Labour Migration Policies in Italy Since 2008: Some Key Actors and Their Degree of Influence, Tesi di laurea di Scienza Politica

Scarica Labour Migration Policies in Italy Since 2008: Some Key Actors and Their Degree of Influence e più Tesi di laurea in PDF di Scienza Politica solo su Docsity! 1 Bachelor Thesis - FrSe 2018/2019 Labour Migration Policies in Italy Since 2008: Some Key Actors and Their Degree of Influence Camilla Guidi 547416 BA EUCS - 6th semester 2 Abstract Migration flows are one of the burning issues in today's political debate, particularly in advanced countries such as those in the European Union. The refugee crisis and the trafficking of migrants in the Mediterranean takes some of the attention away from labour migration, which remains a current phenomenon and a complicated one to manage. Among the various theories on migration policy planning, that of the liberal paradox by Gary P. Freeman assumes particular relevance in liberalized democratic countries. According to him, the decisions of political parties on immigration would be more influenced by organized interest groups than by the vast but disorganized public opinion. This would result in rather receptive policies, despite a population asking for closure. This theory accurately depicted the United States and the European Union before the 2010s. Is this still the case? Our paper analyses the current situation in Italy, looking at the most influential stakeholders in its migration policies. We analyse reports and polls on public opinion, electoral programs, election results and the positions of interest groups, relating them to the implemented policies. Our findings seem to suggest that, in the last decade, the ruling parties have been supportive of citizens' anti- immigration sentiments, enforcing more restrictive laws than in the past. This trend fits into the recent development of populist movements and is probably linked to the financial crisis and migratory emergency of these years. 5 foreign workers and/or have developed new return migration programmes for unemployed migrants. Among these is also Italy (OECD, 2009, pp. 1-3). Although the country's economy has been hit hard by the crisis, Italy remains a migratory destination, especially for low-skilled foreign workers and their families. According to data from the National Statistical Institute, just over 5 million foreigners were living in Italy at the beginning of 2018, of whom 3714137 were non-EU citizens. The current debate mainly focuses on landings, but more young Italians are emigrating than migrants arriving by sea: In 2017 almost 200000 against 119000, while 40000 foreigners residing in Italy have emigrated again. (Allievi, 2018, pp. 9, 25-26). What role can public opinion, interest groups and political parties play in shaping migration policies? Starting with public opinion, data from the Migration Data Portal (Migration Data Portal, 2019, pp. 5, 11), the European Social Survey (Heath & Richards, 2016) and the Eurobarometer (TNS opinion & social, 2018, pp. 28, 30) help us better understand its trends. Public opinion is influenced by factors such as the size, origin, religion and skills of migrant communities, the economy of the host country and individual characteristics such as age, education and employment status. On the one hand, the influx of migrants can increase competition for employment and housing, leading to negative attitudes. On the other, increasing contact with foreigners is likely to promote better relations. On a global average, 34% would like immigration to decrease, 21% to increase and 22% to remain at its current level. There are big differences between regions, and Europeans tend to have more negative opinions, with 52% wishing for a decrease. Only a minority of citizens believe to be well informed about immigration and integration issues, while the majority overestimate the number of non-EU immigrants. There is a clear ranking of 'preferred migrants', for example Jews are much more welcome than Muslims, who in turn are preferred to Roma. Although economic arguments dominate the debates on immigration, European citizens perceive crime as the most negative impact. Of course, there are regional divides within the Union itself. Countries with a low percentage of non-EU inhabitants more rarely see integration as a success and do not believe in the positive impact of immigrants. The same is valid for Mediterranean countries heavily affected by recent migration flows. There are also socio-demographic differences between educated, young and economically secure citizens, and less educated, older, and economically vulnerable ones. People make their voices heard through the channels available to them, but interest groups can often promote an interest opposed to that of the general public. The studies concerning employers associations are scarce, the preference for labour immigration is generally closely dependent on the structure of the economy in question. Labour unions may, on the one hand, adopt a pro-immigration position to protect the weakest, reaffirm the international nature of the class struggle or, more 6 pragmatically, increase their support base. However, they might desire to protect local workers from downward pressure on wages caused by a rise in the number of job seekers. Non-governmental organizations are also concerned with immigration policies. Groups hostile to immigration usually invoke a country limited capacities to absorb newcomers and the threat immigration poses to national identity. On the other side, several civil liberties organisations are supporting pro-immigration policies (OECD, 2010, pp. 137-140). In recent years more and more people have started voting for extreme-right parties, predominantly those in the declining sectors of economies. There is a great number of studies trying to understand the reasons for such a political choice (Encyclopedia of Population, 2019). Mainstream parties have often been ignoring anti-immigrant sentiment and immigration policies, despite some recent restrictions, have been relatively flexible. This could be attributed to the fact that immigration benefits are placed in the hands of a few well-organized actors, while its expenses are distributed over a larger number of individuals. Discontent over immigration policies has harmed the electoral prospects of governing parties, contributing to the decline of support for democratic institutions. For a good understanding of this paper, it is important to still give a few background notions about the role o Migration Policies in the EU and the Italian welfare state. According to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, the EU defines both a procedure for the admission of non-EU nationals for residence and/or work and a common set of rights for legal immigrants. However, the member states set their admission rates and criteria for job-seekers, which vary widely between countries. Successive directives have regulated important sectoral aspects of migration phenomena affecting third-country nationals, for instance, research and study, highly qualified work - EU Blue Card - seasonal employment and inter-corporate transfers. Finally, there are key pieces of legislation to combat irregular migration. Since the Schengen Agreement on the abolition of internal border controls, border management towards non-EU countries is of European competence. To date, 26 countries have joined Schengen, of which 22 are members of the European Union. The members of the Schengen area can re-establish internal border controls in the event of a "serious threat to public order and internal security" or "serious shortcomings in the control of external borders" which could jeopardise the "overall functioning of the Schengen area". Since September 2015, some countries have temporarily reintroduced controls because of strong migratory pressure and the most recent terrorist attacks. A common European migration policy, although one of the pillars of the Union at the time of its establishment, remains in many respects an objective. The various directives have left much power to national authorities. The reason for this is the differences in labour markets in terms of employment growth, population activity rates, regional disparities, 7 linguistic fragmentation and historical reasons. In recent years, there has been a growing awareness of the need for greater coordination of migration policies (Confindustria, 2016, pp. 48-56). In May 2015, the Juncker Commission published the European Agenda for