Comparing Transition to Democratic Welfarism in France, Germany, and Italy - Prof. Orsina, Sbobinature di Sistemi Politici Comparati

Scarica Comparing Transition to Democratic Welfarism in France, Germany, and Italy - Prof. Orsina e più Sbobinature in PDF di Sistemi Politici Comparati solo su Docsity! Page 1 / 180 Comparative History of Political Systems Week 1 5 introduction to the course 5 Politics and time: the political framework of modernity (1789-1945) 8 Democracy: From One Crisis to Another- Gauchet 12 G. Orsina, “Europeripheralism” 17 Week 2 19 Re-founding democracy after 1945: an overview (1) 19 International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order - Ruggie 25 European Liberalism in the Age of Totalitarianism - Orsina 30 The Two Postwar Eras and the Conditions for stability in Twentieth-Century Western Europe - Maier 34 Conway - Democracy in Postwar Western Europe: The Triumph of a Political Model39 Week 3 43 Post-war reconstruction: Germany 43 The Bonn Republic. West German Democracy, 1945-1990 - Nicholls 48 retribution - Judt 55 Week 4 59 Post-war reconstruction: France 59 Transforming Democracy After the Second World War - Corduwener 69 The Liberation and the Institutional Question in France - Cartier 76 Week 5 80 Party democracy in the 1950s 80 Contesting Democratic Legitimacy During the Cold War - Corduwener 89 Party Democracy and Its Enemies: Italy, 1945–1992 - Orsina 95 Week 6 100 The Fifth French Republic 100 The Fifth French Republic - Atkin (ch. 1/2) 104 Page 2 / 180 Week 7 108 Week 8 111 The Sixties as a watershed for democracy 111 Converging Conceptions of Democracy at the Turn of the 1960s - Corduwener 115 Political Elites and the Challenge to the Parliamentary Model - Corduwener 121 Narratives of Democratisation: 1968 in Postwar Europe - Gassert 127 Notes for a Philosophy of Young People - Del Noce 131 Week 9 135 The 1970s: the crisis of the political in Western Europe 135 Democracy between Crisis and Consensus after the 1973 Oil Crisis - Corduwener 142 The “Me” Decade and the Third Great Awakening - Wolfe 147 Week 10 150 The 1970s: the crisis of the political in Eastern Europe 150 The Power of the Powerless - Judt 158 Reframing the international - The Ideas of 1989: The Origins of the Concept of Global Civil Society - Kaldor 161 Week 11 166 The 1980s: the neoliberal moment and the triumph of democracy 166 The politics of time: changing paradigms of collective time and private time in the modern era - Maier 168 Thatcher’s Britain: Conclusions - Vinen 172 The Fifth French Republic - Atkin (ch. 6) 175 Lectures on Monday but we can interrupt and ask questions. Do readings before the lesson, ask to present the readings which is part of the assessment. Thursday: presentations and discussion about the presentation. Syllabus: mostly books, some cases historical documents, mostly constitutions, one film Group presentation + individual essay = 40% 2 groups, 9 topics for each group. 50 people divided into 9 groups, around 5 people in each group 15 minutes to present the topic and 10 minutes to critise it, open up questions, clarify doubts, criticisms to it Page 5 / 180 Week 1 INTRODUCTION TO THE COURSE HISTORY - Francis Fukuyama -“ The End of History and the Last Man” (1993) • was an important publication in the long 1990s (1989-Great Recession in 2007) • History is finished, we have come to the end of History (pessimistic), and there is the last man (optimistic) • we entered into a new period of time, which is post-History: the past cannot tell us anything because the transformation is too deep → we can study History for interests but it is not useful • This idea by Fukuyama belongs to modernity: whatever happened in the past it is not important as it was - A. de Tocqueville - “Democracy in America volume 2” (1840) • given that the past is no longer shading light in the future we are wondering in the dark (“When the past no longer illuminates the future”) • If the world is not enlightened by our past, why should we study the past at all? - History returned to be important with events after the end of the long 1990s (15/17 years) 1. Great Recession - what happened in the past can happen again because some events happen cyclically - We are not ‘outside of History ’after all → studying History is useful for confronting crises and understand why they happen 2. Pandemics: - S. Moyn: biological catastrophes (ex. black death, Spanish flue) are game-changers; however, in practice they were completely forgotten before Covid - The long-term impact of a pandemic may be not so great, so maybe we can argue that the impact of Covid-19 will be the same - There are fashions in the public debate: 15 years ago History was less relevant and the awareness about the importance of History to understand the present was not so strong → today, because of the economic crisis and the pandemic it is more important SOCIAL SCIENCES - Social sciences tend to explain behaviours that human beings tend to reproduce in social patterns with general laws Page 6 / 180 - However, they know that human beings are not always rational actors: they make an effort to include irrational behaviour in their models → not always successful • If human irrationality ended → History ended; Fukuyama said that liberal democracy and the market economy satisfy human beings • liberal democracy satisfies the human desire for recognition • the market satisfies the human desire for expansion of material power and possibilities • If you’re satisfied you tend to be conservative and you do not want to break down the world that is giving you satisfaction - However, the advent of populism brought back irrationality • Populism irrationally wants to break down a satisfying world (irrational explanation) or maybe they are not satisfied to they want to be satisfied (rational explanation) - To understand irrational human behaviour in its uniqueness you have to enhance your sensitivity by studying History, rather that trying to look for some forms of laws and regularities to study • using the so-called “ésprit de finesse” instead of the “ésprit de géometrie” • History is not over and there are no “Stunde Null” METHODOLOGY Traditional political History - History was traditionally about the State leaving written material → it keeps its own memory by publishing in public archives • Using the sources that wrote the history of the state = legitimising its history • The peasant was irrelevant in the past, while the king was an historical subject • The traditional methodology of historiography: not objects but archives - However, the founder of modern history, Thucydides, used oral sources (witnesses with different perspectives) but he was the first that wrote about contemporary history • He was writing in an almost pre-literary state, in the 15th century Ancient Greece, so there was not the idea that state should produce written sources - Traditional political History was more or less invented in the 19th century by L. von Ranke. Traditional political history: • Should be told how it really happened (« Wie es eigentlicht gewesen ») • Is about reconstructing events in their individuality: they are important for their own sake and are unique Page 7 / 180 • Does not compare events and look for relationships among them → it is philosophically wrong because you should enter in the historical event to understand it • Studies politics properly speaking: great personalities in prominent political positions, great political events such as relationships, wars and treaties, so nation-states - It is an instrument to legitimate the nation-state as the most important subject of History → writing History is to write the History of nation-states • Criticises the great philosophers of History (ex. Hegel) and their use of History - There were other alternatives of writing History Ex. Marxism; Possibilist school with Volpe and Salvemini Modern political History - After 1945, the traditional method started to be strongly criticised because the nation-state started to be on a crisis; no longer so relevant but still an important subject • Cause: the division of the world in two blocks and the Cold War - The historiographical outcome of this crisis was the French school of Les Annales by F. Braudel + in the 1980s political historians rethink their discipline which: • Detached itself from the hyper-political long 20th century • Is no longer about “L’histoire événementielle” or “l’histoire bataille” (things that happen) • Studies also the common people, how they behave politically Ex. Their religiosity, mentality, agriculture, society organisation • Focuses on the long-term deep phenomena (Ex. organisation of political parties, organisation of institutions, organisation of popular mobilisation), -term structures that are beneath the political system, deep undercurrents not in politics, but elsewhere • Is not exactly political History but cultural, religious, social, environmental history - However, this is political in itself because of the decision to focus on this → political message to integrate new historical subjects Ex. Americans in the 1960s to study social history - It allows us to compare across nation-states → we can confront the new challenges to historical studies - When political historians started studying politics in this wider way, they also began to question: what is politics? • if you start enlarging your scope, and you can discover that its boundaries are not clear and they change over time, they are shrinking → one of the issues of our contemporary age - Political historians started to compare history of wider phenomena → Historians can now do the “histories croisée” (study how countries are looking at one another and influencing each other) Page 10 / 180 • ≠ modernity is about the refusal of any a priori given by somebody else, such as the existence of God that is giving us any directions • The new order must be self-referential and this is breaking the elements that are keeping the “ancien regime” together • This is a consequence of the invention of the individual: the individual is invented → human beings became aware of their worth as individuals → they want to be free and autonomous - T. Hobbes - Leviathan: wants monarchy not to be found on religion • The Leviathan is necessary for practical reasons (to give orders); otherwise we would go back to the state of nature, in which life is nasty brutish and short • We need to have a state not because God gave it but because of practical matters, because it is utilitarian → otherwise we would kill each other • He was living in the XVII century Britain, it was destroyed by the wars of religion → religion = disorder at his time - A. Del Noce: in the mid-17th Century we did a kind of conscious political choice → we do not want God because we want humans to be free, and they will not be free until their order will be based on any a priori FOUR CRISES OF MODERNITY 1. Crisis of the traditional political order → legitimacy of the political power - With the French Revolution we have the issue of political legitimacy: why should we obey? - Who should govern? Answering “the king that God gave us” is no longer plausible - Charles I was beheaded because he was no longer recognised as the legitimate king → we now have to recreate a legitimacy - ≠ The English king was beheaded 150 years before because he was considered as a traitor of his mission given by God → the citizens thought they had the duty to kill him - Hobbes would say that we need to obey because it is in our interest 2. Crisis of the community → legitimacy of the political units - there is not only the problem on how to legitimise the political power inside the political units but also which are the political units → in the past we had God-created communities - The geopolitics of Europe was built by this tradition → if you change this you open up the possibility for communities to change • Ex. The division of Germany was a crucial feature of the balance of power in Europe → both the two world wars were considered the centre of the “Deutsche Frage” Page 11 / 180 - Legitimacy is no longer based on traditions but on the national principle, on the features that create a community 3. Crisis of the traditional social order - Described by H. Maine as the “transition from status to contract” • Before: the past society was based on status according to “familiar provenience”; it was segmented in classes, impossible to change because there was small social mobility • After: the modern society is about what individuals want to be, not who they are; human relations became linked by a series of contracts - We are not in a stable society, but in a mobile society because human beings change positions and have the aspiration of climbing the social ladder → governance is more complicated - Ex. Anguish of the European ruling elites at the of the 19th century facing the phenomenon of urbanisation: great densities of people in the cities, difficult to control and to govern, with many social welfare and political problems that were non-existing before - In the Congress of Vienna there was the attempt to put back the pieces of the pandora box that the French Revolution and Napoleon broke • Metternich and Taillerand were right to say that domestic legitimacy was connected to international legitimacy 4. Crisis of the openness of History - All this is changing the way in which we conceive history • Before: History was conceived as out of the control by human beings, which are brought by it; it was impossible to change your destiny → History was circular • After: French Revolution is not about recreating the past, but is about creating a new world based on human rationality → History is vectorial - humans are no longer observers (“Homines sapientes") but makers of reality (“homo faber”) → they become subjects of historical change • Marx "Philosophers for centuries have interpreted the world, now it’s time to change it” → they did not think that humans could change reality • There was a division between the creation and man, but if the man can create, he enters in the creation → now there is no division - This opens some problems: liberal democracy has to answer to the problem of how to navigate history and how to create a destiny → new worries and fears because human beings could destroy everything - Anguish that the openness of the future vs. Idea that there will be an incredible new future Page 12 / 180 DEMOCRACY: FROM ONE CRISIS TO ANOTHER- GAUCHET - Modern liberal democracy (MLD) = mixed regime - It is based on 3 dimensions of social existence (political, legal, historical/economic) → there was a balance between them after WW2 but now we have a crisis • The political autonomy is overshadowed by economy and legal dimension • We experience depoliticisation - There have been 2 growth crises of MLD - the second one is characterised by the self-destruction of the foundations of democracy; it corresponds to a crisis of composition of the dimensions of MLD, which is a mixed regime WHICH CRISIS? - Difficult to use the term “growth crisis” because democracy, by definition, is a form of gov’t in which discord protest and questioning of its establishment are always present - During the 1st crisis citizens came to reject the principle binding institutions and support opposition parties → totalitarianism - Today we do not have these external “enemies” but we have an internal form of adversity largely unconscious but still formidable in its effects → difficult to analyse - Democracy transforms itself similarly to something that grows → this growth is not organic and it can provoke deep unbalances that throated its existence MODERN AUTONOMY - Democracy is the putting into political form of the autonomy of the human-social institution - MLD is characterised by the disengagement from religion and is no longer structured through heteronomy to an autonomous form of organisation • We exited from religion by