The Paris Peace Conference of 1919: Shaping the Aftermath of World War I, Tesine universitarie di Storia Contemporanea

Scarica The Paris Peace Conference of 1919: Shaping the Aftermath of World War I e più Tesine universitarie in PDF di Storia Contemporanea solo su Docsity! The Great War was a totally new kind of armed conflict. Its world dimension, the use of new powerful weapons and the involvement of civilians were only some of the new characteristics of the struggle. On June 28, 1914 a Yugoslav nationalist murdered the Archduke Franz-Ferdinand of Austria and his wife. Six months later the World War just started between the Allies (France, United Kingdom, Russia, Japan, United States and Italy, who joined the conflict later in 1915) and the Central Powers (Germany, Austria-Hungary, Ottoman Empire ,Bulgaria). After four years of degrading fighting, the Central Powers collapsed and the stipulation of armistices started with Bulgaria (29 September 1918), the Ottomans (30 October 1918), Austria-Hungary (3 November 1918) and Germany. German government sent a telegram to Washington at the beginning of October, asking for a peace settlement based on Wilson’s “ Fourteen Points”, presented on January 1918 to the Congress. The Paris Peace Conference began on January 18, 1919 and ended a year later with the ratification of five treaties: the Treaty of Versailles (Germany), the Treaty of Saint- Germain (Austria), the Treaty of Neuilly (Bulgaria), the Treaty of Trianon (Hungary) and the Treaty of Sèvres (Turkey) later substituted with the Treaty of Lausanne (1923). This research paper will analyse the Paris Peace Conference. Firstly, I want to focus on the different visions of the pacemakers to understand why the Conference was disparagingly defined as a compromise. Secondly, I will try to figure out in which way the Conference deluded the expectations of the people, making some of them angry and resentful. The studying of the development of the Conference of Paris is important in order to understand which issues a war of global dimension have created, and could still create in our present day. These complications were and could be increased by human incapacity to think and act for the global interests. I’ve made my research using a variety range of primary and secondary sources. In regarding the literature, I’ve also tried to pick information from some works wrote immediately after the closing of the Conference, to discover which impressions it gave at the beginning. Besides, I’ve used some critic literature of the present time, which have the consciousness of the failure of the convention. In approaching the different sources, I’ve focused my attention on the different roles and interests of the participants, focalizing also on the psychological effect of the war on both the leaders and the peoples. Already during the war, it was clear that the Peace Conference would have dealt with delicate and important issues, such as the redrawing of Europe’s geography, the redistribution of colonial possessions, and the rebuilt of the economy of all countries involved. Each of the Great Powers had an own “vision of peace”, according to their economic interests or security needs, but the different parts played during the war and the psychological effects of the conflict have to be consider as well. France had the most clear intents from the beginning, considering how big impact the combats had on French population. Firstly, it was worried about another possible attack from Germany and its principal aim was to reduce to the minimum this possibility. Secondly, France was a destroyed country and saw in the reparations clauses the way to rebuild its economy. America’s point of view on peace is more difficult to determinate. The war in the United States had less consequences on the population and on the economy compared to Europe. Moreover, the line of president Wilson’s “Fourteen Points” were too hazy in its principles to be considered as the strong basis followed by America. We can resume the main ideas that were actually defended during the Conference as the need of creating an international organization to prevent other wars, the principle of self-determination in creating the new boundaries and a policy of trusteeship in regard to the colonies. (Edward M. House, 1921, 425) Great Britain could be seen as a kind of moderator, thought it was nearer the “peace without victory” advertised by Americans. But, as an island, it also cared about the restoration of the traditional balance of power and the economy, particularly the preservation of British naval domain and the maintain of the British Empire. In regarding the other two members of the Allies, Italy and Japan, they mostly aimed to get as many territories as possible. The Peace Conference opened January 18, 1919. Nothing was really prepared, and the confusion about how to precede became evident. The location, Paris, appeared as an hazard choice: the French capital was not able to provide hotel rooms, offices, printing press and all that needed for such a big convention and all its participants. The main issues to discuss were well known, but the solutions proposed were different and muddled. Allied occupied territories had to be restored, Poland would be recreated, but how and with such measures was obscure. Question about the faith of Habsburg After the ratification of the treaty with Germany, the Conference had still work to do. From June 1919 to August 1920, other four treaties were ratified. They were composed using the Treaty of Versailles as the basis, showing quite the same difficulties. The main difference was the new assembly that presided over the last questions. The “Council of Four” was substituted by the “Council of Five”, with changeable members. Despite some unresolved issues, such as the Italian request on Fiume, or the situation with Russia and the revolution, the Conference closed on January 21, 1920. From the beginning the people appeared not completely satisfy by the work made at the Conference.(Harold Temperley, 1920-1924, 274) The disappoint firstly derived from the inconsistency of the League of Nations. President Wilson has insisted to create the Covenant of the League of Nations as first priority, though it lacked any enforcement power, any answer about collective security, no solutions to possible conflict between supra-national organisation and national sovereignty. In spite of the idea of a permanent international association can be consider one of the most important goal reach by the Conference, it remain an ideal, instead of something concretely serviceable. Moreover, the fundamental presuppose of the League of Nations were put in danger by the final decision of United States of not participating to the assembly. As Edward M. House said: “The United States has as yet failed to do the necessary thing to make successful the only instrument which has been devised to save us from the destruction another war would bring. It is a melancholy reflection upon our right to exist”. Generally, the “Fourteen Points” were the principal sources of hopes and became the origin of disappointment as well. As an example, the principle of self-determination was well promoted and considered in the redrawn of the boundaries. Nevertheless, it was criticized that the peacemakers did not properly consider the problem redistribution of territories as a whole, concentrating only on individual ethnicity or economic strategies. The result was a fragmented Europe. This fragmentation made critic the economic and political cooperation, with the consequently growth of political and economic nationalisms. Moreover, no solutions was gave at the problem of minorities. Germany resulted the most embittered. As we saw before, Treaty of Versailles was considered unfair in some points, with particularly resentment for the reparations clauses and the loss of some territories, such as the Polish corridor. Germans population has wrongly thought to a peace without lots of consequences, based on Wilson’s “Fourteen Point” and the idea of a “peace without victory”. Furthermore, considering that during the war German territories had not been invaded, German people started to think that they didn’t lost the war. For this reason they believed loss of lands was undeserved.(Sally Marks, 1976, 16) The anger of German populace, increased by the consecutive events (e.g. the Great Depression, 1929), was used by Adolf Hitler. On January 1933, thirteen years after the Conference, the leader of the Nazi Party became Chancellor of Germany and Führer of Germany only one year later. September 1, 1939, the war started again, with the German invasion of Poland. However, we cannot add all the responsibilities to the decisions made during the Paris Peace Conference, but we can surely say that its principal aim of creating a unfading peace failed. The Conference was unsuccessful in providing the proper instruments to maintain the world harmony. Generally, the peace was built on some wrong assumptions. Firstly, the peacemakers assumed that all states involved would definitely approved the treaties. Secondly, American participation was considered as a fundamental premise to the correct functioning of the new international balance. Lastly, they believed that the people would accepted their decisions without contestations. (Sally Marks, 1976, 24) Bibliography House, Edward M., “The Versailles Peace in Retrospect”, in American delegates, What really happened at Paris, London, Hodder & Stoughton, 1921, pp. 425-445. Marks, Sally, “The Pursuit of Peace”, in Marks, Sally, The Illusion of Peace, London, The Macmillan Press LTD, 1976, pp. 1-26 Temperley, Harold W.V, A History of the Peace Conference of Paris, London, Oxford University Press, 1920.