Political Science Summary, Schemi e mappe concettuali di Scienza Politica

Scarica Political Science Summary e più Schemi e mappe concettuali in PDF di Scienza Politica solo su Docsity! Political Science Summary Comparative politics -> a subfield of political science, three main definitions: 1. The study of political phenomena that are predominantly within countries (opposed to international politics -> between countries) -> the best one. 2. The study of politics in every country except the one in which the student resides. 3. The study of political phenomena through the comparative method. What is science? Science is a quest for knowledge that relies on criticism, it is a method for provisionally understanding the world. The falsifiability of scientific statements is what distinguishes them from non-scientific ones -> all scientific statements must be potentially testable. Non-falsifiable statements -> tautologies; statements about unobservable phenomena. The scientific method 1. Question -> we observe a phenomenon and we question its cause. 2. Theory -> a set of logically consistent statements that tell us why the things that we observe occur. They can also be called models and they are a simplification of the world. In order to construct them we imagine a prior world that would have produced the observation we are trying to explain. 3. Hypotheses -> implications that we deduce from the model other than those we set out to explain in the first place. Good models provide a lot of implications. 4. Testing hypotheses -> we have to evaluate whether the implications of the model are consistent with observation -> difficult tests, critical tests in order to strongly corroborate a theory. 5. Evaluation -> if we observe the implications deduce from our theory, our theory is corroborated (not right); if we fail to observe the implications deduced then our theory is wrong. Valid and invalid arguments Argument -> a set of logically connected statements in the form of a set of premises (statement presumed to be true) and a conclusion (claim thought to be supported by the premises). - Valid argument -> accepting the premises compels us to accept the conclusion. - Invalid argument -> accepting the premises, we are free to accept or reject the conclusion. Categorical syllogisms 1. Major premise -> ‘If P (antecedent), then Q (consequent)’ 2. Minor premise -> claim about the antecedent or the consequent. 3. Conclusion -> claim thought to be supported by the premises. 1. Affirming the antecedent -> valid argument. 2. Denying the antecedent -> invalid argument. 3. Affirming the consequent -> invalid argument. 4. Denying the consequent -> valid argument. In testing theories, we may have: - Deductive learning -> theory than observations. - Inductive learning -> observations that generate a theory. The comparative, or Mill’s method It is an inductive method that represent a systematic search for necessary, sufficient and necessary or sufficient conditions. - Necessary condition -> a condition in whose absence the event cannot occur. - Sufficient condition -> a condition in whose presence the event must occur. Mill’s method of agreement -> the cases agree on the phenomenon to be explained -> e.g. data only about democracies. Mill’s method of difference -> the cases differ on the phenomenon to be explained -> e.g. data about democracies and dictatorships. Nevertheless, for Mill’s method to be valid we have to assume that casual processes are deterministic (a deterministic cause is one that always leads to the specific outcome) and that all the possible causes work independently of each other -> Mill’s method tells us what happens but not why something happens. Failed state -> a state-like entity that cannot coerce and is unable to successfully control the inhabitants of a given territory (e.g. Somalia, Syria). Two views of the state 1. Contractarian view of the state 2. Predatory view of the state Contractarian view of the state It implies a thought experiment -> what would life be without the state, in the State of Nature. People in the state of nature face a dilemma -> ‘without a common power to keep them all in awe’ (Hobbes), the people will choose to steal and kill. Through the State of Nature game, we can see that in the State of Nature the Nash Equilibrium (when both players are playing best reply, the action that yields the highest payoff given what the other player is doing) is that both individuals steal (Steal; Steal). Actually, each player has a dominant strategy to steal (to steal is the best reply to all of the other player’s strategies) -> dominant strategy NE. What is weird about this equilibrium is that the NE is the second worst outcome for both players who would actually be better off if they chose to refrain, however the promise to forbear is not credible because both players have an incentive to steal. Hobbes’ solution to this was the creation of the state, of a sovereign to whom people would transfer power and their natural rights in exchange for protection -> social contract. The sovereign would be able to punish non-cooperative behavior -> in order for the presence of the sovereign to be effective, p (punishment) must be bigger than 1 -> the individuals now have an incentive to cooperate. In exchange for the protection and the punishments the state provides, it asks the citizen some form of taxation -> people