rethinking the organising units that form human communities • As a consequence, the future is unexpected and we have problems concerning our freedom - The process of realisation of this autonomy + the abandonment of religion were realised realised in 3 stages by 3 drivers 1. The political • Before: the role of the monarch was to mediate the here-below and the beyond Page 15 / 180 THE EXPANSION OF AUTONOMY - This crisis was a sign of change in global geography, in the material basis of our societies, of capitalism, of industry and of their technical systems - The balance between the democratic and the liberal dimensions was destroyed in favour of the hegemony of the latter • The re-launch of the process of disengagement from religion led to the rebirth of liberalism - New phase of consolidation for social organisation directed towards autonomy between 1945-1975 → new developments for the 3 drivers: the law apparently prevails over the others, but in fact they all intensified • The nation-state and the historical orientation are still important, but the juridical dimension is the most visible in the collective environment - Another important development: reactivation of the process of individualisation • Before: it was all about masses and classes ≠ after: mass individualism that detached the individual from his/her group membership • In the 1980s human rights become more important THE DEMOCRACY OF HUMAN RIGHTS - Because of the return of individuals to human rights, democracy becomes a democracy of human rights • Within the framework of the Welfare State we have the advancement of personal rights in the form of social rights - This leads to a contradiction → is an enigmatic turn of democracy against itself: at the same time it processes and regresses; it gains more depth but loses substance • The notion of the state of law tends to fuse with the very idea of democracy • The spontaneous understanding of the word “democracy” changed - Before: power of the collective and capacity for self-government ≠ after: referred to personal freedoms → the individual aims to defeat collective power • Consequence: political incapacitation of democracy → the more democracy rules, the less it governs • This contradiction can be understood at two levels: surface → self restriction of the political domain of democracy ≠ dpth - → questioning of the basis of democracy Page 16 / 180 Surface level: A minimal democracy - Individual sovereignty prevails over collective sovereignty → this leads us in the direction of a minimal democracy • There is a link between the 2 in MLD because it rests on the fundamental rights of individuals on the basis of their personhood and it involves the exercise of collective power • Individual freedoms are fulfilled through the self-government because it confers a responsibility of a common destiny • Problem: we need to balance the two dimensions - This is particularly visible in France: • The Republican regime was based on a demanding idea of collective sovereignty → this led to a hierarchical separation between public citizenship and private independence • Therefore, when democracy focused more on the private dimension, it was perceived as highly destabilising - In this operational idea of democracy, more rights for everyone means less power for all → the political community ceases to govern itself and becomes a political market society • There is a generalisation of the market model into politics: the whole configuration appears as a consequence of the initiatives and claims of different players after a self-regulated process of aggregation • The consequence is a growing oligarchisation of our regimes: permanent mobilisation (ex. Populism) reinforces this Deep level: a crisis in the foundation of democracy - Democracy is in the grip of a form of mild self-destruction: its principles are untouched but it is deprived of its effectiveness - The foundational universalism of democracy leads it to disassociate from the nation state → the boundaries of the law tends to see democracy ideally without any territory or history - Consequence: democracy cannot accept the circumstances that gave birth to it → paradoxically, it becomes anti-political: members of the political body want to neutralise power in whatever form in order to protect the sovereignty of individuals from any attack - Human rights based democracy tends to reject the instrument it needs to be effective → it is constantly confronted with public impotence - Therefore the present crisis is in the foundations of democracy because its essence is the promotion of its juridical foundations, as against its historical and political foundations • Autonomy is potentially impossible to govern within the hunt rights democracy → political stagnation of our regimes Page 17 / 180 • It is a crisis of the 3 elements of its mixed regime: the law has a dominant and driving position, but it needs the other two drivers in order to be effective • The economy, under the banner of rights, imposes its rules and, in the process, changes to a very large extent the powers and freedoms of the individual • This turns to the idea of a minimal democracy: only concerned with the protection of the freedoms of the private individual TOWARDS RECOMPOSITION (PREDICTIONS) - This tendency of the unilateral hegemony of the legal element is not the end of the story, but a moment of imbalance calling for intervention - We need to find a compromise between the logic of the individual as legal subject (social-historical dynamic)and the political form of nation -tate • We cannot reverse what individuals have achieved in terms of emancipation andhuman rights - The paradox of freedom without power will become intolerable for everyone - We can be pessimistic in the short term and optimistic over the long run: we have not yet reached the end point in the breakdown of the old forms of equilibrium or in the momentum acquired by new factors + the past shows us that the growth crisis is likely to be overcome - Democracy in the 22nd century could be a substantially enhanced democracy when compared with the one we now know - Essay’s problem: the economy is subsumed under the law → in the minimal democracy it has a more important role than individual rights, and the two things are connected - Minimal democracy is without collective action, so without politics, in which we confront history only on the basis of individual rights and of the hope that History is going to take care of itself • We could argue that populism was an attempt to bring back collective action, as History stopped taking care of itself and not being spontaneously progressive (economic crisis and great recession) - ≠ Von Mises says that there is a crisis of immaturity: liberalism is the best solution, but humans are too stupid not enlightened enough to understand it → it is just a matter of education G. ORSINA, “EUROPERIPHERALISM” EUROPE(S) AND MODERNIT(IES) - Modern Eurocentrism is a product of modernity • temporal and spatial shrinking of Earth + the political, economic, and cultural take-off of a global centre and the reactions of the global peripheries Page 20 / 180 1. Solution to the problem of political legitimacy: who is legitimised to govern? - Liberal democracy provides a philosophical and structural answer with the representative government → the person who won the elections and represents public opinion governs • Legitimacy is created with the relationship with power opinion and not with a divinity - Representing public opinion is a complicated issue because “public opinion” is a vague concept → it changes over time and it is plural • each citizen is member of several communities, so we could be represented for each of our communities: majority systems tend to represent local communities; proportional systems tend to represent ideological communities 2. Solution to the problem of international order and international peace and cooperation: How do we shape a community? What are the boundaries of a community? How do we create an international order? - It depends on the relation between nationalism and liberalism - There is the idea is that communities should be based on some form of cultural/historical similarities of the people, but also be based on the expressed desire of the people - In the liberal democratic utopia, the idea of the world is made by nation-states, people that are happy to live inside their own community, trade with one another • Free trade: basis of a peaceful international order→ entire community has access to all the resources of the world → there is no reason to make wars to extract resources • Rational dialogue → instrument to set any international disputes; countries govern themselves through representative governments and if you have disputes you seat around the table and solve it or in an international arena where all countries can speak with one another 3. Solution to the problem of social order: how to create an orderly society out of individuals whose lives are based on contracts and not on status? - Through the law you regulate the space of autonomy of the individuals, and you regulate the overlap of the space and the conflict with individuals - Your individual greediness, your desire to become richer and gain money, becomes real thanks to the market → instrument for the collective growth • B. Mandeville -“ Fable of the bees” (18th Century): to transform private vices in public virtues (“Private Vices by the dextrous Management of a skilful Politician may be turned into Public Benefits”) - With market and law, it is possible for individuals to move together in a free space, to be free but at the same time to enter into an orderly relationship and give form to social order 4. Solution to the problem of openness of history: what do we do with the future? How do we confront it? Page 21 / 180 - Liberals have always been very enthusiastic about the fact that humans are free to do what they want to do and build their own future → problem: it creates enthusiasm and opportunities, but also danger and anguish • Some human beings are enthusiastic about embracing a new future, but many of them would prefer to have a more close and defined future → maybe every person there are both elements at the same time - M. Oakeshott - “Rationalism in politics and other essays”: history of freedom starting from the late Middle Age and ending up today, following the lesson of Burkhart • The anti-individual was born together with the individual → people worried that wanted to create a set of institutions that could constrain and close down the future - Problem: liberalism is enthusiastic for the openness of the future as a philosophy, but as a political program it must also confront the anti-individualists • Liberalism can promise progress: we do not know what the future will be like, but human freedom creates progress → it is considered as a guarantee of improvement of the majority of humans → the future is going to be better than the present • All ideologies have to face the problems of modernity - Marxism provides an answer by saying what the future will be like - Communism and Fascism also promise progress, but they do it through political actions and not through individual liberties - To sum up, liberalism guarantees: a system able to do without religion and a priori, individuals free to choose their own god and act freely, extract resources everywhere because of the market, act freely thanks to rights, govern own communities thanks to representative democracy, political order, social order, improvement ISSUES OF THE LIBERAL DEMOCRACY - Can a free society be progressive? • Yes: if you leave human beings free, you multiply human creativity → thanks to the market you have a good allocation of resources → a free society is allocating resources in an ideal way → this should produce process • No: Kant: “Out of the crooked timber of humanity, no straight thing was ever made” → human beings are creative but they can also be aggressive, violent, selfish, etc. - the evil component of human beings would be free, too - Hobbes would say that in the state of nature (“homo omini lupus”) - It is not a scientific sentence and we cannot demonstrate it philosophically Page 22 / 180 - However, we can have historical experience and affirm that free societies tended to be progressive in the past: today we can affirm it • ≠ in the mid 1850s it was impossible to have this kind of overview; workers were voting for the liberal party in the UK because it was working → they had a lot of faith • Liberalism is a self fulfilling prophecy: if you believe in it, if you stick with it, it will work; if you lose faith in it, it will not work; there is optimism and the faith in progress is crucial for the model to work - How do we keep this faith going? - Liberalism started in the mid-19th century into a society that was still rather stable and it was not confronted to modernity; in a specific area of Europe, in which civil society was already mature for liberalism - 1870-1900: the faith in progress enters into a crisis because liberalism developed both vertically/socially, inside the country by lowering up to the lower strata of society, and also horizontally/geographically, so it moved in other countries with a different society • The more liberalism grows, the more it opens problems that endanger the idea of the automatic improvement • Some “barbarians” entered in the picture and they were not ready for liberalism • The market is creating social problems • Liberalism does not seem appropriate in a backward civil society that did not produce it internally but imported it from the outside • The progressive character of freedom maybe will not survive into a mass society in which working people vote - How do we educate individuals to be free? - It is not only a matter of anthropological optimism, but of a certain kind of anthropology: human beings have to be ready to control themselves to live in a free society - However, liberalism in the 19th century is working with individuals shaped by the traditional society during the Ancien Regime • Liberalism itself, being liberal, does not have the strength to educate human beings → unable to create individuals that are ready to live in a liberal society • Paradox: free society → no constrictions and discipline → you cannot be educated to be free → you cannot be free - V. Duomo - Neapolitan Revolution (1801) Page 25 / 180 INTERNATIONAL REGIMES, TRANSACTIONS, AND CHANGE: EMBEDDED LIBERALISM IN THE POSTWAR ECONOMIC ORDER - RUGGIE INTRODUCTION - Focus on how the regimes for money and trade have reflected and affected the evolution of the international economic order since World War II - International regimes: social institutions around which actors expectations converge in a given area of international relations • They limit the discretion of their component units to decide and act on issues that are reserved to the regime • They are composed by principles, norms, rules and procedures • Their creation is consider to represent a manifestation of the internationalisation of political authority - Theory of hegemonic stability (Kindleberger): • if an hegemon exists there is an open/liberal economic regime (LER) → there is a strong regime because other states cannot intervene in the self-regulating currency and commodity markets (Ex. UK 19th century, US after 1945) • If there is no hegemon the regime is weaker and closer: mercantilist arrangements that reassert national authorities over transnational ones (Ex. In the interwar period) - This theory is not wrong but is deceiving because of 3 reasons: 1. It focuses only on power and ignores the dimension of social purpose (the Zeitgeist, the prevailing cultural consensus, what people think that is right, legitimate and acceptable) of the political authority, which is essential to understand the content of the LER • there are differences between the two LERs because the second its