Postwar in Eastern Europe Between the end of WWII and the death of Stalin in 1953, there is no room to maneuver within the Eastern bloc. The rigidity of the system is very strong (purges are taking place, strong oppression). Until 1953, there’s no real possibility for any dissent to emerge. The Soviet Union must also face the problem of Yugoslavia: the attempt to have national paths to Socialism; each country makes their own way. In order to fight against this idea, the Soviet system is ever more rigid and constraining. Additionally, criticisms of Stalinism and Communism start to spread from people who have fled from the Eastern bloc (would not be possible from people inside the bloc as oppression was quite strong). One of the most important criticisms comes from Polish author Czesław Miłosz’ book called “The Captive Mind” (1953): criticism of the degeneration of the Communist revolutionary dream into a totalitarian mechanism. It’s also about the appeal of Communism/revolutionary Marxism, it’s not a denunciation of Communism as only violent. It describes what draws people to the system: one enters into Communism wanting to believe it, they tell themselves lies so that they can believe it, but at a certain point this mechanism eats them up and they enter it so deeply so they’re unable to escape it. Between the death of Stalin in 1953 to 1956, the possibility to move a bit begins in various directions : Yugoslav paradox is back – the idea of finding different national pathways to Socialism becomes legitimized again. But also, the idea that after Stalinism there is more possibility to realize Socialism as it should have been. In Poland, this takes the form of revisionism: the ability of people to work with and inside the Communist party to develop the parts of Communism that are more “liberal”. Cooperative Socialism in Poland: not created top-down, but cooperation through collective enterprises to change the rigidity of post-Stalinist Communism. 1956: Invasions of Poland and Hungary with two very different outcomes:  Poland: the Polish Communist party is able to keep the situation under control and there’s no need for Soviet intervention. They’re able to guarantee the possibility a national Socialism that doesn’t take Poland out of the Warsaw Pact. No geopolitical threat the Soviet Union  Hungary: the Hungarian Communist party is not able to control the situation; the protests are too much for them to handle. Faced with the possibility that Hungary may exit the Soviet bloc, the Soviet Union decides to intervene in Budapest. The country that has Soviet tanks rolling through its capital and the Soviet army violently repressing protests is also the country that after 1956 has the greatest freedom to experiment in national forms of Socialism (forms of economic liberalization and some forms of freedom of expression), which makes Hungary named the “happiest place in the barracks”. In sum, in 1956 the issue is NOT the transformation of Socialism, but the geopolitical belonging to the Soviet bloc. The satellites must remain inside the bloc, but that doesn’t mean that satellites cannot experiment with the idea of Socialism. As long as they can guarantee the solidity of the geopolitical bloc, then you can experiment. 36 A new class: the ideology that as supposed to destroy all social classes in fact created a new division of classes. New classes are not left/right, poor/rich, it’s those who have the power within the system and those outside the system (top/down). Bureaucracy has become a new class. The zeitgeist of the West in 1960s is also present in Eastern Europe: greater participation, permanent revolution, de-- bureaucratization, criticism of technocracy.  E.g. a Trotsky letter (Kuron): revolution should never stop, never be bureaucratized, permanent mobilization of individuals that should be stopped only when the system has finally reached its Communist goals. 1968: Prague Spring is the last attempt to have the promise of Communism fulfilled inside the system , to change the system from within to render it able to fulfill the promise. The suppression of Prague Spring demonstrates this impossibility. This is particular shocking bc Dubcek and the Czechoslovaks immediately declare their loyalty to the Soviet Union, they don’t want to exit the Soviet bloc (bc they have the memory of Budapest in 1956). The reforms that Dubcek was trying to make in Czechoslovakia were not geopolitically threatening to the Soviet Union. It’s a national attempt to create a new Socialism within the Soviet bloc – it’s ideological. The repression shows that Socialism cannot actually be reformed bc they’re not only repressing geopolitical deviation, but also ideological deviation. This means that reforming the system from within is not possible. This opens up the path to the anti-political dissident movement of the 1970s in Eastern Europe. Trying to find an anti-political way to criticize the system. The communist other is a crucial factor in the stabilization of the liberal model in Western Europe, both internally with the presence of communist parties in western countries and externally with the Eastern Block, which bases solution on the political management of the country. Exit from the idea that the exit from modernity is the creation of a political utopia. The post-modern system lacks a non-democratic other, war on terror of Bush was an attempt to recreate a non-democratic other (Islamist terror), but very difficult because communist other was a very politically and symbolically alternative. The communist other is also inside the West, it is an option that parts of the West have tried and the idea that we should create a utopian condition of perfection in which we destroy the hierarchies inside society and politics is very important also in the West 11/25 – Presentation Havel, The Power of the Powerless Demo leaves face to the communist order. Most important hypothesis of how to cope with modernity. Message of 1966  don’t mess with the geopolitics. 