Essay: Should the EU create a European army?, Tesine universitarie di Diritto Internazionale

Scarica Essay: Should the EU create a European army? e più Tesine universitarie in PDF di Diritto Internazionale solo su Docsity! Sara Nori Student number: 5001676 Should the EU develop a European army? Historical introduction The term European army was used for the first time in September 1914 in the Scientific American1. At that time World War I had just started, and the term did not refer to a united group of soldiers coming from all European countries to form one big army, but rather it acknowledged the existence of divided European armies -big or small-, coming from the different European countries. If we want to trace back to when the term European army was first used to describe the creation of one single army combining the strengths of all European countries, we need to go back to 1950. In 1950, Jean Monnet expressed the desire to create a common defense policy on a supranational basis. The idea was put into practice some months later, with the formal proposal of creating the European Defense Community (ECD) by the French prime minister Rene Pleven. We now know it as the “Pleven Plan”2: in his vision, the 6 founding countries of the European Coal and Steel Community (France, Italy, Germany and the Benelux) shouldn’t have stopped at regulating their coal and steel production, but should have merged their military capabilities, especially after the destroying experience of World War II. According to Pleven, the European army should have been financed by common budget, and should have become a supranational institution. That is, national governments would not have controlled it. This army would have been accountable to the European defense minister, who, in turn, would have been accountable to the European defense council3. Military units from the member states would have been given up in favor of the Community “with a view of their fusion”4 into the European Defence Forces. These forces should have been composed by soldiers and volunteers, all wearing a common uniform. In that vision, no member state could have recruited or maintained 1 Munn & Co., “The composition of a European army” (1914) 111 Scientific American 160 2Arnold Kanter, “ The European Defense Community in the French national assembly” (1970) 2 Comparative Politics 203 3 European defense agency, “Our history” < https://eda.europa.eu/our-history/our-history.html> accessed December 2022 4 Martin Trybus, The Legacy of the European Defence Community and the Future of European Defence and Security Integration (Nigel White eds, chapter 2, European Security Law, OUP, 2007) national armed forces. This means that the European Defence Force would have replaced the armed forces of the member states. Member states could have maintained national armed forces for international missions such as occupation of West Berlin and Austria and services called for by the United Nations. The community's objectives were exclusively defensive: any aggression against any one of the member states was considered an aggression against them all, and all states would have helped the attacked state5. Immediately after the proposal, the prime minister received backlash: it was especially France that was worried about a possible German rearmament, as it had already been through multiple wars because of the German aggressiveness. Moreover, aware of the German military power, the French government was afraid that it would have become a second-class European power, and that its ties with the British would have deteriorated. Despite all these insecurities, all 6 countries signed the ECD treaty in 1952, with the later addition of the UK. However, the European army was never created for a simple reason: the French parliament refused to ratify the treaty and it never entered into force. The idea of the creation of the European army will be hardly discussed in the following decades due to the fact that during the Cold War, European countries preferred to rely on the military power of NATO to defend themselves from the Soviet threat. We need to wait until the end of the 20th century to hear about a European army again. After the end of the conflicts in the Balkans in the 1990s, it became clear that the EU needed to assume its responsibilities in the field of conflict prevention and crisis management. It was decided that, starting from the year 1992, military units could be deployed only under specific conditions: humanitarian and rescue operations, peacekeeping operations, and management of combat forces in crisis, the so-called Peterberg Tasks6. In the same year, the treaty of Maastricht established a common foreign and security policy with the aim of "safeguarding the common values, fundamental interests and independence of the Union"7. This put security, but not yet defence, back on the 5 Current History, Vol. 23 (pp. 38-41 University of California Press 1952) 6 Kato Van de veire, “Common European defence policy: the discussion on the European army” [2016] 1 International Journal of Latest Research in Humanities and Social Science 1 7 Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union - Title V: General Provision on the Union's External Action and specific Provisions on the Common Foreign and Security Policy - Chapter 1: General provisions on the Union's external action - Article 21 Arguments against As it’s easy to imagine, there are many issues around the question of a common European army, going from the loss of national sovereignty to the question of responsibility. A European army is controversial for those opposed to transferring any further powers to the European Union. The creation of common European military structures would imply the transfer of powers in the area of security and defence policy, which are perceived to be at the very heart of national sovereignty. Indeed, the persistent attachment to national sovereignty is a major stumbling block hindering deeper cooperation. If the competence for defence is given to Brussels, the EU may be perceived as a federal State and the member states would lose their independence. Moreover, it is not clear who would be the political authority controlling it, who would pay for it, and who would be responsible for its actions. The drivers behind this integration wouldn’t be the national governments of the member states, but the EU institutions. The EU defense is considered by the member states as a policy, not a project. A further very controversial aspect of the EU defense system is “outsourcing” which it resorts to deal with crisis-management responsibilities. “Outsourcing” resources refer to NATO capabilities, but also to individual member states ones, being used