POLITICAL SCIENCE BIG course, Dispense di Scienza Politica

Scarica POLITICAL SCIENCE BIG course e più Dispense in PDF di Scienza Politica solo su Docsity! Political Science, Arianna Fracchia 2022 1 BOOKS Principles of international politics 5th edition (de Mesquita) Principles of comparative politics 2nd edition (Clark, Golder W and S) THEORIES AND ARGUMENT HOW CAN WE LEARN ABOUT POLITICS Explanation requires theory, the explanation of some empirical phenomena, not a detailed explanation of every single event. (For example, reasons why conflict in Ukraine broke out is different from reasons why the Russia actually invaded the Ukraine) It states the expected relationship between some variables= the characteristic, event that can take more than one value (for example political regime is a variable, states that have a lot of oil tend to not be democratic, there is a connection between these two things. In rich country is not possible to come back to an authoritarian regime from a democratic one). Two types of variables: • Dependent variables= we are trying to explain (presence of authoritarian regime) • Independent variables= what we think will help us explain the dependent value (presence of oil) For example, we are trying to understand under which condition he have, or we don’t have a conflict. If voters are against the war; a US president in his first term is not going to war because we would be punished by losing votes (audience cost). In the second period he can go to war because he would not be elected (he can’t have a third term). Incentives for the president: being reelected or being coherent with his own ideas. THEORIES Theories are crucial for policymaking, decisions going forward must be based on an understanding of how things fit together. They are composed by: • assumptions, • logic deductions, because data requires interpretation • predictions (assumptions using logic) and hypotheses (statements about how independent variables relate to the dependent ones, they are based also on past events that are useful to predict the future events) Induction is not very useful in studying politics, it is based on the fact that one piece of data leads to the next, however it is good to start with that because it generates assumptions (conjecture that certain basic things are true). Deduction is much better; with deductive method we are able to derive predictions from assumptions using logic. Political Science, Arianna Fracchia 2022 2 Theorizing starts with choosing what we think is important to explain our phenomenon of interest. When we evaluate a theory, we look at logical consistency among the assumptions, evidence on the predictions, comparison with alternative theories in terms of predictive capacity. To evaluate a theory, we look at 1. Logical consistency among the assumptions 2. Evidence on the predictions 3. Comparison with alternative theories in term of predictive capacity Assumptions is a group of simplifying conditions under which is believed to be useful to explain a certain phenomenon. They define the scope conditions for the theory (for example when it is applicable). They must be clear and consistent to create a casual mechanism to have conclusions. Our conclusions are as good as our assumptions are strong. Assumptions about incentives related to the particular phenomenon of interest should be correct; to judge the role of an assumptions we need to ask what it contributes to the theory (what happens to the prediction if we take it out?) Principle of parsimony= the more cases a theory explains using with a limited set of assumptions, the more useful it is. Make the minimal assumptions needed to extract valuable policy insight without trying to replicate reality. MODELS We build models= the simplification of the world that isolates a bite-size piece and tries to make sense of it; logical consistency is essential; testing and falsifiability is critical for practical application (in past philosophers ask themselves how to represent democracy). In models you get rid of unnecessary information, and you get only what you need (like in metro map) To evaluate a model we should ask the following questions: 1. Does some part of the model correspond to some part of the world? 2. Did you learn something about how the world might work from the model? Normative vs optimal/ideal approach, the normative is possible because the society is usually pyramid, at the bottom there are people who has not a political conscience. EXAMPLE We have 2 models (A,B), for example spending more and spending less, and two circumstances (1, 0) for example economic boom and crysis; one is preferable in one circumstance and the other one in the other. The world has a preference in model A but a politician knows that the model B is better in that particular situation, but the world (who has not his information). The politician must decide between being elected and following his information in the benefit of the world, but he would lose votes. Pandering= the action of a politician who says what voters want to hear; he ignores his superior information to be elected. In this simple example we have just two models, in reality we have so much more models. Incentives= something that encourages a person to do something. For example Tax incentives have been very effective in encouraging people to save and invest more of their income. Political Science, Arianna Fracchia 2022 5 Our positive concept of state is not same as normative concepts you might know. In fact states here are not defined by their goals, the sources of legitimacy, their activities; but only by their specific way of getting things done (even through coercion) Coercion= the practice of persuading someone to do something by using force or threats. Notice states do many things above taxation and monopoly of violence (education, health, produce goods, regulate private activities). FAILED STATES According to the definition of a state; states that cannot coerce and are unable to use force to control the inhabitants of a certain territory are often described as failed states. They have not just failed at additional tasks but primary at defining tasks of monopoly of violence and revenue extraction. CASE OF SOMALIA ON THE BOOK (pag.93) YEMEN: https://www.unh.edu/inquiryjournal/spring-2022/yemen-and-dynamics-foreign-intervention- failedstates How do we know when a state is failed? à The Fund of Peace: Fragile states index since 1900s • Methodology is vague • Draws on content analysis of English-language newspapers; quantitative data from organizations like UN, World Bank; review by social scientists State capacity is a separate concept, it is the ability of states to accomplish their objective. So a failed state is far different from an incapable state. The first one deals with the inability to have the monopoly on the use of force; the second one is about the inability to reach its goals Political Science, Arianna Fracchia 2022 6 States may not want to control violence and also an inability to control violence may not indicate fragility. STATES AND THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM Norm of territorial integrity= the international system preserves states even when they are weak or failing There are organizations that act like states (try to monopolize violence and extract revenues), but they lack well-defined territory. Other organization (a former non-failed state) also claims monopoly. A clear example is ISIS: it claims the control of part of territory also claimed by Syrian Arab Republic. STATE OF NATURE Hobbes, the philosopher who theorized the State of Nature said: “War of all against again all” (civil war), “life is short, nasty, brutish”. State of nature could be understood as thought an experiment where humans must choice between producing or grabbing. Without a presence of a state the individuals would try to overcome each other, trying to take advantage of their neighbors. The State of nature’s features: • It is as paradigmatic case of coordination failure= everyone would be better without the state but the absence of it makes impossible to live together and coordinate the activities • It is a sort of social contract signed between the society and the state: people sign away autonomy in exchange of order • At its base it exists a normative purpose Issues in the State of nature: o Enforcing social contact requires coercive apparatus (paradox: we are trying to avoid coercion) Political Science, Arianna Fracchia 2022 7 o Any state that is powerful enough to prevent state of nature is also powerful enough to steal everything you own; so why doesn’t it take everything? Predatory view of the state= focus on incentives for the powerful to build states rather than (its aim is maintaining the power and encourage people to produce to than take a part of it). The state is seen as invisible hand that provides benefits to citizens to take more back, we don’t receive public goods by the benevolence of the dictator but by their self-interest. Let’s make an example to understand this concept EXAMPLE OR ROVING BANDITS (Olsonian mechanism) Roving bandits have coercion resources to take what they want, they can plunder and move on. It also means that there are not incentives for population to invest and increase production On the other hand, there are many warlords (each with a gang of soldiers); they systematically plunder everything, so villagers start to produce bare minimum. In the end, there is very little stuff to plunder for warlords. A warlord decides to settle and continuously extract resources (rational monopolization of theft): setting “tax rate” such that people produce more in order to steal later more. We deduce that population strictly prefers stationary to roving bandit. Stationary bandit is more like a rancher than a wolf. Olson says that “the rational, self-interested leader of a band of roving bandits is led, as though by an invisible hand, to settle down, wear a crown, and replace anarchy with governments”. A recent work on bandits in sub-Saharan Africa provided the empirical evidence of Olsonian mechanism. Raul Sanchez de la Sierra studied state formation among armed groups in Eastern Congo. Where do armed groups choose to provide order? o Price shock for coltan in 2000. o Armed groups provide security and collect taxes more in villages with coltan mines. _______________________________________________________________________________________ Charles Tilly: “If protection rackets represent organized crime at its smoothest, then war making and state making - quintessential protection rackets with the advantage of legitimacy - qualify as our largest examples of organized crime. Without branding all generals and statesmen as murderers or thieves, I want to urge the value of that analogy. At least for the European experience of the past few centuries, a portrait of war makers and state makers as coercive and self-seeking entrepreneurs bears a far greater resemblance to the facts than do its chief alternatives: the idea of a social contract, the idea of an open market in which operators of armies and states offer services to willing consumers, the idea of a society whose shared norms and expectations call forth a certain kind of government.” We can split up her speech analyzing some parts: • States make wars, wars make states: o We are in a nutshell that leads to a competition = need to pay for war, leads to setting up bureaucratic machine o Pure capitalist states (e.g., Republic of Venice) and pure military empires succumb to states with “the right mix” (e.g., France) • European experience during Middle Age Political Science, Arianna Fracchia 2022 10 WHERE DOES DEMOCRACY COMES FROM? For Olson: “democracy emerges in states where balance of power makes it impossible for new leaders to create an autocracy”à Power-sharing is the result. For Tilly: democracy emerges from popular resistance to war-making. In past European rulers needed compliance with taxation, conscription; so, they accepted limits on their powers to raise more revenues. Democracy is the merging (fusion) of contractarian and predatory perspectives. Predatory view of state formation is a useful theoretical tool, but what are some of its shortcomings in explaining political developments in the real world? o People have agency in responding to coercive power o Political leaders are not purely / always self-interested (ideology, morality) Political Science, Arianna Fracchia 2022 11 DEMOCRACY AND DI CTATORSHIP A political regime is a set of rules and practices that determine political rights and their effects on control over state. In other words (definition on the textbook), it is a set of rules, norms, or institutions that determine how the government is constituted and organized, and how major decisions are made. It is different from government, which refers to the people who hold power in the state. EXAMPLE: USA State: political institution, bureaucracy, military forces etc. Regime: democracy Government: currently, in Biden administration and 117th congress; formerly, the Trump administration and 116th congress. EXAMPLE: EGYPT State: political institution, bureaucracy, military forces Regime: authoritarian Government: president Sisi and his cabinet Regimes can change • Transition from authoritarianism to a democracy (Egypt in 2011-2012), • Transition from democracy to authoritarian (Egypt in 2013) • Transition from a type of authoritarian regime to another type of authoritarian regime There’s a binary distinction between democracy and autocracy; within each further distinction possible. Problems with hybrid regime concept (combine elements of both) and “quasi-democracy”. DEMOCRACY HOW TO DEFINE A DEMOCRACY? Almost everyone wants a democracy (eastern and western states), but every country has its own idea of democracy and different priorities (for example for Arab state the most important duty of a democracy is providing job and security). 95% of the countries try to present themselves as democratic, so it is not always easy to understand which one is actually and which one is not. DEFINITION OF SCHUMPETER The key-concept is competition: • central element is having teams of politicians competing for power to make policy • Citizens’ influence stops after election • Minimal requirements of freedom (speech and media) to ensure that competition is real Political Science, Arianna Fracchia 2022 12 DEFINITION OF DAHL Non-procedural views of democracy: democracy is not necessary liberty, social equality, good governance, justice, secular, pro-Western. All these assume the answer to otherwise interesting empirical questions. Two-dimensional characterization: • Inclusion= how different are the electors and how many people are involved in the choice • contestation= who competitive is this race DEFINITION OF PRZEWORSKI His definition is the most used (remember!): the central concept is contestation. Democracy is a system in which ruling parties lose elections. Elections are important in the definition because they determine chief executive and legislative body; and people are not legally constrained to respond to power that has not been decided during the electoral process. Democracies can be very fragile, parties who won the elections won’t be in charge and the government can fall (like in Italy). Three characteristics for democracy in Przeworski’s definition: 1. ex-ante uncertainty (winner does not know in advance with certainty) 2. ex-post irreversibility (if opposition win, it can take office) 3. replicability (whoever wins does not discard rule) An example: in Syria Bashar Assad vote share in 2014: 88,7%. They changed the electoral systemà Syria is not a democracy. Additional remarks on his definition: • Democracy is seen as a temporary suspension of conflict: after the electoral period the conflict stops for some years. Simply accepting that “the other team” has won, but will not rule forever • Democracy benefits from stalemate in social conflict • Democracy is not about discovering the general will: freedom is a byproduct of the temporary nature of victory Political Science, Arianna Fracchia 2022 15 Attempt to categorize non-democratic regimes has long history: in 20th century, there was a concern about totalitarianism and authoritarianism as different species TOTALITARIAN VS AUTHORITARIAN Totalitarianism: category used to understand Nazi Germany and Stalin’s Soviet Union. Some characteristics of this kind of regime: • No political pluralism • No social and economic pluralism • Elaborate ideology with “reachable utopia” • Extensive mobilization, mandatory organizations, hostile to private life • Charismatic leadership with undefined limits and unpredictability But this category was not enough because many post 2nd World War regimes did not fit it. So, it is born the concept of Authoritarianism with its characteristics: • Limited political pluralism • Extensive social and economic pluralism • Distinctive mentality but not elaborate ideology • Not much mobilization • Formally ill-defined but predictable leadership; cooptation of pre-existing elite Various categories: totalitarian, bureaucratic authoritarian, sultanistic. There has been a proliferation of categories that has led to a lack of clarity on criteria. In addition, the mix of institutions-based and outcomesbased features hence not a procedural classification EXAMPLE: JORDAN IN 1950s Jordanian politics after independence: o Constitutional monarchy with powerful king o King shared power with appointed prime minister/cabinet o Parliament is elected in manipulated elections, can create political headaches for monarchy o Regular protests related to Arab nationalism, Israel conflict o No real regime ideology o Tiny intelligence apparatus run personally by the king, sustained by foreign funding CLASSIFICATION Attempt to classify non-democratic regimes based on their institutional design. The starting point is that all dictators rely on some support coalition, even if it is not clearly visible Haber in 2008 referred to the “launching organization” on which dictators rely to seize power: o Military officers in a coup (Thailand, Egypt) o Insurgent army or revolutionary party (Algeria, China) o Political party (Hungary) Political Science, Arianna Fracchia 2022 16 Once in power dictator need support from his coalition to govern à no one governs alone Two questions in order to classify autocracies: • Which type of institution holds the most power to choose the dictator? o Royal family? o Military? o Political party? • How broadly do dictators share power? o Are there other institutions like legislatures, elections, parties? o Do these institutions provide political actors other than the dictator with influence? GEDDES’S CLASSIFICATION The main problem of this classification is that categories are not mutually exchange MAGLONI CLASSIFICATION Magloni, Chu and Min in 2013 provided a different approach to measure personalism using a similar coding scheme: the same four regimes possible • Single party regime, • Multi-party regime, • Military regime • Monarchy LOSING POWER Competitive elections not accepted means of choosing leaders = autocrats always fear losing power. Leader changes are unpredictable. Some autocrats hold onto power for decades. (Hosni Mubarak in Egypt: 1981 – 2011, Paul Biya in Cameroon: 1982 – Present) but many others barely make it a few years (Abdelkarim Qasim in Iraq: 1958 – 1963, Hugo Ballivan in Bolivia: 1951-1952) Autocrats can be removed in two ways: Political Science, Arianna Fracchia 2022 17 • By other political elites à most of autocrats lose power in this way (79%) • By the massà uprisings are becoming a more common pathway losing power. Protestants often facilitate coups Most autocrats are removed by elites but, uprisings are becoming a more common pathway of losing power and protests often facilitate coups. Which type of regime do you expect to survive the longest, on average? MILITARY REGIMES Military regimes, on average, are the last stable authoritarian regime. Why? • Problems with Elites o Officers care about privileges for military beyond direct control of government; they also care about military unity. o Difficulties of governance cause splits in military, and splits create pressures to return to the barracks. • Problems with Masses o Military rule is a particularly visible violation of democratic principles. o Provides a focal point for mass opposition. EXAMPLE: ARGENTINA In 1976 coup against elected socialist government. à Junta of senior military officers takes charge. The governance challenges were declining economy, defeat in Falklands war. However, the result was an internal strife in military; popular protests; return to democracy in 1983. PARTY REGIMES Party regimes, on average, tend to be quite stable. Why? • Benefits to Elites o System of promotion and privilege for party members. o For top elites, institution to check the autocrats. Political Science, Arianna Fracchia 2022 20 TWO VIS IONS OF DEMOCRACY TERMINOLOGY ALREADY SEEN Politics: Process of reaching and executing authoritative collective decisions. Politics should be a mirror to society Political Regimes: Set of institutions and organizations that regulate ↑ Democracy: Political regime that favors contestation and inclusion Citizens should influence policy decisions How is this translated into practice and institutions? Institutions: Rules of the game, both formal (constitution) and informal (practices, norms) Institutional designers face several trade-offs: power disperse (more coalition in the government that rule together) or concentrated; the main point is understanding how to divide powers. TWO VISIONS OF DEMOCRACY Two alternative views about how democracy should work • Majoritarian Democracy: power concentrated; the majority governs • Consensus Democracy: power dispersed, decision-making is a mirror of society, decisions are made through bargaining These two are closely related to (but not the same as) families of electoral systems. It is better to think about them in a more abstract way, then move to concrete implementation Why shall we care? Because they have important implications for representation, decision-making, party competition, public policies, political conflict, and the economy TWO IDEAS OF REPRESENTATION Democratic regimes involve a certain degree of representation - Voters elect representatives who decide on their behalf • Delegate Model of Representation (adopted by the majoritarian) o Clear mandate o Clear roles o Easy to monitor • Trustee Model of Representation (adopted by consensus) o Open mandate o Benevolent ideal of policy-making o Policy-makers decide ex-post optimal policies Political Science, Arianna Fracchia 2022 21 MAJORITARIAN DEMOCRACY (UNITED KINDOM SYSTEM) Voters → Majority → Decision • Party with plurality of votes controls the government • Create strong, single-party majority governments • Unconstrained (I don’t have to ask to other institutions) in the policy-making process • It’s an ideal type: institutional designers should be motivated by these features. Note: plurality is relative majority, different from absolute majority (50% + 1) Elections as competition between “teams”, the team preferred by majority gets a mandate. In UK there is a clear winner; the party who wins will control both legislative and executive power CONSENSUS DEMOCRACY (ITALIAN SYSTEM) Voters → Several Parties in Government → Bargaining → Decision/Compromise → Review • Government should mirror the preferences and interests of society (also represent the minorities) • Should reflect the opinions of all citizens • Decisions are made through bargaining, which leads to policies that are in line with citizens’ preferences • Strong “checks and balances” Elections are still a competition between teams, although now teams will form a coalition government that bargains over policy decisions Slightly different concepts: • “Consensus” view of democracy is a broad concept, ideal type which aims to disperse power • To ensure that, each fraction of society should have proportionate influence over decision-making • Decisions will ultimately require joint agreement of different groups/parties IMPLICATIONS FOR REPRESENTATION AND ACCOUNTABILITY Two types of representation: • Substantive Representation: Representatives take actions in line with the ideological interests of those they represent → Congruence • Descriptive Representation: Representatives resemble their constituents (minorities are better in dealing with minorities’ issues) Substantive Representation may seem more valuable, but can it be achieved without Descriptive Representation? E.g., gender quotas and female representation. Political Science, Arianna Fracchia 2022 22 CONGRUENCE “A democratic government provides an orderly and peaceful process by means of which a majority of citizens can induce the government to do what they most want it to do and to avoid doing what they most want it not to do” — Dahl, 1989 Democracy (is good because it) induces congruence between citizens’ preferences, policymakers, and policies In other words, congruence is the ideological distance between position of the policymakers/policy and that of the median voter: Assume left-right spectrum [0 = extreme-left, 10= extreme-right]. Voters and policy-makers self-place themselves along the spectrum. Order voters based on their self-placement. Median is the voter which splits the group into two equal-size parts. If median is different from mean, majority always prefers the former. Congruence is distance between two “ideal points” Empirical evidence shows that consensus democracy induces more congruence Majority control systems run risk of “leapfrogging representation” (thin advantage ensures majority rules) We now look at two “versions” of congruence, between voters and • policies (decision) • policymakers (those in charge of deciding) EXAMPLE: ABORTION Political Science, Arianna Fracchia 2022 25 In order to reward/punish, need to know who decides. Systems are varied in terms of clarity of responsibility. Empirical evidence shows that in general: more clarity of responsibility leads to more punishments for poor economic performance and less corruption In general, majority control systems have higher clarity of responsibility than proportionate influence systems (by construction) INSTITUTIONS Institutional mixes are not chosen by chance. The table shows strong interdependence between institutional features: 1. FPTP (“first-past-the-post” system, also known as the simple majority system) tends to favor 2-party systems which are both associated with single-party majority government 2. Federalism (the decentralization of power to sub-national entities) tends to be associated with bicameralism, where one chamber represents the interests of the states. 3. Constitutionalism makes sure that central government does not undermine (minare) decentralization Alternative visions of democracy are based on different ideas about representation. However, the overarching (sovrastante) principle is congruence (“doing what voters want”) • When voters’ preferences are highly heterogeneous, consensus democracy might be a better way to “institutionalize” conflict • Important take-home point: inherent tension (and trade-off) between proportionate influence and majority control Political Science, Arianna Fracchia 2022 26 ELECTORAL SYSTEM From last class: institutions are rules of the game (taking and executing authoritative decisions) Rules turning votes → seats are important for defining democracy as: • Majoritarian: power concentrated • Consensus: power dispersed BASIC Basic observation: how votes are counted as important as how votes are cast. It is a sort of translation from vote to seats. In addition, voters cast votes with understanding of how they are counted Disproportionality: difference between % of votes received and % of seats allocated All systems are based on districts (imagine a square where that represent the geographical division of the state) within which votes are counted and seats are allocated. Notice a country might be “divided” in just one district: e.g., Israel MAJORITARIAN SYSTEM The candidate or party that receives the most votes (even not 50% + 1 votes) wins → gets a legislative majority (this time yes, 50% + 1 seats) SINGLE MEMBER DISTRICTS (SMD) Country divided in as many districts as there are seats (for example, we need to elect 300 representatives, so we divide country in 300 districts). Generally, each party supports one candidate and voters can vote for one of the candidates In each district, candidate with more votes than anybody else (plurality) is elected. So even if more parties are close to each other the district will completely be controlled by the party that has the plurality (even if it has 1% more than one other)à plurality candidate might get much less than 50% EXAMPLE of UK Political Science, Arianna Fracchia 2022 27 PROS AND CONS Pros: • Simple • Clear link between constituents and representativeà Good for accountability, remember? Cons: • Not very representative (a candidate can win even with small % of votes) • Risk of large disproportionality • If support is evenly distributed across districts, one party can win 100% of seats with 51% of votes (or less in multi-party settings) • Incentivizes strategic voting instead of the real vote • If voters geographically concentrated decrease electoral competition→ representatives will be less responsive to minorities not decisive for their re-election DISTRICTS If the main party wins all districts with 25% of votes: • 100% of seats • With just 25% of votes nationally • Having concentrated geographic support leads to “wasted” votes • Need 50%+1, have 90%...those extra 40% of votes do not affect outcome Drawing districts is highly politicised, as it has important consequences on votes/seats gap EXAMPLE of DISTRICT ELECTION Suppose there are 5 seats to be allocated and 25 voters identifying with one of two parties and living in this square-shaped state (Red=republican party, blue= democratic party) three scenarios: Political Science, Arianna Fracchia 2022 30 Open listà voter can express one or more preferences for candidates. Once seats are allocated to party (in proportion to party list votes), candidates with most preference votes occupy the seat EXAMPLE Christian Democratic Party wins 3 seats in district. CLOSE LIST: Smith, Jones, and O’Neil sit in the legislature Generates dependence of legislators on parties. Party directorate can punish representatives by placing them at bottom OPEN LIST: David, O’Neil, and Jones sit in legislature. It is a kind of “instant primary”politicians depend less on party, more on personal reputation • create factional conflict within parties HOW CANDIDATES ARE CHOOSEN? “Candidate-centred”: • In SMD: primaries for major parties in U.S .Congress races • In open list PR: voters can express preference “Party-centred”: central directorate of party picks who runs in given district Neither inherently “more democratic”. We should ignore misleading rhetoric and focus our attention on two important trade-offs: 1. power to party (hence closer to “mandate”) 2. power to candidate (“maverick” politicians are harder to control) It turns out to be impossible to maximize both citizen control and party discipline. Is it better to make voters decide the candidate or parties? Voters: • More freedom over choice of representatives • Stronger link between representative and community/constituents • Personal vote (bring back pork-barrell projects for constituency) • Factions and competitions within parties Party: • Inclusion of minorities and candidates from under-represented groups • Legislators free to pursue national interest • No conflicts within candidates • Loyalty to party leaders becomes more important than closeness to constituents Political Science, Arianna Fracchia 2022 31 STRATEGIC VOTING We are looking at votes as cast not fully informative; and we assume that voters respond strategically to rules. Modify votes cast has politically very important effects Implications for democratic theory are complex SINCERE VS STRATEGIC VOTING Sincere votingàI vote for the party I like best. This choice has some problems: o What if my favorite party is hopeless? o What if by being divided, “our camp” loses against “them?” Some people dislike wasting their vote on hopeless candidate, so they might vote for least disliked of the “promising” candidates Vote strategicallyà take into account (expected) behavior of other voters An implication of strategic voting is the so-called Duverger’s Law. We have assumed that SMD leads to two party-system; Duverger’s hypothesis reformulated: in SMD, at most two viable parties at the district level àGeneralized Duverger hypothesis: electoral system of magnitude 𝑀 sustains at most 𝑀 + 1 parties EXAMPLE: strategic voting in SMD _______________________________________________________________________________________ EXAMPLE: strategic voting in other systems (two rounds) Face value: vote sincerely in first round Might vote strategically in 1st round to avoid two disliked candidates in 2nd round In second round, Smith vs Jones: Conservative vs Nationalist Workers Struggle might vote for Labour in first round, get a Smith vs O’Neil race _______________________________________________________________________________________ A pre - election poll Assume for both Liberal and Labour supporters, Conservative is the least liked Election day Requires coordination on one of the two candidates Political Science, Arianna Fracchia 2022 32 Strategic voting is seen as pathology. However, it is easier to coordinate and there are more incentives to do it in SMD. Extent to which it can be carried out varies with systems In PR, almost impossible calculations and lots of information needed Simple forms possible: e.g., Left voters in Spain vote United Left if 𝑀 large, Socialist if 𝑀 small àMathematical proofs exist that it is impossible to fully prevent it Political Science, Arianna Fracchia 2022 35 France experiences less modernization of agriculture: economic power remains concentrated in hands of landed nobility; French crown remains politically dominant. From this example we understand that development is not just about the increase in income, but it is also related to the change in structure of economy à from less mobile assets (e.g., landed estates) to more mobile assets (e.g., factories) to non-expropriable assets (e.g., engineering training). More mobile assets: • take assets out of country if expropriation attempted • cannot force “enslaved engineer” to invent brilliant devices Governments are more likely to cede power as it becomes more difficult to extract resources; so it makes democracy more likely. INEQUALITY, REDISTRIBUTION AND DEMOCRACY A common argument is that inequality worsens prospects for democracy, but our theory also explains how modernization makes this problem less severe. HOW REDISTRIBUTION TO COPE WITH INEQUALITY WORKS Assume tax rate τ = 100%. Everyone receives equal transfer b=Y/N where o Y = total economic output o N = total population o b = average income in the country: y Some considerations: • Anyone whose yi is below average prefers the average y to their own income yi • Agents with income less than average are net beneficiaries of redistributionà they get back more than they pay in. • Notice with progressive taxation (variable τi , higher rate for higher incomes), there is even more appetite for tax EXAMPLE TO UNDERSTAND with NUMBERS There are 100 people distributed in this way: - 80 “poor”, income 1,000 euro - 20 “rich”, income 5,000 euro The total income is 180,000 euro The average income is 180000 euro / 100 people = 1800 euro If set tax rate equal to 100%: • poor agent pays in his entire income: 1000 euro • rich agent pays in his entire income: 5000 euro Political Science, Arianna Fracchia 2022 36 The total budget is 180,000 euro. Each agent gets back their per capita share of the budget: 180000 /100 = 1800. We have two consequences: • Poor agent gets 800 euros more than he paid in • Rich agent gets 3200 euros less than he paid in _______________________________________________________________________________________ We can clearly understand that: • dictatorship of the rich wants tax rate of 0 • dictatorship of the poor wants tax rate of 100% “Poor” pivotal voter in democracy would want to expropriate but redistribution is costly: “deadweight loss” of taxation: high taxes depress investment and depress labor supply Agents know that full expropriation reduces total product hence... • tax rate of poor agent less than 100% • the poorer the decisive agent, the higher the tax rate • more unequal country → higher tax on the rich • rich should be more opposed to democracy but factor mobility constrains ability to expropriate EXAMPLE Guatemalan latifundia elite vs. the Agnelli family Democracy means o total expropriation (and loss of all status/wealth) for Guatemalan o no special consequence for the Agnelli Why? o Latifundia can be expropriated (e.g., divided in small plots) without reducing (and maybe increasing) its productivity o FIAT without investment/industrial plan/entrepreneurship might become less valuable. Agnelli have much less to fear from letting “common people” set tax rate In other words, modernization of economy reduces how much democratic majority can tax the rich. So, democracy becomes less scary for elites AN EXCEPTION: OLI-RICH COUNTRIES Oil-rich countries are extremely wealthy and extremely authoritarian. What does this mean for modernization theory? A good explanation of why oil countries not democratic is because who controls government controls all the wealth. In fact, relationship between authoritarianism and oil wealth strongest after period of nationalizations Oil countries do not need the people for revenues (Saudi Arabia, UAE: first ever taxes in 2018 with a 5 percent VAT, still no income tax) Political Science, Arianna Fracchia 2022 37 Further: the government can give people goodies without charging them. • Approximately 70 percent of working Saudis employed by government as of 2016 • Free healthcare and education, stipends for students • Crisis insurance during Arab Spring: Kuwait grants every citizen $3500 Instead of citizens hiding resources from government the government can hide resources from citizens Resource wealth also means more money for coercion For example: Qaddahfi hiring foreign mercenaries during revolution. Gulf states are some of the largest military spenders in the world. Crisis insurance during Arab Spring: Kuwait grants every citizen $3500 Foreign aid can be a source of external wealthà they can reinforce authoritarianism by reducing need for autocrat to deal with the public. But aid sometimes is conditional. Foreign powers may make demands related to democratic governance: this pressure means aid sometimes associated with democratization Political Science, Arianna Fracchia 2022 40 TRADITIONAL VS SECULAR CULTURES Traditional culture Secular culture Primarily focused on importance of God and religion Religion is less important Claim: “deference to the authority of God, fatherland, and family are all closely linked with each other.” Family is less important Respect for authority generally; emphasis on conformity; nationalistic; apolitical Individualistic SURVIVAL VS SELF-EXPRESSION CULTURES Survival culture Self-expression culture Societies faced by insecurity emphasize economic and physical security Secure societies become post-materialist, focused on self-expression and quality of life Threatened by outsiders; resistant to change; authoritarian tendencies Demands for participation in decision-making Emphasis on environmental protections, rights for minorities, equality Political Science, Arianna Fracchia 2022 41 CONSIDERATIONS AND ARGUMENTS FIRST ARGUMENT Wealthier countries, on average, seem to be secular and self-expressive. Inglehart-Welzel argument: • a shift from agricultural to industrial economy leads to a shift from traditional to secular. You can have a Breakdown of traditional authority, but not yet emphasis on individual autonomy • a shift from industrial to service economy leads to a shift from survival to self-expressive; because with economic needs satisfied, people want self-realization and autonomy Self-expression values encourage democratization, strengthen democratic survival o Democratizationà People who care about self-expression become less supportive of authoritarian governments o Democratic Survivalà People who care about self-expression punish anti-democratic behaviors by politicians and politicians themselves care about democracy Don’t forget the other causal stories. Perhaps democracy is causing self-expressive values. People experience political participation, freedoms and come to value them or perhaps development causes value changes, but also other changes that lead to democracy In general, evidence for Inglehart-Welzel argument is mixed at best RELIGION CATHOLICISM AND DEMOCRACY “The linkage between democratic instability and Catholicism may also be accounted for by elements inherent in Catholicism as a religious system. Democracy requires a universalistic political belief system in the sense that it legitimates different ideologies. And it might be assumed that religious value systems which are more universalistic in the sense of placing less stress on being the only true religion will be more compatible with democracy than those which assume that they have the only truth. The latter belief, held much more strongly Political Science, Arianna Fracchia 2022 42 by the Catholics than by most other religions, makes it difficult for the religious value system to help legitimate a political system which requires, as part of its basic value system, the belief that “good” is served best through conflict among opposing beliefs. (...) Catholics may accept the assumptions of political democracy, but never those of religious tolerance: where the conflict between religion and irreligion is viewed as salient by Catholics or other believers, then a real dilemma exists for the democratic process.” -Lipset 1959 Stepan’s observation: all religions are multi-vocal; elements of intolerance paired with “pro-democratic” beliefs in all religions. Notice also that “democracy requires secularism” is not justified (remember procedural definition of democracy). MUSLIM AND ARAB GAP IN DEMOCRACY “...the Christian religion is a stranger to mere despotic power. The mildness so frequently recommended in the Gospel is incompatible with the despotic rage with which a prince punishes his subjects and exercises himself in cruelty...The Mahometan [Islam] religion, which speaks only by the sword, acts still upon men with that destructive spirit with which it was founded.” - Montesquieu A more recent code: “But there does seem to be something about Islam, or at least the fundamentalist versions of Islam that have been dominant in recent years, that makes Muslim societies particularly resistant to modernity. Of all contemporary cultural systems, the Islamic world has the fewest democracies (Turkey alone qualifies) and contains no countries that have made the transition to developed nation status in the manner of South Korea or Singapore.” - Francis Fukuyama Is there empirical support for the claim of Islam’s incompatibility with democracy? Stepan and Robertson, writing just two years after Fukyuama, say no They discovered that in Arab countries there is an absence of democracies (underachievers) while in Muslimmajority countries, there are many “overachieving” democracies. So, the absence of democracy seems to be related to the Arabian culture, not to Muslim religion. Unlikely what we expect, in Arab countries where the income and the wealth are higher there is a lower probability that these countries are democracies. Do Arab countries lag because of some factor peculiar to Islam in the region? It is very unlikely. Religion is often associated with pro-democracy attitudes, behaviors in the Middle East CIFTCI’S CONCLUSION Ciftci in 2013 analyzes support for sharia and democracy in the Arab world and finds high support for both. We can deduce that religiosity is not strongly associated with support or opposition to democracy. He concludes that “constitutional models combining Islam and democracy, rather than strictly secular institutions, may be more acceptable to Arab citizens.” Ciftci (2019) show that individualistic versus communitarian views of religion shape support for democracy among Muslims Political Science, Arianna Fracchia 2022 45 Intellectual tools to understand these are collective action and cascades; we should also focus on how to model “mistakes” or errors of judgment in game theoretic framework TOP-DOWN TRANISTION Intuition in a nutshellà transitions happen by mistake; conflict between elites and attempts to coopt opposition leads to unraveling of regime It helps us understand both liberalization/reform that gets out of hand and “normalization” periods: sudden phases of brutal repression following initial liberalization (example of Poland on the book) KEY ASSUMPTIONS: There is a pre-existing split in elite: hard-liners vs. softliners. Soft-liners want to broaden support for regime by coopting opposition, that can decide to participate in regime institutions or take opportunity of opening to organize and fight for full democratization. Regime can then respond either by repressing, or by letting democratization take place PAYOFFS Payoffs help us to divide the “tree game” and trying to predict which decision the protagonists of the game will made (in this case the opposition and soft-liners) Soft-liners • prefer broad dictatorship over status quo (because with status quo hard-lines would have more power; it is risky) • prefer status quo over narrow dictatorship • prefer narrow dictatorship over democracy • prefer democracy over insurgency Opposition • prefers democracy over broadened dictatorship • prefers broadened dictatorship over status quo • prefers status quo to insurgency and narrow dictatorship We can also deduce that opposition can be o strong: mount insurgency o weak: accept repression and narrow dictatorship The numbers mean how valuable are possible outcomes (the first one is for soft-liners; the second one is for opposition). A higher number means a better ending for a specific faction. Political Science, Arianna Fracchia 2022 46 WEAK VS STRONG OPPOSITION *soft-liners know that opposition is quite strong; so they prefer doing nothing instead of open because status quo is preferable to all other consequences possible if they open MISTAKES THAT CAN BE MADE o In neither case we have democratization o Assumption of complete information: everyone knows everything (soft-liners know already if the opposition is strong or not). Yet: what if soft-liners think they are facing weak opposition, but opposition is strong? o Open, thinking opposition will simply accept offer of partial broadening but then find itself having to concede full democratization o Analogous logic could be used to understand “normalization”: narrow dictatorship after partial opening EXAMPLES 1. Communist Poland proceeds with elections in 1989; surprise victory for solidarity results in selection of non-Communist prime minister that the ruling party is not strong enough to undo. 2. Surprise electoral victory for Islamists in Algeria leads to military coup and narrow dictatorship, insurgency. 3. Success of NLD in Myanmar after liberalization prompts military coup and narrow dictatorship, insurgency. COLLECTIVE ACTION Large-scale collective action is rare. Why? Naive views Olson’s “Logic of Collective Action” people have common interest; they act upon it people with common interest tend to freeride and they do not act collectively large groups are more powerful than small groups small groups are better able to exert influence and achieve common goals Political Science, Arianna Fracchia 2022 47 Another key-concept related with collective action is the concept of public goods. They can be: • non-excludable: if available to one, available to all • non-rivalrous: amount consumed by one does not affect what other will consume (examples: clean air, national defense, democracy) Would people organize and act collectively to produce public good? why not just let other fight? If I was a free-rider (parassita) I’d like to: • avoid cost (e.g., risk of being arrested or killed) • enjoy benefit (as I cannot be prevented from consuming public good) But if I was an opposition organizer, I would have to find a way to make people participate offering selective incentives: private (or club) goods (cash handouts, access to “members-only” resources,“fun” of being part of movement or punishment for non-participation) Notice that in small group, monitoring and rewarding is far easier MODEL FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION N people, potential participants; K people needed to be successful. So at least K ≤ N people must participate for action