English summary of The democratic Paradox by Mouffe, Sintesi del corso di Filosofia Politica

Scarica English summary of The democratic Paradox by Mouffe e più Sintesi del corso in PDF di Filosofia Politica solo su Docsity! 1.0: Democracy, power and the political From diverse perspectives, numerous thinkers have censured the concepts of a universal human nature, a widespread canon of rationality used to comprehend that human nature, and the plausibility of an absolute universal truth. This critique of Enlightenment universalism and rationalism, sometimes labeled as 'postmodern', has been articulated by certain authors, including Jurgen Habermas, who perceive it as posing a danger to the modern democratic endeavor. In this chapter, Mouffe challenges this viewpoint and advocates for the opposing argument. 1.1: Pluralism and Modern Democracy Firstly, it's crucial to differentiate liberal democracy from democratic capitalism and comprehend it as a political societal structure within classical political philosophy, distinct at the political level while disregarding its potential interrelation with an economic system. Liberal democracy, in its various interpretations, should be perceived as a regime addressing the symbolic organization of social connections, transcending the notion of a mere 'form of government'. It constitutes a particular method of politically arranging human coexistence, arising from the fusion of different traditions: political liberalism (encompassing the rule of law, separation of powers, and individual rights) and, on the opposite spectrum, the democratic heritage of popular sovereignty. In essence, the divergence between ancient and modern democracy isn't merely a matter of scale but rather one of essence. The pivotal distinction lies in the acknowledgment of pluralism. By 'pluralism', Mouffe refers to the abandonment of a fixed conception of the good life, a concept Claude Lefort terms 'the dissolution of the markers of certainty'. Pluralism should be regarded as an axiological principle, constituting an intrinsic element at the conceptual level in defining the very essence of modern democracy. Giving a positive status to differences and questioning the objective of unanimity and homogeneity, which is always revealed as based on acts of exclusion. This position differs from the conception of pluralism as a radical heterogeneity, namely the valorization of all differences without limits, a view that prevents us from recognizing how certain differences are constructed as relations of subordination and should therefore be challenged by radical democratic politics. What such definition of pluralism misses is the dimension of the political, by erasing antagonisms we are left with the liberal illusion of pluralism without antagonism. To deny the need for a construction of such collective identities, and to conceive democratic politics exclusively in terms of a struggle of a multiplicity of interest groups or of minorities for the assertion of their rights. Is remain blind to the relations to of power. It is to ignore the limits imposed on the extension of the sphere of rights by the fact that some existing rights have been constructed on the very exclusion or subordination of others. 1.2: Pluralism, power and antagonism The ineradicable character of power and antagonism is what is at stake. Mouffe’s perspective questions the objectivism and essentialism that are dominant in democratic theory since the Enlightenment. In her view any social objectivity is constituted through acts of power, making it a political act made possible by acts of exclusion. She therefore introduces in her reasoning the concept of “constitutive outside” borrowed by Derrida’s thought: the being of the objects must be inscribed in something else than itself, and it is therefore constructed as a difference. The constitutive outside is present within the inside as a real possibility, every identity becomes purely contingent. The implication is that power is not to be intended as an external relation taking place between two predetermined identities but rather as the link constituting the identities themselves. This point of confluence between objectivity and power is what we have called 'hegemony'. Putting ourselves into such anti-essentialist perspective we can conclude that for democracy to be no social agent should be able to claim the foundation of society. The more democratic the social agents become, the more they accept the particularity and limitations of their claims. The The aim of justice as fairness is to establish a consensus on a public reason whose content is given by a political conception of justice: 'this content has two parts: substantive principles of justice for the basic structure (the political values of justice); and guidelines of enquiry and conceptions of virtue that make public reason possible (the political values of public reason)'.1 Rawls contends that domains where rational agreement is unattainable, such as philosophical and religious