will decide to leave or remain in the state of nature depending on the tax rate the state offers. People will leave the State of Nature if: - p > 1 (punishment must be sufficiently large). - t < 1 (taxation must be sufficiently small). Can cooperation occur in the state of nature? Cooperation is possible in the state of nature if the State of Nature game is infinitely repeated. - Discount factor (δ) -> it tells how much people care about the future (δ = 0 -> now; δ = 1 -> future) - Present value of stream of benefits -> it is the worth of something right now divided by (1 – δ) -> e.g. 5 / (1 – δ). If people in the State of Nature use, for instance, the grim trigger strategy (if you ever steal, I will always steal from this point on) and we compute the present value of ‘Refrain’ and the present value of ‘Steal’, by comparing them we will see that deciding to refrain or not will depend on the discount factor. Nevertheless, both ‘Refrain’ and ‘Steal’ are sustained as Nash Equilibria, thus relying on cooperation without the state is probably not the best thing to do. Predatory view of the state It focuses on the potential conflicts of interest that can arise between the citizens and the state. The concern for security leads states to behave like individuals in the State of Nature and to use their power to predate -> states = protection rackets (Tilly) -> the seller of security represents the key threat to the buyer’s security. State formation -> the political geography of Europe is a function of the strategies by lords to remain in power -> ‘war makes the state, states make war’ (Tilly). What states do: 1. War making -> eliminating their external rivals < thanks to weapon development and changes in the economies of scale in the use of violence. 2. State making -> eliminating internal rivals. 3. Protection -> eliminating the rivals of their clients. 4. Extraction -> acquiring the means to carry out the three previous activities => taxation, formation of an administrative machinery, bureaucracy, development of the military… Process of capital accumulation -> in order to acquire resources to invest in state making, early modern leaders often placed constraints on their ability to predate. If they predated too much people would not invest in their territories, but if they didn’t -> investments, voluntarily compliance -> leaders would get a smaller portion of a larger pie. Chapter 5: Democracy and Dictatorship - State -> entity that uses coercion and the threat of force to rule in a given territory. - Government -> the set of people who run the state. - Regime -> the set of rules, norms or institutions that determine how the government is constituted and organized. In historical perspective, democracy assumed a positive connotation only during the Age of Revolution (18th - 19th centuries), previously it was not in fact seen as a desirable form of government. Plato and Aristotle considered democracy as rule by the poor and the uneducated that who would rule just for their own interests. Plato in fact supported the idea of the philosopher king, while Aristotle viewed democracy as the degeneration of ‘politeia’ (rule by many). Democracy was also not associated with elections (linked instead to aristocracy), but with lottery. Monarchy was consistently preferred to democracy, especially in Europe, until the 18th – 19th century when a new two-way distinction between democracy and autocracy came to be widespread. In historical perspective, dictatorship had a positive connotation in Ancient Rome -> the dictator was an extraordinary Roman magistrate nominated under exceptional circumstance (especially in case of war) that stayed in charge only for the duration of the extraordinary task -> full powers of command, state of necessity, short duration of office. In order to study democracies and dictatorships we need to be able to classify them -> Dahl’s view of democracy: - Substantive view -> it classifies political regimes in terms of the outcomes they produce. Chapter 6: the economic determinants of democracy and dictatorship Classic Modernization Theory ‘Stage Theory’ development -> all societies develop through a series of stages (agriculture -> industries, services; dictatorship -> democracy) and underdeveloped countries are just at an earlier stage in this linear historical progress. Because of economic development, society becomes too complex and dictatorial forms of control lose their effectiveness. As countries develop economically, they are more likely to: - Become democratic - Remain democratic This theory also predicts that regime transitions (to democracy or dictatorship) may or may not become less likely as countries become richer. There is, in fact, a strong positive relationship between income and democracy. Income helps democratic survival because: - If you are rich, autocracy is a big gamble (you could lose everything) - If you are poor, autocracy is less of a gamble (there is a little chance that you could have everything). Survival Story Democracy is more likely to survive as countries develop and become richer, but it is not more likely to emerge. This theory also predicts that regime transitions (to democracy or dictatorship) become less likely as countries become richer. In order to distinguish between the classic modernization theory and the survival story, instead of looking at the raw number of transitions, we