Migration. Migration and border security were made top priorities, in the knowledge that these challenges need to be addressed collectively by the EU Member States. As the refugee crisis - the most severe one since World War II - had immediate and far-reaching implications for the EU, the Commission and the Member States accelerated work to meet new challenges and to design a more sustainable way of managing migration and border security (European Commission, 2019). Let us move to the economic features of the Italian state. In General, Southern European countries have a ‘Familistic welfare regime’, where intra-family and inter-family relations are intense and the family functions as a social safety net to meet the needs of its members. In this system, the state intervenes only subsidiarily and public services are underdeveloped (Esping-Andersen, 1999, pp. 92- 94). These nations are also characterized by precautiousness and lack of social protection for workers in low skilled sectors. These are almost new immigration countries, in which migrants disproportionately work in the low-skilled sector and percentages of irregular migration are high. The Italian welfare state is a combination of, among others: very generous programs of retirement benefits, no income-support for the young and little employed and for the long-term unemployed, generous allowances for unemployment linked to economic contingencies and universal health coverage through a national health system. Families play a key role for most welfare matters and they are the main buffer institution. As an example, the pensions of the aged may finance the study of non- working nephews. The system is still based on the centrality of a male breadwinner. In this context, immigration is a functional alternative to the direct provision of services by the state, it should be considered not only as a welfare burden but also as structural resource for the functioning of certain welfare regimes (Sciortino, 2004, pp. 179-182). The general purpose of this paper is to test theories of migration policy on Italy's current situation. More specifically, we want to discover if the concept of 'liberal paradox' developed by Gary P. Freeman in the 1990s is - still - applicable to Italian labour migration policies. This requires us to compare recent data with literature and see how they relate. The first chapter presents the theoretical framework for our work. We start by explaining the impact of immigration on both a country’s labour market and its welfare state, the possible benefits and drawbacks. Then, we go into the subject of immigration policies: their use, form and tendencies. We describe the various perspectives on the analysis of such policies, relying on the writings of E. Meyers. The core section of this chapter follows, with an introduction to the liberal paradox theory. 10 international migration is a source of challenges. The presence of non-citizens appears acceptable only if they do not compete economically with the natives and, indeed, contribute to the general well- being. According to opinion polls, migrants are often seen as one of the categories least deserving of welfare support (Sciortino & Finotelli, 2015, pp. 185-187) Concerns about the link between immigration and welfare are relevant for several reasons. Migrants are becoming a significant and growing proportion of most modern societies, while the ageing population increases the level of public financial liabilities, on which the global financial crisis has intensified the pressure (Jakubiak, 2018, p. 1). Whether migrants can become a burden on the state depends on the type of welfare. For example, systems based on insurance contributions are less exposed to the risk of excessive exploitation of services than socio-democratic welfare states, which seem to discourage low-skilled immigrants from entering the labour market. However, immigration can be seen as a resource if the role of migrants as potential consumers of welfare provisions is stressed. Just think of foreign domestic workers in welfare systems, especially in conservative ones: countries are reducing directly or indirectly the costs of social spending through migrant care labour (Sciortino & Finotelli, 2015, pp. 192-199). Immigration Policies There are three main types of immigration regimes in the developed world. The United States, Canada and Australia, which were founded by European settlers, have the longest tradition of immigration. Those European countries having recruited temporary labour or received substantial colonial migration after the Second World War follow. Finally, there are southern and eastern European states, which have recently turned into countries of immigration (Encyclopedia of Population, 2019). The migration policies implemented by receiving countries have a dimension and rigour linked to the economic situation. They can also be implemented selectively, concerning the origins, or by assessing integration levels based on the time of permanence. In addition to the traditional criteria - origin and family -, some policies refer to the possession of professional qualifications and training credentials, to meet the specific needs of the production system. Another tendency is to favour the temporary nature of immigration. The prevailing opinion of scholars is that the European immigration policy is mainly restrictive, hence the image of a 'Fortress Europe' (Treccani, Migrazione, n.d.). Migration policy very often aims to protect native workers on the national labour market, ensuring that foreign 11 employees play not a competitive but a complementary role (Sciortino & Finotelli, 2015, pp. 187- 188). Immigration policy consists of two strands: the rules and procedures governing the selection and admission of foreign nationals; and the conditions offered to resident immigrants - for example, working and housing conditions, social assistance and educational opportunities (Meyers, 2000, p. 1246). We will focus on the first ones, called immigration control policies. Theoretical approaches to immigration control policies seek to explain what determines a country's decisions about the number, type and origin of immigrants accepted. Some also focus on key actors (Zogata-Kusz, 2012, p. 2). E. Meyers describes the various perspectives on the analysis of immigration policies in his essay Theories of International Immigration Policy: A Comparative Analysis (Meyers, 2000, pp. 1246- 1268). According to the Marxist approach, immigration is a structural tendency of the current phase of monopolistic capitalism. Immigration policies are shaped by a class-based political process and by economic factors: Capitalists import migrant workers to exert downward pressure on wages and increase profits. Governments stop or reverse immigration to prevent capitalist crises, thus fluctuations in the economic cycle and unemployment affect immigration in the short term. In the long term, however, labour migration is set to increase. The Neo-Marxists have attributed international migration to the structure of the world market. Supporters of the National Identity approach argue that migration policies are shaped by the history of each country, its conception of national identity and the social conflicts within it. The importance of external and situational factors is thereby minimized. Distinctions are made between: Colonial societies, which accept large-scale immigration, and ethnic states, which tend to reject such immigration; homogeneous and heterogeneous countries; countries that adopt ius sanguinis and those with ius soli. The Institutional Approach sees the state as the main actor and focuses on interactions at the governmental level. The political institutions are autonomous, they form public policy according to the interest of the state, not influenced by social or interest groups. Different variants of this vision recognize diverse levels of autonomy and cohesion of the state. Some see the state as monolithic, others as a combination of bureaucratic agencies. Realism and Neo-Realism: International affairs are a power struggle between states, which are the main actors. Each state is unitary and rational, national security is its priority. Actual or potential conflicts between states influence migration policies, contributing both to restrictions and acceptance/encouragement of immigration. 