doctrines, should be relegated to the private sphere. In contrast, consensus based on reason can be achieved in the public sphere, specifically within the political domain. Once reached, political consensus is definitive, unquestionable, since a subject in disagreement would be deemed “unreasonable”. In conclusion, Mouffe defines Rawls’ vision as a “dangerous utopia of reconciliation”2 where political conflict is eliminated, since what is being eliminated is the link between political and economic interests and therefore, the political itself. In the case that conflicts of interests between social and economical issues should arise, they are to be solved through discussion the framework of public reason. “Political” adversaries share the allegiance to the liberal-democratic principles, and they shall only differ on their personal interpretation of what liberty and equality mean and their practical application. However, Mouffe’s interest lies in the preservation of the political, of the conflict, while remaining inside the framework of liberal democracy, the reason being that the Rawlsian perspective excludes passion from ever interfering in the rational process and the realm of politics reduced to a neutral field in the conflict of interest. If this were true, there would be no room for the concepts of power, antagonism, and relationships of forces in the 'political' realm of modern liberal democracies. However, reality tells a different story. The Rawlsian project fails in front of the essential element of ‘undecidability’ of human relations. The dark side of the political has been hidden under the rug by the clever stratagem of distinguishing between ‘simple’ and ‘reasonable’ pluralism, limiting the possible consensus. The excluded is defined as such because it is 1 p.28 2 P.29 required by the exercise of reason: “'paradox of liberalism': how to eliminate its adversaries while remaining neutral”.3 1.5: Democracy and undecidability Mouffe’s aim in her critique of Rawls work was to reveal the dangers of a rationalistic approach to the question of justice in a democratic society, the danger being the jeopardization of democracy itself through the overlaying of the concepts of justice and law, closing the constitutive space of modern democracy. Therefore, the idea of a ‘rational’ political consensus must be renounced. “Indeed, such an illusion carries implicitly the desire for a reconciled society where pluralism would have been superseded. When it is conceived in such a way, pluralist democracy becomes a 'self-refuting ideal' because the very moment of its realization would coincide with its disintegration”4. Now, Mouffe moves her attention to post-structuralist framework where the concept of an irreducible alterity is both the condition of possibility and the condition of impossibility of any identity. Another tool that Mouffe borrows form the post-structuralist framework is the concept of ‘constitutive outside’: it highlights that pluralism inherently involves ongoing conflict and antagonism. It prompts us to recognize that these conflicts shouldn't be viewed as unavoidable disturbances or barriers preventing us from achieving complete harmony based on a rational universal ideal. Difference becomes the very possibility of constituting unity; pluralism has to be viewed as a necessity since the refusal of the possibility of the reabsorption of alterity into oneness and harmony. Unlike other radical or participatory democracy models rooted in rationalistic frameworks, radical and plural democracy dismisses the idea of a non-exclusive public sphere where a consensus through rational argumentation could be achieved without coercion. Demonstrating the conceptual impossibility of such a consensus, it does not undermine the democratic ideal, as some might suggest. Instead, it safeguards pluralistic 3 31, read highlighted conclusion on the book. 4 32 democracy from tendencies toward closure. This rejection serves as a crucial assurance that the democratic process will remain dynamic. In contrast to the Kantian-inspired democracy model, which envisions an ideal communicative community, a task seen as infinite yet clearly shaped, Mouffe’s perspective advocates for a democracy concept that, rather than pursuing consensus and transparency, distrusts any imposition of a single model of democratic discourse. Acknowledging the perils of rationalism, this perspective does not seek to control or eliminate indecision, understanding it as the very condition necessary for decision-making, freedom, and pluralism. 2.0: C. Schmitt and the paradox of liberal democracy According to Mouffe, the critique made by Schmitt of liberal democracies has to be addressed in order to elaborate a conception of a liberal-democratic society that is able to win the active support of its citizens. Two topics are analyzed in particular: the boundaries of citizenship and the nature of a liberal-democratic consensus. 