should look at transition probabilities, thus transitions to democracy or dictatorship adjusted for the country years in that regime, and of course wealth level, we can see that income has little effect on the probability of a regime transition -> it supports classic modernization theory. If we further compute the transitions to democracy adjusted for country years and the transitions to dictatorship adjusted for country years (both also taking into account wealth level), we can see that the kind of transition a country experiences is a function of income - > it supports classic modernization theory. Thus: - Democracy is more common in rich than poor countries - Transitions to dictatorship become less likely as income increases. - Transitions to democracy become more likely as income increases. - Regime transitions may or may not become less likely as countries become richer. - Increases in income make it more likely that a country will stay democratic. ð Classic modernization theory is corroborated. A variant of modernization theory According to this variant, it is not income per se that encourages democratization, but rather the changes in the socioeconomic structure that accompany increases in income, specifically a shift from a focus on agriculture to a focus on manufacturing and services. The state, in fact, can really tax or predate only those assets that they can observe or count -> when wealth moved from land-owners to merchants, bankers and industrialists, it became more difficult to tax because this new gentry could now hide their more mobile (in contrast to land) assets. Thus, in return for paying their taxes, the economic elites demanded limits to state predation -> this produced with time the supremacy of Parliament over the Crown and limited and democratic government. This is exactly what happened in England: - Parliamentarians have mobile assets and a credible threat of exit (E > 0). - The Crown is dependent on the Parliamentarians (L > 1). ð Rich democracy. In France, instead: - Parliamentarians do not have mobile assets and a credible threat of exit (E < 0). - The Crown is dependent on the Parliamentarians (L > 1). ð No democratization, rich dictatorship. Furthermore, when also the state is autonomous (L < 1) (e.g. its revenues are mainly derived from natural resources and not taxation): - If elites have credible exit threats -> poor dictatorship (the elites will exit). - If elites do not have credible exit threats -> rich dictatorship (elites will stay). Thus, we expect democracy to emerge only when: - The state is dependent. - The elites have credible exit threats. Thus, the fact that the elites on whom the state depends must have credible exit threats is fundamental for the emergence of democracy, however there are economies where these threats of exit are limited, these are economies based on quasi-rents -> a quasi-rent is the difference between an asset’s value in its best-case scenario usage and its value in its second-best case scenario usage. When this difference is high you have a quasi-rent -> e.g. oil wells, copper mines -> immobile assets. When the difference is instead low -> mobile assets. ð It’s not just the mobility of the asset, but also the type of asset that determines its value and a possible threat of exit. Resource curse Democracy is therefore less likely to emerge and survive in countries whose economies depend heavily on things likely oil production or mineral extraction. Countries with an abundance on natural resources tend to experience things like poor governance, low levels of economic development, civil wars and dictatorships. Natural resources help dictators because: - They do not have to raise high taxes that would lead to demands for representation by the people. - Natural resources revenues allow dictators to buy the military’s support. - Citizens have little information about the country’s finances. - Protestantism -> highly compatible -> connection to capitalism, individualism and development. However, these theses are often problematic because nearly all religions have doctrinal elements that make them both compatible and incompatible with democracy, it is often religious leaders that influence the attitudes of religion to democracy and not the doctrine per se, furthermore there is growing evidence that cultures are malleable and constructed. Another important problem lies in the fact that people often associate certain religions/cultures to a particular type of regime because they are analyzing the situation of the world in that point in time -> e.g. in the 1930s it would have seemed that Europe was not compatible with democracy. In fact, if we analyze the data for the emergence of democracy, we can see that, accounting for factors such as oil production, income levels and economic growth: - Having a Muslim or Protestant majority does not affect the emergence of democracy. - Ethnic, religious and cultural diversity do not appear to impede or aid the emergence of democracy. - However -> countries predominantly Catholic are more likely to become democracies. For the survival of democracy: - Having a Muslim majority does not harm democratic survival. - Having a Protestant majority is good for democratic survival. - Having a Catholic majority is bad for democratic survival (Latin America). - Ethnic and cultural (but not religious) diversity seems to be bad for