characterised by “embedded liberalism” • This is a critics to Realism, according to which the order is based on power → power is not enough → institutionalism brings back in the picture values and the institutions that are created around them → they can constrain power 2. There is no direct relationship between the LERs and international transaction flows (ITFs) (for Marxists, Realists and Liberals there is one) Page 26 / 180 • LERs provide the good environment for the emergence of specific kinds of ITFs, which then encourages the emergence of certain type of fusion between power and purpose within the LERs • H: the models of trade are shaped by international regime → by looking at trade we can understand the kind of international regime we are living in → trade as an empirical proof to demonstrate that his international regime really exists 3. Before the model depended only on power (2 scenarios: open/closed) but the power and the social purpose do not necessary covary (4 scenarios): • Hegemon (+) and incongruence of social purpose (-) → Dutch in the 17th century • No hegemon (-) and incongruence of social purpose (-) → interwar period • Hegemon (+) and congruence of social purpose (+) → Bretton Woods • No hegemon (-) and congruence of social purpose (+) → post-1971 scenario → the instruments (rules and procedures) change but the normative framework (principles and norms) does not change THE STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL AUTHORITY - K. Polanyi - “The great Transformation” - “embedded liberalism” (≠ laissez faire liberalism) • International authority reflects a fusion of both power and legitimate social purpose, not only the distribution of power alone • The economy has always been enshrined in a wider notion of social order (Ex. in the feudal system, production was not an insulated arena following its own rules, but a part of the social arrangements) - There is no international economic regime that is able to dictate rules to the individual nation- states because the economy is not independent from it - With modernity, the economy becomes dis-embedded → with capitalism production becomes the primary function to which all the functions are subordinated → This is creating an unbearable amount of human suffering (criticism to capitalism) The internationalisation of domestic authority relations - There is an internationalisation of political authority: part of the political authority is not working anymore on the national but at the International level → this is an international economic regime • How and what kind of balance do we have between individual nation-states and the rules that are set by the international economic regime? Page 27 / 180 • The functioning of the international economy is creating a number of rules → what kind of rules are them? How do states fit into them? Do they care about the internal tensions created by the rules? - The balance between “authority” and “market” transformed state-society relations that expressed a collective reality, by redefining the legitimate social purposes in pursuit of which state power was expected to be employed in the domestic economy • The role of the state became to institute and safeguard the self-regulating market → it assumed more direct responsibility for domestic social security and economic stability Transformations in power vs. purpose 5. Liberal period before the First World War (late 19th century-early 20th century) - The LER prevails on the role of the hegemon (the UK): there is the focus on economic integration of the world as a producer of greater wealth → this can be done with liberalism by having an international division of labour (standard Adam Smith argument) - there was a consensus that free trade was desirable (thus being the “purpose”) → economy was to be free, independent from the state, and the international economic regime, e.g. gold standard, was designed to serve such purpose 6. Interwar period - The explodes → nation-states try to bring under control the LER with an attempt to overturn the relation of power by setting the rules → protectionism and imperial trade areas - Breakdown of the liberal order and the creation of the rebellion of the nation-states - Collapse of the gold-exchange standard in 1931 → the international monetary order disintegrated into five blocs, each with its own prevailing currency arrangement - The existing regime failed because the institution was no more suitable for the newly shared purpose (not because a hegemon was lacking) • These efforts stood in contradiction to the transformation in the mediating role of the state between market and society THE COMPROMISE OF EMBEDDED LIBERALISM 7. Embedded liberalism (post-1945 period) - We are not back to the normal liberal order but to an embedded liberal order (≠ metaphor of K. Polanyi was instead about an embedded economy) - We need to find a compromise between the LER and the needs of the nation-states Ex. With the Bretton Woods agreements; the IMF able to rebalance possible unbalances of trade; European payment system to lessen the impact of the unbalances of trade - Trade liberalisation is done very slowly and it was thought to have lots of exceptions → in reality, this is not a liberal order with cheaters → cheating is in the model (“double screen”) Page 30 / 180 - “Ironically, then, the foremost force for discontinuity at present is […] the resurgent ethos of liberal capitalism” → he was seeing that there could be some change in the legitimate social purpose, that was the dis-embedment of liberalism • this happens starting from the late 1970s and becomes clear in the 1980s and 1990s → the economy becomes dis-embedded once again, nation-states still have an Important role to play but their ability to make the rules is diminishing - Critiques: • While it is clear how power changes, it’s unclear as to how norms change • Intersubjectively held social purposes: are these really norms in the conventional sense of the word, or are they shared interests? Not clear if this is actually an alternative, more sophisticated materialist theory masquerading as a materialist + constructivist theory • In the 1980s he is not able to understand the transformation entirely because he is into it • While he was writing, the rules were destroyed and we were entering in a new period of history → the rules of the international economy became more important that what was decided inside national democracies • he described the breakdown of the postwar order and the origins of our order → we live in the world that begins to be created at the end of the 1970s which is described with the very generic world “globalisation” EUROPEAN LIBERALISM IN THE AGE OF TOTALITARIANISM - ORSINA INTRODUCTION - Failed liberal project in the 20th century led to fascism and communism - Liberalism: key player in political conflict in the era of tyrannies - 3 perspectives for consideration • Liberalism as the ambivalent ideology (static and methodological, and dynamic and substantial): able to provide a reassuring/convincing answer to acceleration of historical changes brought about by modernity; • Liberalism as a historically fragile ideology given that it is only possible in rare and well-defined historical conditions; • Liberalism as an ideology that can establish an institutional system and a political party active within that same system. Page 31 / 180 - 2 classics: L. von Mises ’Omnipotent government and K. Polanyi’s The great transformation LIBERAL IDEOLOGY - Liberalism: comprehensive and coherent project for the overcoming of the social, economic, political, and cultural problems posed by modernity • Core of Liberalism - (1) establishing free and spontaneous interaction among human beings is possible within a well- thought-out framework of rules and institutions; - (2) interaction structured in this way can generate progress at all levels. • This definition of liberalism focuses on its ability to say something substantial about the quality of historical change and to take into consideration all spheres of human activity. - Liberalism’s intent: to rebuild social order from its foundations following a rational and perfect plan as an alternative to the improvement of humankind. - Under this perspective, the liberal project is progressive, utopian, pedagogical, unitary and universalistic. • Progressive: it offers an alternative to conservation through social transformation; • Utopian: it doesn’t reject an optimistic philosophy of history and suggests a positive direction for human transformation (striving for a positive-sum game); • Pedagogical: interaction among individuals is a positive-sum game and peaceful cooperation is more profitable than conflict; • Unitary: the positive-sum game applies to every field of human activity (economy, politics, culture, etc); • Universalistic: the LP strives to become universal in his reach. THE CRISIS OF THE LIBERAL PROJECT The liberal project may be considered the “hegemonic solution” to the macroscopic problems that arose with the advent of modernity. - The LP is however fragile due to the difficulty encountered when trying to transform this idea into a concrete balance between methodology and substance. • Liberalism focuses on the forms/models of interaction between individuals, but it doesn’t dictate the contents and direction of such interaction. - Liberalism is not only methodology, but has two aspects of substance: • Upstream application of methodology: methodology can only be applied in certain historical conditions where it considers that a positive-sum game is possible only when humans have reached a certain level of maturity. Page 32 / 180 • Downstream application of methodology: methodology can be applied only when it takes into consideration the evolving nature of human interactions (perceived in a utopian progressive way). - Issues with the LP: • The contradiction between the awareness of the need for specific historical conditions and the universalistic/expansionist tendencies of the LP - E. Burke’s paradox: liberalism fails because its methodology implies that to obtain something, that very something ought to be there already. - Liberals believe that there isn’t an “unsavable” state that cannot reach utopian liberalism. • The liberal promise of progress • Issue dictated by the very word “promise” (which doesn’t entail certainty, and therefore required an act of faith in the LP a priori). • A. Koestler in Darkness at Noon: “the ultimate truth is penultimately always a falsehood” - Liberalism refuses the existence of anything “ultimate”, and therefore cannot sacrifice anything “penultimate” in its name. 1. Because of the conviction that history is progressive - Liberalism just like its enemies, embraces an “a priori faith” in the methodology • The pace of historical development is crucial in understanding how well the methodology can function - Lord Acton: liberalism needs time to overcome obstacles and establish balance/freedom. - (Opposing view) von Mises and Polanyi • Polanyi: LP made impossible because it causes human suffering short-term, regardless of long-term achievements – Politics is programmed towards laissez-faire, not towards solving such suffering (even though it’s the only entity that has the ability to tackle this issue) - Attribution of the failure of the LP to “immaturity” – people are not enlightened enough to truly understand liberalism (let alone translate it into practicality) • The elite was not “mature” enough to know how to “advance” the masses. • Von Mises: objection to the optimism of the 19th century liberalism (while not abandoning the utopian and progressive components of the LP) “to prevent the fulfilment of the capitalist method because of the short-term effects, is to carry out a self-damaging operation” - People’s maturity shows in their being sure of the progressive nature of liberalism and in being able to survive those short-term negative effects. • Outside of the Anglo-Saxon experience, the LP’s realisation is the result of a complex and delicate virtuous circle Page 35 / 180 the German occupation made the factory a less central source of oppression → more focus on anti- Nazi unity Main source preventing ideological polarisation were the new Christian Democratic parties Fascism and the traditional conservative nationalism were rejected → no veteran- based right radicalism (★ Gaullism, Uomo Qualunque) the purges became more and more restricted, although originally the Left had envisaged them as a mode of collective change Left Catholicism served to contain otherwise radical currents in the flux of immediate post-war (Adenauer, De Gasperi, French MRP) Collaborationist regimes had to rethink the economic role of the state and the future relationship of capital and labour Domestic party development were influenced by the great powers: continuous intervention of the US and USSR in their respective spheres of influence General powerful impulses: discrediting of European Right + fear of Communist motives and USSR replacing Popular front + desire on the part of Christian and Social Democrats to establish moderate welfare states DIFFERENT BUT NOT SEPARATED PERIODS - Both post-war periods formed part of a continuing effort at stabilisation which entailed a two conditions → each post-war overcame one of the two → there is a cumulative achievement: #1 postwar #2 postwar Legitimation: re-establishing the contested legitimacy of social and economic elites Production: justifying inequality through a satisfying economic performance response to ideological attack to the legitimacy of capitalist hierarchies → did not solve economic dilemma of continuous production and high employment only by the 1950s were the afflictions that undermined capitalist stability effectively overcome as a whole - The relative strength of the Left depended upon the particular national situation • its programs remained a less clear-cut challenge after 1944 than they were after 1918 • It aspired less to overturn bureaucratic and economic control than to attain public ownership of key industries → by 1945 ownership was less crucial issue - #1 postwar: the Socialists were challenged after Bolshevik Revolution: they wanted innovation of soviets, criticised managerial control of the workplace/production regardless of ownership and challenged the Western chains of command • They failed for many reasons: - Their militancy derived especially from conservative impulses (defending work skills and artisanal independence against the degrading standardisation of tasks) - They developed only in a few industrial regions and out of phase with each other → they did not even explode in France (keystone) Page 36 / 180 - Trade-union leaders tolerated also alternative modes of representation - They were internally divided between progressives and reactionaries - Stabilisation of currencies on the gold-exchange standard, strong international competition, and the saturation of home markets made rationalisation more urgent • Scientific management was an economic and social breakthrough: it promised a painless method of cost cutting but it translates to speed-ups and extra hours - The Left exhausted its capacity for resistance during useless labour struggles in the 1920s → it never challenged this again with the same vigour - #2 postwar did not resume the fundamental ideological challenge to managerial control of the #1 postwar - The #1 postwar restoration confirmed the premise that the modern industrial order must operate under hierarchical chains of command, like an army or bureaucracy - The presumption of technical rationality legitimised the economic power that ownership alone could not #1 POSTWAR: NOT ENOUGH FOR STABILISATION - Having the control the organisation of production and making economic authority democratic was not sufficient to have stabilisation because of domestic and international constraints 1. Balance of payment concerns mandated relatively