12 Liberals and Neoliberals recognize international economic interdependence. Transnational interactions, international institutions and the spread of democracy can promote cooperation. Non- state actors are important and economic and social issues do not come after military ones. Neoliberal institutionalism, Globalization theory and Human Rights Embedded Liberalism are variants of this vision. Finally, we have the Domestic Politics approach, which is the one partly adopted in this paper. According to its proponents, the state serves as an arena for exchanges between interest groups and parties, and sometimes one of these players may prevail. It is, therefore, the social actors who shape immigration policy, which is the result of negotiations and compromises between them. Changes in immigration policy are attributable to socioeconomic factors such as a recession. In this political process, organised interest groups try to force parties, legislators and administrators to adopt specific regulations. The interests of small sections of the population and not of the electorate are thus favoured. Employers and ethnic groups tend to support immigration, while trade unions and nationalist groups tend to oppose it. The Liberal Paradox One of the main exponents of the aforementioned Domestic Politics approach is the American scholar Gary P. Freeman, who analyzes migration policies in liberal democracies, political regimes "characterized by free constitutions founded on individual rights, competitive party systems, and regular elections" (Freeman, 1995, pp. 881-887). Freeman refers to James Wilson's concept of client politics: A system in which small, well-organized groups with political interests develop close working relationships with the responsible authorities and influence their decisions. These interactions take place with little interference from public opinion. The benefits resulting from the admission of migrants are concentrated and mobilise interest groups. These include employers in large industries or dependent on an unskilled workforce and companies that benefit from population growth and family reunification. The costs of migration, such as increased population density, are widespread instead. They mainly concern people competing with immigrants for schools, housing, scarce jobs and public services. Such costs contribute to the persistence of an anti-immigrant mindset in society (Zogata-Kusz, 2012, pp. 11-12). The result of client politics is, however, that government policies in liberal democracies tend to be more open towards immigration than public opinion, to the extent that annual recruitment is higher than politically optimal. 15 both a large U.S. military contingent and the largest Western communist party. In recent decades, the country has undergone strong migratory pressures, both as a transit country and as a destination. Even if today Italy no longer has external land borders other than Switzerland, “That vast, fluid, non-linear border that is the Mediterranean will never shift and Italy, just like Spain and Greece, will never become a “core country” (Pastore, 2002, pp. 1-2). For at least a century Italy has been one of the main countries of emigration, in fact, more than 25 million citizens expatriated between 1876 and 1976. It is also for this reason that no adequate infrastructure, norms and institutions for the management of immigration have been available for a long time. Under strong external constraints, the country had to rapidly equip itself with a functioning migration management system. This process was mainly based on importing standards from other countries. Southern European countries have often been accused of failing to efficiently organise legal admission and limit the illegal entry of foreigners, with regularisations, marginalisation and exclusion as a result. However, these countries have recently tried to improve the situation with an approach based on better management and recognition of labour demand (Finotelli & Echeverría, 2017, p. 39). When one thinks of international emigration to Italy, they quickly recall a picture of battered and overcrowded boats off Lampedusa, whose passengers face serious physical conditions but are still piled up in 'reception centres' or left to the black labour market. Both in academic literature and to the international public, Italian migration policies appear harsh, impractical and unhelpful. The attitude of the Italian population towards foreign immigrants is considered racist and immature. Such stereotypes are not, however, able to explain the complexity of this phenomenon, even if they are based on some underlying truth. To understand the characteristics of immigration management in Italy, the whole context must be taken into account. Foreign workers in Italy are essential to counteract the rapidly ageing population and to keep afloat some sectors of the economy in difficulty. Already before the crisis, the Italian economy was not performing well: the cost of labour per product unit was raised by a loss of productivity growth, despite wage moderation. The supply was high for the poorly paid, very flexible and unskilled labour sectors, which did not, however, correspond to the demand of young Italians. The labour market became therefore increasingly dual: There were many potential workers for scarce medium or high skilled jobs and a growing number of low skilled jobs for very few people willing to accept them. This is when unskilled foreign labour came into play. Today, immigrants in Italy still perform primarily manual functions and have a fairly high labour market participation rate. It is enough to think that one-third of unskilled workers in the Italian economy are national citizens. The economic recession seems to have strengthened and further accelerated this dynamic, in which foreign workers 16 find employment relatively easily but have few opportunities for subsequent professional mobility (Sciortino, 2015, pp. 633-636). The inefficient governance of labour immigration is partly due to an unstable and changing politics. In the early 2000s, the government passed into the hands of right-wing conservative politician Silvio Berlusconi, prime minister for over nine years. Significant in this period was the influence of the populist party Lega Nord, which further ignited the debate on migratory planning with its anti- immigration vision. Restrictive anti-immigration rhetoric was also fomented by intra-EU mobility from Eastern Europe. In Italy, the lobbying capacity of trade unions and employers' associations has always been very weak. Employers' associations struggle to transmit reliable estimates of supply and demand because they play a fragmentary and weak institutional role. Hence the difficulties in reconciling the interests of social and political groups for the formulation of annual admission quotas. Such admission quotas were thus insufficient for the labour demand, improper use was made of them and regularizations were applied. Today, Italy still lacks a homogeneous and cohesive administrative leadership to efficiently establish annual admissions. State bureaucratic structures have not been reformed, public authorities and state intervention capacity are poor, especially in the South. Controls and inspections are sporadic, slow and unevenly distributed. (Finotelli & Echeverría, 2017, pp. 44- 46). These problems are compounded by the development of large irregular immigration flows. This is difficult to prevent, starting with the general mentality: Most of public opinion and employers consider hiring an undocumented migrant more as a courtesy than as a crime. The expulsion of irregular workers who are productive and unproblematic is seen as too harsh a measure. About 17 per cent of Italy's GDP is undeclared, irregular immigration falls fully within this context (Sciortino, 2015, p. 640). The Italian sociologist Ferruccio Pastore identifies some persistent structural imbalances in the European migratory regime, which systematically penalize the peripheral states of the Union - in particular, those at the maritime borders (Pastore, 2015, pp. 62-66). These imbalances derive from two fundamental principles: the Schengen principle, according to which the duty of surveillance at external frontiers is the responsibility of border states and mainly at their own expense; and the Dublin principle, according to which asylum seekers irregularly crossing the border of a Member State must have their application for international protection examined by this country. At first, there was no direct opposition to these imbalances because of the hope in gradual convergence through economic growth and greater integration. This illusion was based on the assumption that all states participating in the regime had already made a historical migratory transition and that Southern Mediterranean nations, governed by pro-Western autocracies, were relatively stable. According to Sciortino, the 17 crisis of the European migratory regime would, therefore, have a negative repercussion on the Mediterranean countries, despite the TFEU (art. 80) stressing the " principle of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility, including its financial implications, between the Member States" (European Union, 2007). Migration Policies Historically The first step towards an Italian migratory policy is taken after the Second World War when the principle of non-discrimination and human rights are included in the Constitution, based on international rules and treaties. However, Italy remains almost exclusively a country of immigration until the late 1960s, when small groups of foreign workers begin to settle, attracted by the economic boom and the first refused jobs - for example, the Tunisian seamen of Mazara del Vallo. Yet, no law will be enacted until 1986. The economic crisis, rising unemployment and a European context of closure lead to complete freezing of work permits in 1982. Thus begins the practice of irregular entrances for work followed by periodic regularizations. Between '86 and '98 new regulations are established to cope with constant changes: economic development, the growth of immigration and the first episodes of rejection and xenophobia. In 1990, the Martelli Law introduces the quantitative planning of non-EU workers' flows and extends the right of asylum, establishing a fund for immigration policies. Also, reception centres are created and measures to control and expel illegal immigrants are intensified. The Mancino Law - 1993 - follows, aiming to combat episodes of discrimination, racism and xenophobia. The approval in 1998 of the Turco-Napolitano law leads to an improvement in the planning of the flows, introducing privileged quotas for the countries collaborating in repatriation and envisaging the admission for job seeking to facilitate legal entry. Control and expulsion policies are also strengthened and the Centres of Temporary Residence for undocumented migrants, now called Centres of Residence for Repatriations, are created. In the following decade, we witness a further divergence between a strong acceleration of immigration and the increasing polarisation of the political debate. The low birth rate of the 1970s 20 Own depiction, data from the Ministry of the Interior (http://www.interno.gov.it/) Positions on Labour Migration Data and Concepts Since 2011, the presence of foreigners who come to our country for work has slowed down considerably, while in the past they accounted for the majority of entry flows. The characteristics of arrivals have also changed (ISTAT, 2018, p. 20). In addition to cyclicality linked to sectors of economic activity, low qualifications, particular recruitment channels and specific types of contracts, there are also patterns in foreign labour flows that could be defined as geographical. Demand for foreign labour varies considerably not only at regional but also at local level (Ministero del Lavoro e delle Politiche Sociali, 2018, pp. 7-8). The various territories experience immigration in different ways. In a nutshell, we can observe two Italy: the South, facing the emergency of landings every day, and the Centre-North, where the oldest communities - Albanians and Moroccans - are decreasing as 0 20000 40000 60000 80000 100000 120000 140000 160000 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 Decreto Flussi (flows decree) Entries 2008-2019 21 a result of the acquisition of citizenship. The foreign population is nevertheless concentrated in the Centre-North, which is home to almost 84% of it, while the South represents an area of entry and transit for migrants, who hardly settle there (ISTAT, 2018, p. 18). In recent years, foreign manpower has been central to the labour market, performing specific tasks and having a compensatory effect in the cycle of the economic crisis. However, there are considerable differences between European Union nationals and those from third countries. Employment growth is faster among non-EU citizens, but this fact conceals some problems. Such workers have lower wages and low-skilled profiles, constitute the most vulnerable category and their high level of professional adaptability often translates into an imbalance between the tasks performed and the skills possessed. This means a dispersion of skills for the Italian labour market. Another issue is found in the use of recruitment channels. The friendly/family relations channel leads 44.2% of non-EU workers to mainly unskilled jobs - and also 34.0% of EU workers. The reason is that these channels only provide information on labour market segments where the foreign community is already present. The mediation of a private agency or a public centre, on the other hand, guarantees jobs with a higher level of specialisation in 6-7 out of 10 cases. Nevertheless, the data analysis confirms the predominance of ethnic links as a privileged tool for inclusion in social networks, while the share of users of the private system or employment centres is low. A strengthening of the policy, training and intermediation services system would hence be necessary for Italy (Ministero del Lavoro e delle Politiche Sociali, 2018, pp. 40-42). Public Opinion In political science, public opinion tends to be considered as an aggregation of individual views on an issue of general interest, emerging from the rational choices of people. This discipline seeks to analyse the role of public opinion in the political system and in the formulation of public policies, which is primarily revealed through surveys. The value of opinion poll results is widely questioned, both regarding the interpretation of answers and from the technical point of view - the type of questionnaire, selection of samples. In this paper, however, we rely on national and international surveys, while trying to maintain a critical point of view. According to the study International Migration Outlook, conducted in 2010 by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, a large percentage of OECD nationals tend to support 22 strictly controlled or reduced immigration (OECD, 2010, pp. 118-122). National differences remain wide and depend on multiple factors. First of all, there are the dynamics and the scale of flows: public opinion is likely to be more negative when the immigrant population is perceived as too large or has increased before the survey. Each migration system has its specific characteristics, including the selection procedures, the main entry channels and the social and political rights granted to immigrants. Then, we have the countries of origin of most migrants, the perception of residents regarding such countries and the different categories of foreigners. The economic context of destination countries finally plays an important role. How does Italy fit into this context? We shall now present the data from institutional reports and opinion polls carried out over the last decade. First, we have the study I migranti visti dai cittadini - migrants seen by citizens -, published by the statistical office ISTAT in 2012 and referring to the previous year. It may be useful to identify the situation at the beginning of our decade and to make comparisons with more recent data (ISTAT, 2012, pp. 0, 8-10). On the one hand, the vast majority of respondents in 2011 denounce discrimination against foreign students - 89.6% - and workers - 88.7%- as such. More than 60% see the presence of immigrants as culturally positive and necessary for the job market. On the other hand, though, almost half of the citizens consider it right to prioritize Italians for social housing all the rest being equal - 55.3% - and when hiring in conditions of work scarcity - 48.7% -. 65.2% also believe that migrants are too many and 35% feel that they steal the Italians' jobs. Therefore, there seem to be some contradictions within public opinion, which on the one hand condemns and on the other justifies discriminatory behaviour. In general, the greatest openness is shown by young people, especially women, and residents of central Italy. The attitude of both immigrants and Italians towards the other group is mainly described as suspicious, quite often as indifferent and only rarely at the two extremes - hostile and friendly. Religious differences do not create particular problems for Italians, who are usually tolerant, but other concerns are at the root of such distrust. For example, 43.3% of respondents believe that foreigners divert political attention from the problems of citizens. More than half agree that the presence of many immigrants contributes to the degradation of a neighbourhood - 56.4% - and the spread of crime - 52.6%. Among the most cited immigration-related problems are lawlessness, public order, drugs and prostitution, while there is little concern about diseases, religion, work and terrorism. For more recent data we have at our disposal the Special Eurobarometer 469: Integration of Immigrants in the European Union, a study published in 2018 (TNS opinion & social, 2018). 25 relatively low, while that associated with the Eastern European area is much higher. The areas of sub- Saharan Africa and the Middle East and North Africa record percentages are respectively 7 and 5 times higher than those recorded by the areas of Western Europe and North America. We shall finally mention a recent manifestation of the general public interest, which has turned into a political proposal. As of July 2019, the Chamber of Deputies is considering a citizens’ initiative - proposta di legge di iniziativa popolare - for the promotion of legal residence and the inclusion of foreigners. The citizens’ initiative is an opportunity included in the Constitution: At least 50000 signatures of electors must be collected, after which the bill must be submitted to the Chamber of Deputies or the Senate. The current initiative suggests abolishing the annual entry quotas defined based on job application forecasts and introducing two new entry channels instead. The first would be based on the intermediation of authorised institutional bodies - for example, employment centres and chambers of commerce - and the second would be based on the guarantee of access to employment by public bodies - for example, regions and trade unions. Also, a third possibility for established foreigners would be to obtain a residence permit for a proven integration period of two years. This legislative proposal repeals the crime of illegal entry and residence and is supplemented by a series of measures to promote effective social integration of foreigners (Servizio Studi Camera dei Deputati, 2019). Political Parties As explained by P. Odmalm in The Party Politics of Migration, scholars dealing with migration issues have often focused on states, policymakers and the public, neglecting the engagement of parties (Odmalm, 2018, pp. 118-119). The main focus was on explaining and understanding state responses to increasing integration and mobility processes. Political parties were represented as absent or less influential than political science communities working on asylum and immigration. Ultimately, however, it is the parties who design and implement migration policies and several changes over the last decade have finally underlined their importance. We are especially thinking of the development and growing popularity of right-wing radical populism. Immigration and integration are the subject of different policy areas, economic measures and cultural factors. Perhaps this is also why today immigration is dealt with in a confused way, without following a precise logic and with sudden changes of direction. Political parties balance the different options, stressing either the threats or the advantages of further immigration. Centre-left leaders often support 26 the idea that labour markets should be controlled and that wage negotiations subject to collective bargaining, thus they underline the threats of foreign labour. Many centre-right parties refer instead to the gains that increased labour supply can bring to employers and capital holders, thus seeing immigrant workers as beneficial. However, if we consider migration phenomena other than employment - like asylum -, positions are reversed. Such general picture, though, does not seem to correspond to the Italian situation in the last ten years, possibly because the flows of refugees and foreign labour are confused and influence people's perceptions of on both. Before moving on to the analysis, here is a couple of basic information on Italian politics. The government in Italy is based on a parliamentary system of bicameralism. This consists in the existence of two chambers placed in a position of absolute equality, so that, even though subjectively constituting mutually distinct and autonomous bodies, they can give rise to manifestations of will attributable to the State only if both allow on the same deliberative text The members of the two parliamentary chambers are voted on during the national general elections. Subsequently, it is up to the President of the Republic to appoint a President of the Council and, on his proposal, the Ministers. He must identify a potential Prime Minister who can form a government likely to obtain majority support in Parliament (Governo Italiano, La formazione del Governo, n.d.). We now proceed to discuss the positions of the main Italian political parties on immigration. For this purpose, the electoral programs for the general elections of 2008, 2013 and 2018 are considered. We will concentrate on the aspects that seem more relevant for our analysis. For the year 2008, we draw on a report provided by the Neodemos association, an independent forum for advice, observation and analysis made up of experts in the fields of politics, society and demography (Vesci, 2008; Vesci, 2008). Starting from the left, a leading role is played by the coalition Sinistra Arcobaleno. It focuses on the situation of immigrant workers, arguing that, if their legal entry were simplified, they would not resort to clandestinity and informal work. Immigration is seen by these parties as a resource. They criticise the fact that immigrants pay taxes but are still excluded from many rights, for example, voting in administrative elections. The main centre-left representative, the Partito Democratico, acknowledges the need to regulate immigration in line with Italy's reception capacity and with the labour demand of companies and families. A key statement is governing immigration not to succumb to it. On the one hand, it aims to encourage inflows of professional workers, extend the duration of residence permits and improve administrative mechanisms through simplification and efficiency. On the other hand, the PD proposes 27 to introduce a citizenship pact with immigrants, based on a clear system of rights and duties. It also aims to severely oppose illegal immigration and crime, for example by making expulsion measures more effective. The centre party Unione di Centro focuses on defending the security of citizens, national culture and national identity. It argues that foreigners should be integrated into Italian law, tradition and culture. For the UDC, immigration from outside the EU must be controlled and conditioned on the availability of housing, work and tax regularization. Foreigners who have committed crimes should be expelled quickly and definitively. The Popolo della Libertà, a major centre-right party, aims primarily at bilateral relations with countries of origin, to encourage practices of control and facilitation of labour migration. It also proposes giving priority to workers from countries that guarantee reciprocity of rights. The PDL criticises any previous amnesties for illegal immigrants and proposes to put an end to this phenomenon. It also advocates combating clandestine immigration, unlawful exploitation and the illegal settlement of nomads. On the other hand, incentives are envisaged for foreigners to become acquainted with the language, culture and laws of Italy. Moving on to the right-wing parties, La Destra aims to restrict the phenomenon of immigration by freezing entries for at least two years, including cases of family reunification. Among other things, this party is opposed to new amnesties and suggests the revocability of citizenship in cases of major crimes, for which it provides a points card. In such instances, the sentence would also be served in the countries of origin. It also calls for a numerus clausus for foreigners unable to prove how they support the family unit. La Destra would also impose a ban on wearing hijabs in schools. Lastly, the programme of the party Lega Nord stands out for devoting ample space to the issue of immigration and for promoting very strict measures. Some of the proposals would even be impracticable because they run counter to EU directives and international human rights conventions. An example is the elimination of measures such as bargaining, indulgence and amnesty. The foreword already states that the Northern Regions are affected by the growth of criminal phenomena, caused by massive and uncontrolled irregular immigration, which threaten the security of citizens. The Lega announces more effective measures to combat illegal immigration, involving an armed defence of national borders. The entry requirements for non-EU citizens would also be tightened up and would include a test of knowledge of the Italian language, culture and tradition. If foreigners violate the law, they would have to serve their sentence in their country of origin. Finally, the party calls for an explicit reference to Europe's common Christian roots to be included in the Treaty on European Union. 30 Let us finally consider the program of the Movimento 5 Stelle, which has developed considerably since its foundation in 2009. The slogan of the immigration section is 'zero landings' because they plan to improve legal access routes. The M5S proposes that applications for international protection be submitted to the embassies and consulates of the countries of origin/transit or the EU delegations. Automatic and obligatory redistribution of asylum seekers within the EU is called for, with sanctions for non-compliant states. The time required for examining applications should be reduced to a maximum of six months. Finally, they envisage targeting international cooperation in a plurality of small development funds. The party declares its support for any intervention aimed at safeguarding the inviolable rights of vulnerable people - children, women, victims of violence, the elderly. Here too, however, there is no mention of labour migration (Movimento Cinque Stelle, 2018). Other issues often discussed by political parties include the law on citizenship - to be simplified or made stricter - and the possibility of foreign citizens voting in administrative elections. We would like to stress that many other parties run for election, but we have focused on the most voted ones in the years under consideration. Election results The meeting between public opinion and the programs of political parties occurs with the vote. We hence summarise the election results of 2008, 2013 and 2018 in this section. We need to recall some political developments taking place in our period of interest, to make the context clear. Since the resignation of Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi in 2011, the Italian party system suffers a major shock. The Popolo della Libertà dissolves, with a subsequent re-establishment of Forza Italia. The Partito Democratico achieves historic success in the European elections of 2014, but then support gradually decreases and the electoral results for the centre-left are increasingly disappointing. The Lega abandons its pro-north vision and becomes a typical radical right-wing nationalist party, under the leadership of Matteo Salvini - hence the deletion of ‘Nord’ from its name. This development is important for the return of the centre-right as a potential leader. At the end of 2016, a proposal for constitutional reform is rejected via referendum, the following month the electoral reform is declared unconstitutional and a new electoral law is finally approved in November 2017 (Paparo, 2018, pp. 64-65). What are the consequences? Between 2008 and 2019, Italy experiences seven different governments, three of which are temporary: Mario Monti and Enrico Letta replace Berlusconi - the Italian politician with the longest career as Prime Minister -, while 31 Paolo Gentiloni supplants Matteo Renzi. The last formation of government in 2018 is particularly complicated because no party or coalition achieves the majority necessary to obtain support from the Parliament. In 2008 the electorate seems to follow a logic of convenient voting and focuses its preferences on the two main leaders, Veltroni - PD - and Berlusconi - PDL - and the parties that support them. A process of simplification is thus taking place, affecting the entire political framework. A wave of dissatisfaction results in an expansion of the anti-political wings within the two groups. On the one hand, the growth of the centre-left coalition seems almost entirely driven by the advancement of the Di Pietro list, which extends its consensus by more than two points. On the other front, the progression of the Northern League is even more disruptive: the party doubles its preferences and reaches 8.3% on a national scale (Demos & Pi, 2008, pp. 4-5). The coalition led by Silvio Berlusconi eventually wins the elections by a large margin in both branches of parliament. In the Chamber of Deputies, 430 seats are occupied by the centre-right coalition and 239 by the centre-left. In the Senate, these are 168 and 130 respectively. The UDC has 36 deputies and three senators, the other parties obtain no seats (affaritaliani.it, 2008). The 2013 elections record a noticeable decrease in voter turnout: -5.3% compared to 2008. As mentioned, they fall into a critical evolutionary phase of the Italian political system and fail to produce a result capable of resolving the tensions. The outcome of elections is, comprehensibly, affected by the economic crisis too. The centre-left prevails, but with much less support than expected. We witness an affirmation of the 5 Star Movement that is unprecedented in Western Europe: the party registers 25.5% of the votes at its first ballot. A central aspect of M5S' success is its geographical, political and socio-demographic transversality. Compared to 2008, there is a general retreat of the two coalitions of centre-left and centre-right and their main parties PD and PdL. The result of Lista Monti is disappointing. For the first time in Italy, three parties get more than 20% of votes, so that the classical bipolarism of the Second Republic becomes a tripolarism. In conclusion, we experience increased volatility, an electoral realignment and the possible restructuring of the party system (De Sio, Cataldi, & De Lucia, 2013, pp. 9, 48, 57-58, 69, 72-73, 95, 99-103). In 2018, voter turnout is 72.9%, the lowest in Italian history. Considering the historical trend, however, these elections return to normal compared to the sharp turnout decline in 2013: Studies show how affluence tends to decrease 'naturally' over the years (Paparo, 2018, pp. 65, 76-77). The centre-right coalition obtains a majority of votes, headed for the first time by the Lega. Movimento 5 Stelle is the first absolute party, while Partito Democratico marks its historical minimum. For the first time, two parties in opposition but both anti-Europe and anti-establishment achieve, combined, an 32 absolute majority of votes and a potential majority in parliament. This situation probably results from social unrest, driven by economic difficulties - unemployment, poverty, social exclusion - and increasing migration flows (Aida Partners, 2018). The data available allow us to analyse the electoral results by professional category, as illustrated in the table below. M5S PD Lega FI FdI LeU Più Europa Others Total Unemployed 37,2 10,3 18,2 20,4 2,6 0,6 3 7,7 100 Entrepreneurs/Directors 31,2 22,5 12,9 13,4 4,9 3,3 5,3 6,5 100 Labourers 37 11,3 23,8 12,5 5,4 1,3 1,6 7,1 100 Retirees 26,4 27,6 14,6 16,1 4,5 3,7 1,8 5,3 100 Employees/Teachers 36,1 18,9 14,5 8,6 4,7 5,6 4,1 7,5 100 Mean 33,58 18,12 16,8 14,2 4,42 2,9 3,16 4,732 97,912* Own depiction, data from https://www.internazionale.it/notizie/2018/03/09/risultati-elezioni-voto-italia Focusing the analysis on the four main parties, it can be seen that M5S is the most voted - 33.58% in total - in nearly all sectors, except for retirees. Secondly, the Democratic Party mainly gets the support of entrepreneurs/directors, retirees and employees/teachers, while workers - 23.8% Lega and 12.5% FI - and unemployed - 18.2% Lega and 3.4% FI - tend to the right. As far as the 'secondary' parties are concerned, the vote is more or less homogeneous between right, left and centre. Interestingly, workers and the unemployed very rarely vote on the left, in favour of the centre, the right or the M5S (Internazionale, 2018). This situation reflects the European trend of recent years, in which populist or conservative parties have gained the support of the more vulnerable classes, probably frightened by the economic downturn and migration crisis. Interest Groups As far as interest groups are concerned, finding information and documents about their position on migratory policies is more complicated. In this paper, we differentiate between industry associations, trade unions and associations of/for immigrants, as they represent very different interests. When available, we analyse the websites and publications of such groups on the subject of migration. 35 work while respecting fundamental human rights. This page, again, recalls the serious demographic situation of our country, characterized by few births and emigration (UIL, 2017). The Confederazione Italiana Sindacati Lavoratori - CISL - is the last major Italian trade union we are dealing with. In its offices, it has help desks for immigrants. To understand its position, we rely on the document Documento Immigrazione CISL, published in 2015 (Ocmin, 2015, pp. 3-12). Here is explained that migration processes must be addressed objectively and responsibly, starting from the clear distinction between economic migrants and asylum seekers. The CISL promotes a path which combines responsibility, solidarity, rights, duties, security and legality. For the union, migration and cooperation policies should be coordinated at European level and made compatible with the needs of border countries. They stress the need to intervene on employment trends through active policies safeguarding the participation of all workers to the labour market, regardless of age, origin, sex or so. To this end, the dualism of the Italian labour market and the immigrant labour market must be overcome. The CISL strives, if supported, to contribute to the design of a more effective system. The document presents its proposals, of which we report the main ones. There is an intention to review the mechanisms of regular entry, starting with modifying the system of quotas flows. They aim to create an entry system based on the use of external labour only when the needs expressed by companies cannot be met through the relocation of forces already present in the labour market - and unemployed. It is demanded to inform and to sensitize foreign workers on the pension system and the importance of a correct contribution. It follows: Combating trafficking and exploitation of human beings, support for asylum seekers and humanitarian protection, revision of the Dublin Regulation, greater cooperation at European level. We finally move on to migrant associations, based on a mapping realized in 2014 by the study and research centre IDOS, as part of an initiative promoted by the Ministry of Labour and Social Policies and co-funded by the European Fund for the Integration of third-country nationals. The data have been updated in 2016 and 2018. Currently, there are 1413 associations in the database (Centro studi e ricerche IDOS, 2018). Below are three examples of associations for which detailed information is available. The Associazione Nazionale Oltre Le Frontiere - ANOLF - is a voluntary organization for immigrants of various ethnic groups, promoting brotherhood between peoples in the spirit of the Italian Constitution. ANOLF is supported by the CISL but is not collateral to any ideology or political movement. It is present throughout the country with regional, provincial and territorial offices. The manifold organized activities include information, training, political and social initiatives, meetings with the Italian population, research, projects, collaborations and many others. ANOLF participates 36 in the council for the problems of immigrants and their families and the national coordination body for immigrants' social integration policies (ANOLF, 2010). The Associazione Nazionale Lavoratori in Italia - ANLI - aims to facilitate the integration of immigrants in the Italian social and work environment. It operates in the field of protection and employability of domestic workers, both Italian and foreign. It puts families in contact with workers, helps with the renewal of residence permits and with the handling of bureaucratic procedures, with the booking of language tests and with the enrolment of children in school. Workers in search of employment can register to the association (ANLI, 2013). As final example we can mention the association Tolbà, founded in Basilicata in 1992 to promote the health of immigrants, provide tools for access to social and medical facilities, promote meetings of foreigners and locals, support international solidarity initiatives in the health field and draw up social evaluation forms on the countries of origin of immigrants. (Associazione Tolbà, n.d.) Furthermore, there are numerous regional and national associations for immigrants of all nationalities, such as the Associazione Angolani Residenti in Italia - Angolan Residents in Italy Association. Evaluation State of the Art Considering the surveys conducted in recent years, Italian public opinion seems sceptical if not negative about immigration. The data even suggest a slight aggravation since 2011, for instance, more people seem to believe that immigrants steal jobs than a few years ago. In general, figures are more negative than the EU average: Fewer Italians than Europeans - which include Italians too - believe that immigration improves a country's culture and society or that foreigners are successfully integrated, while more Italians think that immigration increases crime and illegality. Italy is also one of the European Union countries where the overestimation of the number of immigrants, i.e. the number of immigrants perceived compared to the actual one - is higher. On average it is thought that 25% of the resident population is made up of non-EU immigrants when the actual rate is about 7%. Italy has a higher nationalism index than other countries in central or western Europe and it is thought 37 that numerical overestimation and nationalism may be linked. Finally, let us remember that 17% of immigrants feel discriminated on grounds of their origin. Among such rather negative facts, the citizens' initiative currently examined by the Chamber stands out. It contains suggestions for the management of immigration that seem rather positive in terms of solidarity. One cannot determine to what extent a citizens' initiative reflects public opinion unless more precise information about the context and the signatories is available. Nevertheless, many signatures are required for the proposal to be considered and thus we can expect at least part of the population to have encouraged it. All the other data suggest, however, that the majority of the population is rather reluctant towards immigration. Concerning political parties, we can analyse the evolution that took place between 2008 and 2019 by combining their programmes with the election results. Of course, people's choice to vote for one party over another does not only depend on their views on immigration, but it is interesting to consider the results of elections in relation to the position of politicians. In 2008, the programmes of major political parties differ greatly on immigration. Some promote a fairly receptive policy, for example the coalition Sinistra Arcobaleno and Partito Democratico. Popolo della Libertà has a neutral position, wanting to encourage the entry of skilled workers but also recognizing a need for more effective regulations. Unione di Centro, Lega Nord and La Destra advance more restrictive proposals, of a nationalistic nature and sometimes conflicting with international treaties. The focus is generally on labour immigration, which in this period is still the main phenomenon. After the counting of votes, the Partito Democratico led by Veltroni and Berlusconi's Popolo della Libertà are the main 'winners'. Lega Nord is for the first time increasing its consensus, which is interesting because this coincides with the beginning of the financial crisis. Unione di Centro also receives enough votes to elect senators and deputies. Immigration is hardly present in the electoral programmes for 2013 and no party proposes particularly strict measures. The centre-right coalition leaves little room for this issue, just like the newly formed Movimento 5 Stelle. Scelta Civica takes a neutral stance, while PD and Sinistra Ecologia Libertà appear to be in favour of reception. It is indeed the centre-left that prevails at elections, albeit with less support than expected. The consensus boom for M5S at its first election does not tell us much about immigration, but it underlines the dissatisfaction of people with former governments. The 2018 elections are a turning point. It is the first ballot since the beginning of the so-called migration crisis, reason