Globalization Theories: Understanding the Economic, Political, and Cultural Impacts, Sbobinature di Sociologia

Scarica Globalization Theories: Understanding the Economic, Political, and Cultural Impacts e più Sbobinature in PDF di Sociologia solo su Docsity! 1. PERSPECTIVES ON GLOBALIZATION Three waves + a fourth wave. Globalization theories arise about the 1980s  is said to have begun with strong accounts of the globalization of economy, politics and culture, along with the sweeping away of the significance of territorial boundaries and national economies, states and cultures. The first wave in globalization theory is said to have a ‘hyper’-globalist account of the economy where national economies are much less significant, or even no longer exist, because of the free movement of capital, MNCs and economic interdependency. Reduced political restrictions on the movement of money, and technological change in the form of the computerization of financial transactions, mean that large amounts of money can be moved almost instantly with little to constrain it within national boundaries. The global economy has opened up, integrated and included more parts of the world, although whether this has been a positive thing or not is debated. The sceptics see evidence of the continuing role of nation-states, within their own boundaries and as agents of globalization, through which they both lose and maintain power. In the case of core countries, for instance in North America and Europe, states continue to be very powerful in global affairs. National identities have a history and a hold on popular imagination that global identities cannot replace, evolving rather than being swept away. Politically, the effects of globalization are uneven – states have gained as well as lost power in processes of globalization. Many states are more globally powerful than others, and some are able to continue with more social democratic policies despite hyperglobalist perspectives that see globalization requiring compliance with neoliberalism. Third wave  departure from some conclusions of the sceptics, with instead a more complex picture of globalization in which it is seen to occur without just sweeping all away, as hyperglobalists have pictured it. National economic, political and cultural forces are transformed and have to share their sovereignty with other entities of global governance and international law, as well as with mobile capital, MNCs and global social movements. But they are not removed. Globalization may have a differentiated effect depending on type (e.g., economic, cultural or political) or location where it is experienced, while still being a force. In short, the third-wave contributions are critical of hyperglobalism and wish to formulate a more sophisticated picture but feel, contrary to scepticism, that globalization is changing the world. They do not go as far as the sceptics in that they say that real, significant changes have happened. The fourth wave  The fourth wave in globalization theory analyses globalization as a discourse. Post-structuralism and postmodernism emphasize the role of symbols and consciousness of the world as much as the world itself. What we experience and so believe and act upon is in discourses or ideas about society, which mediate between us and the world, and, in effect, are the world itself as far as we experience it. It is from discourses that we know the world or through which our experience of the world is constructed. When we developed a consciousness of globalization, rather than globalization itself, is the important thing. At this point people started to move away from national identities to global identities, and global imaginings led to globalization. People interpreted the world as globalized and acted in accordance with this. Global imaginings precede and help constitute substantive globalization. Ideational types underpin political and economic forms of globalization. Main points about globalization · internationalization of financial markets, technology and some sections of manufacturing and services, especially since the 1970s · The current internationalized economy is not unprecedented. The international economy was more open between 1870 and 1914, its international dimensions are contingent and have been interrupted or reversed in the past. Hirst and Thompson’s data shows high levels of trade and migration before 1914, much of which was reversed in the interwar period, showing how globalization is not going along an evolutionary or predetermined path, but can stop or go into reverse. · A company may be based in one country and sell its goods or services abroad. But this makes it a national company operating in the international marketplace, rather than a global company. · The world economy is not global. Trade, investment and financial flows are concentrated in the triad of Europe, East Asia and North America. Hirst and Thompson  internationalized rather than globalized world. Transformationalists and sceptics compared There are differences between the transformationalists and sceptics: on definition (should the processes they see be defined as internationalization or globalization?); on history (is current globalization unprecedented or the period between 1870 and 1914 the most globalized?); and proposals (divergence between seeing nation-states and international blocs or global democracy as the bases for future political action). Sceptics and transformationalists agree that globalization is long running. Rhetorically, transformationalists are stronger in defending globalism, despite such commonality with the sceptics, and this may be partly what leads to one area of significant difference. Transformationalists remain committed to a globalist outlook, and their prescriptions of a politics which can respond to globalization put strong emphasis on cosmopolitan global democracy. 