low European wages to make states maintain exports, compete internationally and preserve exchange rates 2. Potential saturation of the market and limits of profitability → attack on the costs of labour and new social-insurance obligations - What had to be attained was a "warranted growth" path of capital and incomes that allowed the expansion of each to call forth and absorb the increments of the others • In the 1920s there was a limited confidence in mass consumption as a force of growth ≠ in the 1970s the difficulties derived from excessive reliance on such system - Two significant changes after the #2 post-war solved the 2 past constraints: 1. The US developed a commitment to European prosperity • Marshall Plan available for the reconstruction of a welfare capitalism in Europe • US aid served more as a capital-liberating (generate their own capital more freely) than a capital-transfusing The political and economic calculations of European countries themselves changed → they felt less locked into a distributive content Page 37 / 180 • Increase in agricultural productivity thanks to technology → more supply of labor available for industry, special efficiency of investment • Rigorous stabilisation programs, new business confidence (technocratic impulses and expansionist entrepreneurs), commitment to supranational institutions - Consequence: need for cooperation under US supervision of the labour leaders who shared the premises of a growth-organised welfare capitalism → “politics of productivity” • Communist leaders themselves accepted the trade-off between present consumption and future growth - #1 postwar: repression, co-optation and the success of the managerial mystique reconsolidated the bureaucratic organisation of industrial work - #2 postwar: the economic accomplishments completed the 2nd half of the stabilisation assignment → Western leaders recovered more of their prosperity and liberalism and retained more of their privileges and prerogatives SUCCESSFUL STABILISED POLITICAL SYSTEMS - They are either isolated (Japan) or International in scope → in Europe we had both class equilibrium and international compromise simultaneously (not only because of the Cold War) - Centres of growth in the 1950s and 1960s were West Germany, Japan and Italy: they we’re fundamental in creating a coalition of liberal polities with mixed capitalist economies • Not directly a consequence of the fact that they are ex-fascist powers, but the combo defeat + occupation allowed for the greatest intervention by the US → working classes were severely limited - The US was focused on overcoming other alternatives • There were disagreements between US and UK on the capitalist model to adopt: - US: maximisation of multilateral trade and welfare → rewarding the most massive and technologically productive economy (itself) - UK: economy based upon regional systems of domination that guaranteed international markets to the weaker power • But the central conflict was between capitalism and communism - Therefore, stabilisation is the consequence of a trilateral association between Germany, US and Japan achieved only after two world wars - For the incorporation of the middle classes and European bourgeoisie into the political community: • 19th century: the institutional device was a parliamentary representation Page 40 / 180 - Power often shared by nation-states, rarely devolved to subsidiary layers of government. - Nation-state constituted the basic unit of currency of post-war democracy. - Exceptions to this trend: 2nd Austrian Republic and Federal Republic of Germany 2. Supremacy of parliaments - Sovereign figures perceived as protectors of democratic freedoms - Free election of national parliaments - Emphasis on management and control rather than mass participation - Post-war parliamentarism aimed to include not exclude + proportional representation to avoid single-party dictatorship - Coalition governments = logic of compromise → respect for diversity → pillarized societies (Ex. low countries, Germany and northern Italy). 3. A governed democracy - Top-down culture of public administration where decision-making was mostly remote from the people. - Complexity of government. - Legislation prepared by bureaucracies. • Ministers and parliamentary deputies had limited voice. - Government: matter for experts (lobbies and pressure-groups try to pursue own interests). 4. Limited/controlled structures of popular participation - Enfranchisement in France, Italy, and Belgium of majority of adults → establishment of electoral democracy. • Change in significance of gender issues - Universal suffrage → culture of citizenship was only formal and rather limited → once they expressed their votes, people were expected to retreat from politics. 5. Reliance on individualism and essentially negative definitions of freedom - Developed by anti-Communists → congress for cultural freedom. - Freedom to think and live independently of the state inherited from US influence after WW2. - Restricted and individualist definition of freedom → quiet virtues of democracy → population less inclined to influence the actions of the state rather than ensure that the state didn’t invade their lives again. - Christian democracy had more influence on post-war welfarism than social democracy. Page 41 / 180 3 EXPLANATORY PARADIGMS - Western interpretation • Triumph of parliamentary democracy as inseparable from the logic of wartime alliances. • WW2 = not an ideological war, but a political war. • US won the war. - Southern interpretation • Post-war democracy = product of the CW not WW2. • Invasion of American experts/culture and forms of industrial organisation → creation of American Europe. - Eastern interpretation • Emphasis on post-war Germany. • Focus on social destruction caused by the war. • Parliamentary democracy = combination of political stability and economic prosperity which mirrored individualist and conservative popular mood. • Discrediting of radical left and right alternatives - Victory of Western allies + development of the CW + complementary social dynamics of exhaustion and prosperity = explanation of the establishment of post-war democratic regimes. 3 THEMES illustrating the way in which pre-war and wartime events and social/political/economic factors determined the character of post-war democracy - The way in which events of the war years contributed to a longer-term change in the relationship between the individual and the political process • Immediate consequence of outbreak of WW2: suspend/reduce national political life. • Tangible community of the village/town/region became centre of activity and focus of loyalty. • Focus on the welfare of one’s immediate family. • Post-war surge of material selfishness due to wartime repression and austerity. • Social and geographical expansion of the more individualist and consumerist culture. Page 42 / 180 • Culture of mass consumption cinema/magazines, etc dominated post-war boom years. • Political movements (except Communism) sought to appeal to people as individuals (not en masse). - The reconfiguration in the structure and attitudes of social elites • Elites of post-war Europe almost universally regarded parliamentary democracy as the best guarantor of their economic interests and social influence (especially industrialists). - This resulted from the changes in the composition of elites themselves. • Catholic Church acquired a stature of particular importance within wartime elites. - Rise in religious practice + increased demand for the Church’s social/charitable role. - CC and elites abandoned many of the informal roles they assumed during the war. - Nascent structures of the post-war Christian Democrat party. • New democratic regimes integrated new elites → newly ambitious state bureaucracy. - Due to frustration of the 1930s of immobilism and corruption of parliamentary regimes that led to authoritarian reforms. • State bureaucrats accompanied by well-organised and professional social organisations and lobbies. - Reliance on a class coalition of the middle-class and of rural populations, supported by the non- Communist organisations of the working class. • Caused by the decline in the industrial working class accompanied by a rise in the social power and political influence of rural population and of the middle class. • WW2 caused a transformation in urban-rural relations. • New political leaders who came after 1945 were predominantly lawyers, intellectuals, and other professionals with common middle-class culture. - The three themes don’t provide a complete explanation for post-war democracy – there are other factors. - There was no “year zero” after WW2 → in some states (ex. Germany and Italy) change occurred through a series of dramatic ruptures while in other states (ex. Netherlands and Britain) the process of change was more gradual and almost invisible. Page 45 / 180 - Germany: there were small attempts (ex. Die Weiße Rose) which never amounted to a full movement - This highlights important moral energies on which the reconstruction in the postwar country could have been based • Ex. In Italy the degree of the resistance was enhanced to increase this idea of anti-corrupted morals which lasted even during the war → the revolutionary drive of the movement inserts a strong wish for something new 5. The Cold War - The Cold War could be only/both a domestic or/and an international issue - The communist party: • in the UK is negligible • in Germany becomes irrelevant fast and is soon outlawed by the constitutional court - However, the Cold War has an impact because there is no communist party in Western Germany but there is a communist other in East by which it is conditioned • in France and Italy the communist parties are significant and strong, and are connected to the USSR → there is an element of the Soviet Block inside GERMANY Territorial discontinuity 1. Dissolution of Prussia + new balanced Lander + creation of federal Germany bottom-up → very strong territorial discontinuity with the past - The rebirth of Germany was characterised by: lost of territory, division of the remaining part of Germany and of Berlin, the direct government of the allies, end of Prussia as the most important Land of the German federation Page 46 / 180 - In the past the federation was unbalanced because Prussia was disproportionally bigger than the others, the core of the German empire, the maker of the German authoritarian and military tradition - In imperial Germany before the First World War the Prussian chancellor was also the German chancellor; Prussia was bringing the traditional militarist tradition - In 1927 the decision to dissolve Prussia and to restructure the Land changed the internal territorial distribution of power in Germany • Bavaria is bigger than the other Länders but no Land is disproportionately bigger • Idea to create a balanced federation - The Landers were recreated before the Federation and the “Grungesetz” is created by the Lander → it is not a state with a federal structure, but a number of states that created a federal structure → bottom-up creation for a strong structure Institutional discontinuity - Previous institutions are destroyed: after 1945 there is no German government or head of state → D is directly governed by the occupying powers which start the reconstruction from the summer of 1945 Page 47 / 180 - Yalta and Potsdam agreements: Germany should have been rebuilt as a single country by the occupying powers together BUT the reconstruction of Germany sets Eastern Germany on a different path from Western Germany - USSR: the Third World War, the confrontation between communism and capitalism, was inevitable • The post 1945-arrangement was a preparation so USSR wanted to take Eastern Germany to gain resources • Stalin said to Milovan Đilas: This war is unlikely any others because whenever an army arrives, there also a social-economic system arrives • It was necessary to Sovietise Eastern Germany with: - economic system: nationalising the land and the factories that still were not brought to the USSR - Political system hegemonised by the communist party by: 1. Merging the Russian and German communist party and social party in the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands, SED) 2. Creating an anti-fascist alliance in which the SED was hegemonic because the communist by themselves were not strong enough US: the Third World War was not inevitable initially It wanted to create a liberal democratic system for cooperation with the USSR, in which they wanted to be the hegemon They started to understand how Stalin was thinking in the early spring in 1946 when G. Kennan sent a long telegram to the US embassy explaining how the Soviets were thinking Cooperation and economy Starting from the late 1945 the US started to implement a Western-style system: local municipal elections → Länder elections → assembly of the Länder wrote constitutions → cooperation between Western Länder Cooperation was made necessary by the economic needs The industrial apparatus was about 80% still intact ≠ but the infrastructure was destroyed and act as a single economic unity No currency because the inflation destroyed its value → when you are paid with money that has no value, you don’t work and you don’t sell → low productivity and empty shops → reverted to barter A currency has a value if you trust the state → the real problem of the rebirth of the economy was connected to the creation of national institutions → impossible because it would mean that the division was forever → Cold War escalation In short, it was impossible to recreate Germany together or to create only a Western Germany; but without the latter, it was impossible to have an economic rebirth Page 50 / 180 - This verdict of the Nuremberg trials didn’t acquire much success even in Germany → police involved in the protection of those acquitted. - Other trials were held in different places, some Nazi leaders managed to avoid justice altogether (showing how Nazism had been widely accepted and supported in certain areas of Germany) and others escaped in exile abroad. - A major issue remained regarding the denazification of the German population since at least 1/5 of the German population had participated to different degrees to Nazi activities or had been involved in them. • Additional issue of people not necessarily connected to the Nazi who may have had a more significant role in perpetrating negative aspects of national socialism than Nazi concierges had. - Additional issue: in the Soviet zone a different form of denazification took place, but it was based on Marxist-Leninist principles. • This type of denazification was based on the belief that national socialism had been an extreme form of capitalist exploitation and that fascists could be defeated by removing the bourgeoisie from prominent positions and by destroying its economic power. - In WG zone, the Brits often relied on former Nazis for administrative and technical services in rebuilding the area’s economy. When these people were brought to trial and condemned → Brit authorities often accused of softness on the Nazi and inefficiency in administration. - Authorities also faced public criticism (especially in the US) for not doing enough to denazify Germany → both Americans and Brits dismissed and arrested large number of Nazis during the first months of the occupation → large amount of people removed from office/had job applications refused. US military governor under pressure to produce a compelling denazification scheme applicable to the whole of Germany → questionnaire method + set up of denazification tribunals. - Issue: even those accused of being “followers” were suspended from their positions → significant administration issues. - Tendency to focus on smaller cases rather than large and more important ones → such application of the law created a shared sense of solidarity between Nazis and non-Nazis