1968, there is a hope that something can be changed in socialism. The way that the dream was implemented in the soviet bloc  possibility to work on the system. Politics has destroyed the class system of capitalism and inside of the new system there is a new class system. Process of the 1960, process of self-determination, system where people can express themselves ex the Prague spring. Dubcek, leader of the communist party in Czechoslovakia resigned bc it was not an option. Called for a reform of the socialism, wanted to make a system truer to itself: “Socialism with a human face”. Put an end to the dream but self-determination is back. In Poland the repression was tough. Gomulka is a national hero. He thought that something can be done, dialog with the reformator inside the party. But disgrace under Communism. Believed that individual nation could follow their own path to socialism without following the path of the soviet bloc. The dissidents find themselves in a difficult position, in a blind alley. The system is not going to collapse soon, so what do you do? Do we resign and accept the system? This is the moment where dissidents transform into moralism, trying to speak in the streets and put pressure on the government. The only way is to make nonpolitical spaces, parallel structure. We cannot have a public sphere made of lie and a private sphere made of truth. Create a tension that is not durable, going to explode. 37 The fact that the market was an instrument to re-moralise was very clear in Thatcher’s rhetoric, unlike Reagan. So, the market is hyper narcissistic, where the ego can be satisfying, but it is also an instrument of discipline. For both Reagan and Thatcher, the market is a place of endless possibility where discipline is needed. Thatcher (in power from 1979 to 1990) was against the integration GB in Europe and was very close to the US (GB as a Trojan horses of the US in Europe). Economic was at the core of Thatcherism  Market as a way to remoralize. She had an economic success (money internationally stronger, good economic growth, decrease of unemployment, a lot a of privatization). She controlled the inflation but increase of poor and inequality in population. She was against the labour party, conservative. Definition of Thatcherism : mixture of free market, financial discipline, firm control over public expenditure, tax cuts, nationalism, privatization and clash of populism. 2 major achievements:  Control of inflation  Reduction of trade union to size 2 distinct novelties:  Techniques by tackled both inflation & labour relations  Diff between governments that try to do things and gvt that do things NUTSHELL –  Need govern society but no longer able to gover it  Need find technocratic ways to govern, the more move poer to tech the more wander if having politicians = useful ? = CRISIS OF POLITICAL  Depoliticized society : birth 80/90  Enter crisis 21st century : world governby non po institutions , have rebellion of po against depoliticsation attempt repoliticising & recompressing technocratic areas  But keep jumping from one emergency to another  move power onto democratic bodies 02/12 Maier: describes the privatization of time, in modernity there is a collective notion of time that ends at the end of modernity, so every individual has its own conception of time within a set of general of rules. This is connected to a reinterpretation of individualism, a society of individuals. Politics concern time in 2 ways : 1. Ideological : resolve and carry out the decisions that order the collective life of societies. Thus the sphere of politics differ from the economic sphere. There is a politics of time bc those who govern advance characteristic of how society should evolve through time. Bourgeois society used time and fascism denied it. Postliberal society tend to decouple collective and individual, public and private, time, renouncing the alignment that was earlier sought. 2. Allocation of time: political leaders propose different uses for time considered as a scarce social resource. Politics involves mobilizing community resources of constraint to allocate scarce goods or to privilege some values above others. Time cannot be distributed so treated as politically unproblematic. 