democratic survival. The Ultimatum Game and the Dictator Game Ultimatum Game -> the proposer is given a divisible pie (money), he/she has to make an offer to the responder. If the responder (knowing the offer and the size of the pie) the pie takes the offer, the proposer keeps the rest, if he/she refuses, nobody gets anything. Dictator Game -> same as the ultimatum game but the responder cannot refuse the offer and he/she gets what the proposer wants. Theoretically we would think that people would behave in a rational way (homo economicus), however, peoples’ cultural backgrounds influence their behavior (in industrialized societies as in small-scale societies) -> players seem to care about fairness and reciprocity. How people interact with each other and other families clearly affect their behavior in the game. There are two important factors: - Payoffs to cooperation -> how important it is in a group to cooperate in economic production with non-immediate kin. - Market integration -> how much people rely on market exchange in their everyday lives. The higher these values are, the higher the cooperation -> higher mean offers. if we see democracy as a ‘game’ that individuals must play, some cultures will find it easier to support it because the individuals in those cultures will have analogous games in their everyday lives that make it beneficial and easier for them to play the democracy game. Thus culture, a shared way of playing games, may well affect the emergence and survival of democracy. Chapter 8: democratic transitions Huntington’s three waves of democratization: 1. 1828 – 1926 -> Age of Revolution – after WWI 2. 1943 – 1962 -> countries that lost WWII 3. 1974 – today -> Greece, Spain, Portugal, Latin America. 1. External imposition E.g. US invasion of Iraq. There is still little research on this topic, but some studies suggest that these types of intervention may promote democratic reform in the short run but ultimately produce political instability. More precisely, intervention by the UN or dictatorial states -> reduction in democracy. Intervention by democracies -> trappings of democracy (elections, legislature…) but not actual democratic regimes. 2. Bottom-up transition E.g. East Germany 1989 Bottom-up transition are the result of popular revolts, unrest or revolutions. However, they can also be intertwined with top-down transitions and an intent of the dictatorial leaders to reform the system (e.g. Gorbachev -> perestroika, glasnost). Collective action theory Collective action concerns the pursuit of public goods by a group of individuals. Public goods are: - Non-excludable -> everyone gets to enjoy the good. - Non-rivalrous -> if someone gets to consume the good, there is still just as much for everyone else. Public goods are desirable, but -> collective action problem, free-rider problem -> the decision to not participate in a costly protest is very appealing: if the pro-democracy rally fails, I did not pay the costs of the protest, if it succeeds, I get to free ride on the participation of others. Individuals often have little incentive to contribute to the provision of a public good that will benefit all the members of the group. There are only two possible equilibria: - No one participates - Exactly K people participate For a pro-democracy rally to succeed, exactly K individuals must believe that they and only they are likely to participate -> they need to believe that their participation is crucial to the success of the protest, otherwise they will not participate either because they think no one will participate or because they think a lot of people will and so their participation is not crucial. Two factors are crucial for determining the likely success of collective action: - The difference between N and K: If K = N there is no incentive to free ride and everyone will participate. If K < N there is an incentive to free ride. The larger the difference between K and N, the greater the incentive to free ride. Chapter 9: democracy or dictatorship? Does democracy make a difference? Economic growth 1. Protection of property rights Claim: democracies have higher economic growth because they are characterized by the rule of law and the protection of property rights. Empirical evidence is weak -> rule of law is linked to economic growth, however, democracy is not directly linked to rule of law. Why democracies might fail to protect property rights -> Meltzer-Richard model In a simple tax-transfer system, rich people are net contributors, while poor people are net beneficiaries. Since poor people have higher representation in democracies, according to this model, democracies will impose higher taxes not allowing the rich to invest -> slow economic growth. Two criticisms to the Meltzer-Richard model - Poor people are less likely to vote than rich people. - Structural dependence of the state on capital (Marxist argument) -> capitalists have a veto over state policies because if they do not invest, state managers will have major problems -> the state is less keen to tax capitalists rather than workers. 2. Consumption versus investment Claim: democracy encourages workers to immediately consume their assets rather than invest them -> the poor has to eat and pay their rent today and since they can vote, they encourage government policy to redistribute assets away from investment to consumption. If instead dictators are future-oriented they can force people to save. The fact that poor people have a higher propensity to consume than the rich is corroborated by the data, but is economic growth driven primarily by capital investment? Why would dictators care about the future? 