against the occupiers. - Americans tried to apply their process of denazification to the whole of Germany → 1946 quadripartite directive made categorisations given above mandatory for the whole of Germany → 1949 denazification ended. - Russian denazification didn’t use much reference to the legislation and adopted a more pragmatic manner that enabled several competent administrators (including social democrats) to aid the process of zonal rehabilitation. - Denazification = heavily criticised aspect of the Anglo-American occupation policy. Page 51 / 180 • Delayed impact and scale, and perceived unfairness → discrediting of the policy among victor countries and zones alike. - Denazification had some advantages: forced Nazi enthusiasts to not have freedom of activity → limitation to their actions → Federal Republic had a great advantage compared to the Weimar Republic. RE-EDUCATION - Allies wanted to create new political culture in Germany → re-education. - Britain and US believed that the militaristic and aggressive nature of German politics was explicable in terms of family life and education. - 2 possible ways of changing German education: • Altering the structure of the German system (US approach) • Trying to inculcate a system based on liberal values (UK approach - *France tried a mix of the two measures. - Americans believed German system of secondary education encouraged hierarchical and authoritarian attitudes + the restricted nature of the study route in Germany strongly contradicted the system of comprehensive and free public high schools in the US which seemed more democratic → US saw re-education as a prerequisite for the revival of self-government in Germany and therefore hoped to be able to change the structure of schooling. - Brits believed one aspect which was defective in German education was the absence of prestigious private schools however, they never admitted that their education system was inferior to that of the Germans. For the Brits, re-education should have come from the Germans themselves and couldn’t be imposed from outside. Brits ’tendency was to encourage native traditions of liberal education dating back to von Humboldt. - There were also some attempts to dissuade German prisoners of war in Britain away from national socialism. The Brits and the US were effective in tackling the serious issue presented by textbooks in German schools → the teaching of history was a particular problem. - The various attempts to alter fundamentally the structure of German education weren’t so successful. In the British zone, some efforts were made by social democratic Land governments to reform the system by introducing comprehensive education, but they aroused intense hostility from those who feared a loss of status if the Gymnasium was abolished and were unsupported by the British authorities. Page 52 / 180 - Americans tried to insist on changes in their zone by pushing for the abolition of school fees and the introduction of a mandatory period of primary school and comprehensive high school education. - Land gov’ts showed little enthusiasm for these experiments. - Christian democrats were concerned with establishing the right to create separate confessional schools in the public sector. - 1948, Americans stop trying to impose new ways on Germany and switch to an approach of influence by encouragement. • Ex. Lander in the American zone abolished school fees and provided free textbooks. - Post-war era was also an opportunity to change the German university system. The best model to follow was the American one. However, the difficult economic situation made these reforms a low priority + the vested interests within German university asserted themselves against reformers and denazifiers → University system was left virtually untouched. SENIOR CIVIL SERVICE - Universities in Germany served the state purpose of training senior civil servants. • Category of employment included secondary school teachers and university professors, and judges, but most importantly, senior administrative officials of the Lander and the Reich. - Employees of this sector qualified for the well-established rights of German officialdom. • In order to quality, university education was needed and so was a qualification in the law field. - Critics of civil service deemed it too subservient to the rulers of the state, rather than focused on the duties of the state + the monopoly of lawyers created a narrowly legalistic attitude to administrative problems. - 1945-48: opportunity to reform the German administrative system civil service. - Americans wanted to end lawyers ’monopoly → recruitment should become more flexible and openly competitive; officials should be prevented from presenting themselves for election to parliament as they should be politically neutral and appointed by independent personnel offices in each Land. • Christian democrats and liberals sympathised with senior officials and didn’t want change. • Social democrats were attracted to the abolition of caste division but refused to accept restrictions on officials ’political rights. - The changes represented a double-edged matter: if the officials were allowed to be politically active, the parties could hope to attract them and create for themselves a source of patronage. Page 55 / 180 • Broadcasting remained decentralised in the Lander who still had influence over it (TV channels adopted the same method) - This led to (after German unification 1990) Germany having one of the most respectable broadcasting services in the world. - Federal Republic had greater difficulties to overcome. • Misery → discrediting of militarism - Miseries blames on Hitler, not on the new German party system • Democracy = only real guarantor of German security against Communist penetration → creation of an environment to prevent authoritarianism in West Germany RETRIBUTION - JUDT - In order to gain legitimacy and reassume the authority of properly constituted states, the governments of liberated Europe had first to deal with the legacy of regimes that had fallen during the war. The Nazis and their allies had been defeated, but given the unprecedented scale of their crimes, this was obviously not enough. - It was important to define their actions as crimes and to punish them accordingly. The desire for punishment also responded to deep-seated needs. It was a kind of revenge because the conflict was an experience of daily degradation, in which everybody had lost something and many even everything. Unlike the First World War, nobody emerged proud from the Second World War. World War II with pride, indeed many came out guilty. The majority of Europeans experienced the conflict passively: defeated and occupied by a foreigner, then liberated by another. The only reason for national pride were the armed resistance movements that had fought against the invader. - The experience of collaboration was certainly very degrading. The punishment of the conflict began during the conflict, but often in a clandestine manner. In the gap between the German retreat and the establishment of an allied government, popular frustration, and the desire for personal revenge, often tinged with political opportunism and economic interests, led to brief but bloody showdowns. - In France, many people were executed before the Normandy landings, as well as in Italy before the collapse of the Salò Republic. - In the East, the Germans sought cooperation mainly with separatist movements, therefore, with the German retreat, the first victims of spontaneous revenge were ethnic minorities and the Soviet forces did nothing to prevent this. In fact, the spontaneous showdowns contributed to a further elimination of political elites that could have been an obstacle to the post-war ambitions of communism. - Nowhere, however, did these summary showdowns last long. The new fragile governments had no interest in fuelling all this violence, so the first task of the new authorities was the establishment of justice. Trials and sentencing were to be the responsibility of the new state, and this transition took place as soon as the new governments became strong enough to disarm the partisans and impose their Page 56 / 180 own authority. The disarmament of the partisans was surprisingly smooth, at least in Western and central Europe, and the murders and other crimes committed in the furious months of liberation where somewhat dismissed. The first problems arose with the punishment of collaborationists. First of all, there was no precedent for this, so it was an entirely new discipline to legislate on. It was individuals who were put on trial, with results that varied according to time and place. Many were unjustly accused and punished, while many others managed to escape fair punishment. - There were incredible procedural irregularities and paradoxical situations and the results were largely flawed. All in all, however, given the precarious context, it is surprising that the rule of law could be established relatively quickly, albeit, albeit with a number of problems. - The number of people convicted, and the severity of the penalties varied considerably in each country. The highest percentage of punishments was in Norway, followed by Belgium and the Netherlands. In France, collaborationism was punished rather mildly, partly because it was widespread during the war. There is a substantial difference between countries where governments had gone into exile, such as Holland, Belgium and Norway, and France, where the Vichy regime was the legitimate government. Since the state was the main culprit, it seemed cruel indeed to accuse citizens of the same crime, especially taking into account that, in the trials against the collaborationists, one judge in four had worked for that state. The main punishment for the collaborationists was 'national degradation', which consisted of being deprived of everything the French considered pleasant, such as the right to wear war decorations, to be a lawyer, a notary, a teacher, to own a publishing house or to be a bank manager. No one in France was punished for 'crimes against humanity' like the Germans. For various reasons, the Italian experience was particular. Although it was a former Axis power, the Allies allowed it to conduct its own trials. But there remained considerable uncertainty as to whom to prosecute and for what, given that the term fascist could be applied to a very broad and indefinable category of people. - The only clearly indictable offence was collaboration with the enemy after the armistice, so most of the accused were in the north and were connected to the Republic of Salò. The difference therefore applied to fascists who joined the CSR and those who did not. However, the trials were largely conducted by former fascists, and they were very sympathetic as they could be in the dock. The results of the trials satisfied no one. - In the years of the Cold War, Italy's transformation from Axis power to democratically which took place in a suspiciously painless manner, was often attributed to American pressure and the political influence of the Vatican, but the reality is much more complex. Certainly, the Church got off lightly, considering its friendly relations with fascism and its silence about Nazi crimes. However, the pressure from the Church had to be borne, so the purge of fascists was carried out more efficiently in the regions where the Resistance and the left had control of power. - It was Palmiro Togliatti, leader of the PCI, who, as Minister of Justice, drafted the 1946 amnesty that ended the Fascist purge. Togliatti saw no reason, in a country where almost all citizens had been compromised with fascism, to exasperate the situation of a nation that was already on the brink of civil war. It was much better to work to re-establish normal living conditions, leaving fascism behind. A special case was Greece, where punishments were meted out to left-wing partisans who tried to overthrow the post-war government. In the Soviet countries and in Tito's Yugoslavia, the punishment of fascists was a way to cleanse the local social and political landscape of any possible obstacles to communist rule. Page 57 / 180 - It is difficult to judge the success of the post-war trials and anti-fascist purges in the countries that were occupied. The verdicts were highly criticised: those who had been tried during the war or immediately after the liberation received far harsher punishments than those tried later. - Those found guilty, even those with minor offences, were sentenced in the spring of 1945 to much longer sentences than the leading collaborators one or more years later. Death sentences were frequent and provoked little opposition: devaluation of life brought about by the war made them seem less severe, and more justified, than they would have appeared under normal circumstances. What caused indignation was the manifest incongruity of the sentences and punishments, which were issued by judges and juries that were certainly not without blemish. - Many intellectuals were punished, while businessmen and high officials who had profited from the occupation got off lightly, at least in Western Europe. In Italy, for example, the Allies left FIAT manager Vittorio Valletta in place, despite his known collusion with the fascist authorities - Across Europe, bankers and officials who had worked for the occupying regimes and supplied the German forces were left in place, provided they continued to provide the same services to the new democracies, ensuring continuity and stability. - Perhaps compromises of this kind were inevitable. In 1945 there was a great desire to start again from whatever was necessary as a basis for building for the future. The provisional governments established after the liberation had proved almost totally impotent and therefore the help of the economic, financial and industrial elites was essential to help the population. Economic purges could have been counterproductive and even disastrous. But a price had to be paid for such compromises in terms of political cynicism and the drastic cancellation of the illusions and hopes raised by the liberation. This led to a rapid change of mood. Once the blame had been assigned for the recent past and punished those whose cases were more striking or psychologically satisfying, almost all the inhabitants of the former German-occupied regions wanted above all to put what had happened behind them and return to a normal life. - Few were still willing to blame their fellow citizens for the most horrendous crimes, for which, according to common opinion, the Germans had to pay. The conviction that Germany was the main culprit for the horror of war was so great that even Austria was excluded. - Austria collaborated with Germany to a considerable extent during the war but was treated as a victim of the Nazis and got off scantily. Germany, on the other hand, had to pay for its war crimes in a series of trials between 1945 and 1947. The most famous trial was that of the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg, which tried the main Nazi leaders between October 1945 and October 1946. But trials were held all over Germany. Certainly, the Germans could not be punished for being Nazis, there were too many of them and they were against collective guilt. Instead, the guilt of the leaders was clear. From the beginning, war crimes trials had both justice and pedagogical intent. The Nuremberg hearings were broadcasted twice a day on German radio and the trials were repeated in schools, cinemas and re-education centres throughout the country. However, the pedagogical function was not always clear. In a first series of proceedings, many concentration camp commanders and guards managed to get away with it thanks to lawyers who cross-examined and humiliated witnesses and camp survivors. It is therefore difficult to determine the extent to which these trials contributed