2. THE HISTORY OF GLOBALIZATION The periods I will be looking at are: 1. Pre-modernity – before about 1500. 2. 2. Early modernity – c.1500–c.1800. 3. Modern industrialism – c.1800–1914. 4. The world wars and in between – 1914–45. 5. Late modernity – 1945 onwards. 6. Contemporary or recent developments – from the 1980s onwards. Globalization as pre-modern For those who view globalization as pre-modern, movements over a long distance are very old. People moved in search of food, land, slaves, to escape persecution or pursue trade well before the sixteenth or seventeenth centuries, and the centuries after that when industrialization and the rise of capitalism occurred. What moved were not only people but also the ideas that came with them and goods that were bought and sold. Empires were pursued, religions spread with the movement of people, people themselves migrated and economic exchange extended. Examples of long-range trade include the silk route between China and the Mediterranean, and migration and trade in people, art and luxury goods between Arab regions, the Near East, South Asia and Africa. Key points about archaic globalization are raised by Hopkins. He identifies phenomena such as trading, and diasporas that developed from this, as well as empires and religious movements spreading across wider regions. This led to interconnections between parts of the world and, as relations developed between them, to interdependence. The key actors were kings, warriors, priests and traders. Hopkins suggests that what occurred in archaic globalization was not that enduring but more intermittent and reversed. So there were globalizations that were mini, i.e., regional rather than global, and short-lived processes of extension and retreat rather than enduring or stable relations of interdependency. This involves some of the things already mentioned: ancient population movements across continents, long-distance trade and the mobility of culture and world religions like Buddhism, Hinduism, Christianity and Islam. Consciousness was not global, at least beyond elites, and there was not transcontinental consciousness of the whole world. Early modernity: proto globalization Hopkins identifies this with the pre-industrial period of 1600–1800 and distinguishes it from modern globalization post-1800. It is significant that Hopkins distinguishes pre-industrial from industrial globalization. This suggests that capitalist forms in the early modern preindustrial period were not alone sufficient to establish globalization. They needed to be accompanied by industrial technology that could allow and facilitate the globalization encouraged by capitalism. Before radio, TV or the Internet, printing enabled wider distribution of information than spoken or handwritten forms, and on a scale that made it into mass media. With these developments of technologies for mechanized war and mass communication, the foundations of globalization were established. Modern globalization Often, economic motivations only turn into globalization if technology (as well as other factors) allows them to. The rise of capitalism created a force for globalization. But it was when technologies of communication and transportation developed under industrial capitalism that globalization could take place. Economic and other factors have to allow the technology to develop – so they are the determinant forces. Economic gain, or political or scientific institutions favourable to technological developments, have to exist. Important to cultural globalization is not just technology that transmits media and information but also technology for the transportation of people. This is significant culturally because people take their culture with them, especially if they are moving on a longer-term rather than transient basis, as in tourism. They experience global culture in the places they go to. Or they have global culture brought to them by the movement of people from abroad to their locality. Host communities’ cultural configurations are changed by the movement of people into them. Cinema and TV are two of the most important media for transmitting culture globally. The digital and Internet era This gives people across the world access to common global information, although in countries such as Cuba, North Korea or China use of the Internet, or areas of it, is restricted. In China, for instance, searches for terms such as ‘human rights’ or ‘democracy’ and specific websites, blogging sites and social media are limited (although some of these restrictions can be circumvented). Internet availability is globalizing rapidly, although still very uneven. In terms of economic motivations behind the rise of the Internet, advertising revenue is a key factor. Much Internet content is funded by adverts rather than consumer payment. Some authors as Castells see the access and horizontal networking the Internet allows as part of a developing