why the parties mainly focus on asylum applications, illegal immigration and landings. This year's programmes also include a great deal of criticism against the European Union and the other member states. There is a generalised idea that migration flows fall disproportionately 40 What situation should then be expected in Italy concerning labour immigration? The main interest groups should be in favour of this phenomenon, trying to highlight its positive aspects to influence the decisions of the administrative elite. Public opinion, on the other hand, would be against a further entry of foreign workers, at least in the most vulnerable societal strata. However, they would not be able to obtain enough information on the subject and it would not be clear to them which political parties reflect their position. The latter would avoid expressing anti-immigration visions during the election campaign, to escape accusations of nationalism or populism. As a result, politicians would be under the influence of industrialists and trade unions and implement tendentially receptive policies. As expected, we have seen that interest groups in Italy are open to immigration and clearly express their position, motivating it from various points of view - economic, demographic, humanitarian. Public opinion also behaves according to predictions, showing distrust towards immigrants and the migratory phenomenon. The main anxieties concern jobs, security and crime. The Italian population is even more sceptical than the European average. Nevertheless, migration policies have become increasingly restrictive in the last decade, not only for refugees and illegal immigrants but also for foreign workers, to the point of considerably limiting the rights of migrants. Political figures have begun to freely express their positions, even when radical or controversial. This had already been noticed by Freeman in 2000 when the first populist movements were emerging. Such observations make us realize that a liberal paradox can no longer be observed in contemporary Italy, not regarding immigration policies. What made the situation paradoxical in the past was the insignificant role played by citizens in a liberalized labour market, but today the population appears to be much more heard than interest groups. Finally, we cannot help but notice that in recent years labour immigration and refugee flows have been combined, intertwined and often confused, both by public opinion and in political debates. That is why it has become impossible to analyse the first phenomenon without referring to the other one. Conclusion In this paper, we have tried to determine the role of public opinion, interest groups and politicians in the planning of migration policies in Italy, from 2008 until today. As a theoretical framework, we have relied on Gary P. Freeman's theory of the Liberal Paradox, formulated in 1995 to explain how migration policies are shaped in modern nations. Freeman writes of 'paradox' because he observes 41 that public opinion has very little influence on political decisions, while the logic of the liberal state would foresee the opposite. On the other hand, organised interest groups play an important role, resulting in measures favouring labour immigration. Freeman also points out that sound data on immigration are rarely available to the population, which often misperceives its consequences and characteristics. Focusing on the countries of Southern Europe, he assesses the measures implemented as inclusive and sees the critical case of Italy, where public opinion is particularly negative. We decided to analyse the Italian situation over the last decade and assess whether this theory is still applicable. We also mentioned the vision of James F. Hollifield, who in turn recognizes paradoxes in the new liberalism. For example, states have a duty to society to maintain control of their borders, but at the same time, liberal precepts require openness and the rights of individuals must be protected. Immigration is currently one of the most pressing issues at the national, European and global level, as shown by official data. It is an essential feature of today's world, but it raises political, social, demographic and cultural issues. For over 40 years, Europeans have feared the negative effects of such a phenomenon and they are losing faith in its benefits. Nationalism, populism and racism are spreading, and several national politicians blame the European Union. However, European directives leave extensive powers to national authorities: The TFEU requires member states to set rates and admission criteria for labour migration. Criticism, however, mainly concerns the rules for the management of refugees, especially under the current humanitarian emergency. The centrality of migration flows towards Europe and a peculiar migration history render Italy a particularly interesting case for studying migration policies. On the one hand, its position on the northern shore of the Mediterranean makes it a common destination for migratory flows from Africa. At the same time, however, Italy has quickly turned from a country of emigration into a destination and has not been able to equip itself with the necessary management tools. Just think that between 1876 and 1976 more than 25 million citizens expatriated. Even today, Italy lacks uniform and cohesive administrative leadership to effectively establish annual admissions, which has led to recurrent and improper use of regularizations. The instability and mutability of Italian politics, the weak institutional role of employers' associations and the development of large irregular migration flows further complicate the situation. However, and even if the national economy has been hit hard by the crisis, Italy remains a major destination for migrant workers too, especially unskilled labour. Foreign workers already filled unskilled sectors of the Italian labour market before the crisis. Today, immigrants in Italy still perform primarily manual functions and have a rather high rate of participation in the labour market. Like other countries in southern Europe, Italy is often criticised 42 for inefficiently organising legal immigration and failing to limit the illegal entry of foreigners. Much of this is true, but the complexity of the phenomenon is often underestimated. We can identify three main groups of states in the western world, which manage immigration in different ways. First, there are the United States, Canada and Australia, which have the longest tradition as destination countries. They are followed by the countries of central and northern Europe, which favoured and received the arrival of foreign labour after World War II. Finally, there are countries having only recently become destinations of flows, namely Southern and Eastern European ones. More generally, immigration control policies regulate rules and procedures for the admission of foreign nationals. These policies are analysed by experts through several approaches, among which 'Domestic Politics' is the one closest to our analysis. This vision sees social actors as the main shapers of migration policies, while the state acts as the arena for their negotiations and compromises. The interests of small sections of the population are favoured, not those of the electorate, because organised interest groups push parties, legislators and administrators to adopt specific rules. Two of the main exponents of such an approach are indeed Gary P. Freeman and James F. Hollifield. Let us then move on to our findings. We have seen that Italian public opinion is sceptical, if not adverse, towards immigration. The indicators point to a more negative vision than the European Union average. A citizens' initiative recently proposed to the Chamber of Deputies stands out for its positivity, but all the other data suggest that the majority of the population is rather reluctant towards the admission of foreigners. As for political parties, things have rather changed over time. In 2008, electoral programmes differed considerably concerning immigration. The focus is generally on labour migration, which at this time is still the largest phenomenon. Migration, on the other hand, is not very present in the electoral programmes of 2013 and no party proposes particularly strict measures. The consensus boom of Movimento 5 Stelle at its first elections underlines a general dissatisfaction of citizens with the state, even if it is not directly related to immigration. 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