to the political and moral re-education of Germany, although they did set an important legal precedent by establishing that responsibility for crimes committed for reasons of state or ideology was punishable in law. Page 60 / 180 - ≠ The US constitution created 2 representatives centres, one fragmented (Congress), President (unified) - ≠ In the UK the fragmented parliament must be able to produce a unified government thanks to the role of political parties - French history is centred on this problem since the French Revolution • The Jacobins were proposing themselves as a party that was not a party, able to represent democracy in its entirely according to a Rousseauvian concept of representation: do not represent public opinion in its diversity, but as the volonté générale • Napoleon was an answer to the inability of the French Revolution to rebuild this unity → all the 10th century is about this dispendium: the revolution puts the assembly at the centre, and counter- revolution that puts a single individual at the centre of the political system • The Second Empire of Napoleon III 1848-51 - we need government to be entrusted into the hands of a single individual that can embody the general will, because the assembly would embody only the fragmentation of the public opinion → it would weaken the nation-state • End of the Second Empire in 1870 and birth of the III Republic (1870-1940) → equilibrium strongly centred on parliament and on the representation of the diversity of public opinion - The price that it pays is a very unstable of the government → there is a trade-off: the more you represent public opinion in its diversity, the more you have troubles to have a stable government that takes decisions - It is culturally strong: they created a strong public republican culture • Republican = centred on the rights of the individual, on the representative government, on the primacy of parliament, on the separation between state and church, cooperative foreign policy and on the idea of social progress (similar to what we define as “liberal democratic culture” • There is an effective effort in educating people to republican values, giving them a very strong republican formation → people absorbed liberal democratic values - but politically weak: not able to create a very effective stable strong political regime the system is not able to solve this structural problem of democracy • This feebleness of this regime to confront History in an effective way is constantly denounced by the anti-republican culture radical right wing and also by the moderate right • there is a constant criticism and tension, an anti-parliamentary feeling: in a parliament, we are waste time on discussions, chat all the time, sectional interests, corruption takes place • This criticism becomes strong in the 1920-1930s for two reasons Page 61 / 180 1. after the First World War the crisis of the important Parti republican radical socialiste makes the III republic weaker → the republican system is in crisis because liberal democracy is in crisis 2. External challenges are much more serious - This culture is suspicious of strong government → they think it is a danger to democracy - In the 1920-1930s there is a lot of debate about reforming the constitution to strengthen the executive power and make the system more stable - All this debate of constitutional reform comes to nothing because republican culture is suspicious and able to block any attempt → the situation does not change DEFEAT OF FRANCE - When France is defeated in 1940, all this comes up because it demonstrated that the III Republic was inefficient and fragile; the political system was not able to defend the national interest when it came to the final confrontation - The full powers were given to Marechal Pétain, a military figure, which had to create a new political system meant to be more efficient and authoritarian • He explains the defeat in a speech (June 20, 1940) "Tous les peuples ont connus tour → tour des succès et des revers. C’est par la manière dont ils réagissent qu’ils se montrent faibles ou grands. Nous tirerons la leçon des batailles perdues. Depuis la victoire, l’esprit de jouissance l’a emporté sur l’esprit de sacrifice. On a revendiqué plus qu’on a servi. On a voulu épargner l’effort; on rencontre aujourd’hui le malheur.” • He is putting together a spiritual with an institutional element: this republican culture was based on individual enjoyment and lost its unity → this is the reason why France lost • This interpretation of the defeat was widespread → destroyed the III Republic - In 1940, De Gaulle fled to the UK and created an alternative France: also among the people around him, the interpretation that the III Republic was a failure was similar; the difference was that whereas Pétain accepted the defeat, DG wanted to continue fighting - This explains why the French went for an authoritarian regime the Republic of Vichy - If the defeat in 1940 demonstrated the weakness of republicanism, during the early 1940s, the impossibility of the authoritarian system is also demonstrated - Between 1940 and 1944, through the Second World War, until Paris is liberated in 1944, there are some changes • The Vichy republic is discredited by its collaboration with the Nazi regime and by the final defeat of Nazism Page 62 / 180 • Defeat of liberal democracy and authoritarianism → he idea is how to get back to a different form of republicanism without authoritarianism • There are 2 centres that both pretend of embody France - In 1944 is clear that De Gaulle won the battle and that its government in exile is the real continuity in Aug 1944 • Ordonnance on 9 August 1944 to establish the republican legality “Article 1 : La forme du Gouvernement de la France est et demeure la République. En droit, celle-ci n’a jamais cessé d’exister” TOWARDS THE FOURTH REPUBLIC - Dilemma between 1944-1946 in the recreation of the new republic: how should it be? - The debate on the institutional/constitutional reforms inside the resistance movement presents 3 options: 1. Presidential system: creating an element to counterbalance parliamentary fragmentation • Dualism with the parliament and president counterbalancing one another: parliament would represent public opinion and President would represent the national interest in its unity • Republican culture was suspicious because fearful of bonapartism • inspired by US and Weimar (president elected with a universal suffrage) 2. System with strong political parties, that would create a strong majority and a stable government • It should be the task of political parties to organise the parliament and to create a stable and strong majority that would create a strong executive • Inspired by the UK 3. Assembly Parliamentary system: strongly based on parliament • Wanted by the Communists: they did not have clear institutional ideas in this historical moment; they focused on power relationships and the strength of political parties • Hostile to presidentialism and parlamentarism • they are aware that in the West they would end up in the opposition so they want a system that leaves an important role of the opposition and creates wide convergences of different political parties → they could gain more power • They think that in the assembly they would have a strong presence and influence DUALISM: POLITICAL PARTIES-DE GAULLE - There is a rather important dualism in the recreation of this new political system and Charles De Gaulle Page 65 / 180 • The referendum was a victory for Charles De Gaulle but the result of the election was not. The majority went to the socialists and the communists. • “Droite”: right wing groups were among the heirs of thee III rep, what in the IV rep would be called the “moderé” • The indication is ambiguous also because Charles De Gaulle does not have his own party • He is expressing some supra-party opinion based on a contradiction: winning the referendum and losing the elections • After the election in 1945 he becomes head of government but in Jan 1946 he resigns as PM because of clashes with the political parties DRAFT CONSTITUTION OF 19 APRIL 1946 - The first draft constitution was similar to what the Communists would have liked to have - Very strong parliamentary unicameral assembly that leads a marginal role to the president and to the government ≠ the Christian Democrats wanted a bicameral parliament because they believe in the checks and balances - First title is "On sovereignty and the National Assembly” Page 66 / 180 - Article 47: “Le peuple français exerce sa souveraineté par ses députés à l'Assemblée nationale, élus au suffrage universel, égal, direct et secret. La Constitution ne pourra être modifiée que par voie de référendum” • Sovereignty is expressed by the national assembly ≠ in the Italian constitution: sovereignty belongs to the people, they express their sovereignty in the ways written by the Constitution (so also through the referendum) - There is a unicameral parliament because the general will cannot be divided (Jacobin logic) - The National Assembly elects the President of the Council of Ministers • The President does not even have the right to appoint him/her as in Italy • ≠ In the German constitution the chancellor has an individual confidence then he/she appoints the ministers → he/she has more freedom - Article 81 “La question de confiance ne peut être posée qu'après délibération du Conseil des ministres ; elle ne peut l'être que par le président du Conseil. Le vote sur la question de confiance ne peut intervenir qu'un jour franc après qu'elle a été posée devant l'Assemblée. Il a lieu au scrutin public. La confiance ne peut être refusée au cabinet qu'à la majorité absolue des députés a l’Assemblée. Ce refus entraîne la démission collective du cabinet” • introduces a feeble rationalisation of parliamentarianism (typical of postwar constitutions): idea we can strengthen the government by making more difficult for parliaments to vote a no- confidence motion against the government → but this is weak • The most effective norm is the constructive vote of no confidence in the German constitution: you cannot vote against the government if you do not have another government that is waiting - The dissolution of the National Assembly is complicated, because if the president or the government has this power, then it becomes an instrument of blackmail • It can happen only if 2/3 of the deputies vote for it (impossible) or with complicated conditions (set of ministerial crises) that make it possible for the council of ministers (as a collective body) • ≠ in the UK it is in the hands of the government: important instrument to put pressure on a parliament Page 67 / 180 - According to the regulations that Charles De Gaulle established and were voted in 1945, this constitution had to be voted also in a referendum → Second referendum in May 1946 → the constitution is rejected • High level of abstention (almost 19%), the “no” won by a narrow margin - The impact of Charles De Gaulle in the transition is crucial in creating an alternative to political parties → this is mirrored in the refusal to the first constitution THE CONSTITUTION OF OCTOBER 1946 - France is obliged to vote a second time for a second constituent assembly that should write a second constitution Page 70 / 180 - Relationship between capitalism and democracy THE DISPUTED LESSONS OF INTERWAR DEMOCRACY Politicians drew different conclusions from the failures of interwar democracy → determination of debates on institutions and socioeconomic conditions needed to transition to democracy (instrumentalist view of the past used to discredit opposing democratic credentials) LEFT Roots of democracy’s troubles: failed integration of masses into the state. Suspicion of elites’ intentions and inability of the masses to be “political” and “democratic”. Free market capitalism harms social equality → democracy suffers from the absence of true equality. Capitalism forces people to compete and be egoistic → only the state can guarantee social and political equality. Post-war democracies needed to be more inclusive by fostering integration between citizens and state. - Institutions: representative and responsive to popular sovereignty. Democracy ought to be parliamentary. - Parties = vehicles of political emancipation RIGHT Challenge to the Left’s notion of democracy failure from economic system and inability of representative institutions to meet the challenge of mass politics. Failure of interwar democracy caused by excess of democracy → harm of political stability and individual freedoms. Institutional outline of Italy, France and WG failed to provide stability and secure individual liberties → democracy needed rigid mechanisms to defend itself and the freedom of citizens. Political liberties should be constitutionally secured. Priority on the stability of the executive, guarantee of individual freedom to protect democracy against potential radicalisation of popular will. Democracy ought to be parliamentary (except Gaullists). - Parties = vehicles of political emancipation. Page 71 / 180 ITALY *2 political divides (due to economic policy and int’l alliances): 1. Between major parties (PSI, PCI and DC) and those holding anti- party sentiments. 2. Among all parties. Liberal tradition: parties removed from society. Average citizen lacked sufficient political development to enable integration. - Fascism exacerbated the average Italian’s lack of civic education. Interwar lessons varied (especially regarding the rel. between communism and democracy) - Biennio Rosso → rise of fascism → impossible to secure democracy without unity of the working class → formation of the Popular Front (in which communists gained advantage). Universal blame on the capitalist system for the failure of democracy. - Belief that the roots of fascism still existed. - Capitalism and democracy are incompatible. Predilection for institutional reform aimed at governmental stability. FRANCE Interwar lessons varied (especially regarding the rel. between communism and democracy) - Strained collaboration between socialists and communists → rupture in 1947 (less definitive). Universal blame on the capitalist system for the failure of democracy. Authoritarianism = threat to democracy. 3rd republic should be replaced by a system maintaining supremacy of parliament and parties. Predilection for institutional reform aimed at governmental stability. Gaullists: problem of French democracy = parliament and parties were too powerful, 3rd republic failed in preventing party conflict and guaranteeing a strong/stable executive. 3rd republic should be replaced by a system with a strong executive led by a powerful head of state. Page 72 / 180 WEST GERMANY Average citizen lacked sufficient political development to enable integration. - Germans remained subjects and didn’t become citizens. Interwar lessons varied (especially regarding the rel. between communism and democracy) - Antagonism between SPD and communist KPD impossible to resolve Universal blame on the capitalist system for the failure of democracy. - KPD: German catastrophe caused by big capital. - Capitalism and democracy are incompatible. Interwar democracy failure = relationship between citizen and state in post-unification Germany. - Reform = militant democracy able to defend itself against anti-democratic forces + special guarantees to endure political stability Basic Law 1948: commitment to representative nature of democracy, intolerance for opposition or manipulation of democratic values, institutional mechanisms to safeguard governmental stability. Interwar democracy failure = relationship between citizen and state in post- unification Germany. - Reform = militant democracy able to defend itself against anti- democratic forces + special guarantees to endure political stability REFORM OF PARTY DEMOCRACY Transformation successful only if accompanied by new institutional outline. 