network society. People can communicate and organize via the Internet themselves, rather than through hierarchical or bureaucratic forms in states, other political organizations and corporations. Networks are a form of mutual civil society organization and communication that is an alternative to these via the state or the market. The arrival of social media and smartphones has been significant for speed, organization and access via the Internet. Mason (2012) argues that social media allow dissent in tyrannies, fact-checking, and the rapid spreading of counter information to propaganda or lies. Knowledge becomes more freely available in greater volume and the young have a better and more informed understanding of power than previous generations. International pressure and the Internet can facilitate political change, as Mason says was the case in the Arab Spring from 2010 onwards. The technology of global media and culture as modern, economic and unequal Developments in media have made the world a ‘smaller’ place, a ‘global village’ where time and space seem to have shrunk. Modern industrial technology has increased the speed and volume of people movements, separating the transmission of information and culture from the mobility of people to make the former more immediate. Internet users per 100 inhabitants, 2014 In this context, themes of power and inequality are relevant. Large corporations and wealthy states have a disproportionate role in the production and distribution of culture and media. A significant part of what is transmitted is Western and especially American, for instance in cinema, TV and pop music. Internet access is important not only for the transmission of culture but increasingly also for business success. Inequality in Internet use is not just a form of cultural inequality but also affects economic life opportunities. Technologies of cultural globalization have developed where it is profitable, and unequally, according to who can afford to produce the technologies or buy them as users. As a result, there are patterns of inequality in the production and distribution of technologies such as TV and the Internet and their content. This shows up in geographical concentrations in production and use. Institutions, corporations, and the global media New technology has contributed to the globalization of culture but changes in institutions and regulation of the media have also been important. Issues of economy, wealth and power are relevant here. The development of international news agencies in the mid-nineteenth century allowed for the gathering of news from around the world for domestic consumption. Such agencies provide a global dimension to news even where newspapers themselves remain mostly national or subnational es. Reuters, United Press International, Bloomberg, etc). Since the 1980s there has been a movement of European TV and cable away from government ownership or control. This has entailed a shift from goals that stress public service and the expressing or shaping of national culture towards an emphasis on profit, consumer ratings and advertising as determinants of content. There has been deregulation of cross-media ownership in many parts of the world, especially from the 1980s onwards, so that companies can diversify and obtain ownership in a range of types of media. Someone who owns one type takes ownership in others, or companies from different areas of media merge. Foreign ownership of media has been relaxed. As a result, more of the media are concentrated in fewer private hands. Trends in ownership have been towards privatization, deregulation, mergers, diversification, and concentration of power. While more companies can enter media ownership, an overall effect is that fewer owners monopolize control globally and across sectors, so there is increasing control of the media in a smaller number of powerful hands. More of the media are in private as opposed to public hands, with the result that private profit dominates over public service as the dominant ethos of media companies. There is less space for alternative media with different perspectives and for media from countries beyond the core. Deregulated global media can undermine states’ attempts to maintain collective identity, promote public concerns or egalitarian measures, or find space for messages from the perspectives of their own society through greater control over the media. Such an argument can be misused by governments to justify censorship, transgress individual freedom and promote nationalism. 4. THE GLOBALIZATION OF CULTURE: HOMOGENEOUS OR HYBRID? All of these perspectives agree that transformations in culture and the media have gone beyond national boundaries and national cultures. Culture extends across borders and in doing so brings the same or similar cultures to many parts of the world, even if without the same consequences everywhere. This process has been accelerated and expanded by changes I have discussed in technology, deregulation and corporate ownership. It forges new forms of culture, identity, consumption and style, from dress to food and music, in the everyday life of individuals. Homogenization The homogenization perspective is sometimes known as the McDonaldization thesis, referring to the fact that consumer products such as McDonald’s burgers have spread around the globe. This is linked to the idea that a small number