to succeed Benefit of success is B; cost of participation is C < B Whether you participate depends on conjecture κ about how many other joins. You will join just if you think that your participation is necessary to reach success People must believe that they are pivotal: succeed if they join, fail otherwise o closer K is to N à clearer that no success without me à that’s why campaigns always insist “every vote counts” or “every donation is indispensable” o with smaller N àeasier monitoringà easier to figure out whether one is pivotal Systematic advantage of small groups (e.g., industrial lobbies) vs large groups (e.g., consumers) CASCADES Authoritarian regimes often seem very stable: mass unrest always starts unexpectedly and is difficult to predict. That what happened with Communist regimes in 1989, equally unexpected in North Africa and Middle East Can we understand these processes systematically? Two key-concepts: Political Science, Arianna Fracchia 2022 50 Need for cooperation (common support for policies) Logrolling: “I vote for your proposal if you vote for mine”, so an exchange of political favors “Party whips”: in charge of inducing the MPs to vote according to party line. Parties’ power depends on • Control access to nominations for elections → influence voting behavior • Other resources too: e.g., in US no direct control of nominations, but manage campaign funds PARTY SYSTEMS Qualitative classification: • Single party (e.g., North Korea): o Dominant party system: maybe some parties exist but just one is important (e.g., Authoritarian Mexico, Post-War Japan, Post-Apartheid South Africa) • Two-party system (e.g., US, Spain 1980-2014) o Only two major parties have realistic chance of holding power • Multi-party system (e.g., First Republic Italy, Belgium) o More than 2 parties have realistic chance of holding power Classifications of party-systems starts from counting: how to do it? Should we count joke parties too? “Beer Drinkers Party” Quantitative criterion: Effective Number of Parties where 𝑝𝑖 can be • vote share (effective number of electoral parties) • seat share (effective number of legislative parties) Equal to number of parties 𝐾 if all parties have equal share, < 𝐾 if support lopsided for example, two parties (𝐾 = 2), one large (70% vote) one small (30% vote) → 𝐸𝑁𝑃 = 1.7 We can make a prevision on the fragmentation of party system. This formula gives more importance to the party with highest vote share WHERE DO PARTIES COME FROM? Two views: • Bottom-up: Parties emerge from social conflict, each representing a different group (or simply, heterogeneity in preferences). The focus is on social issues felt close to people Political Science, Arianna Fracchia 2022 51 • Top-down: Political elites decide to represent previously unrepresented groups giving them consciousness; elites try to teach people what they should focus on. Heterogeneity in preferences created by elites Combined: supply and demand o Demand side: voters have preferences for policies o Supply side: parties offer bundles of policies to voters When demand is not listened to, there is a moment of tension (French revolution). ISSUE SALIENCE “Supply creates its own demand” (similar to role of advertising for goods, there is a strict relationship between politics and economy) Strategic considerations of political elites who might form party → affects which social conflicts have political expression Two elements: • salience of issues: what voters think is “the most important problem the country should face”. It measures how important a problem is • issue ownership: a party decide to represent an issue (e.g., Greens and environment, [Northern] League and immigration) Parties try to influence perceptions of most important problems. Emphasis on issue where they have an advantage Political Science, Arianna Fracchia 2022 52 MAIN SOCIAL CLEAVAGES In 1967 Lipset and Rokkan tried to understand the division in society since the Middle Age. They discovered that cleavage is focused on social and economy polarities: 1. Urban-Rural: feudal lords who owned the land/bourgeoisie who lived in cities, have right to vote, economy focused 2. Confessional (Northern Ireland, Catholic/Protestant, India & Pakistan, Hindu/Muslim) 3. Secular/Clerical (tax authority of Catholic Church in France before revolution) Industrial Revolution Shuffles all Cleavages 4. Class (workers/capitalists) 5. Post-materialist (“left-libertarian”/ “nationalist right”) QUESTIONS What explains why we get the type of parties we do? We don’t know What explains why we get the number of parties we do? Duverger’s Theory: Party-system (e.g., number of parties) depends on: 1. Distribution of individual attributes in society, how are individuals dividedà it decides the number of parties (less divisions in society à less parties) 2. Electoral institutionsà it moderates the number of parties (more institutions à more party) DISTRIBUTION OF ATTRIBUTES Attribute: characteristic that qualifies an individual (e.g., race, profession, ...). It’s objective Identity category: social group in which an individual can place herself (e.g., muslim workers). It depends on the country EXAMPLE Take two cleavages: e.g., religion and class • 50% Christian, 50% Muslim • 50% Poor, 50% Middle class and rich In the first case there should be 4 parties: party of poor Christians, party of poor Muslims, party of rich Christians, party of rich Muslims. Political Science, Arianna Fracchia 2022 55 A DRAW TO UNDERSTAND SQ= status quo P= preferences A=agent 1_ This delegation is successful because the distance between P and the point after the delegation (which is the agent A) is less then the previous distance between P and Status Quo 2_ This is the optimal delegation where agent and preferences are the same 3_ This delegation is unsuccessful because the distance between P and A is higher than P and previous SQ (agency loss) PROBLEMS Agency loss can emerge because P has incomplete and asymmetric information about A’s type and A’s actions. Two problems: • Adverse selection • Moral hazard ADVERSE SELECTION Term comes from related literature on insuranceà Intuition: only people who are already sick get health insurance In politics, related to attracting “bad” officeholders (no complete information on the “type” of agent). There is the risk to delegate to the wrong person because we do not have complete information. Agent (politician) knows her type (e.g., public-spirited or rent-seeking) but P (voters) do not. For example, only the greediest (più avidi) are attracted to political office. MORAL HAZARD Term comes from related literature on insuranceà Intuition: once I have theft insurance (risk), I can stop locking the car (riskier behavior). There is a distortion of the presence of insurance. In political agency, related to “rents” officeholders can extract. Principal does not fully observe what done by agent. In this case loss (distance between preferences and agent is not quantifiable) à Once I am in office, I can use official role for own benefit Political Science, Arianna Fracchia 2022 56 In complex situation, P has no expectation about what A should do, A is free to do whatever she wants MECHANISMS TO REDUCE INFORMATION ASSYMMETRIES Ex ante mechanisms → Mitigate adverse selection o Political campaigns o Debates between candidates o Candidates’ background (e.g., educational attainment) publicly available Ex post mechanisms → Mitigate moral hazard o Police patrol systems: the principals (voters) direct monitor the agents’ actions (for example through a website) o Fire alarm systems: it relies on third party information to learn about A’s activity o Creating rules that Agents must follow; they have to motivate their choices and decisions to a Parliament BETWEEN EX ANTE AND EX POST: ELECTIONS Elections are a tool to reduce political accountability problems. One single binary instrument to pursue • Ideological representation: those who govern represent the ideology whose voted for them • Selection of best representatives. Often voting just to choose the “best” Reward (punish) good (bad) behavior Note: reduce not eliminate PA problems. In fact, behavior still be partially observed, and selection still be conditional on information on politicians’ type. SANCTIONING VS SELOECTION Sanctioning is retrospective: based on past behavior, I either vote for incumbent or choose (one of the) challenger(s) Selection is prospective: based on what I know now, do I want to choose a challenger or keep what I have? Notice tension: the more I discipline politicians, the less I can select them The aim of institutions/mechanisms to avoid agency loss can limit our ability to see the true type of agents. If I let them “show their true nature” I can weed them out. Discipline also means “they pretend to be good to be re-elected” (new streets before elections) Closed-list PR or SMD where candidate is nominated by party limit selection WHAT IS “GOOD BEHAVIOR”? Rules to decide what’s good behavior based on which I’ll punish or reward politician, have some issues: Political Science, Arianna Fracchia 2022 57 o If a rule is too strict → rule will be ignored (“take the money and run”) o If a rule is too tolerant → we will end with more corruption (or “slacking”) than otherwise possible Individual voters do not decide alone: need social norm of what good behavior is • Is threat credible? what if challenger is horrible? • More general: how do I pre-commit? • What if great candidate shows up? Best for me to ignore commitment To keep politician accountable (selection and sanctioning), need info on behavior. These are all be mechanisms to reduce information asymmetries • Role of media (as politician’s performance not directly observed) o Media freedom is a complement of electoral control • Judicial oversight ( anti-corruption