3 ways to break with interwar-style democracy: 1. Overhaul intra-party relations. 2. Restrict political process to truly democratic parties. 3. Parties to reform themselves as means of reforming party democracy. LEFT RIGHT Page 75 / 180 SOCIOECONOMIC DIMENSION OF DEMOCRACY Two competing camps: LEFT CONSERVATIVES Extensive limitations on the free market economy. Unification of political liberties with social equality → Socialist economy and democratic politics. Transformation focused on social equality. Capitalism could never ensure the substantive degree of social equality essential to the realisation of democracy. Contestation of link between democracy and capitalism. Expansion of democracy should transcend national boundaries of liberal and formal democracy. Post-war constitutions should be programmatic + socioeconomic rights + state’s imperative to realise such rights. Basis of position: - Post-war democracy involved protection of people by the state and required nationalisation of banks, insurance companies, big industries and energy sector. Social market economy in which the state intervened to foster social justice. Market economy guarantees individual liberties → democracy. Basis of position: protection of people against the state → construction of a substantial democracy → reformation of the social structure. Rejection of expanding democracy. Democracy centred on individual liberty, not social equality. Only reformed capitalism can ensure individual freedom. Socioeconomic reforms focused on individual freedom and guarantees against possible threats to democracy associated with excessive state interference in the economy. Relationship between democracy and capitalism divided Conservatives and the Left during the last decades of the post-war period. The extent of these ideological divisions affected political power relations depending on national circumstances. ITALY and WEST GERMANY Longer constitutional debates. Rift between Left and CD → economy = most divisive issue in the debate on democratic reform. FRANCE Main political actors settled on nationalisation of industrial and financial sectors and agreed on the principle of a planned economy in the framework of a free market. Popularity gained by combination of political liberalism and socialist economy. Page 76 / 180 THE LIBERATION AND THE INSTITUTIONAL QUESTION IN FRANCE - CARTIER INTRODUCTION - Question of French institutions absorbed attention of the Resistance movement and of the political parties → aired in the legislative or quasi-legislative organs of the Resistance and Liberation authorities: 1. Provisional Consultative Assembly (1943) to enhance the democratic legitimacy of the CFLN 2. PCA replaced in 1945 by the 1st of the two National Constituent Assemblies where the legislature was legitimated by universal suffrage - Institutional question was central to the political debate and focused on liberty, dignity, and daily lives of human beings - Two unifying factors: 1. Internal Resistance reflected desire for renewal. 2. “Republic became a unifying symbol of fight against fascism → the concepts of republic, democracy, liberty and welfare merged into a single ideal - French people accepted a compromise between CDG’s strong executive and the Left’s unicameral parliament - Construction of the new republic in two phases: 1. Groundwork for transition based on the founding myth of the continuity of the republic. 2. Definition of a new regime within the framework of two aspirations: • Renew the bases and modes of expression of French democracy • Establishment of a form of rationalised parliamentarism THE PRELIMINARIES OF TRANSITION: A CONSENSUS OVER ESSENTIALS The selective liquidation of the past - Break with Vichy regime was easy and consensual VS break with the 3rd republic was harder and more controversial. - Consensus had a twofold base: #1 Legal void of Vichy; #2 Myth of continuity of the republic - For the Free French in London, Vichy had no legal existence: it was illegitimate and unconstitutional → 1944 ordonnance re-established republican legality on the French mainland and declared all Vichy acts “null and void” → legitimisation of Free France. Page 77 / 180 • CDG used the word “France” alongside the concept of democracy to foster the political union of the Free French in their fight alongside the alliance. - 3rd republic was deemed guilty of institutional and moral weakness; however, the term “Republic” soon became synonym with fighting for Free French and the internal Resistance was very attached to this concept. - → Straightforward return to the constitutional laws of 1875 and to France’s institutions as they were before 1940 was not a fully viable option. - National sovereignty: it was up to the nation to assume responsibilities through a free vote concerning the institutions and the leadership of France. - 1st step: 1944 ordonnance regarding the provisional post-liberation authorities → gradual return to representative institutions working on democratic principles. - 2nd step: 1945 ordonnance deciding on a national vote combining the referendum with the election of a constituent assembly against the opinion of the Consultative Assembly. • Provision for a referendum = responsibility for the break with former institutions was politically attributable only to the French people. FORMALISING THE PRESENT - Legal texts issued by provisional authorities = basis for a provisional regime → 1945 = end of the era of autocratic provisional governments. - The first formally constitutional law of the provisional republic (1945) re-established the republican principles of the separation of powers and representative and accountable gov’t. - Provisions were aimed at reinforcing gov’t stability by setting a limit to the scope of no-confidence motions + rejection of a finance bill should not automatically result in the resignation of the gov’t. - Restrictions on powers of the newly elected Assembly → 1945 National Constituent Assembly was limited in its competences and term of office by a constitutional law. • Limitations corresponded to the same logic of restraining the “sovereignty” of the constituent assemblies. • NCA wasn’t empowered to change the constitution or modify the provisional constitution - This power was legally vested in the French citizens. • Clear majority agreed with such limitations. - Divisions predicted fundamental political quarrels in discussions of the new constitution → disintegration of the unity of France THE CONSTITUTIONAL OUTCOME: A COMPROMISE ON FUNDAMENTALS - Question of French future institutions debated in the two Constituent Assemblies. Page 80 / 180 - 1946: Laws passed by the National Assembly could be referred to the Constitutional Committee together with the president of the republic and the president of the council, only after an absolute majority vote of the upper house. - In the 4th republic, the Constitutional Committee only had symbolic role , but it laid the foundations for a real judicial review of constitutionality under the 1958 constitution. The constitution of the Fourth French Republic Week 5 PARTY DEMOCRACY IN THE 1950S - How democracies were recreated in the 1950s conditioned today’s reality - In the 1960s and 1970s we have new challenges → democracy is under stress because in some cases it did not even solve the previous ones THREE MODELS OF DEMOCRACY - When we say that liberal democracy came back after 1945, this is a simplification. There are three models of democracy battling against one another: 3. Competitive democracy 4. Progressive democracy 5. Direct democracy 1. Competitive democracy - Representative government in the Anglo-Saxon style (model since the late 19th century) - You vote for a parliament → the parliament creates a government - there are 2 blocks (left and right) competing for power in a liberal democracy - there is the liberal foundation (different opinions among the voters) - there is a competition in a representative democracy 2. Progressive democracy - Wanted by the Communists - Not a competition but a convergence of all the mass political parties (permanent “grosse coalition”) → democracy based on a near unanimity of all mass antifascist parties • The communist want to be the hegemon of a coalition - This model is compatible with the idea of the centrality of the National Assembly, that embodies the general will Page 81 / 180 - Real strategy behind this: the big and strong communists parties in the Western block countries know that they must act carefully • as Americans are paramount, it would be difficult for them to take power alone → they cannot bring a Soviet model - There is the idea of creating a large coalition inside which the Communists may have power, so it can be acceptable - This was the model in Italy until the 1980s: the Historic Compromise between the Communist E. Berlinguer and the Christian Democrat Aldo Moro is an example of this model (Craxi wanted to break up the dialogue) • P. Togliatti calls it “progressive democracy”: competitive democracy would not be progressive, it would be functional to capitalism • the only way to create a democracy able to deeply transform capitalism and put the basis for the construction of a Socialist economy is to represent all the interests of the people by building a large coalition with the socialists and Christian Democrats • This is an answer to the “converse of excludendum”: unwritten rule in Italian politics to say that the PCI cannot govern alone - In Germany this does not happen: in Western Germany, the Communist party is too small 3. Direct democracy - Another answer to revolutionary postwar climate: there is a strong desire for renewal through democratic participation - National Liberation Committees: political counterpart of the Resistance movement • They participated in the fight against fascism, so they want a democracy in which ordinary people everyday take decisions ≠ not voting only every five years • Participation makes you a guardian democracy - It can also be called grassroots/soviet democracy, or even Soviet of democracy (paradox: there was a lot of control by the party) - Anglo-Saxon competitive democracy prevails on the other two models - Direct democracy is something that belongs to the revolutionary expectations of 1945-1946 but then with the Cold War it is reabsorbed • The public opinion wants stability and order → this idea of participating in the decision-making is not appealing because individuals want to retreat in the private sphere - Progressive democracy is perceived by the non-communists as a Trojan horse by the Communist Page 82 / 180 - Cfr. Speeches by Palmiro Togliatti (quoted in the article by Orsina): if it does not work well, it is because the communists are not in power → however, this utopia during the Cold War is impossible and it can work only in emergency - In FR this idea of the big anti-fascist coalition in all moment of crisis is a major threat, but it never becomes real → both in 1958 and in 1968 the solution its De Gaulle - In Italy the solution of progressive democracy is used between 1976-1979 but this is because it is an emergency; there is always the alternative of direct grassroots democracy still today - The three political systems had different paths: Italy and Germany solved these two problems in different ways; France did not solve them → collapse in 1958 TWO PROBLEMS 1. The role of individual leadership / efficiency of government - Difficult with Charles De Gaulle in France - The failure to solve this problem was crucial for the Weimar Republic → the German constitutional thinking was influenced by the importance of the Emperor → this problem remained open in 1918- 1919 → how to substitute the emperor or rebalance the system is an issue 2. Anti-system parties - The theorising of Max Weber → he gave an important role to charismatic leadership → the dictator in emergency is needed → the archetype of the charismatic leadership is Moses that brings the Jews from one element of stability to the other - A dictator is needed in emergency times because he/she brings the system from a moment of stability to a moment of stability through crisis - This is a problem in Italy (went from a monarchy to a republic) and Germany too → how do we create an element of stability in case democracy enters into a crisis? - What do we do with anti-system parties (nostalgic or Communists) that do not accept the basis of democracy? Constitutions on #1 issue: individual leadership - German postwar constitution • There was a strong element of dualism in the Weimar Constitution between the Reichstag and president of the republic (directly elected by the people) • While the first Friedrich Ebert was a socialist and a defender of the republic, in 1925 the following president Paul von Hindenburg was no friend of the republic but of the old traditional Germany → since 1925 there was a strong opposition • The idea that institutionalised individual leadership can be a danger to democracy was widespread Page 85 / 180 - The postwar system is build with suspicion against individual leadership because of the fascist experience → The Italian constitution does not provide an important role for individual leadership - However, between 1945-1953 we have A. De Gasperi as a strong leader → we can argue that in the I legislature (1948-1953) Italy is governed like a chancellor democracy centralised on the president of the council of ministers • This is because of three exceptional circumstances: 1. 1948 the Christian Democrats had an absolute majority in the Parliament, so being the leader of the Christian Democrats he can condition the parliamentary struggle 2. The Christian Democrats are not yet a strongly organised party in the late 1940s; the party is still in search of itself until the late 1950s → this allows De Gasperi to be independent from its party and govern as a prime minister without considering what the party would do 3. The personality of De Gasperi: is a man of the 19th century that has in mind the liberal model centred on the president of the council of ministers • ADG was aware of the exceptional circumstances: he knew that things would change and that the stability was imperial → he tried to stabilised the system but he failed • When these circumstances disappear after 1953, the problem of how to have a strong government and how to use charismatic leadership as an element to strengthen the system will pop up Constitutions on #2 issue: Anti-system parties - German constitution • It coped with this issue thanks to the Constitution - Art 1: idea to anchor the constitution to important values and almost natural law elements Article 1 [Human dignity – Human rights – Legally binding force of basic rights] (1) Human dignity shall be inviolable. To respect and protect it shall be the duty of all state authority. (2) The German people therefore acknowledge inviolable and inalienable human rights as the basis of every community, of peace and of justice in the world. (3) The following basic rights shall bind the legislature, the executive and the judiciary as directly applicable law. Article 18 [Forfeiture of basic rights] Whoever abuses the freedom of expression […] in order to combat the free democratic basic order shall forfeit these basic rights. This forfeiture and its extent shall be declared by the Federal Constitutional Court. Page 86 / 180 - Art. 18 → contradiction clause: If you use your expression of opinion to attack the free democratic basic order, you lose your expression of opinion • important and recurrent formula “free democratic basic order”: set of values on which the constitution is based (individual HR, representative government, respect of international law) → they cannot be touched • Art 21: political parties are at the centre of the constitution - In the Weimar Constitution even if it is considered as a party democracy, political parties were mentioned en passant and only considered in negative