of big media conglomerates dominate the marketplace, replicating similar types of culture worldwide. Because such culture originates in these big, mostly Western or capitalist corporations, it is seen as cultural imperialism or Westernization – homogenization in the image of the West and dominated by Western media. Much of the culture referred to by the homogenization thesis is consumer culture – food and drink, media and other consumer products. It is seen as coming from the West or the USA especially, and if from the East then from a sort of hyper- capitalism in countries such as Japan or South Korea, and eventually perhaps China too. From this perspective, there is a homogenization, convergence or sameness of cultures. People are more and more watching the same sorts of TV programmes, from CNN news to the Disney channel, MTV, ESPN, American soap operas on cable and satellite channels, and playing the same sorts of video games, as well as consuming the same products, such as Coca-Cola, in the same sorts of places, like McDonald’s and Starbucks. All these products are made by American corporations. Diversity, alternative views or local products get squeezed out as these big firms monopolize markets, through competition or buying out competitors. Mostly Western culture may come into tension or conflict with local values. It can have images or messages which are counter to or not supportive of the values of local ways of life, whether politically, as in places like China, or culturally. Beyond hybridization The idea that culture is being homogenized with the West just imposing the same everywhere through globalization is too simplistic. It does not recognize complexity, or the autonomy of people to be able to define their own cultures even if subjected to more powerful actors such as big media corporations. Despite some conflicts between certain cultures, it does appear that cultures often interpenetrate and mix without clashes. Similarly, when cultures meet it seems they do not simply coexist next to each other in hermetic enclaves. They may intermingle and create new hybrid cultural forms as a result. In global cities sometimes people follow their own religions and value systems separately, with migrants relying on support from their community rather than the host society. People may live in separate groups in the same neighbourhood alongside other ethnic or cultural communities rather than intermingling with them to create new cultures. For one thing hybridization and homogenization need not be mutually exclusive. But all cultures are hybrid and what is being hybridized is itself already hybrid. Migration is not an aspect of the late twentieth and early twenty- first centuries alone, and neither is transnational cultural influence. Nations are constituted by such hybridity, and it goes back a long way. Robins (1997) emphasizes hybridization but with an acknowledgement that there are also processes of homogenization, reaction and conflict, defensiveness, particularism and inequality in media and culture. This is important in recognizing hybridization as a more complex picture than simple homogeneity or a process of Westernization. But it also suggests that the concept of hybridization as an alternative to such perspectives is too simple. It retains a recognition of power, inequality and conflict, and of hybridity but within a context of homogenizing processes. The case of Bordieu on culture and globalization His writings on globalization are short and polemical and include a commitment to political action by intellectuals, whom he views as often complicit in the negative sides of globalization, and by social movements operating internationally. He believes that ‘culture is in danger’ because of its marketization in the global economy. Bourdieu argues that the changing structure of the cultural industries mean it is more controlled by a smaller number of big corporate actors. So again, the way the market works, allowing large corporations to buy out and beat smaller competitors, rather than allowing greater pluralism and freedom, ensures more control of the media by fewer people. Bourdieu says that publishing has become concentrated in fewer hands, and companies own the means of production and distribution, so controlling not only what is produced but what is shown too. The case of McDonaldization in Hong Kong McDonaldization has been used as a metaphor for the homogenization of global culture into an Americanized form, as a result of globalization. McDonald’s first opened in Hong Kong in 1975 and has been very successful. Interior layouts of McDonald’s globally are similar, and Hong Kong McDonald’s management decided not to compete with Chinese outlets selling Chinese food but opted for providing American food. The name of the chain was displayed at first in English. Then it was transliterated – i.e. put into Chinese characters – in a form that has no Chinese meaning but that sounds like the word ‘McDonald’s’. In short the emphasis was on keeping the original American name, not adopting a Chinese one, maintaining difference from the locality it was operating in. After a while McDonald’s also succeeded in introducing American-style breakfasts. So McDonald’s has managed to Americanize lunch and breakfast. Watson argues that young people in Hong Kong have taken to McDonald’s because they identify it with dynamic American culture and not