3 political concept of time  liberal, fascist, and postliberal. “Politics of liberal time” (market is controlling time, depolitisation of time, the concept of time is linear and intuitive) has its roots in the general dvpt of Western rationalism. For locke and Hobbes, time could no longer just be taken for granted. The ordering of space and time became an obsession of the emerging liberal era. There was an allocative politics of time in the liberal era to construe time as a marketable commodity. In a liberal political economy, managers 40 had the power over individual’s time. Contradiction: government disinterested itself in the allocation of time but on the other hand, in the 19th century, population sought to standardize the measurement of time, to establish units of time and eventually to coordinate it. State did not preclude its effort to keep allocation of time an affair of the market. Serving time required to master time. Effort to impose control over time, perfervid demarcation of private and public space, family time and work time… adjust human life more rationally to the constraints of an absolute time and space. Denying time : the fascist era (repolitization of time, time controlled by the state) 2 impulse tended to dissolve the absolute of time that marked the bourgeois era. Scientist and philosophers undertook radical redefinition of time (Poincarré said there were no single absolute time valid for all the universe). Class conflict meant a struggle to control time. Authoritarian era in which public authorities sought to reclaim temporal control and redefine the nature of historical time. Time was to be repoliticized. Soviet Union changed the mechanism for influencing time preferences from the market to the state. No totalitarian state can afford to let time remain a private resource or market commodity. In Italy and Germany there was a Fascist conquest of time, it was the revolt of the young, youth very celebrated but on the other hand fascism was the triumph of the permanent. New state-controlled arbitration with the prevailing enforcement of employer’s control. Labor time went from a resource to be distributed by market exchange to one that had to submit to political command. Control of the leisure time and the demarcation btw private and collective time (19th century) was eroded as much as possible. Decoupling time: the postliberal paradigm Non-totalitarian path also led away from the temporal consciousness of the nineteenth century. Time could be entrusted either to the state or to the individual. Postliberal society has acquiesced in the decoupling of private and collective time. Society coordinated the measurement of time but no collective claim on the uses of time. More plastic and malleable image of time. Recent indication suggest that a new balance of collective and individual time may be sought. Rather than stages of temporal consciousness we confront recurring political cycle. Bourgeois Europe treated the control of time and space as property right so that they might be exchanged for others values. Mitterand became president in 1981: First socialist president of the 5th republic. He abolished the death penalty, he created the 5th week of paid vacation and the week of 39h. Did a lot for the culture and so that every French can have access to the culture. Also his double presidency is entached with the Rwandan genocide, he said France doesn’t have any responsibility in that but in 2021 the study show that France did nothing to avoid it. Was in favour of Europe, Was in favor of NATO bc strong communist party in his government and scared. Europe centered on Paris and Bonn bc thatcher not in favor of Europe so will weaken the institutions. The cohabitation was not a problem for him. Erosion of state sovereignty in the late 1990s: 1. International level: Vietnam war, oil crisis (1973), end of Bretton Woods system -> in the mid of the 1970s, the post-war system and the Keynesian paradigm were in crisis. The answer of western political elites was to further integrate global markets, initially financial and then productive level, and go beyond the borders of the state -> divorce between capitalism and the borders of the state. De-regulation allowed capital to move from one country to another, this set up erosion of state sovereignty on its capacity to control flows of capital. 2. Furthermore, central banks were detached from politics: technicization and automatization of the Central Banks, which became connected to each other internationally to manage the level of the currency and the monetary offers, not possible for governments to intervene anymore -> strategy deployed to avoid massive inflation of the late 1960s and early 1970s. Insulation of central banks of politics meant that stats were losing control over flows of capital and their currency, even more so with the introduction of the Euro and the creation of the ECB. 3. In addition, the development of globalization, multinational actors (companies) -> internationalization of the entire economic system create a sense of common practices that spread, mainly managerial practices, which was exported to the public sectors -> new managerial paradigm in public administration in 1980s (company-like management), this lead to a disaggregation of administrative unity into different administrative agencies, which were later privatized (1990s). 41 Critics of the representative demo in the 1960 and 70 Denazification 42