terms (republic functionary could not belong to political parties) - There was a strong anti-party sentiment which allowed hitler to take the power saying that its party was the party to end all parties - However, there is the possibility to outlaw political parties if they seek to abolish the free democratic basic order. This happened times: • In 1952 to outlaw the Sozialistische Reichspartei (neo-nazi party) • In 1956 to outlaw the Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands (KPD) • However, it is very difficult to outlaw a political party, because if you outlaw a political party by legal means you are not killing members and voters, they are still there - Using legal clauses is tricky and not necessarily has an impact Article 19 [Restriction of basic rights – Legal remedies] (1) Insofar as, under this Basic Law, a basic right may be restricted by or pursuant to a law, such law must apply generally and not merely to a single case. In addition, the law must specify the basic right affected and the Article in which it appears. (2) In no case may the essence of a basic right be affected. (3) The basic rights shall also apply to domestic legal persons to the extent that the nature of such rights permits. Article 21 [Political parties] (1) Political parties shall participate in the formation of the political will of the people. They may be freely established. Their internal organisation must conform to democratic principles. They must publicly account for their assets and for the sources and use of their funds. (2) Parties that, by reason of their aims or the behaviour of their adherents, seek to undermine or abolish the free democratic basic order or to endanger the existence of the Federal Republic of Germany shall be unconstitutional. […] Page 87 / 180 • Success in economy, foreign policy, and the ability of Adenauer to have Germany accepted among the civilised nations → fostered a centripetal dynamics • Voters are moving in the biggest and centrist parties → defragmentation and depolarisation foster stability • It is the opposite of what G. Sartori described as the “polarised pluralism”: votes moving to smaller and more radical parties - Votes in German election between 1949 and 2013 - black line: Christian Democrats; red line: social democrats; yellow line: liberals; grey line: all thee others • In 1949 there was almost 30% of the votes to the other parties, 30% to the christian democrats and 30% to the social democrats • Already in 1953 there is a growth of votes for the christian Democrats up to 45% → in 1957 they got 50% • Other parties disappear so that by the early 1960s we only have three mainparties • There is no major left or rightwing opposition • In 1949 the KPD gets 5%, disappears in 1953 and is outlawed in 1956 • There is no major left or right-wing anti system opposition France and Italy - In France and Italy the dynamic is the opposite: there are strong left and right-wing oppositions - In Italy the Christian Democrats are losing votes from 1948 to 1953 from 48% to 40% Page 90 / 180 - In France: • CDG and Gaullists highlighted similarities between the defects of party democracy and the 3rd and 4th republics. • Opposition painted CDG as a dictator. - After the elections, the political divisions and the democratic narratives justifying them remained in place for a decade. - Failure to build broader coalitions affected the degree of consensus among political elites on the principles of democracy. THE CONTESTATION OF DEMOCRATIC CREDENTIALS AND STRUGGLE FOR POLITICAL POWER IN THE LATE 1940S Divisions of post-war political elites into two camps: - France: victory of the third force made of anti-communists and anti-Gaullists. - Italy and WG: victory of coalitions led by CD. Opposition forces were often able to turn the notion of democracy against the governing coalitions → democratic concepts were disputed throughout the whole election-time debates. Italy and WG: major fault line between CD and the left. - Italy was in a state of ideological war In Italy and WG, CD endorsed 3 key principles challenging the Left’s democratic credentials. 1. CD’s democratic allegiance to the West. 2. Commitment to the market economy. 3. (a) emphasis on individual freedoms and (b) any form of Marxist-inspired politics would lead to totalitarianism. The Left countered these attacks on its democratic credentials by stating that the CD were fundamentally no different from the pre-war conservatives who lacked a real commitment to democracy. • Marxist parties in Italy linked democracy to anti-fascism, social equality, and structural economic reforms. - The Left’s conclusion was that the CD was a totalitarian party and the communists and socialists had to unite in their duty to save Italian democracy + the Left also contested the CD’s foreign policy preferences. - France: major fault line between Gaullists and anti-Gaullists. • Communists and Gaullists jointly formed the double opposition of the 4th republic. • Core issue of the French debate: constitutional reform. • CDG = true structural opposition to the 4th republic. Page 91 / 180 • Double opposition (communists + Gaullists) → creation of the third force (CD + socialists + radicals whose aim was to defend the 4th republic). • CDG’s rejection of political parties = end of parliamentary regime. - The 1st post-war elections and their aftermath established a division of political power which persisted through the late 1940s and 1950s. Opposition groups contested these divisions on democratic grounds by criticising the lack of reform in post-war capitalism. The Left feared that capitalism in the post-war era would render democracy vulnerable to being dismantled in the same way as in the interwar years. In France, the Left also pointed to similarities between the pre-war and post-war regime de partis. Continued contestation of democratic credentials → general tendency of ruling parties to equate strength in numbers in the parliamentary majority with democratic legitimacy. • Ex. Expulsion of the Left from the Italian gov’t in 1947. • De Gasperi: gov’t without the Marxist parties = return to regular parliamentary politics and means of guaranteeing liberty. • Marxist parties: CD was jeopardising Italy’s transition from fascism to democracy. • By eliminating the Left, the CD showed that Italy has not yet returned to the practices of a democratic regime. THE SOCIAL MARKET ECONOMY’S DEMOCRATIC PROS AND CONS - Socioeconomic reform laid the groundwork for sustained economic growth and the expansion of the welfare state. - Reforms centred on increased state intervention in the economy. - Keynesian paradigm characterised socioeconomic reforms: • Both social democracy and CD social market economy identified with it - However, essential differences persisted concerning the democratic function and objective of these reforms - All Left-wing parties: post-war capitalism made democracy vulnerable to threats and it failed to foster social equality needed for democracy - CD linked democracy to individual liberty + capitalist market economy = best guarantee of individual freedoms and democracy • The differences between Left and CD over the economy surfaced more strongly in WG and Italy b/c of the ideological fault lines between gov’t and opposition - For the CD, socioeconomic reforms were mainly regarded in pragmatic terms and intended to enhance social justice and stability rather than democracy Page 92 / 180 - Social market economy based on the free market principle of supply and demand and rejection of central state planning → negative effects of the market economy were to be countered by redistribution of the free market’s economy surplus for all of society’s benefits → a free economy was a precondition for individual liberty - The Left was reluctant to embrace this form of capitalism b/c it believed that without massive state intervention, nationalisations, and economic planning, the economy and the development of democracy were in jeopardy - Conception of democracy with 4 main features: • Democracy required social equality • Working class had to be integrated into the state • Need for agricultural and industrial reforms and massive economic planning • The economic structure was inextricably linked to the institutions of political democracy - While the Left’s criticism to capitalism in France, WG and Italy shared these 4 features, the political conflicts played our very differently from country to country PARTY DEMOCRACY’S WOES IN THE 1950S - Political elites in the 1950s shared some basic notions, for example the lessons learnt from the troubled interwar period regarding the importance of party democracy and parliament - Political parties gained a lot of power in the 1950s and the parties in gov’t sometimes blurred the lines between party and state • Even In France in the 4th republic, parties managed to defend their position • Except in France, political elites successfully parried this critique by scrutinising the democratic credentials of any political force that questioned the link between parties and democracy - Dissatisfaction with party democracy heightened the mood of crisis that already plagued the 3 democracies - Criticism affected the dominant conception of democracy - In WG and Italy: anti-party rhetoric was viewed from the perspective of the totalitarian past → delegitimization of anti-party critique easier than it was in France • Gaullist critics of political parties were able to establish themselves as the main rival of the 4th republic - 3 objections to party democracy by M.Debré: 1. Parties represent a list of candidates at election → no transfer of sovereignty from one citizen to another, but from one citizen to the party. Party acts in its own interest rather than for the common good. Page 95 / 180 - Parties in gov’t used their power to defend democracy and change the rules in their advantage (ex. electoral change 1951). - Real structural French opposition = the Gaullists • RPF = only viable alternative between communism and party regime. - The political parties managed to cope with the crises of the 4th republic for several years, but many factors contributed to its downfall: • Resistance of CDG. • Surge of Poujiadists. • Feeble coalitions. • Colonial crises. - Instability increased when CW broke up 3-party alliance among MRP, SFIO and PCF soon after the constitution was ratified - Core of the French ideological debate on the principle of democracy: interpretation and value of the constitution PARTY DEMOCRACY AND ITS ENEMIES: ITALY, 1945–1992 - ORSINA - Fragile de facto legitimacy → collapse of the Republican political system in 1992/93 and political instability of Italy in the last quarter century. INTRODUCTION - Public corruption and judicial investigation triggered (don’t fully account for) the collapse of 1992/93 = local manifestation of the transformation of the boundaries and workings of the political. - Events of 1992/93 = consequence of combination of external pressure and internal fragility → formation of a dysfunctional political system. - Presence of anti-democratic sentiments and non-democratic parties explain the Republic’s weak legitimacy. - Nostalgia for fascism and right-wing hostility against democracy not limited to small neo-fascist electorate however, democratic values were strongly rooted in the Italian soil – Paradoxically, the Italian political system collapsed at the end of the CW, when democratic values triumphed everywhere. - A potential source of such outcome is the gap between practices of power and the narratives of democracy. Page 96 / 180 THE COMPETING NARRATIVES (1944-1948) - 3 major conceptions of democracy in the founding years of the Republic, based on 2 different historical narratives: • Liberal democracy • Progressive democracy • Participatory democracy - Ferruccio Parri’s gov’t (1945) provides examples of how the 3 conceptions interact and are clarified → Symbol and proof of opportunity for Italy to revolutionise itself → Transformation of Italy into a real democracy. - Parri focused on the moral foundations of this change aimed at: • Reducing ideological polarisation. • Closing the gap between the elites and the people. - Liberals and Parri clashed in 1945 → Liberal’s disagreement with Parri moved on to the political level with the opening up of the crisis that led to the downfall of Parri’s gov’t. - Liberals were convinced that Parri’s cabinet was trying to pre-determine the future of Italian democracy. • CD’s often acted in agreement with Liberals. - Liberal triumph presented some issues: • Failure to provide new gov’t with some measure of autonomy from political parties by inserting independent personalities from pre-fascist Italy in the ministerial team. • New president of the council = De Gasperi (CD) focused on representative democracy + leader of a mass party. • Plebiscite reinforced connection between old and new regime. • Victory of the Republic weakened Liberals ’vindication of pre-fascist Italy + further weakening by poor performance at the elections. - → re-establishment of representative democracy, but with mass parties. - Notion of progressive democracy based on an interpretation of Italy’s past struggling to identify positive features connecting the PCI to the national heritage + acknowledgement of the impossibility of an immediate revolutionary uprising + PCI was entrusted with enacting gradual and far-reaching social and political change. PCI argued in favour of a wide anti-fascist coalition → parties are democracy that organises itself. - Party cooperation = actualisation of the communist notion of party democracy. Page 97 / 180 - CD considered this cooperation exceptional and temporary (it ended with the beginning of the CW) – CW stopped cooperation among parties, but also competition due to the impossibility to alternate power. THE HEYDAY OF PARTY DEMOCRACY (1962-1979) - 1948-1953: 1st Republican legislature – opted for coalition gov’ts and CD governed with absolute parliamentary majority. • De Gasperi (CD): parties should be subordinate and instrumental to gov’t. - 1953 elections – change of perspective: CD lost parliamentary majority + coalition gov’ts became a necessity. - 2nd legislature (1953-1958) and 3rd legislature (1958-1963): governing parties provided themselves with heavier and costlier organisational structures. - Formation of centre-left governing majority (including socialists, excluding liberals) → increased role of parties in 1962-64 – Political change accompanied by two discourses: • Radical anti-fascist discourse. - Belief that fascism had deep national roots → only sharp break with the past could prevent its resurfacing. - 1960, culture and politics began to converge when anti-fascist demonstrations led to the resignation of Fernando Tamboroni’s gov’t → new governing coalition anchored to the anti-fascist narrative aimed at completing the process of social and political transformation + parties ought to play a crucial role. • Discourse of necessity. - Centre-left unable to introduce reforms fast and far-reaching enough to satisfy desire for change → (to legitimise itself) new gov’t coalition turned to the discourse of necessity (A. Moro) → The Republic was jeopardised by its very success. - Inclusion of socialists in the centre-left majority strengthened the connection between politics and society and kept communists distant → centre-left = only viable solution. - However, Moro’s centre-left failed to include the anti-fascist discourse and only focused on necessity. - None of the discourses coincided with the 3 main narratives. On the contrary, the narratives could be used to legitimise political and institutional arrangements of the early 1960s. • Rhetoric of necessity: new governing formula with provisional/fragile legitimation. • Rhetoric of anti-fascism: more solid but depended on the Resistance and the constitution + inspired by the desire for a deep discontinuity with the past.