the region’s conservative, colonial past. He describes an embracing of McDonald’s by the young that is much more developed than by older generations. The lack of anti-McDonald’s protest could be a product of the nature of the Hong Kong economy; people are just used to a highly capitalist economy, which is what makes their region what it is. In other words lack of protest could be a symptom of local characteristics as much as acceptance of Americanization. This brings us to ways in which Watson sees McDonald’s in Hong Kong as having localized features rather than simply accepting Americanization. These features vary from local resistance to some practices of McDonald’s to local adaptation of aspects of McDonald’s to Hong Kong society. Watson argues that when you take consumers into account and do not focus solely on economic structures then there is not straightforward Americanization in McDonald’s in Hong Kong. Consumers have adopted American food but maintained local cultural practices, so that the transnational is localized. American-style service with a smile and a friendly manner did not work out. Watson says that friendliness as a manner in Hong Kong happens between close associates and is less prevalent in more public relations. It was not a factor attracting people to McDonald’s, competence and practical issues being more important. In fact friendly service made some customers suspicious. Transnational regulatory frameworks could ensure minimum international standards, maybe policed by the ILO or the UN. The tide towards deregulation should be reversed so there is better employment regulation, which is enforced, to protect workers and ensure more security. This is especially needed in unregulated, informal sectors, for instance domestic work and casual work, and in protection for female workers against discrimination. Minimum wages should be universalized. National negotiations with trade unions should be normalized internationally and union recognition in workplaces encouraged. Independent trade unions should be legal globally. Welfare state encouraged. Independent trade unions should be legal globally. Welfare state safety nets can protect individuals when out of employment, and directed stimulus economics can promote employment, especially in green growth, to respond to environmental problems like climate change. These measures are affordable through progressive income and wealth taxes, financial transaction taxes, the closing down of tax evasion and loopholes, and redirection of spending from military projects. Ideally these measures can be implemented through international organizations like the UN, ILO, EU, IMF and World Bank. Finance Finance is often said to be the area of the economy that has been most globalized, this is in part because of information technology: money often consists of figures in networked computers rather than physical money or goods that have to be transported. Furthermore, finance is less tied by local cultures than people or goods. People have roots (such as family and friends) and cultures that affect their ties or mobility, whereas finance is a virtual entity that does not. Finance is also of concern: (1) because of its capacity to evade state control and move across boundaries and to places where it can exploit more relaxed regulations; and (2) because the highly global and interdependent world of finance is, as a result of this, very volatile. Finance is central to the world finance is, as a result of this, very volatile. Finance is central to the world economy. So lack of predictability (with the consequences this has for confidence and therefore investment and stability) and financial crises have significant consequences for the world economy and hence for people’s individual lives, as we saw in the post-2007 financial crisis. One problem is volatility. Money moves so fast that there can be big shifts in international finance that reduce stability and confidence. High levels of interdependency and velocity mean that an upheaval in one place can quickly carry over to other places. Nevertheless, even in this massive globalized industry, the role of the nation state as regulator is not dead. One consequence of deregulation and the mobility and insecurity that can follow is that states step in to control this situation. For instance, they can limit the involvement of institutions in different functions across financial services and restrict foreign ownership. Conclusions Economic globalization raises key themes of this book. The economy is important to understanding other types of globalization. I have argued for seeing economic motivations as primary forces in globalization. Concrete cases of this in culture and politics are discussed in other chapters. It is economic motivations that are important as much as impersonal economic structures. However, despite the importance of economics, and the significant force of economic motivations, political or cultural factors cannot be excluded. Power and inequality play a large part in the international economy and restrict globalization. In addition, they are important themes in sociology, and a sociological perspective also shows how the embeddedness of global corporations in national societies makes a difference. Since the development of industrial capitalism, from the end of the nineteenth century onwards, there has been an internationalization of