prosecutors) o If we cannot punish them in election, punish them in court • Independent anti-corruption agencies very popular o Under-appreciated, though, is they are not themselves monitored by anyone... o Who over sees the over seers? Term limits are very popular with voters: • Time in office→ Power→ Distribute Rents • Focus more on policy than career But if accountability matters, then best behavior with infinite re-election CURRUPTION Corruption is a consequence of moral hazard (hidden actions hard to observe for P); basically, it is the private use of public office. There are many varieties of corruption: 1. Bureaucratic corruption: bureaucrat gets paid for service o without theft: get payment on top of official price o with theft: pocket money that should go to government 2. Political corruption: elected politician pockets money o $$for decision o Kickbacks from procurement contracting o More naïve appropriation of budgeted resources Similarity between political corruption (illegal) and lobbying (legal). In fact, not all “bad policy” is corruption Political Science, Arianna Fracchia 2022 60 EXAMPLE W e want to move the status quo. Everything inside the circle is better than what is outside or on the indifference line. So , if the policy changes the new point will be inside the little space that Senate and House have in common In this case between the three ideal points the policy can be inside the set . There is space for improvement In the third case there are not policies preferable to the status quo. Because they would be less indifferent to at least one of the three actors Core winset Political Science, Arianna Fracchia 2022 61 ABSORBED VETO PLAYERS N of veto players generally reduces the winset of status quo → policy change less likely with increasing number of players ...unless there are absorbed veto players. veto players with ideal point in core (nucleo). Notice in one dimension core is a segment connecting veto players hence only most extreme players’ matter. In two dimension the core is the polygon that connects all the ideal points of the agents. In general: • 1 veto player → policy always changes to reflect party preferences • More than 1 veto players → policy change if SQ not “between” them (in their core) The larger the core, more likely SQ is in it. So, it’s less likely policy changes. (Empirical prediction: large distance between veto players → policy change less likely) Link policy stability with configuration of veto players Heterogeneous preferences → nothing gets done (for example Obama vs Republican-controlled Congress) AGENDA SETTING Number and preferences of veto players determine policy change. But what kind of change? Where do we place the proposal on the policy space? In which direction do we move SQ? Some veto players have agenda-setting power: take-it- orleave-it proposals to the other players. In politics generally the agenda setter is the prime minister (as in the graph example) Agenda setters can pick the point in the winset of the status quo that is closest to their ideal point. Notice power of agenda-setter • Make proposal, picking one point from winset of status quo • Smaller winset → less leeway for agenda setter • Hence more heterogeneous veto players →less power to agenda setter Simple algorithm to model reform cycles/dynamic policy change 1. Is status quo in core? Political Science, Arianna Fracchia 2022 62 2. If yes, do nothing; if no, pick new policy from winset 3. Policy implemented, becomes new status quo 4. Go back to step 1 Differences between winset and core: • The winset tells the potential status quo that improves the utility of both actors, where the policy should be. • The core tells the unbeatable status quo. If the status quo is inside the core (and also inside the winset), there is no policy that is better than it. Political Science, Arianna Fracchia 2022 65 Which parties will form coalition? Many possible coalitions: who gets to choose first? Formateur: o often choice explicitly reserved to head of state o constitutional customs: leader of largest party is formateur Problems of power sharing: o need to compromise on ideological grounds o need to share power with other parties OFFICE-SEEKING Let’s assume that politicians just want to maximize powerà Office-seeking: a party wants to control as many ministerial portfolios as possible Some given amount of power to be divided between various parties in coalition. So formateur should seek smallest party (or collection of parties) that insures 50% +1 votes in legislature Prediction is formation of minimum winning coalition (MWC) EXAMPLE We have 5 parties from extreme left to extreme right Head of state appoints party A as formateur because A has largest vote share. Minimum winning coalition with party D (No matter the ideological differences, Left party forms coalition government with centre-right party. They choose the weakest party which ensures legislative majority and largest control of ministerial portfolios POLITICIANS WITH IDEOLOGY Politicians care about policy: so, coalition bargaining leads to policy in between ideal points of coalition partners. There is compromise with parties with different ideological position costly à Coalitions will form along ideological lines “Compact” or “connected” coalition: only include ideologically contiguous parties Additional (mild) prediction: among all connected (that contain formateur) pick the smallest Political Science, Arianna Fracchia 2022 66 EXAMPLE The decision between having a coalition between one party or another is taken depending on the situation (how far is the left or how similar is the center) SPECIAL TYPES OF CABINETS 1)Minority government: cabinet parties control less than 50%; other party or parties in legislature supports “from the outside”: they behave like that because in this way they won’t be responsible for bad policies. 2)Oversized: coalition members control much more than 50% (“Grand Coalition” and “National Unity”). Rationale of having oversized coalitions: in MWC, small partners have disproportionate bargaining power o if they leave → coalition government falls o by bringing in more than one junior partner, defuse threat of exit → reduce bargaining power of small partners EXAMPLE of SPAIN Consider this scenario happened in Spain in 2015 Political Science, Arianna Fracchia 2022 67 SUMMING UP Central role of formateur: (usually) largest party gets to pick its partner(s). The Gamson’s law establishes that allocation of ministries should be proportional to size of partners. Coalitions: • Minimum winning coalition: pick the smallest that gets you above 50% (office motivated) • Compact coalition: pick neighbor parties (policy motivated) • Combining with minimum winning coalition (MWC) logic: pick the smallest ideological neighbor(s) “Anomalous” coalition governments: • Minority government: govern with less than (explicit) support of 50% • Grand coalition: assemble much more than 50% (neutralize small partners) HOW PARLIAMNETARY GOVERNMENTS TERMINATE Legislative responsibility: legislative majority has constitutional power to remove a government from office without a causa → motion of no-confidence, if it passes government resigns (note this doesn’t necessarily lead to new elections). There are several ways to terminate a government. Remember governments in parliamentary systems do not have fixed term Prime minister ousted: • bill with confidence provision fails • no-confidence votes • party-driven replacement (e.g., because of growing discontent in society; factional conflict) • intra-coalition failure Important that government instability is different from inexperienced ministers (for example, first republic Italy: very short-lived cabinets, always the same faces for decades). Being part of institutional design (constitution), cabinet instability is not pathology CONFIDENCE PROVISIONS Legislative majority proposes a billà Prime minister wants different bill. He can send proposal to legislature with “confidence provision” (disposizione di fiducia). A down vote on PM’s proposal → automatic resignation of PM which entails: • start procedure to select PM • or have new election Take-it-or-leave-it offer: if vote No, might face re-election (and lose, possibly) Two sides to this: o force members of legislative majority to “swallow” possibly disliked bill o PM relieves legislators from responsibility for possibly unpopular policy (“bitter medicine”) Legislators can claim they opposed the bill, but they are loyal to PM because they didn’t want to cause political crisis. Political Science, Arianna Fracchia 2022 70 CABINET FORMATION President does not have a need for legislative majority to stay in office, but it helps. Different types of coalitions: • portfolio coalition: give departments/ministries to party-affiliated members • legislative coalition: count of other parties’ support to pass policies Minority governments (just president’s party) very common in presidential systems. But coalitions also common (albeit less common than in parliamentary settings). However, they are less stable in presidential settings (it’s less risky for presidents to lose a coalition partner compared to parliamentary systems where cabinet depends on legislature. The president can kick them off) LEGISLATIVE DECREES To pass legislation there are rules to follow: a legislative process. Legislative decrees issued by presidents have same power of legislation but follow special procedure which do not involve legislature. In this case legislative decrees are: • in force from moment when they are issued • valid unless legislature repeals them • often renewable Unless majority unified in opposition to decree, president decides content of legislationà the initial “status quo” can be wiped out by decree EXAMPLE President Menem of Argentina issued up