2.1: Democracy, homogeneity and the boundaries of citizenship With the rise of the phenomenon of globalization political theories such as David Held and Richard Falk started advocating the need of a universal citizenship where the only criteria for being a cosmopolitan citizen is being human, or alternatively a supranational institution where world citizens could appeal right violations in their own nation-states. However, this view is not free of criticism: other theorists are skeptical about the practical possibility of such institution and therefore assert the privilege of nation-state as the locus for citizenship. Mouffe explains that the polarization on the matter is due the inherent conflict between the democratic and liberal element of modern society, a point of view she borrows from Schmitt. The latter, in his 1926 work The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracies argues that homogeneity is a necessary condition of democracy and if the conditions need it, the challenges for the framework of democratic politics, particularly in the context the concept known as 'deliberative democracy’. Undoubtedly, proponents of this model aim to inject moral and just considerations into politics, contrasting with interest-driven democratic notions influenced by economics, which are often skeptical about the value of political participation. However, by advocating reason and rational argumentation over interest aggregation as the core of politics, they essentially substitute the economic model with a moral one, albeit missing the political realm's specificity in a different way. In their pursuit to transcend the confines of interest-group pluralism, proponents of deliberative democracy vividly exemplify Schmitt's observation that “liberal thought systematically avoids or disregards the state and politics, consistently oscillating between two distinct realms: ethics and economics, intellect and trade, education and property”7. Mouffe’s main critical aim is the deliberative democracy model advocated by Habermas, in his view the legitimacy of power claimed by individuals within democratic institutions is grounded in the belief that their decisions represent an impartial standpoint, serving the interests of all. To uphold this presumption, decisions should emerge from proper public deliberative processes adhering to habermasian discourse guidelines. The fundamental concept of this model rests on the notion that only norms can be deemed valid if unanimously agreed upon by all affected parties through deliberation possessing specific characteristics: 1. Participation is regulated by equality and symmetry norms, ensuring an equal opportunity for all to engage in speech acts, question, interrogate, and initiate debate. 2. All participants retain the right to question proposed conversation topics. 3. Every participant possesses the right to introduce reflective arguments regarding the discourse procedure's rules and their application. There exists no a priori regulation limiting the conversation agenda or participants' identities, provided that any excluded individual or group can reasonably demonstrate their relevance to the contested norm. 7 46 Deliberative democracy theorist by basing legitimacy on rationality they imply that the process of public discourse needs to embody the characteristics of ideal discourse, setting the procedural values as impartiality, equality, openness, absence of coercion, and unanimity. Adherents of habermasian thought acknowledge potential obstacles to achieving the ideal discourse, viewing these impediments as empirical rather than theoretical. Thus, the ideal speech situation is presented as a regulatory idea rather than an achievable reality. However, considering Schmitt's thesis on the inherent relations of inclusion and exclusion vital in the political constitution of the demo, it becomes apparent that obstacles to attaining the ideal speech situation and consensus sans exclusion are ingrained within the democratic framework itself. Here Mouffe draws on post-structuralist Derridean concepts affirming “that the very conditions of possibility of the exercise of democracy constitute simultaneously the conditions of impossibility of democratic legitimacy as envisaged by deliberative democracy.”8 Ultimately consensus manifests as an expression of hegemony, the demarcation it establishes between legitimacy and non-legitimacy is fundamentally political and should remain open to contestation. 2.4 Pluralism and its limits Assumed that deliberative democracy’s framework is inadequate to represent pluralism, to the point that Mouffe affirms that in both Rawls and Habermas consensus is created at the direct expense of pluralism, she takes into analysis Schmitt’s critique once again, particularly considering the concept of homogeneity. In liberal thought it is defined by law or by procedure, reducing the moment of political constitution to a mere legal status. In Schmitt the ‘us’ finds its definition by opposition to the ‘them’, but other forms of cohesion can develop within the components of the 'us', and usually states that any kind of pluralism is a threat to the unity of the ethical State due to the risk of subsuming the political realm into society. In his 1930 publication Staatscthik und pluralistischer Staat, Schmitt contemplates 8 48 the prospect of a particular type of pluralism that does not pose a risk to the State's unity. Although he promptly dismisses this notion afterward, he outlines a necessary condition: the requirement for political parties to reach consensus on shared principles, which are to be regarded as constitutional ethics. 