3. Autonomy from special interests Claim: dictators are not subjected to as many pressures from special interests as democratic leaders -> democratic leaders should be because they can easily be voted out of office. However, some political scientists say that autonomy is good for economic growth and others that it is bad: ð Politics and institutions do matter, but regimes do not capture the relevant differences in economic growth. By looking at the data of other measures of material well-being we can see a triangular pattern -> democracies seem to be doing good, but there is great variance in dictatorships. Chapter 10: varieties of dictatorship Types of dictatorships - Monarchy -> it relies on kin and family networks -> very stable. - Military dictatorship -> it is often ruled by committee or junta -> often unstable, relying on military support is very dangerous, the biggest threat to the stability of military dictatorships is more military coups, but they may also become civilian dictatorships or democracies. - Civilian dictatorship -> quite stable but may collapse into military dictatorships if the leader asks the military to help them. o Dominant-party dictatorship -> one party dominates office and control over policy. o Personalistic dictatorship -> the leader controls all policy decision and selection of regime personnel; parties and the military are purposely weakened. Personality cults alter the beliefs of the citizens and help the leader stay in power because public belief of outrageous stories can represent credible signals of support. A further classification of civilian dictatorships: - Electoral authoritarianism (mixed regimes) -> elections are held (for dictators to stabilize their rule), but democratic norms are violated (no ex ante uncertainty or ex post certainty) o Hegemonic electoral authoritarian regimes -> the leader’s party wins with overwhelming majorities. o Competitive authoritarian regimes -> opposition parties win substantial minorities. - Politically closed authoritarian regimes o Dominant-party dictatorships o Personalistic dictatorships However, there are some criticisms regarding this further classification due to the great variation of elections. The two dictators’ dilemmas - Problem of authoritarian control -> threats from the masses (repress or co-opt). - Problem of authoritarian power -> threats from the elites with whom the dictator shares power (institutionalize or ignore). Selectorate theory This theory allows us to understand the good performance of democratic regimes and the differences between those of dictatorial ones. Basic assumptions: political leaders are motivated by their desire to gain and maintain office. Some environments in which leaders struggle to survive in office, encourage them to behave in a way that benefits society, other environments encourage them to behave in a way that benefits only themselves and a few others. Crucial elements: - Selectorate (S) -> the people who can play a role in selecting a leader. Problematic -> the one who sets the agenda is behaving like a dictator because they can influence the result; an agenda generates strategic voting -> strategic actors think ahead and reason backwards: an actor may not vote for their most preferred option in the first round because they know that if they did, this would produce their worst outcome in the final round. Through an agenda setter, then, stability is achieved at the sacrifice of fairness. - Stability through preference restrictions: Median Voter Theorem Assumptions: o Contest between two alternatives o Single-issue dimension o Odd number of voters -> without it there is no median voter o Single-peaked preferences -> voters have an ideal point in the policy space and experience a decline in utility as policy moves away from that space. o Voters vote sincerely -> no abstentions, no strategic voting. A proposal equal to the median voter’s ideal point is the only stable outcome -> we found a Condorcet winner but with restrictions on preferences. Chaos Theorem In a two-dimensional example there is always an alternative preferred by a majority of the representatives => no equilibrium, no Condorcet winner. - Chaos Theorem: in a two or more issue dimensions and three or more voters with preferences in the issue space who all vote sincerely, there will be no Condorcet winner. Arrow’s impossibility theorem The pathologies of majority rule apply to any group decision procedure that wants to meet the following minimal standards of fairness: - Non-dictatorship condition -> no individual that fully determines the outcome of the group-decision making (related to the agenda setter). - Universal admissibility condition -> individuals can adopt any rational preference ordering (related to the Median Voter Theorem) - Independence from irrelevant alternatives condition (related to the Borda Count). - Unanimity condition -> if all individuals in a group prefer x to y, then the group preference must reflect the same preference. Arrow proved that it is impossible to meet all four of these fairness conditions while simultaneously guaranteeing that the