to 85 decrees per year. Only less than 5% explicitly repealed by legislature and for around 90% of them, legislature does nothing. The reason behind these actions is that making amendments is costly, Presidents can take advantage of that (and conceal favors or corruption). PRESIDENTIALISM AND REGIME SURVIVAL Presidential systems are frail mainly because: • democracy under presidentialism has shorter life • presidential democracies are more likely to experience military coups than parliamentary democracies These considerations lead to problems with reverse causality: does presidentialism make democracy frail? Or do frail democracies choose presidentialism? à Systematic evidence: democratic survival (probability of democracy next year given democracy this year) significantly much lower in presidential systems. Why? 1. Rigidity of the system to party 2. Societal fragmentation and divisions Many problems of presidentialism emerge with multiple parties: they lead to a legislative fragmentation and inter-party conflictà instability. But type of instability varies: Political Science, Arianna Fracchia 2022 71 • cabinet instability in parliamentary • regime instability in presidential (they are more likely to behave like authoritarian regime) REGIME INSTABILITY Division between executive and legislature leads to inability to implement policy. President might be highly unpopular, but he cannot be removed using political meansà Immobilism might create mass unrest or elite anxiety No constitutional means to solve the crisis → policy crisis turns into regime crisis SEMI PRESIDENTIALISM Semi-presidential with two sub-species: 1. Premier-presidential: the prime minister and cabinet are collectively responsible solely to the legislature a. President has little power and cannot remove the prime minister b. Parliamentary systems + popularly elected president but executive power rests with government (PM + cabinet) 2. President-parliamentary: the prime minister and cabinet are collectively responsible to both the legislature and the president a. President has power to remove PM/government b. Legislative responsibility & presidential responsibility Because there are separate elections for president and legislature, if party of president doesn’t have legislative majority → cohabitation: prime minister party is different from president party Political Science, Arianna Fracchia 2022 72 FEDERAL ISM DEFINITION Federalism can be fully understood as a continuum moving from complete centralization to full decentralization. Federal States can be: 1. Federal in structure (de jure= legally): constitutional provisions referring to the federal organization of the state à federalism 2. Federal in practice (de facto): decentralized organization of the state without formal reference to federation à decentralization FEDERALISM IN STRUCTURE To be classified as federalist in structure, three structural criteria o Geopolitical division: country divided in mutually exclusive subnational governments recognized in constitution and that cannot be unilaterally abolished by central government. To change the prerogative there are strict procedures in which are involved both the central government and the subnational states. o Independence: subnational and central governments have independent bases of authority (independent elections), independence in government but also in civilization o Direct governance: authority is shared by both central and subnational governments (each citizen is governed by at least two authorities) Sovereignty is split between at least two territorial levels. Clearly delineated scope of authority that cannot be trespassed: some policy domains only for states. There are institutions to protect balance of power (e.g., complicated rules for constitutional amendment) Difference between federation and confederation: in federation there are the states and then at the top an institution that typically has the sovereignty, while in confederation the institution at the top has just a regulation aim. DECENTRALIZATION/FEDERALISM IN PRACTICE There are very few federations according to de jure/structural definition. However, many countries assign federal-like powers to subnational unitsà not properly federal as sovereignty only at center. For example, Spain, UK (devolved governments), Italy, India Decentralization= the total share of power between partsà federalism in practice • Sovereignty is at center, but subnational governments have the authority to make policies autonomously • Continuum, not a yes/no Political Science, Arianna Fracchia 2022 75 Subnational units cede authority to central government. They need safeguards against exploitation by center and by other units INSTITUTIONS: • constitutional provisions protecting the authority of subnational governments • supreme/constitutional court safeguarding the laws are compliant with constitution • majority/supermajority of units to alter constitution and distribution of power • malapportioned legislatures= generally one of the two chambers in parliament does not represent the population but representing a subnational unit (e.g., U.S. Senate or German Bundesrat) Representation in federal systems based on combination of population and territory o Lower chamber based on 1 person/1 vote o Malapportioned upper chamber based on 1 state/1 vote (regardless of population size) Upper chamber: precise arrangements vary but could be placed along this continuum 1. just a duplicate of lower house 2. elected in districts coincident with subnational units, no malapportionment (e.g., Italy) 3. elected in districts coincident with subnational units, equal representation of subnational units (e.g., contemporary US) 4. appointed by subnational governments (e.g., Germany where the MPs are directly appointed by subnational government) EXAMPLE Examples of malapportionment: o Smallest US state: Wyoming, 590.000 inhabitants → 2 senators o Largest US state: California, 40 millions → 2 senators o Smallest German Land: Bremen, 680.000 inhabitants → 3 votes in Bundesrat o Largest German Land: North Rhine-Westphalia, 18 millions → 6 votes in Bundesrat Constitutional amendments by supermajority: • Amendments to US Constitution need ratification by two thirds of state legislatures • Amendments to German Basic Law need approval of 2/3 of upper chamber EUROPEAN UNION AS A BARGAINED FEDERALISM EU has all the elements of a coming-together federalism • Union of already sovereign entities • Negotiated allocation of powers to center • EU parliament as lower chamber • Council of ministers as malapportioned upper chamber: o Just 4 countries (at least 35% of EU population) can veto Political Science, Arianna Fracchia 2022 76 o Need supermajority: 15 countries (of 27) and at least 65% of population o Unanimity for taxation, foreign policy, admitting new members BENEFITS AND COSTS Benefits 1. Better for market economy 2. Accountability 3. Information: the government is closer to me and my area, so it’s easier to observe the effects 4. Prevents tyranny and “improper and wicked” policies Costs 1. Collective action problems 2. More veto players 3. Duplications and overspending 4. Lack of clarity of responsibility 5. Overgrazing corruption 1)MARKET-PRESERVING FEDERALISMJ Main concern is excessive intervention of state in economic activity. To be market-preserving, federalism must have multiple levels with delineated scope and self-enforcing autonomy, but also: • regulation of economy in hands of subnational units • common market: the consumer can decide where to go to buy a product • hard budget constraint for subnational units Competition between subnational units is the key-concept because if they can compete, they are stimulated to provide the best condition. Constrain ability to regulate à Capital and labor move if government places limits or expropriates More general: productive factors move where the mix of taxation, regulation, and public good provisions is their preferred level. Accommodate heterogeneity of preferences across citizenà (implicit:) factors must be willing to relocate 2&3)INCREASED ACCOUNTABILITYJ It brings government “closer to the people”à Informational advantage: easier to monitor close to home. Bottom-up accountability brought by firms, and citizens, can “vote with their feet” or move to another state if state government does not supply public goods or engages in corruption. Checks and balances o unitary government unchecked if it overspends o state governments police central government o support central bank independence (to limit power of center) Political Science, Arianna Fracchia 2022 77 3)VERTICAL IMBALANCEL Subnational units might overspend, especially if most of their resources come from center rather than own taxes. In addition, raising taxes might be impossible, because of competitive pressures (race to the bottom) Central government can bail them out à Fiscal discipline is undermined 1&2)COLLECTIVE ACTION PROBLEML Empower regional politicians means undermine provision of national public goods. policy at subnational level can be in contrast with national plan; in addition, subnational units turn out to be veto players Example: • attempt to balance budget requires cutting expenditures by all subnational units → coordination problems • subnational politicians prefer to further their own career, which does not depend so much on national deficit • if one subnational unit larger than the others, “too big to fail” effect 5)CORRUPTIONL Federalism adds layers of government Blame-shifting → reduced accountability → overgrazing by corrupt politicians Overgrazing: each tier wants its share of bribes o pay bribe (tangente) to state regulator to start business o pay bribe to federal regulator to start business o without coordination among corrupt officials, total bribe paid higher