2.5 Schmitt’s False Dilemma Mouffe agrees with Schmitt on the necessity of constituting the demo politically, and, therefore, she seeks a definition of pluralism that will not negate the political, on the contrary she believes that a form of pluralism that fuels political association is achievable. In her view Schmitt poses a false dilemma on the matter: either there is unity of the people, and this requires expelling every division and antagonism outside the demos - the exterior it needs if it is to establish its unity; or some forms of division inside the demos are considered legitimate, and this win lead inexorably to the kind of pluralism which negates political unity and the very existence of the people. The illusion of the dilemma is explained by taking into analysis the Schmittian definition of political unity and of identity: the unity of the State is assumed and therefore stable, and people’s identity exists as a given, the demarcation of the ‘us’ and of the ‘them’ is not politically constructed, instead it is a mere recognition of an original divide. Ultimately, Mouffe finds Schmitt contradictory since he affirms that pluralism might lead to the disintegration of the state's unity, yet f such disintegration is a plausible political prospect, it implies that the existence of such unity itself is contingent, necessitating a political establishment. Conversely, the unity is portrayed as an unquestionable fact, potentially overlooking the political circumstances contributing to its formation. Only through this maneuver can the alternative be as inevitable as Schmitt intends it to be. Therefore, Mouffe refuses Schmitt’s dilemma while taking into account the need of a redefinition of the concept of homogeneity in democracy, proposing the concept of ‘commonality’, strong enough to define the demo but flexible enough to be compatible with different forms of pluralism, such the sole plausible and just approach, additionally it dismisses the claim of the superiority of the liberal system as the ultimate or unparalleled way of life. 3.2 Democratic Consensus and Agonistic Pluralism Mouffe's current inquiry revolves around how a commitment to democratic values can be attained and why she views rationalism as a hindrance rather than a benefit in this pursuit. Instead of arguing about the superiority of liberal democracy by “making context- transcendent truth claims”11, it is to be enquired how the process of identification with democratic values develops, and Wittgenstein provides the tools necessary to comprehend the emergence of a democratic consensus: is it through acting rather than rational evidence that the agreement on forms of life is established. As an alternative to the rational-consensus approach of 'deliberative democracy,' she advocates for 'agonistic pluralism,' where consensus would be entirely inclusive, deeply inspired by a Wittgensteinian approach to theorizing. To support her thesis, she references the James Tully's interpretation of Wittgenstein’s work, particularly in Philosophical Investigations, where according to Tully, Wittgenstein delineates the correct way to comprehend general terms is not through the establishment of a rational consensus on universal principles, on the contrary, it should be valorized the different ways the ‘game of democracy’ can be played: “this would mean fostering a plurality of forms of being a democratic citizen and creating the institutions that would make it possible to follow the democratic rules in a plurality of ways”.12 Mouffe’s proposal is to delineate democratic institutions able to coexist with the possibility of the conflict that could arise from the different understandings of the democratic framework, and this view is incompatible with a rationalist-universalist approach that tends to erase diversity. 