group be able to make rational decisions. If we accept the unanimity condition and the independence from irrelevant alternatives condition as given => institutional trilemma, to satisfy two of the following conditions, we have to give up one of them: - Group transitivity - Non-dictatorship condition - Universal admissibility condition Thus, there is always a trade-off between fairness and the ability to decide. Chapter 12: parliamentary, presidential and semi-presidential democracies Democracies can be classified into three types: parliamentary, presidential, semi- presidential. This classification is based on the relationship that exists between: - The government - The legislature - The president (if there is one) Two main questions: 1. Is the government responsible to the elected legislature? No -> presidential democracy. Yes -> parliamentary or semi-presidential. Here it is fundamental the concept of legislative responsibility -> a legislative majority has the constitutional power to remove a government from office without cause through a vote of no confidence. A successful vote of no confidence will bring about new bargaining processes between parties or new elections. Constructive vote of no confidence -> the majority that plans to bring down the government must also indicate who will replace it. Vote of confidence -> initiated by the government; it can be attached to a bill. 2. Is the head of State popularly elected to a fixed term? No -> parliamentary Yes -> semi-presidential Thus: - Presidential democracy -> the government does not depend on a legislative majority to exist. - Parliamentary democracy -> the government depends only on a legislative majority to exist. - Semi-presidential democracy -> the government depends on a legislative majority and the Head of State is popularly elected. Making and breaking governments in parliamentary democracies Government = executive branch = PM + Cabinet PM -> chief executive and head of government. Cabinet -> composed of ministers that head the various government departments. - Ministerial responsibility -> cabinet members must bear ultimate responsibility for what happens in their ministry. - Collective cabinet responsibility -> ministers must publicly support collective cabinet decisions or resign. New governments forms: - Following elections. - Following the resignation of the current government. 1. Surplus majority governments may be common in times of crisis -> governments of national unity. 2. Surplus majority governments may be required to change the constitution. 3. Strategic approach -> no single party could unilaterally threaten to bring down the government. Pre-electoral coalitions A pre-electoral coalition is a collection of parties that do not compete independently at election time. Pre-electoral coalitions might help parties win more votes or seats and provide the new government with increased legitimacy -> they allow voters to identify government alternatives at election time. Government ending - Technical reasons -> beyond the control of the government (death of the PM, constitutionally mandated elections). - Discretionary reasons -> political reasons (vote of no confidence, calling early elections). Endogenous election timing It refers to situations in which the government gets to choose when an election occurs (otherwise -> exogenous election timing) during the maximum amount of time allowed between elections. Three different stories that explain the timing of elections: - Political surfing -> the government waits until the economic conditions are right before calling an election. - Political business cycle -> the government actively manipulates the economy to engineer a short-term economic high and call for an election that will be followed by an economic decline. - Signaling story -> the government calls early elections prior to an expected economic decline -> risky. Making and breaking governments in presidential democracies Government = executive branch = President + Cabinet President -> political chief executive, head of government, head of state. Government formation The president is always the formateur and can appoint and dismiss whomever they want to the cabinet. The government cannot be dismissed by the legislature. If a government formation process fails in a parliamentary democracy -> new round of bargaining/elections; in a presidential democracy -> the president’s party rules on its own, the BATNA (‘best alternative to a negotiated agreement’) is that the president still remains in charge. Minority governments are more frequent in presidential democracies -> it does not need the implicit support of a legislative majority. Coalition governments are frequent in presidential democracies when the president cares about policy, they do not have strong decree power and their party does not control a legislative majority. Composition of presidential cabinets Governments in presidential regimes have more nonpartisan ministers than those in parliamentary democracies. Presidents allocate cabinet portfolios in a less proportional way than prime ministers. However, presidents with weak decree power, whose parties in the legislature are small and with low level of party discipline, exhibit cabinets that are much more similar to parliamentary ones -> they rely on winning the support of the opposition to pass their legislation. Making and breaking