instead of EU common military capabilities12. So, simply saying that the EU must do more does not necessarily imply that the efforts will be effectively implemented in the end. The EU can do more by supplying common cooperation frameworks, for example battlegroups, but if they are not used by the member states due to different reasons, the worth of these is quite limited. The value the EU is giving to the defense of its member states and boundaries is therefore quite restricted. Lastly, member states have difficulties in seeing the EU as a military power because the Union was not born with that scope, but mainly for economic reasons. Instead, an organization like NATO was meant to be, and surely will remain, an alliance of sovereign countries contributing to the common purpose by making nationally acquired military assets available to the NATO allies. It will take a long time before EU member states will be willing to give up on this core of their sovereignty. However, the project of a European army should lead in its ultimate aim to an “ever closer union”13. 12 Richard Gowan and Nick Witney “Why Europe must stop outsourcing its security” (2014) ECFR/121, Policy Brief <https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/187410/Why_Europe_Must...updated_PDF.pdf> accessed December 2022 13 Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union - Title I: Common provisions – Article 1 (ex Article 1 TEU) The Eurocorps After the Second World War, the total destruction and the millions of lives lost made realize that the solution could only be found in peaceful understanding between the European nations. The French and German leaders understood the necessity to foster friendly relations between them; this resulted in the Elysée Treaty of 1963. Konrad Adenauer and general Charles De Gaulle were the driving forces behind this reconciliation. The treaty already included cooperation in the field of defense. In 1989 a further step in French-German defense cooperation was taken, with the creation of the French-German brigade (5000 soldiers) based in Germany. In October 1991, the French president François Mitterrand and the German chancellor Helmut Kohl were eager to increase the visible signs of reconciliation: a few months later, in May 1992, both governments decided to set up a French- German corps headquarters in Strasbourg, where both nations would share equally the command and the burden. Eurocorps was born. Shortly after, they decided to open the project to members of the western European union (WEU)14. The CFSP became the driving force behind the Eurocorps. The Eurocorps should consist of a mechanized and light force15. The mechanized unit is intended for sustained middle term operations, for example in the regions of the ex-Yugoslavia. The light force is intended for rapid intervention, possibly in Africa or in order to prepare the ground for the mechanized force. Finding a common operational language has proven difficult. Initial problems have been addressed and slow progress is happening. Whatever its final organization, it is clear that the Eurocorps is essentially a Franco- German joint army, as it represents the mutual commitment of the French Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany to the common European future. However, Mediterranean countries have also committed units to the Eurocorps. The Eurocorps is responsible principally to the WEU, though it would be possible for them to be integrated into NATO operations. France is expected to contribute with 20,000 troops. Germany has offered 18,000 and Spain 6,000. The Eurocorps might look good on paper but in practice it faces problems, such as the absence of satellite intelligence and heavy lift. 14 Eurocorps, “History” <https://www.eurocorps.org/about-us/history/> accessed December 2022 15 "The Europeans lack military transport, especially heavy aircraft capable of carrying tanks and artillery, and rely on NATO for intelligence and logistical support. Their performance in Kosovo last year varied from bad to abysmal. With rotation, it could require 240,000 men to meet the target of 60,000 available at any time." Ambrose Evans-Pritchard in Brussels and Michael Smith, German to lead “Euro-army” in The Telegraph While Europe has the necessary means, whether it has the will to pay the costs of such deployments, and the capacity to develop common policies is questionable. Even more questionable is whether such policies would have the popular support needed for long term out of area operations. Another big issue is the absence of unified command. This lack of unity can be improved somewhat by strengthening the role of the European Commission in foreign policy. However, democratic deficit severely undermines committing Europeans to fight wars, even for good reasons, even as close to the EU as ex-Yugoslavia. Without real democratic input, European foreign policy, at least in security matters, would lack the necessary legitimacy for coherent, extended, out of area operations. Nevertheless, it is important to remark that after the United Kingdom left the EU, the possibilities of cooperation and creation of the Eurocorps are higher, as the disagreements between France and Britain hindered the realization of the project. If disunity explains why the Eurocorps has only had few missions it may also explain why the mission, to Yugoslavia, failed. This experience demonstrated Europe’s incapacity to solve European problems without American intervention, partly due to the political division within the EU. The failure of Europe to demonstrate a common policy in Yugoslavia, where the basic issues seem clear enough (separate warring parties, bandage wounded, build new stable democratic institutions) shows that Europe is dependant on the US. Europe's addiction to US weapons is not because the US is so much richer or even that much better equipped. What was lacking was political coherence and decision making. No politician, party, nor coalition decided to separate belligerent parties. In short, democratic deficit is the ultimate explanation for the failure of the EU foreign policy in the form of Eurocorps16. Models of European army Based on the explanations made so far, three models for a ‘European army’ emerge. The first model is that of the ‘European Defence Force’, a true ‘European army’ to replace the national armed forces of the member states. This model is currently the least likely in the short or medium term as it would involve a major restructuring of all aspects of defence policy and would represent a significant transfer of member state sovereignty to the EU. 16 Eric Engle, “The Eurocorps: Toward a European army?” (2009) <https://ssrn.com/abstract=1335744 > accessed December 2022