3.3 Wittgenstein and Responsibility 11 70 12 73 In this subchapter Mouffe addresses the limits of the insights drew from Wittgenstein’s thought. Particularly, she addresses the critique made by Stanley Cavell where he compares Wittgenstein to Pragmatism. In the case when the acting subject cannot find any justification for his actions, he tautologically states that ‘this is what I do’ (because it is what I do). According to Cavell, this pragmatist conclusion, rather than being a representation of an action, it is the expression of powerlessness portrayed as potency, conversely, in Wittgenstein “skepticism is neither true nor false but a standing human threat to the human”13 and this precludes the type of self-complacent understanding of liberal democracy typical of pragmatist reasoning: “a decision which cannot simply presented as mere application of procedures and justified as the only move that we could make in those circumstances.”14 4.0 For agonistic model of democracy In this chapter Mouffe addresses how the model of deliberative democracy, while being the dominant model in modern times, it was theorized in the 70’s by theorists such as John Rawls in opposition to the ‘aggregative model’ initiated by Joseph Schumpeter in 1947 in his seminar Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. The aggregative model was developed in response to the inadequacies of classical-direct democracy, it focuses on the aggregation of preferences through the mechanisms of political parties and representation, this system allows citizens to engage in a competitive electoral process where they possess the right to elect or reject leaders, despite not having the ability to express their opinions on every political issue directly. Another objective of the model is to develop a descriptive approach toward democracy, contrasting the traditional normative perspective: with the abandonment of concepts such as the 'common good' and 'general will' marked a shift in acknowledging pluralism in interests and values as integral to the concept of 'the people'; individual actions 13 75 14 Ibid. were believed to be driven by self-interest rather than a moral obligation to serve the community's interests. This shift emphasized that interests and preferences should serve as the basis for organizing political parties and constitute the framework for bargaining and voting processes. Democratic politics were “to be envisaged from a purely instrumentalist standpoint”15. In response to the reduction of democracy merely to procedural aspects, John Rawls inaugurated a new wave of normative political theory in his 1971 book A Theory of Justice. Deliberative democrats reintroduce the moral dimension of the good into the political sphere, asserting the possibility of attaining a rational consensus on the common good, however, Mouffe criticizes this stance. 4.1 Deliberative democracy: its aims The specificity of deliberative democrats’ approach is characterized by advocating a type of normative rationality and they aim to establish a firm foundation for allegiance to liberal democracy by reconciling the concept of democratic sovereignty with the defense of liberal institutions, with the ultimate objective of recovering the moral dimension of liberalism. They believe feasible to achieve agreements that can satisfy both rationality and democratic legitimacy, at the cost of reformulating the concept of popular sovereignty in such a way that deems unreasonable any position that would endanger liberal values. Mouffe distinguishes two main schools of thought: one initiated by Rawls and the other influenced by Jürgen Habermas. Despite their different approaches and certain disagreements, she emphasizes the convergences between these two schools. Rawls’ objective is to develop a liberal democratic model capable of guaranteeing both liberty and equality, while at the same time able to resolve the enduring dilemma between the ancient concept of liberty involving active engagement in public life and the modern notion emphasizing individual freedom of thought and property. Habermas’s main aim, on the other hand, is to highlight the “co-originality of 15 82 between the logic of democracy and the logic of liberalism”18. This, far from being the demonstration of the impracticability of liberal democracy as Schmitt would us to believe, it highlights a tension that need mediation, that is not achieved through a conclusive rational resolution as deliberative democrats propose, instead, it involves confronting the challenge posed by acknowledging the plurality of values. 4.3 Which Allegiance for Democracy The consensus-driven approach by both Habermas and Rawls is explained by their aim to provide a stable foundation to liberal democratic institutions able to withstand the challenges of the future. Stability and legitimacy are obtained, in Rawls, through the establishment of a well-ordered society around the principles of justice as fairness, meanwhile in Habermas through the formation of procedures able to guarantee “rational results through democratic participation”19. Mouffe while sharing the concern on the state of democratic institutions, she rejects the idea that rationality alone can serve as the primary driving force to advocate for democratic values. Moreover, that the opposition against aggregative democratic theory proves insufficient when merely substituting one form of rationality with another. According to her, referencing Michal Oakeshott work: The authority of political institutions is not a question of consent but of the continuous acknowledgment of cives who recognize their obligation to obey the conditions prescribed in res publica. […] what is really at stake in the allegiance to democratic institutions is the constitution of an ensemble of practices that make possible the creation of democratic citizens. This is not a matter of rational justification but of availability of democratic forms of individuality and subjectivity.20 Mouffe contends that the erosion of the relationship between citizens and democratic institutions has contributed to the rise of religious, moral, and ethnic fundamentalisms, therefore, she advocates for the restoration of this bond through the augmentation of 18 93 19 94 20 95 democratic practices rather than through mere arguments. Referencing Wittgenstein, she asserts that achieving a genuinely pluralistic approach to democracy, which rejects the pursuit of an ultimate rational consensus, necessitates to come to terms with human form of life: the rationalist constructs such as the 'original condition' and 'ideal discourse' encounter not empirical or epistemological barriers, but rather ontological ones. Ignoring specific forms of life to achieve a façade of universalism is unsustainable. 4.4 An ‘agonistic’ model of democracy The matter at heart in Mouffe’s dissertation is the dimension of ‘antagonism’ that she states being an ineradicable character of pluralism. Referring to Schmitt's argument that liberalism confines the political within the realms of ethics and economics, she critiques the deliberative model for reducing politics to ethics. Her solution is to theorize a model capable of grasping the nature of the political, such system acknowledges that social objectivity is ultimately political and is obtained through exclusion and the affirmation of a hegemony, intended as the point of convergence of power and objectivity, that ultimately is the necessary condition to express a political order. Hence, within a political structure, identities and groups should not be perceived as predetermined entities; instead, they are formed within the prevailing hegemonic framework. Acknowledging that power dynamics are intrinsic to societal structures, the primary concern within democratic politics becomes not the eradication of power but rather the establishment of power forms aligning more harmoniously with democratic principles. This viewpoint underscores the importance of reconfiguring power dynamics within a democratic framework rather than seeking their elimination. The essence of a society's democratic nature resides in the absence of any singular social actor possessing the authority to exclusively represent the totality or claim complete mastery over its fundamental principles. Moreover, she argues that the relation between power and legitimacy is much more intricate than deliberative democrats would assert: if any power has been able to impose itself, it is because it has been recognized as legitimate in some quarters; and if legitimacy is not based in aprioristic ground, it is based in some form of successful power. This link between legitimacy and power and the hegemonic ordering that this entails is precisely what the deliberative approach forecloses by positing the possibility of a type of rational argumentation where power has been eliminated and where legitimacy is grounded on pure rationality.21 Mouffe introduces the concept of 'agonic pluralism' by drawing a distinction between 'the Political' and 'politics'. 'The Political' refers to the underlying antagonistic aspect ingrained within human relationships, while 'politics' represents the mechanisms, discussions, and institutions aimed at structuring public life, which remain susceptible to conflict due to the influence of 'the Political'. The core of this model is rooted in Schmitt's conviction that politics seeks to foster unity within a framework of conflict and diversity by delineating an 'us' and a 'them'. Mouffe's innovation lies in her pursuit of developing a system where the designation of 'them' no longer denotes an adversary to be eradicated but rather represents an 'adversary' whose viewpoints are challenged without undermining their right to uphold those viewpoints. Antagonism remains inherent within the concept of the 'adversary', distinct from a mere competitor. It retains elements of the 'enemy' as per Schmitt's definition, albeit in a sense where physical annihilation is renounced (to use Schmitt's expression). This is realized through the acknowledgment of a common ground: a collective commitment to the ethico-political tenets of liberal democracy. The transformation sought is to shift the struggle from being one of 'antagonism' between enemies to 'agonism' between adversaries, where compromises are to be intended as “temporary respites in an ongoing confrontation”22 and assuming the adversary political position is to be deemed rather a “sort of conversion than a process of rational persuasion”23. Mouffe radicalizes the inherent plurality of democratic society in a system which empowers such plurality instead of immobilizing institutions to a hegemonic and unquestionable status quo. The consensus achievable within this framework 21 100-101 22 102 23 Ibid. The argument to move beyond the traditional left and right political spectrum claims that in today's globalized society, neither conservatism nor socialism can offer adequate solutions, but it's a different matter to conclude that such a distinction is irrelevant or undesirable. In the strife for progressive politics, acknowledging the inherent conflictual dimension, or 'the political,' is crucial, otherwise one could fall in the liberal rhetoric claiming the absence of power relations and social structures. In contemporary modern politics, Mouffe argues the need for left-wing democratic politics is to present an alternative to neo-liberalism and to stop being ideologically defeated by surrounding itself in neo-liberal ideology. Arguing that there is no alternative to neoliberalism is a stance rooted in the view that globalization is to be considered a consequentiality of the information revolution, Mouffe opposes this stance by referring to André Gorz’s works in which it is argued that “the process of globalization must be understood as a move by capital to provide what was a fundamentally political answer to the crisis of governability of the 1970s […] the crisis of the Fordist model of development led to a divorce between the interests of capital and those of nation-states.”27 The technological revolution was merely applied in a context where a political revolution had already taken place. Far from simply refuting the process of globalization, Mouffe’s counterstrategy to neo-liberalism is to propose ‘another globalization’ informed by a political project, rather than treated as a natural consequence of technical advances. Mouffe closes the subchapter by strongly criticizing the radical centrist approach of the new ‘left’ by stating that is impossible to simply reach consensus on social justice and cohesion between the interests of ‘rich transnational corporations’ and the unemployed, single mothers and the disabled. 5.3 The left and equality Mouffe argues that radical politics cannot operate from a central position because genuine radicalism entails a profound transformation of power relations, and this necessitates the 27 119 demarcation of political boundaries and the identification of adversaries or even enemies: while a radical project requires garnering support from various sectors, including the middle classes, historically, the left's significant victories have resulted from alliances that align the interests of different societal sections. In the present context, such alliances remain crucial for formulating a radical project, however, this cannot happen without developing a new hegemonic project that reintroduces the struggle for equality, a cause discarded by advocates of neo-liberalism, back into the public discourse. The social structure that forms the foundation for their advocated 'consensus at the center' contends that most individuals belong to the middle class, excluding a small elite of the very wealthy and the marginalized, therefore society is no longer shaped by unequal power dynamics, reframing structural inequalities as issues of 'exclusion' to avoid deeper structural analysis of their origins and sidestep crucial questions about necessary actions to address them. Mouffe argues that this perspective seemingly overlooks the essential need for a new mode of regulating capitalism to achieve the inclusion of the excluded, emphasizing the significance of the idea of equality in shaping the left's vision. She argues against the idea of reverting to a Keynesian social democratic model, emphasizing the need for a 'post-social-democratic politics' that does not regress but advances further towards a more radical and pluralist form of democracy, a model that addresses various forms of subordination related to gender, race, environment, and sexuality, promoting radical and plural democracy. Mouffe's argument revolves around the need to rethink social justice in a manner that preserves pluralism, promotes equality, and avoids consolidating power in few hands across different spheres of society. 5.4 A new left-wing project In this final subchapter Mouffe addresses the economic problem of modern society. She notes that traditional economic models like laissez-faire liberalism or Keynesianism are deemed inadequate for resolving the issue of unemployment, and therefore a new approach is needed. Mouffe focuses on the relation between working hours and productivity and deems necessary a redistribution of working time to prevent the increasing polarization within society between stable earners and those living in situations of precarious employment or unemployment. She summarizes her proposal in three main tenets: 1. Laws reducing working hours by redistributing work time in-between salaried employees. 2. Development of non-profit activities by associations in bothj private and public economies, aiming at the establishment of a diverse economy rather than one solely dictated by market forces. 3. The establishment of a basic income to every individual who falls below the minimum resource level. To conclude, Mouffe believes that a comprehensive remedy to counter neo-liberalism entails the collective implementation of the aforementioned three measures, coupled with a call for leftist political parties to adopt a European perspective. Considering that the book here summarized and analyzed was written in the year 2000, with hindsight we can state that recent events such as Brexit and the ascent of the populist right across several EU countries have posed additional challenges to her proposal. Nevertheless, elements of her perspective have been evident in political initiatives like DiEM25 – Democracy in Europe Movement 2025, initiated by economist and former Greek Minister of Economy Yanis Varoufakis28. DiEM25, advocating for economic pluralism, has garnered support from influential figures such as Slavoj Zizek and Noam Chomsky. Conclusion I: The ethics of democracy 28 Who in his works agues in favor of pluralism in the economic field, making the concept of pluralism a common denominator between his and Mouffe’s thought. Mouffe employs deconstruction to support her idea of 'agonistic pluralism,' challenging consensus-based models like 'deliberative' approaches. Deconstruction, drawing on Derrida's insights, reveals the impossibility of reaching a non-coercive consensus due to inherent uncertainties in constructing objectivity: undecidability perpetually conflicts with the Kantian definition of duty, hindering conclusive decision-making. Mouffe aims to clarify her stance concerning the concept of 'democracy to come' and differentiate it from certain interpretations of deconstruction that dilute its essence by treating it as a mere regulative idea. In opposition to rationalist like Habermas that believe that democratic consensus represents a limitless approach toward the ideal of free communication, viewing impediments as empirical issues, Mouffe acknowledges the conceptual impossibility of a democracy achieving absolute justice and harmony. V Mouffe reflects on whether emphasizing the conceptual impossibility of reconciliation adequately addresses the ineradicable nature of antagonism and whether it offers the required ethical perspective for an agonistic conception of democracy. She considers the works of Jaques Lacan where the concept of ‘ethics of dis-harmony’ could be applied in political philosophy, particularly she credits the interpretation of Lacanian theory made by Slavoj Žižek that reveals: “how discourse itself in its fundamental structure is authoritarian since, out of the free-floating dispersion of signifiers, it is only through the intervention of a master signifier that a consistent field of meaning can emerge. For him (Žižek), the status of the master signifier, the signifier of symbolic authority founded only on itself (in its own act of enunciation), is strictly transcendental: the gesture that 'distorts' a symbolic field, that 'curves' its space by introducing a non-founded violence, is stricto-sensu correlative of its very establishment. This means that we were to subtract from a discursive field its distortion, the field would disintegrate, 'de-quilt'.”29 Mouffe also considers Yannis Stavrakakis interpretation of Lacan’s ethics, nothing how the French psychoanalyst emphasizes the continual failure of successive conceptions of the good in traditional ethical thinking, since these notions fail to master the central impossibility or the constitutive lack intrinsic to human experience, a concept Lacan refers to as 'the Real’. This departure from traditional ethics marks a significant shift: instead of striving for another conception of the good to achieve harmony, psychoanalysis acknowledges the perpetual inadequacy and impossibility associated with any conceptualization of the 'good.' Mouffe asserts that Lacan's psychoanalytical approach introduces novel inquiries into ethical and political considerations, aligning with the core tenets of the agonistic pluralism she advocates: this constitutive role of the 'Real' necessitates a reevaluation of classical ontological categories, prompting the consideration of new objects and relationships between them. In Mouffe's perspective, the 'ethics of the Real' derived from psychoanalytical insights, particularly as articulated by Žižek, appears well-suited for a pluralist democracy. The ethical conundrum within a pluralistic-democratic setting revolves around how to confront and manage this inherent violence and antagonism, these questions persist endlessly and lack a final solution: rejecting the idea of a feasible reconciliation between ethics and politics, Mouffe asserts that the political realm defies rational moral calculation and continually demands decisions. This recognition forms the crux of addressing the democratic paradox, a paradox that cannot be resolved but must be continuously acknowledged and navigated within democratic societies. 29 137-138