governments in semi-presidential democracies - Premier-presidential -> the president has no power to remove the government; there is legislative responsibility but no presidential responsibility. It functions like a parliamentary democracy. - President-parliamentary -> the president can remove the government; there are both legislative and presidential responsibility. Government = PM + Cabinet Executive branch = Government + President Cohabitation -> a president from one political bloc and a PM from another -> the government still has to enjoy the support of a legislative majority. Government formation It is in between that of a parliamentary and of a presidential democracy. When the president’s party controls a legislative majority, it looks like a presidential democracy. When the president’s party does not control a legislative majority, it looks like a parliamentary democracy. Delegation theory Delegation -> it occurs when one person or group (principal) relies on another person or group (agent) to act on the principal’s behalf. Delegation advantages: - Benefit from the expertise of others. - Reduction of personal costs and effort. Delegation problems: - Agency loss -> the difference between the actual consequence of delegation and what the consequence would have been had the agent been perfect (had they voted in the exact way of the principal). - Adverse selection -> principals can’t observe whether the agent has the right preferences or skills. - Moral hazard -> principals don’t have complete information about the agent’s actions. Possible solutions to delegation problems: - Ex ante mechanisms o Screening -> competition among candidates (elections). o Selection -> agents have to choose an action that reveals their type. In a List PR system, each party presents a list of candidates for a multimember district. - Electoral formulas -> used to determine how many seats each party wins according to votes. o Quotas -> the quota indicates the number of votes that guarantees a party a seat in a particular electoral district. Hare quota -> valid votes / seats. Droop quota -> valid votes / (seats + 1). In order to allocate the unallocated seats: • Largest remainder method (more proportional). • Highest average remainder method (more majoritarian). • Modified highest average remainder method. o Divisors -> a divisor or highest average system divides the total number of votes won by each party in a district by a series of numbers (divisors) to obtain quotients. District seats are then allocated according to which parties have the highest quotients. D’Hondt -> 1, 2, 3, 4 Sainte-Lague -> 1, 3, 5, 7 - District magnitude -> the number of representatives that can be elected in a district. The larger the district magnitude, the greater the degree of proportionality. - Electoral thresholds -> the minimum percentage of votes that a party must win to gain representation. When the electoral threshold is high, the proportionality is low. o Formal threshold -> legally imposed to avoid legislative fragmentation. o Natural threshold -> mathematical property of the electoral system. - Types of party list o Closed party list -> the seats are allocated according to the order of the party list -> the party holds considerable power, high level of party discipline. o Open party list -> the seats are allocated according to whichever party candidates win the most votes -> personal vote. o Free party list -> panachage: the ability to vote for candidates from different party lists; cumulation: the capacity to give more than one vote to a single candidate. 2. Single transferable vote It is the only proportional system that does not employ a party list. It is a preferential candidate-centered PR system used in multimember districts. Candidates that surpass a specified quota of first-preference voters are elected. In successive counts, votes from eliminated candidates and surplus votes from elected candidates are reallocated to the remaining candidates until all seats are filled. Mixed electoral systems A mixed electoral system is one in which voters elect representatives through two different systems, one majoritarian and one proportional. Electoral tier -> a level at which votes are translated into seats. Lowest electoral tier -> district level (majoritarian formulas). Highest electoral tier -> regional or national level (proportional formulas). 1. Independent mixed system The application of one electoral formula does not depend on the outcome produced by the other. 2. Dependent mixed system The application of one electoral formula is dependent on the distribution of seats or votes produced by the majoritarian formula -> more proportional outcomes. Individuals have two votes: - One vote for the candidate at the district level (candidate vote). - One vote for the party list in the highest electoral tier (party vote). Some candidates compete for constituency seats but are also places on the party list. Some parties win more constituency seats than is justified by the party list vote -> overhang seats -> added seats to ensure proportionality. Chapter 14: social cleavages and party systems Political party -> a group of people that includes those who hold office and those who help get and keep them there. They: - Structure and simplify the political world. - Recruit and socialize the political elite. - Mobilize the masses. - Provide a link between the