the economy globally, and of capitalism. The modern world economy is more global than pre- modern forms were. This has a lot to do with capitalist incentives and technology developed with industrial capitalism. The world economy is interdependent. Instability or changes in one place have repercussions internationally. MNCs have spread, finance has been globalized and capital is mobile. But there are reasons to question whether the world economy has been globalized. This is not just an issue of academic definition but to do with power and inequality. MNCs are more national and international than transnational, with distinct national bases, and are disproportionately located and owned in the rich developed world, notably in selected areas. Varieties of capitalism in the world show a sociological embeddedness to the global economy and affirm sceptical conclusions. If globalization is measured by convergence, there have been national variations in capitalism and different routes to economic success, some of which are more statist and collectivist than based on liberalization and open competition. Pre-modern trans nationalization was based in part on trade, as was the globalized belle époque world economy before the First World War. But trade is globalized belle époque world economy before the First World War. But trade is not open and inclusive. It is most intense between a small number of leading economies: a signifier not of a globalized economy, but of an unequally inclusive and unintegrated one in which the rich and most significant remain to the fore in terms of dominant corporations, trade and FDI. Nation-states compete and protect themselves in the global economy, for instance in world trade talks and in trying to attract investment. Economic blocs have grown, led by nation states. These are regional rather than global and some of the richer blocs dominate trade and investment. Although discourses of economic globalization are used by corporations and politicians to justify decisions, these do not reflect the actuality of globalization. 9. POLITICS, THE STATE AND GLOBALIZATION The state is part of society and affects it. Governments and their policies are part of society and shape it. Sociologists should be interested in this form and not shunt its role away as something not relevant to their discipline. The role of the nation-state in globalization has a historical context. The nation-state differed from previous political forms in a number of ways, as well as developing out of them. It became what represented people, both politically and in terms of their identities in the modern period, and it is not clear that globalization has pushed this aspect out of the picture. Dickenargues that states are containers of distinctive institutions and practices, and regulators of economic activities and practices. As far as the outside world is concerned, they are competitors with other states and also collaborators with them in international fora and relations. It is within and through states that these things happen. The economy is important and is often a causal factor behind globalization, but non-economic actors, such as the nation-state, are agents in this process. Economic determinism need not imply determination by impersonal economic structures. Power, inequality and conflict are a big part of the story of nation-states in relation to globalization: their autonomy from, or integration into, globalization is heavily affected by how powerful or weak they are. Some are proactive agents of globalization; others are more passive recipients of it. Globalization undermines some but others, more powerful, are its hegemons or subjects. There are enormous inequalities between nation-states. Conflicts between them show the limits of globalization, and often their own needs and desire for self-preservation have led to their integration into transnational processes and structures in which they maintain power often in the same process that they give it up. To be patronizing towards those who see possibilities in national social democracy, as out of touch with new globalization thinking, pays too much democracy, as out of touch with new globalization thinking, pays too much attention to theory over empirical evidence, and sometimes to culture over knowledge of economics and politics. And it is to give up on some of the most feasible means, like them or not, for pursuing solutions to problems such as injustice and hardship, sometimes in favour of global approaches which are misused or ignored by the powerful who are agents of injustice and hardship. 10. GLOBAL POLITICS AND COSMOPOLITAN DEMOCRACY A number of criticisms I have mentioned fall into realist or Marxist perspectives on international relations. These contrast with cosmopolitan perspectives. Realists see international relations as the interaction of states trying to further their own interests on the global stage. Cosmopolitan democracy or institutions of global governance are, therefore, an extension of state interests in international institutions. These are dominated by the most powerful states. Marxists have a similar perspective to this, but link the state to economic interests and the imperatives of capitalism. From a Marxist point of view, realists have a reasonable perspective on world politics but do not match their description with enough of an explanation for the bases of state interests. State interests are based on economic interests, specifically the imperative of capital towards accumulation and economic expansionism. States act in the interests of the capitalist economy’s pursuit of profit. Both of these perspectives cause problems for cosmopolitanism because rather than seeing commonality and agreement, they see interests and conflict. Problems of cosmopolitan democracy I have outlined problems with cosmopolitan democracy. These are mostly linked to political-economic issues of power and inequality and conflicting interests. However, I have also made some more positive points and I will conclude this part of this chapter on that note. 1) Globalism. It is right to focus on global institutions to solve problems that are global. Falling back on state sovereignty alone, as a method of politics is not adequate when many problems are of a global nature and important supranational structures exist that can be engaged with. It is wrong to stand aside from institutions where things can get done or which, if just left to others, could be misused. 2) Normative cosmopolitanism. A cosmopolitan outlook is desirable. I have argued less against being cosmopolitan and more about why cosmopolitanism is unrealistic given political-economic differences, or not very cosmopolitan in practice given the biases of what it proposes, such as Western ideas of human rights and democracy and maybe capitalism and markets. Inclusiveness, negotiation and democracy and maybe capitalism and markets. Inclusiveness, negotiation and agreement to solve huge world problems are desirable. 3) Actual cosmopolitanism. As far as cosmopolitanism in practice goes, whether it works or takes a cosmopolitan form is dependent on the material bases for it, and whether or how these are politically articulated. Where mutual material interests for cosmopolitanism exist, and political actors articulate and mobilize these, it can work. Where they do not, the opposite is the case. Aspirations to common consciousness will fail because different actors have diverging material interests, or have mutual material interests that political actors have failed to mobilize. This perspective is better than (a) being positive about cosmopolitanism purely on the basis that it is desirable and should be hoped for. I have argued for a positive approach to cosmopolitanism not just on the basis of hopefulness, but also in terms of material interests and political mobilization. This perspective is also better than (b) being completely against cosmopolitanism on the basis of conflicting political-economic interests, because these could change to being more mutually similar and thus enable cosmopolitanism to be effective if articulated by political actors. And (c) I have tried to put forward a perspective that does not favour a utopian approach to cosmopolitanism, or complete negativity on material grounds. Instead, such a perspective sees material interests as a basis for being critical or sceptical, but also sees bases for positivity on grounds of material interests. 4) Global conflict. politics Even if cosmopolitanism does not emerge on such a basis then political participation in global or cosmopolitan institutions is still important, given that global solutions are needed to global problems. What will be required in such circumstances is for these to be secured through a politics of conflict, where like- minded nations form bilateral or multilateral alliances in favour of things like social and economic as well as individualized ideas of rights, more regulated and less liberal markets, more protectionism and fair trade for poorer countries, or serious reductions by rich nations in WMDs and carbon emissions as a basis for wider global action on these. Where there is not a material and political basis for cosmopolitanism, this should not lead to sceptics ruling out institutions of global politics. These will still operate at a level that make them important for tackling global problems, and if they are not engaged with then other powers will take advantage of them. But if they lack material and political basis for cosmopolitan politics, this will have to be pursued through conflict politics, recognizing real material and political divides, and taking the side of those whose interests favour the poorer and more exploited. This will involve multilaterally forging alliances with those who have shared material and political interests and orientations, and trying to secure objectives against those who have opposed interests and orientations. This is an international politics but on the basis of conflict rather than cosmopolitanism and at a lower, less inclusive level than the fully global. An example of global conflict politics can be seen in Latin America, where there is a history of experiments with neoliberalism that turned out harshly. · Nation-states still matter. There are national differences in state policies and there is space for politics like that of social democracy at state level. So the politics of issues such as social justice, rights and environment still involve nation-states strongly, and these are one alternative to cosmopolitan democracy. · Nation-states are building blocks for globalization and, if the interests of nation-states clash, this undermines cosmopolitan democracy and leads to conflict rather than cosmopolitan politics at a global level. It is right to