rulers and the ruled. Party systems: - Nonpartisan democracy -> a democracy with no official political parties. - Single-party system -> only one political party is legally allowed to hold power. - One-party dominant system -> multiple parties may operate but only one party has a realistic chance of gaining power. - Two-party system -> only two major political parties have a realistic chance of gaining power. - Multiparty system -> more than two parties have a realistic chance of gaining power. Counting parties Effective number of parties -> a measure that weighs the number of parties by the share of votes they get, so a party that is large is counted more than a party that is very small. We can further distinguish between: - Effective number of electoral parties -> the parties that win votes -> 1/∑vi2 - Effective number of legislative parties -> the parties that win seats -> 1/∑si2 Social cleavages Parties represent social cleavages: - Urban-rural cleavage < industrialization. - Confessional cleavage. Federalism Federalism in structure A federal state is one in which sovereignty is constitutionally split between at least two territorial levels so that independent government units at each level have final authority in at least one policy realm. States that are not federal are known as unitary states. Devolution -> it occurs when a unitary state grants power to subnational government but retains the right to unilaterally recall or reshape this powers -> it is a top-down process. - Congruent federalism -> territorial units share a similar demographic makeup. - Incongruent federalism -> territorial units do not share a similar demographic makeup. - Symmetric federalism -> territorial units possess equal powers relative to the central government. - Asymmetric federalism -> some territorial units enjoy more extensive powers than others vis-à-vis the central government. Federalism in practice Decentralization refers to the extent to which actual policy making power lies with the central or regional governments in a country. It is also an issue of revenue -> the greater the share of tax revenues going to the central government, the less decentralized the state. - Coming-together federalism -> bottom-up process -> previously sovereign polities voluntarily agree to give up part of their sovereignty in order to pool together their resources and achieve common goals. - Holding-together federalism -> top-down process -> the central government chooses to decentralize its power to subnational governments in order to diffuse secessionist pressures. Advantages of federalism -> closer match between policy and citizen preferences; the government is closer to the people; competition among states; policy experimentation; bulwark against tyranny. Disadvantages of federalism -> unnecessary duplication of government; exacerbates collective action problems; competition between states => race to the bottom; amplification of inequalities; blame shifting and credit claiming. Bicameralism Unicameral legislature -> legislative deliberation occurs in a single assembly Bicameral legislature -> legislative deliberation occurs in two distinct assemblies. - Congruent bicameralism -> the two legislative chambers have a similar political composition. - Incongruent bicameralism -> the two legislative chambers differ in their political composition. Congruent or incongruent bicameralism depend on: - How the membership of the two chambers is selected. - Whom that membership is supposed to represent. Four common methods to select members of the upper chamber: 1. Heredity 2. Appointment 3. Indirect elections 4. Direct elections In federal countries, the upper chamber always represents the citizens of subnational geographic units. This may lead to malapportionment -> the distribution of political representation between constituencies is not based on the size of each constituency’s population. In unitary countries, even if with time the power of the upper chamber has been significantly curtailed, some bicameral systems still remains because members of the upper chamber are often chosen for special merits and other criteria thought to enhance the quality of legislation. - Symmetric bicameralism -> the two legislative chambers have equal or near equal constitutional power. - Asymmetric bicameralism -> the two legislative chambers have unequal constitutional power. Strong bicameralism -> symmetric/incongruent. Weak bicameralism -> symmetric/congruent; asymmetric/incongruent. Insignificant bicameralism -> asymmetric/congruent. Constitutionalism Constitutionalism refers to the commitment of governments to accept the legitimacy of, and be governed by, a set of authoritative rules and principles laid out in a constitution. A system of constitutional justice comprises the set of institutions and procedures that are established to protect constitutional rules and principles. - Codified constitution -> a constitution written in a single document. - Uncodified constitution -> a constitution that has several sources, which may be written or unwritten. - Entrenched constitution -> it can be modified only through a special procedure of constitutional amendment. - Unentrenched constitution -> no special amendment is required and it can be modified at any point in time with the support of a legislative majority. Historically, there have been two ideal types of constitutions: