Riassunto - Migration Development and Politics, Appunti di Sociologia delle Migrazioni

Scarica Riassunto - Migration Development and Politics e più Appunti in PDF di Sociologia delle Migrazioni solo su Docsity! 2020 Routledge Handbook of Migration and Development Edited by Tanja Bastia and Ronald Skeldon Pauline Maréchal University of Turin Migration Politics and Development - CPS0697 1 Introduction ▪ The definition of migration is complex. The relation between migration and development is also complex ▪ Migration is an integral part of the development ▪ Migration means change: a change in the distribution of populations within and between states ▪ The United Nations defines an international migrants as “someone who has moved across an international boundary for 12 months or more in coming to its estimate of a stock of international migration of 257.7 million in 2017 ▪ Mobility entails actually way more than what we think thus, countries experience it actually way ▪ The migration and development debate needs to be considerably broadened in terms of the types of population included (ex: tourisms (=mobility) also greatly contribute to development) Chapter 1] Paradoxes of migration and development Introduction Migration is essential to development and social change, but political discourse, media and many researchers continue to represent migration as opposite to development Some things work wrong: ▪ Aids, trade and remittances are used to accelerate development in origin countries and avoid migration ▪ There is the idea that poverty, violence and other human misery are the main causes of migration ▪ → This ignores the fact that development initially tends to increase internal and international migration. To migrate, people need some social, cultural and economic resources. Extreme poverty, illiteracy, and inadequate infrastructure make migration impossible: they are unable to move to make their life better Development actually leads to more migration because it provides people with: ▪ The capabilities ▪ The aspirations to move - Increasing education - Access to modern media - Exposure to the relative wealth of migrants Coincide with - Changing ideas of the ‘good life’ - Increasing material aspirations Example: if you have higher education, you want to move for degrees, or to find jobs that match their qualifications. Farmworkers and construction workers are likely to find employment in close geographical proximity, the geographical extent of labour markets typically increases with specialisation levels. ▪ Economic and human development in low-income societies accelerates emigration. Only when countries achieve high-income states, and when rural-to-urban transitions have been largely completed, do emigration levels tend to go down → inverted-U-shaped relation between development and emigration levels 4 Redefining human mobility What has been argued so far: ▪ Migration is an intrinsic part of broader development processes ▪ Development in low-income countries generally increases overall levels of migration ▪ For most people involved, migration is a vital resource rather than a desperate response to destitution ▪ The most deprived people are more likely to find themselves trapped in involuntary immobility and exposed to the greatest dangers in case of economic crisis, violence of environmental calamity. Migration is development, instead of the antithesis of development → need to reconceptualise migration and human mobility Human mobility definition: People’s capability (freedom) to choose where to live, with residential human movement (migration) as the associated outcome. Human mobility therefore also includes the freedom to stay. People can enjoy mobility capabilities without necessarily using them, it still adds to their sense of freedom. For example, in the European Union, since the borders are always opened to EU citizens, they are not obsessed with (permanent) emigrating at the first occasion. If people feel deprived of their mobility freedoms, the concomitant feeling of being ‘trapped’ may further fuel their migration aspirations and can lead to an obsession with ‘getting out.’ Migration and development: a reciprocal, but asymmetric relationship There has been way more research on the impact of migration on destination countries rather than on origin ones Remittance flows have far exceeded Official Development Assistance (ODA) and have approached the value of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). Opposing views on migration and development 5 Important question: Whether migration encourages development of the countries of origin or, conversely, stops such development ▪ 2 perspectives: pessimists (predict a “brain drain”) and optimists (predict a “brain gain”) ▪ The debate went back and forth: post-1945: optimism, since 70s: pessimism, since 2000s: optimism ➔ The reality lies in the middle, because the impact of migration depends on general development conditions ▪ Migration can be very beneficial for origin countries (by improving welfare and wellbeing), but migration cannot solve problems in origin countries such as corruption, lack of trust in governments, and macro- economic instability → this is why studies generally fail to show the link between migration and origin country development at a macro-level (economic growth, investment, …) ▪ Migration and remittances can neither be considered negative (brain drain) nor positive (brain gain). Remittances have a positive impact at micro and meso-level but at a macro level, it has no effect since it cannot solve obstacles such as corruption and failing institutions. Migration cannot solve everything for development. ▪ Migrants the prefer to settle in the destination country. But if the origin state change, the migrant is then willing to invest in its country of origin, this is very positive at a macro level! (ex: South Korea, China, India) o Situation in the Philippines, Morocco and Egypt: lot of emigration but no real benefits at a macro-level The relation between development and migration is reciprocal but strongly asymmetrical. Migration as an intrinsic part of broader development processes implies that migration is a subprocess of larger development processes (other factors are needed!) ex: trust in government to be able to invest → thus, there are some benefits at the macro-level Recap: Migration = integral part of broader processes of economic development and social transformation - Low-income countries: they are trapped and ;cannot move, or short distance - Middle-income countries allow people to immigrate - High-income countries: more immigrants than emigrants but still more emigrants than in low-come countries, because they have the capabilities and the abilities (they want a “modern lifestyle”) to move (push-pull model) Migration is not a “problem to be solved”, but need to be considered as an intrinsic part of development, BUT cannot affect structural change (thus, it cannot be considered as the solution for origin and destination, but is intrinsically part of it) 6 Chapter 2] Migration and development. Theorising changing conditions and ongoing silences To be able to formulate appropriate approach to migration and development, scholars and policymakers need both knowledge of previous arguments about the topic and an assessment of the changing conditions. This chapter is about revisiting migrations and development debates to assess what is missing from the contemporary discussions. ▪ = Intellectual orientation that assumes that nation-states can be equated with the boundaries of society and that each state is an independent political actor, and therefore can serve as the primary unit in historical, economic, political and cultural analysis. ▪ Has marked many debates about migration (whether the discussants have been for or against migration) ▪ From this perspective, a state’s development is primarily a product of a country’s distinctive national history and political, economic, and cultural strengths and weaknesses. ▪ From this perspective, migration is the cause of independent level of development of states (underdeveloped countries citizens want to leave and developed countries attract migrants) (=puh-pull theory) By the end of the 20th century, some scholars start talking about the migration and development “nexus” ▪ = a set of complex interdependencies between two processes or phenomena, such as migration and development’ ▪ Some scholars found that rather that “specific policies”, “structural variables” are at work in terms of whether migration and development reduced or increased inequality in sending countries The transnational framework for the study of migration The initial transnational framework (relating to the inequalities of 1970 - 1990s) highlighted the historical conjuncture within which these transformations and transmigrants’ agency were mutually constituted. After: Nations Unbound: Transnational Projects, Postcolonial Dilemmas, and Deterritorialized Nation-States (Basch et al. 1994): argued that scholars not only must recognise transnational migration as ‘totally linked to the changing conditions’ of global capitalism and its processes of accumulation but also must connect these transformations to the political, economic, religious, cultural, and social practices and understandings within which migrants established transnational lives (=must take several conditions into account!) In the 1980s: increasing number of “transmigrants”, living they lives across two or more states. Many wanted to settle in the country of origin but were facing discrimination, racialisation and economic insecurity so they were sending remittances or establish business oriented towards the nation-state. The nation-states contribute to structure and culture of inequality (racialisation, unequal gender and sexual empowerment, stigmatisation and discrimination on ancestry and religion. → to analyse the dynamics between migration and development, analysts had to investigate the way that social relations, emotions, and identities of individuals of a migrant background were connected to various networks of power that linked households, neighbourhoods, localities, regions, nation-states, supra-national regions, and the globe. This form of transnational analysis can usefully be summarised as ‘multi-scalar’ Multi-scalar networks link individuals to institutions of differential power: businesses, banks, corporations, the media, and political and legal authorities, situated in diverse geographic locations → scholars, policymakers need to understand the multi-scalar to shift focus from differentiating natives from strangers to creating a politics that speaks to the interconnections among differentially empowered actors 9 Chapter 3] Migration and Development Theoretical legacies and analytical agendas in the age of rising powers Introduction In some countries, the economic growth has increased way more than expected (China, India, the BRICs countries, Colombia, Indonesia, Vietnam, Egypt, Turkey, and South Africa) = “Rising Powers” The growth of the Rising Powers has had an impact on migration (some new patterns have emerged or intensified) ▪ Return migration (people return to the south taking advantage of the opportunities that their home countries now provide) ▪ Migration from North to South: new patterns (ex: Portugal to Angola) ▪ Intensification of South–South migration ▪ There were attempts have been made to slow South–North migration ▪ Remittances now play an increasingly acknowledged part in development ▪ BUT no analyse on the Rising Powers for migration and development → this chapter fills this gap The Rising Powers are sometimes theorised as if they were joining the development countries, or sometimes as a mid- point. This chapter unsettle this “binary vision” → it is rather a multipolar world Dominant binaries in migration and development thinking Binary thinking has dominated the migration-development nexus literature ▪ Migration theory binaries = sending–receiving, origin– destination or some other forms of a ‘here–there’ analysis ▪ Development theories binaries = modern–traditional, First World–Third World, Global North–South or core–periphery Two different versions of place which are at play in this analysis of binaries: 1. Holds places as distinctive and different (often underpinned by modernisation theories) o Push-pull theories: the developed countries attract immigration, the difference between “here” and “there” is the cause of migration. Danger: “brain drain” 2. Theorising connections between places through Marxist influenced theory (dependency, or phenomenology influenced theories of transnationalism) o Takes into consideration differences + connections. There are (at least) two connective arguments 1. Economic causes and consequences of migration and the inequalities. They try to understand why some places are more desirable and by linking this to how inequalities are produced between places. → virtuous and vicious circle 2. Transnationalism: attachments that migrants form to multiple places, we think further than “nation-state” Will the Rising Powers simply be added into these binaries? Will the Rising Powers become additional destinations or alternative destinations? 10 Beyond the binary in migration and development thinking – versions of the middle Instead of this “binary vision” of the Rising Powers, three intermediate positions can be envisaged 1. Migration hump: a necessary level of developed is required to be able to migrate ➔ Rising Powers analyses can be shaped from migration hump theories Ex: there is a lot of increases of Chines and India migrants (particularly students and entrepreneurial classes) → this has been explained by the fact that China and India are increasingly developing. BUT the analysis of the emigration and growth are two different things and must be done separately. These emigrations also utilize the possibilities offered by earlier migrant flows (not only the simple growth of the country) Also: modernization and mobility of students can increase human and cultural capital. Citizens of the Rising Powers have higher aspirations. Educational institutions in destination countries facilitate the social and class mobility → it is not only people who are becoming mobile but also, for instance, educational institutions which give existing powers, an opportunity to benefit from the Rising Powers 2. The geographical middle in the migration trajectory o The in-between places on the migration route, “transit zones”, offer ideal places for controlling mobility o Transit zones: they can stop “unwanted migrants” → they have become places of investment o Question: how neighbouring countries may become transit zones on the way to the Rising Powers? 3. European borders: European borders don’t exist to isolate Europe from migrants from Africa but rather to selectively include and exclude migrants → a third way to think about “the middle” o The transit zones are actually zones of inclusion and exclusion: these borders are a method o Instead of the key categories of North–South, developed–developing, First World–Third World, what we see today is both an increase in borders between nations but also an implosion of nations with new forms of connections between places irrespective of their location o This analysis is very important because it recognises the multiplicity of boundaries between North and South and it offers the possibility of both (a) opening up and (b) moving beyond the North–South divide Beyond the middle – pluralist positions The Rising Power countries have as many differences as similarities (ex: Russia vs. South Africa). The Rising Powers have altered the discussion on global power. The Rising Powers can be seen to promote a new global imagination. There are many forms of the rethinking of the binaries of migration and development and concepts of multipolarity Empirical difference and dynamism in migration patterns globally ▪ While emigrants from low-income countries are more likely to migrate to neighbouring countries, those from middle-income countries are more likely to move to high-income ones ▪ Also, regional wage differentials have led some middle-income countries to become both origin and destination countries (ex: Mexico and Turkey), and there is a mix of different kinds of migratory systems in such countries (= they don’t all have the same story!) ▪ → it is crucial to take into consideration the differences between countries and not speak broadly about “south-south migration) → we need a pluralist frame, not a binary framework! (like Skeldon did) Draw on transformation itself as the basis for conceptualising plurality ▪ Castles (2010): links the migration–development trajectory to a variety of other transitions (demographic, rural–urban, political, and economic transitions as well as shifts in the meaning of gender) o → but we need to theorise through the Rising Powers 11 Theoretical and empirical agenda for future research Both capital growth and political influence are acquired through the movement of people, and these mobilities are necessary for the countries to extend their reach. Migration and development are not cause and effect but a necessary relationship. Migration is a way of governing societies, not just an object of governance by society. It is a journey, not a beginning or an endpoint, and therefore suggests the need to focus on the practices of mobility and migration as inherent to, and part of, development. This also enables us to move past the South–North binary in both migration and development. Need to rethink the division into territorially defined “North and South worlds” through vectors of power, like has already been put forward by black theorists, feminists, and postcolonial theorists ➔ called by Nancy Fraser “transnational precariat” We need to ask questions that effectively decentres the migrant as the object of study; instead power, its modalities, and the part played by mobility in Rising Powers ▪ What role does the movement of people play in the flow of goods, ideas, policies, and money? ▪ When is migration a necessary party of investments abroad and what are the different kinds of mobility that these require? Migration and development may be seen as a binary relationship, albeit one with in-between steps. Others conceive migration and development along multipolar lines. This history of thought needs revisiting in order to better theorise migration and development in the context of rapidly changing realities Recap We should get rid of binaries when in comes to analysing the migration and development nexus → this chapter analyse other theories that tried to unsettle binary - Thinking through the middle (quite useless) - Emphasises the multiplicity of flows of development (less binary but still not so successful) There can be excellent conceptualisations that draw from analysing the Rising Powers - Countries find their own path to development: multipolarities → alternative modernities. The country’s own history and culture has an impact on how it is going to develop - Need of de-westernisation and ‘de-coloniality’ (accepting that rising countries can have new politics + unsettle the Eurocentric coloniality of knowledge system - Need to rethink the division into territorially defined “North and South worlds” through vectors of power 14 Recap It is conceptually difficult to separate borders from migration and development since borders are central to basic definitions of both migration and development Borders frame migration and development and allow both processes to be measured and studied Border are becoming more rigid: it is not only territory (“borders” through legal rights documentation (papers)) → it is more about population than territory Already a decade ago, it has been said that increasing barriers were bad for development 15 Chapter 6] Undocumented Migration and Development Introduction This chapter focuses on migration without the identity papers and permissions required by states to allow migrants to move between jurisdictions and settle in new places (➔ concern for many states, because they feel like they loose control on their borders) Development may be better served by leaving people to continue to move freely regardless of the paperwork Defining undocumented migration “Undocumented migration”: term emerged in the last 20 years as an alternative to “illegal migration” ▪ Because “illegal migration” is a too strong term: it was replaced by ‘undocumented’, ‘irregular’, ‘unauthorised’, ‘clandestine’, or ‘non-status’ migration Since the definition is very vague, there is no means to count how many “undocumented migrants” they are, even in wealthy country where they have developed surveillance methods ▪ In Europe and South Africa, they attempted to estimate the number of undocumented migrants (which was very not precise). But in the rest of Africa and in Asia, they are no serious attempts to count In much of the literature, the terms irregular and undocumented migration are used interchangeably and refer both to people’s movement and their ongoing legal status in the destination. This chapter: ▪ Focuses on the manner in which people cross borders ▪ Make a distinction between undocumented and irregular migration Where one lacks documentation, as undocumented migration and consider it as is a subset of irregular migration; some irregular migration (such as overstaying visas) is fully documented ➔ 2 different things ▪ Many studies show that despite the headlines about illegal border crossings and desperate journeys across desert and sea, the majority of those who stay without any legal authorisation are those whose journey is undertaken wholly legitimately o Their irregularity arises as a result of their overstaying visas, breaking conditions of entry (such as working when they are admitted as students), or other actions that contravene immigration regulations o In developing countries there is much more interest in the way people cross borders without papers and find ways to settle despite their lack of documentation o In some contexts, it is almost impossible to migrate in full accordance with the law (because some very poor people don’t even have a basic identity card); this begs the question of whether this undocumented migration is necessarily a significant problem that demands a response The problem of undocumented migration It is largely thought that undocumented migration is a huge problem that harms a lot In wealthy nation-states (like the EU): we need to enforce control to reduce undocumented migration In human right activism: we need to facilitate the access to documents for migrants → their interest is in increasing the availability of documented migration rather than reducing demand for migration → ensure that the framework of human rights is extended to cover undocumented migrants regardless of their immigration status Also: we should focus on documentation to understand and analyse migration, rather than as a means of control ▪ For people, if there is no documentation of migration, there will be no data BUT we need some idea of who is moving where and why (data!) to track changes in societies, to identify emerging trends and to plan Also: we should see documentation more as a process of documenting people’s lives and journeys (more human) rather than a means to acknowledge their existence and understand their experiences 16 Linking undocumented migration and development General consensus that undocumented migration is a problem which needs to be addressed This chapter offers a different perspective focusing on undocumented migration in some of the poorest parts of the world, referencing to two African cases studies 1. Focus on movements between north-western Zambia and eastern Angola, where I have followed people’s changing relationship with the border for the last 20 years 2. Recent work in the Horn of Africa examining cross-border movements and livelihoods ▪ In these areas, rationale for seeking to reduce undocumented migration is open to question. Development, in the sense of enhancing the quality of life of poor people, may be better served by leaving them to move, with or without the right papers. What is the role of documentation? In wealthy countries, documentation of life is widely accepted but it is not the case in many poor countries (birth certificates, identity cards, marriage certificates or any of the routine paperwork that accompanies the passage of life for others) Actually, whether or not they have papers, migrants are subject to human right abuse It is not because papers are hugely important in our wealthy state that it should work the same everywhere (instrumental vs. Effective value). It is actually just a question of satisfying bureaucracy Example: in north-western Zambia on the border with Angola, many Angolans came into Zambia in the 1980s as refugees fleeing the civil war in their country. Many people did not have identity papers. In this context, people’s attitudes towards nationality and documentation varied enormously. For some, having documentary proof of citizenship was associated with their identity; it had some intrinsic value. For others, formal papers were primarily of instrumental value rather than reflecting their identity in any profound sense → Documentation therefore has different meanings for different people o Insisting on documented migration in contexts where there are these much larger questions about the role of papers in managing the interaction people-state is putting the cart before the horse (=we’re missing the main point) How is documentation used in border crossing? The use of documentation in crossing borders varies enormously around the world In the EU: freedom across 26 European states (but still with a lot of tracking and surveillance) → facilities undocumented migration within Europe In many cases, there is simply no border infrastructure ▪ Ex: between north-western Zambia and Angola. They rather have agreements with local authorities about their presences in the country when they enter the country ▪ Ex: thousands of labour migrants seeking to move from Ethiopia into Sudan: local conventions have emerged that facilitate border crossing in the absence of the correct papers What is the value of movement for people’s lives and livelihoods? Migrate requires resources. Pastoralism (prevalent in many parts of Horn of Africa). For the most part, these movements associated with pastoralism remain undocumented as herders move across remote unmarked borders. Labour migration to neighbouring countries is another an important way of securing an income for some very poor populations, such as the Ethiopians looking for seasonal work on the commercial farms of eastern Sudan. Often, such system occurs informally Most of this migration is undocumented although there have been various attempts to register workers and provide Undocumented migration and development 79 them with time-limited work permits, even when they do not have the papers (such as a Cambodian passport) required for securing full legal status. 19 - Policy environment and structural inequalities: (race, gender, or ethnicity). Example: women do not migrate even where it might be an economic possibility for them due to their gendered position in the family. BUT other studies say that migration can result in changed social norms and freeing women from gender constraints (ex: improve women’s employment conditions because the conditions are better in the country of destination than of origin) - Political context: (how migration is conceptualised in the political, social, and cultural domains). Whilst the literature above indicates the need for greater understanding of local-level migration decision-making, there is also a need to recognise the political nature of migration in ways that connect local decision-making to global inequalities. Migrants cannot be assumed to be rational decision-makers outside of social pressures, hierarchies and emotions (→ we need to understand the local political conditions!) The analysis is appropriate we it treats intersectional with the global, national and local influencing one another (inequalities can be causes by global level and have an impact at a local level) Producing vulnerable children: law and everyday life on South African borderlands Example 1: how inequality is produced at local level through national-level practices of migration control and identity construction Children’s Act, there is primary piece of legislation guiding child protection in South Africa. There are 3 assumptions of why children would migrate: ▪ Children do not move, they are sedentary ▪ If they leave home, they won’t come back ▪ They left because of a breakdown with their family ➔ It does not reflect social realities, the solutions in the “Children Act” have little value for child’s migrants Example of South Africa and Lesotho: many people (including children) cross the border for shopping, go to school, … ➔ These children are considered “unaccompanied migrants” by politics of border control. In terms of the Children’s Act, they become children ‘in need of care’. In reality, this intervention would ironically separate them from the families that they continue to be part of in spite of their frequent border crossings. Although they often face violence, much of this violence is created by the presence of the border rather than the risks of migration. → In this instance the border is managed by a range of informal rules negotiated between border officials and children (not formal policy). In this example, it is precisely the practices of border control that make children’s movement remarkable and create barriers to their access to education and other basic needs. Their vulnerability to social inequality is produced by the presence of a border. Gendered work and the regulation of migration Example 2: how inequality is produced at local level through national-level practices of migration control and identity construction Collaborative study of migration policymaking in South Africa, Bangladesh and Singapore Singapore: process of passing the ‘day off policy’ for migrant workers who engage in domestic labour ▪ Before 2013, it was not mandatory for employers to give migrant domestic workers a day off each week. ▪ Pregnancy would result in their contract being cancelled, and you couldn’t stay in Singapore with a contract ▪ → domestic workers’ migrant status creates inequality within the destination state Bangladesh: migrant domestic workers who move from rural to urban areas usually to work in the households of wealthier family members were excluded from the Labour Act of 2006 which, for the first time, offered protections for domestic workers → In these two examples, structural inequalities based on the gendered nature of work and the migrants’ place of origin shape what becomes possible for them and their ability to migrate in ways that improve their livelihoods. Inequality is embedded in most migration policy, based on a combination of assumed economic costs and benefits South African Immigration Act (2002) actively discriminates against low skilled migrants (although it’s the majority of migrants) Singapore: they ask for high skill migrants and leave little work for low skill migrants 20 Three conclusions 1. Policymaking in each of these three country contexts was shaped by global influences (like the US) 2. International NGOs often motivate the creation of global lobbying for what had previously been a concern only of nationally based NGOs in each country 3. Research evidence did not do much to shape the policy and the debates were rather emotive, moral and drew of popular mythology surrounding migration. Implications for the study of inequality Migration policy does not reflect the realities of migration. It is not migration that creates their vulnerability but rather the practices of migration policymaking and border control (they’re move vulnerable to exclusion, social inequality). While their poverty is their motivation to migrate, inequality is supported through the migration framework that they are in While the policy might apply to all migrants, the impact it has will be different depending on their social position and the inequalities associated with it (like whether someone is an adult or a child) → the ability of one country to address inequality is shaped by global influences ▪ → It is not simply a matter of establishing whether inequality is to be studied at the macro, meso, or micro- level BUT rather understanding how each of these levels produce different access to resources ▪ → Migration interventions are taking place in a context where powerful nation-states frequently shape and impact on the policies of less powerful ones in ways that may or may not improve the lives of migrants themselves Borders can be to migrants’ disadvantages instead of protecting them Debates about migration at the international and national level clearly impact on the local level Research is often not at the heart of what drives migration policy Recap Literature on migration, poverty and inequality is very contradictory New in the literature: whether migration increases or decreases inequality and poverty is shaped by a number of contextual and political factors, such as local-levels factors (social capital or gender norms) and global debates stops local migration decision-making (like practices of border control) The result of the relationship between economic measures of inequality and social ones has been too often ignored in research This chapter suggests that we need: ▪ A greater attention to how social inequality is connected to (or create) income inequality ▪ Connect micro-, macro-, and meso-level studies in order to understand: o How migration policymaking (or interventions) might sustain or even create inequality o Its differential impact on different kinds of migrants Policies that aim at protecting migrants (more security, moral) by putting borders actually fail (it is worse for migrants) The need to understand better local-level migration is important but without adequate attention to how the local and the global are mutually constituting, local studies risk failing to capture the political and institutional constraints on individual migrants → it is important to take into consideration how the global level shapes the local 21 Chapter 9] Gender, migration, and development Introduction Today, policymakers and scholars recognize women in migration but for all the 20th century, they have been greatly ignored, although they (since the 60s) represent almost half of international migrants. Depending on the migration steam we look at, there’s going to be more women of men (according to the labour markets, … Gender surely impacts the “type of migration” (how long, what experience, what job, relation to remittances, their families). Women are affected by gendered norms, as well as men (men have the sentiment of failure is they are unable to send money to their family, and young women to their parents). Attention to gender relations, and women’s and men’s social roles helps us better understand the formation of gendered migration streams, migration policies, the temporality of migration, and the consequences that migration has for places of origin and destination Most policy and research don’t cover a large range of topics on the gender relations and migration (study that show the negative effects of migration on women migrants, although it can also empower them at other levels, or how it was realized the number of “children left behind” when it was discovered how many mothers emigrate, but also these children were “left behind” by their father Approaches to gender and migration Before, most scholars assumed that men were the primary economic migrants. In the 1970s, feminist critiques in migration studies. The critiques highlighted that a. Women formed a large percentage of international migration flows b. In some regions, women in fact dominated cross-border migration flows c. Many women migrated independently of the men in their families d. Many of these female migrants, including some of those who had migrated as spouses, held active economic roles at their destinations Women have increasingly migrated independently, notably because of the demand for cheap female labour for domestic and care work ➔ “feminisation of migration” (more female migrants + they migrate more independently) In addition to focus on female migrants, it is important to study the gender relations to allow a more precise analysis of how power relations between men and women shape migration flows ▪ Many of these studies focused on internal migration. Their intention was more on considering gender relations to understand migration flows better, as opposed to how gender relations change as a result of migration. ▪ After 2000s, gender was recognised as an intrinsic part of the process of migration It is important to pay attention to gender, but also to other features such as race or social class, to fully understand the disadvantage that migrants might be experiencing Gender in migration-development nexus Development is often defined as purposeful action to improve the well-being of a segment of the population, usually the poorest Here: whether specific policies that use migration for bringing development take into account the different experiences of women and men In SDGs, they have various goals related to gender. But the migration-related goals are not very gender-sensitive ▪ Women migrants are now recognized, but they feature primarily as victims (ex: of trafficking) ▪ Neglect of actual employment practices, a lack of focus on the well-being of migrants, the victimisation of female migrants, or a lack of recognition of the complex change brought about by migration in places of origin. There is a lot of information on economic aspects of migration and development (for men and women) but very few on social aspects 24 Chapter 10] Remittances Eight analytical perspectives Introduction The billions of dollars that migrants send to their countries of origin every year might be the most obvious and direct link between migration and development Remittances are nearly 3x as large as official development assistance Remittances has become an over-researched aspect of the migration and development agenda This chapter addresses the many roles that remittances play in the migration–development nexus Remittances as a pivot in the migration-development nexus Migration and development nexus: the totality of mechanisms through which migration and development dynamics affect each other ➔ The migration-development nexus emphasises the multiple two-way relationships Seeing remittances as focal point in the migration–development nexus = regarding remittances not only as a conduit for development once migration occurs, but also as potential influences on migration dynamics. How remittances change migration dynamics: (decision-making of migrating or not) ▪ Remittances can be envied and be a powerful driver of migration aspirations (ex: because people want a better life for their children ▪ Receiving remittances could affect migration aspirations in two ways o The money illustrates the potential benefits of migration (become someone that gives rather than who receive) → promote migration o Remittances can make it possible, and desirable, to stay (compensation to not migrate) → prevent migration ▪ Remittances can also finance migration (by covering the cost of travel, agency fees, …) → This approach takes the household as the primary unit (micro-level, much studied in the 80s/90s) but of course, it is much more complex. In more recent research, the macro-level has be studies (financial flows) Remittances as development finance The comparison of migrant remittances to official development assistance (ODA) increased the interest in remittances among policymakers/academics. In the 90s, the ODA remained roughly constant while the value of remittances increased and surpassed ODA in 1996. 25 ➔ Remittances are considered as a development finance (and national development!). Remittances gained interest Governments and big businesses were a bit sceptic about remittances (because they were private funds) The “remittances euphoria” received some critics ▪ “Remittances do not automatically generate development and there is a real danger that they may be seen as a substitute for policies that do” Remittances as a research topic Between the 90s and the 2000s, the number of journal articles about remittances increased a lot (from less than 1% in the 80s to 5% in the early 2010s The graph (panel A) shows the rise and fall of interest in remittances: why? - Remittance’s fatigue (scholars thought it was time to “move on”) - Perhaps migration started being seen more in a pessimistic way The disciplines in the study of remittances also changed (see graph, panel B). Before the 80s, the discipline of economics dominated, then anthropologists and other social scientists increasingly became interested in remittances (it was intertwined with the rise of transnational perspectives on migration) Remittances as a transnational practice The concept of transnationalism provided a new and different frame for the study of remittances. Transnationalism was initially defined as “the processes by which immigrants forge and sustain social relations that link together their societies of origin and settlement’” ▪ Remittances sending was an obvious part of these processes (often referred to as transnational practices) → Remittances have dual existence: o Partly as a form of development finance (alongside foreign direct investment and development assistance) o Partly as a transnational practice (alongside activities such as return visits and cross-border communication) ▪ Remittances transfer wealth, but they also forge and sustain relationships. 26 Remittances as scripted transactions Remittances as a methodological challenge Quantitative data on remittances come primarily from two sources: balance of payments statistics and sample surveys. It reflects only recorded remittances and leave out unregistered remittances (ex: hand-carried cash, hawala transfers) ▪ There was more such transfer in the past than today ➔ Official figures therefore provide a more accurate picture today than they did in the past. Over the past decades, remittances are increasingly recorded → based on a diversity of evidence for the 1990–2010 period they surprisingly conclude that as much as 80 per cent of the rise in remittances probably results from changes in measurement → comparisons between countries should be interpreted with caution! How should remittances be understood? It is difficult to detect them precisely ▪ In fact, money that we think of as remittances might be transferred from senders who are not migrants (but descendants of migrants, or collective institutions such as hometown associations) to recipients who are not relatives (but friends, or charitable organisations, for instance), to communities that are not in the country of origin (ex: in the near diaspora such as Somali communities in Kenya or Afghan communities in Pakistan) ▪ Money considered as remittances can not even be transferred to one person to another, but from a migrant to the country of origin, to build houses for example → All these considerations complicate the official accounting of remittances. Survey research has the advantage of not being bound by existing systems for accounting and reporting (more flexible). But it is difficult to ask questions about remittances in a survey. Brown et al. (2014): two dilemmas that must be tackled on a case-by-case basis ▪ Complexity dilemma: what context? Who send the money to who? (Maybe it is from country of origin to destination) ▪ Diversity dilemma: variability across context; one issue that is known to vary is the relationship between individuals and households (ex: How is information about remittance transfers to or from the household shared between household members?) Remittances as a driver of development A widespread, but misguided, approach to measure the impact of remittances is to ask recipients how remittance income is spent, and to assess the development-enhancing potential of the spending pattern Most extensive review on remittances concluded that ▪ International remittances consistently reduce poverty in the developing world ▪ They tend to reduce the labour supply because people who receive remittances choose to work less Where do we set the beginning for saying that remittances drive development? Can remittance-led growth be a development strategy? (are remittances only there to finance an underdeveloped country of to help do they help it develop?) 29 Lobbying = influencing the government and its leaders to influence policymakers/legislators to address specific issues Two forms of diaspora lobbying: “cold and hot” → Cold lobbying: contact elected officials in the residence state to influence decisions that affects the home state o Ex: During apartheid, South African diaspora activists lobbied the governments in their residence states for trade boycotts which would put pressure on the regime in South Africa. This government lobbying was combined with boycotting campaigns directed at the corporate and business sectors, sports federations, and international news outlets. A combination of such efforts was crucial in isolating South Africa from global economies and networks, which significantly limited the National Party’s ability to resist within its borders → Hot lobbying: you add to “cold campaigns” mass demonstrations, public protest, … ➔ you also shape public opinion in residence state o Ex: The Senegalese diaspora in Europe in the 60s campaigned for Senegalese independence from France and mobilised again in the 80s to protest against government corruption and police brutality in Senegal. Their tactics involved subversive activism, including occupying the Senegalese embassy in Paris to gain support from the French public Diaspora lobbying can be very positive (by bringing down oppressive regimes, supporting important social and political changes in homelands, …) BUT is sometimes controversial: → Problem of representation: even diaspora groups can claim to represent the interests of entire nation-states, they can, in reality, they are small identity groups or political movements which have particular interests in campaigning for specific kinds of change. → Diaspora lobbying can sometimes only be used to protect their own status and express their belonging to in the residence states → Diaspora lobbying need to be within political structure, and require parameters of acceptable discourses and behaviours (ex: they “convert” their interests into onto globally legitimate campaigns such as human rights or transitional justice → danger: this can also lead to misrepresentation) Diasporas and the development industry While diasporas have played roles in homeland development for as long as there have been diasporas, the incorporation of diasporas into the development industry, is a much more recent phenomenon The incorporation of diasporas into development must be seen considering two key anxieties which arose in the late 1990s and early 2000s. 1. The critiques of top-down NGO interventions (=which uses lobbying) → development organizations needed incorporate local actors and knowledges into their planning. Then, diasporas started being recognized as development actors which can facilitate the ‘localisation’ of their development interventions 2. In the early 2000s, there was a rise of apprehensions around the impact of diaspora remittances. Remittances, since they do not go evenly distributed to the poorest on a needs-based basis but rather on the basis of connections and affiliation, have been viewed by development actors as ultimately biased, unregulated, and unaccountable ➔ These two concerns resulted in the desire among development practitioners to divert and utilize remittances but also to control, regulate, and securitise diasporas as development actors Many large development NGOs have launched diaspora engagement programmes or partnerships, which attempt to support and incorporate diasporic actors into formalised development interventions (ex: in the UK) Diasporas, being neither purely domestic nor purely international, are deployed in partnerships as effective brokers between development aid-givers and local populations (they have domestic and international connections) → they are well placed to engage in ‘transnational brokerage’ since they can connect groups or networks that are otherwise isolated from each other + diasporas have also performed roles as consultors or watchdogs during development partnerships: the pressure from the diaspora can act as “soft power” 30 Diasporas has been integrated with enthusiasm into the development industry but there are also some criticisms ▪ Diaspora-NGO partnerships can be seen as ‘Western attempts to degrade and instrumentalise diaspora- homeland relationships’ which removes the prospect for ‘bottom-up’ forms of development. ▪ Concerns around the legitimacy of diasporas in development planning and management in the eyes of home landers. Home landers often argue that diasporas are out of touch or that they gave up their rights to comment and to be influential on the path their homeland will take. Diasporas in national development planning In the late 20th century, sending states often criticized diasporas as ‘unpatriotic’, ‘disloyal quitters. In the 21st century, there has been a turn towards diaspora engagement → In 2014, over half of all UN member states had emigrant focused institutions compared with less than 20% in 2000 and less than 10% in 1980 → New trend in the establishment of ministerial departments dedicated to diaspora affairs → An increasing number of states have been introducing ‘diaspora strategies’ which are the formal and explicit policy initiatives ‘aimed at fortifying and developing relationships with expatriate communities’ → Incorporation of diasporas into national development planning where states seek to ‘activate the diaspora’s unseen potential to promote homeland development’ Three ways exist in which homeland states involve diaspora in their development strategies and planning 1. Brain gain: via utilising ‘diaspora knowledge networks’ during planning, architectural projects, and emergency response. Founding knowledge institutions 2. Transnational lobby: to promote the interests and particular images of homelands on the world stage. This “diaspora diplomacy” ’can be seen as part of diaspora lobbying discussed earlier but where the impetus comes directly from the homeland state elites, rather from the Diasporas and development in the global age 151 diaspora themselves and the diaspora (or specific sections within it) are used by the homeland state for their own diplomatic ends. 3. Market for products and services, as well as investment opportunities: means through which developing states can ‘creatively and proactively insert themselves into the global economy’. o + In addition, the raising of funds through taxation or mandatory payments is another avenue for harnessing the diaspora for homeland development o + Diaspora communities also comprise another huge market for the tourism industry Diaspora engagement strategies have been critiqued as a ‘uni-directional endeavour’ whereby diaspora communities are expected to give to the country of origin in return for very little. However, by 2008, 111 states had implemented policies on absentee voting and numerous states offer diaspora the rights to form political parties and run for political office. Diaspora engagement strategies have had variable success. Success seems to depend largely upon the nature of the relationship between the state and those who have migrated. Partnerships are only possible only where there is mutual trust, ‘where the diaspora was well understood, and where the objectives of diaspora engagement were clearly articulated’ Recap: Diaspora contributions to development go way beyond the sending of financial, social, and political remittances. Diasporic communities have profoundly influenced development in homelands indirectly through their lobbying and advocacy work. Diasporas have contributed to development in homelands through their participation in ‘diaspora partnerships’ with NGOs during the diaspora engagement strategies (they played the role of influencers, consultants, watchdogs, knowledge networks, investors, and markets, …) The challenges are their lack of impartiality, their claims of representation and legitimacy, and the complexities of maintaining a relationship with a place from which they have migrated away. 31 Chapter 25] Rights-based approaches to migration and development Introduction For long, rights were not considered as an integral part of development, rights have entered development debates only fairly recently Before, rights were perceived as legalistic, related to governance and globalisation. Development was linked to macro- level change, approached primarily from an economistic angle ➔ 2 different issues The rights of migrants are an important part of the right discourse, especially because they often face inequalities, lack of economic opportunities and discrimination ▪ Forced labour and human trafficking are perceived as under-development Innovative thinking about migrant rights and a rights-based approach to migration and development has raised from political activism by migrants in the Global South The birth of the rights-based approach If we started thinking of human rights as a central feature of development, it’s because of the rise of the belief that state-led approaches to development have failed in individual well-being and empowerment Rights have come to be seen as a useful conduit, since rights theory serves to define individual injustice and to frame advocacy efforts as urgent and justified claims → a focus on rights has emerged as the moral or intellectual framework for challenging injustices In the post-communist liberal triumphalism since 1989, rights entered global politics more forcefully → human rights began to be talked about more seriously as having the potential to transform global politics. ▪ This rise is also related to the rise of international rights movements in 1990s Before, rights were perceived as a social struggle, something that need to be fought for and won The perception of “development” and “human rights” as separated: it started changing with the entry of newly independent southern countries into the UN in the 1960s and 1970s. ▪ Their key demand was for a new international economic order (transforming notions of aid as charity to becoming a matter of social justice, power and entitlement) ▪ The issue of inequality took a global dimension → collective obligation of all states, collective duty The end of the Cold War made possible a more comprehensive view of rights encompassing all rights (including economic, social, and cultural rights) → collaboration between mainstream human rights NGOs and development- oriented NGOs has increased.  This heavily summarised historical account of the rights-based approach, thus, indicates the complexities involved in the politics and efforts to realise a rights-based approach to development. The rights-based approach: a multi-actor, multi-institutional perspective A rights-based approach differs from the traditional approach to development, which focuses on discrimination and disempowerment, which in turn requires ‘development work’ to be viewed as a struggle for justice. → The rights- based approach highlights the human rights and the responsibilities of governments and other actors as duty bearers in the attempts ‘to respect, protect, and fulfil’ human rights. In this context, rights are understood in two major ways: 1. As participation in a political process involving advocacy and mobilisation 2. As a means through which projects are implemented. Rights are rooted in the context of power as well as in the analysis of exclusion. 34 While development may have been the vehicle upon which migration entered the UN, migration management (migrants, refugees) continues to be a dominant feature of UN deliberations on migration The Sustainable Development Goals Everything started in 2012, the creation of SDGs was quite intentional. SDGs were much larger than MDGs In the Stockholm Agenda, civil society organisations called for the moral necessity of addressing the rights of migrants and the root causes of migration They really try to include migration sin the SDGs (the Global Migration group and others), through lobbying, etc. They also try to give more rights to migrants Key arguments by international organisations for including migration in the SDGs: 1. Under the right conditions, migration can be an enabler of development 2. Migration can be a threat to development and if not addressed, may weaken other development goals 3. Migrants are a vulnerable population group at risk of exclusion from development opportunities 4. Development can drive migration from both a ‘development failure’ (negative) and ‘development enabled migration’ (positive) perspective 5. Displacement can disrupt development and thus should also be a focus for development actors, particularly in the context of promoting durable solutions for displaced populations. ➔ Complexity of migration as an international policy issue Migration in the sustainable Development Goals Thanks to all these efforts, migration has an entire paragraph in the SGDs Migration is explicitly mentioned under the goals on reducing inequality, promoting decent work and economic growth, and the context of data disaggregation ▪ Other references to human trafficking, gender equality, promotion of peaceful and inclusive societies In total, seven Goals (3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 16) and 27 Targets encourage that the specific goals or target is ‘for all’, thus inclusive of migrant populations. Before being officially in the SDGs, migrants were mostly perceived as “a distinct social group at risk of being excluded from development, as opposed to migration being conceptualised as an enabler of development” it is possible to connect almost all goals to migration in one way or another → there is a lot talking about migration! ▪ About migration and the labour market, climate change, education, domestic work, access to services “Almost all of the SDGs are relevant to migration, and can only be fully achieved if migrants are taken into account during implementation” The MDGs and SDGs are essentially the products of the concerted efforts of different constellations of interest groups to propose their particular vision of development, at a particular point in time MDGs were created in a top-down fashion, and the creation of SDGs more in a bottom-up process MDGs were criticised to be too access on the developing world, the SDGs have a more universal applicability → SGS consider the transnational aspects and the complexity of it (does not represent a compact among nations) → The MDGs were applauded for their simplicity, the SDGs are nothing but simple → The number of issues covered in the SDGs makes it possible to create many connections, explicit or otherwise between migration and the SDGs Framing migration as a development issue (though monetary and social transfers) has been a vehicle for bringing migration into the UN, and to be considered as a global policy issue However, there is still unclarity about migration among migration actors. Perhaps the most important, if not new, observation, that can be made is that migration is intrinsically part of development and, by reducing migration to a single narrative that supports a particular organisational focus, is reductionist and fails to capture the essence of the migration and development ‘nexus’: that migration is – has, and most probably always will be – development 35 Chapter 27] National Migration Policy Nature, patterns, and effects Introduction A few decades ago, there were no real need to re-think about the immigration systems because there was not much migration and were manageable solely at and within their borders. International cross-border migration follows largely the same practices for decades: ▪ Nation-states see what type of and how many human beings arrive on their territory ▪ If considered necessary, states usually respond in mostly uncoordinated ways by making admission and stay regulations slightly more or less restrictive, putting more or less effort in the apprehension of irregularly entering or residing migrants, or trying to attract and select much needed labour migrants for employment in shortage occupations Immigration policy changes, and are usually the outcome of political processes and interactions among stakeholders in bureaucratic, legislative, judicial, and public arenas Explicit migration policies are established to affect (migratory) behaviour of a target population Explicit migration policies: policies that target potential migrants aiming to influence their migration decisions in a certain direction → It is also possible to influence international migration more indirectly and implicitly by changing the socio- economic context (ex: industrial policies, education and labour market policies, taxation, welfare policies, …) This chapter aims to review the current state of (explicit) national migration policies and their role in influencing international migration and integration processes Migration policy transition Migration policies reflect and adapt their characteristics to major trends and patterns of emigration and immigration Every country has emigration and immigration, but to be considered a country of emigration or immigration, you need significant and long-term migration → Immigration countries have regulations and administrative measures to control immigration processes → Emigration countries remain mostly unregulated Non-linear, hump-shaped pattern and relationship between economic development and its effect on (net) migration Net emigration countries lack the capacity to control and manage the movement of people in an orderly manner. Emerging middle-income countries have a balanced net emigration, which is compensated by both growing return movements of nationals living abroad and immigration of foreign workers High-income countries are net immigration countries → they’ve developed sophisticated immigration control systems Socio-economic, political and demographic transition can transform countries from net emigration to net immigration → This is often associated with policy transition (=evolution of immigration systems, establish immigration categories for temporary, circular, and permanent, economic/ non-economic, forced and voluntary migrants) Usually, there’s a policy transition for two reasons 1. Controlling + if necessary, restricting unwanted (mostly low-skilled, irregular migrant, non-economic migrant 2. Facilitating migration and mobility of high-skilled migrants and knowledge workers recruited for sectors such as health or ICT in which many countries perceive growing shortages Examples of countries: Brazil, China, Malaysia, or Turkey 36 Immigration policy evolution Over the past half-century, immigration policies in most net immigration countries have become more sophisticated, and overall, less restrictive than the period between World War I and II ▪ With the introduction of modern passport Over the past decades, policy changes in on border control and more recently on exit and return measures (in destination countries), and post-entry integration policies have become overall less restrictive → BUT policies have become more detailed and targeted on specific migrant groups, reflected in the creation of multiple entry category (low/high-skilled workers, permanent/temporary migrants, family members, students, entrepreneurs, and asylum seekers) → Entry regulations are more or less restrictive according to the type of migration group High-income countries want high-skilled migrants (for health services, ICT, engineering, …) Since the 2000s, there more instrument to measure and filter immigration of labour (quotas, occupational shortage lists, job contingency requirements, labour market tests, points-based systems, (student) job-seeker visas, …) Now: more emphasis on policies that regulate post-entry rights of migrant workers have gained wide importance ▪ Ex: immediate family reunification rights, social security provision → it facilitates mobility of wanted migrants Visa: While the immigration of high-skilled migrants is now more controlled and favourited, but they’re also more control to prevent unwanted migrants (like asylum seekers, their visa clearly show that cannot stay in the country) → The nature of travel visas allows nation-states to discriminate between nationalities and to impose restrictions on only those nationalities which are considered ‘high risk’ of overstaying visas and/or claiming asylum Outbound visa restrictiveness has become comparatively high for mobile people in Africa and the Middle East, as well as for most South, East, and South-East Asian countries, despite a few exceptions such as Japan, South Korea, and Malaysia Visa policy regimes reflect not only the general openness or closed-ness of countries towards the mobile people but also the strength of political, social, cultural, and economic ties between states and societies- Migration policy effects But do all these policies to restrict unwanted migration actually work? → well, migration is mostly driven by structural factors (labor market imbalances, inequalities, persecution in origin countries) rather than policies Example of effects of policies on migration: t a visa requirement reduces bilateral migration flows by more than 30% When a country restricts the entry for unwanted migrants, they still can find another entry channel Conclusion There are some policies other than on migration that can affected migration (ex: policies on labor market or education) ➔ the lines between migration and other migration-relevant public policies are often blurred → We must take into account these factors to understand international migration processes! (policy and non-policy drivers of migration) 39 Global migrant civil society It took a long time for migration to enter the arena of global politics, and the aspect of development played a crucial part in this process It took time before CSOs were recognized in the global level Concluding remarks Migrant civil society is as diverse in its organisational forms, levels of engagement and social and political agenda as civil society as a whole. CSOs such as the HTAs can be directly involved in development measures, but the outcome of these projects is varied. Transnational dimension: necessary condition (e knowledge ‘back home’ can help to identify measures adequate for local circumstances) While HTAs often work independently, more network-based projects have been presented that ideally include all stages of the migration process from pre-departure training, to measures such as financial literacy training or the establishment of credit unions for the migrants abroad as well as their families back home to reintegration programme and social entrepreneurship after return HTAs are not new and they change over time (A major factor influencing this change has been the relation of HTAs to government, or more precisely, governments, both of the countries of origin and countries of destination, but also third countries, regional institutions, or state-led international organisations which might support ‘diaspora engagement’.) → Are CSOs legitimate? → Does ‘the diaspora’ really ‘know what’s best’ for the homeland? → When cooperation with governments exists (ex: in the Mexican Tres Por Uno programme, Stefan Rother 318 questions of the legitimacy of private money influencing the distribution of public resources arise. close involvement and equal participation of the home communities are crucial for successful and sustainable programmes. (ex: line in the Philippines) 40 Chapter 30] Research and policy in migration and development Some personal reflections Research and policy in migration: some personal reflections It is difficult to have evidence relevant to policy because: ▪ Migration is multifaced ▪ Migration touches the most sensitive of social issues – the boundary between ‘us’ and ‘them’ ▪ Source of sensitivity is political (difficult to debate calmy) ➔ These difficulties do not make it impossible to use research for policymaking in the field of migration, but they certainly make it challenging Research and policy: a personal account From an extremely small base 15 years ago, migration is now a firmly established part of the economics profession, matching the longer-standing interest in the subject from other disciplines. It is greatly to the credit of DID staff, especially those in the Research Department, that the contribution of migration to development gradually returned to the policy narrative Bringing research into policy What is “policy research”? Research in development and in the social sciences in mostly about acquiring general understanding of economic and social processes. Only clear and politically persuasive results are attractive, new/complex patterns are not so welcome ▪ But this approach doesn’t apply well on development policies, because development is very complex Policy-makers are not willing to work on sensitive issues (like migration!) Policy is usually made with not enough information. Two needs: ▪ Better transmission of the results from the researcher to the policy discussion + adequate research questions for researchers Researchers should accept help Researchers tend to be lazy since they know that their policy client “won’t see the difference” → NO, they always have to produce the best work! Researchers should use the most appropriate methods, not necesseraly the most sophisticated one Translating policy requests into research questions is not well-done The correct aim for policy research is to be ‘policy relevant’ – that is, to focus substantively on issues of practical importance. But this does not necessarily mean analysing a specific policy lever or proposal, and nor does it necessarily have to be empirical research. However, given that policy requires policy levers and is about the real world, it should support and eventually help to lead to these features. Taking policy seriously Migrants are adventurous and risk-taking people, it is crucial to understand and take it into account to make policies The demanders of policy research and researchers should recognize that research cannot do everything. Defining and implementing policy solutions need differently skilled work, and not only simple initial diagnostic research ➔ Suggesting policies requires multiple elements, researchers cannot do everything 41 Engaging with policymakers We need to listen very carefully to policy makers Researchers tend to be arrogant towards policy-makers because they tend to lack of rigour. Policy-makers are not stupid, they just have a different job from researchers The researcher should always ask himself, ‘Why are they asking this question?’ ‘What don’t they understand that I do?’ ‘What do they understand that I don’t?’ Often the answer is that policy-makers bring context to a question of the sort that researchers – at least in economics – tend to place on one side in order to make a question manageable → it creates balance between researchers and policy-makers Having an impact Sometimes, society have urgent problem and needs answers quickly: the risk of premature application is justified. But in some case, there is no particular urge, but researchers still rush thus, the reliability of their work is lower → purely personal/institutional urgency should not be permitted. The quality of work is primordial Making policy is like making sausage Policy proceeds are not linear processes Conclusion Policy should not be made by rational arguments, it is more complex! Researchers of policies are influenced by the result, dynamic of “policy winning” The point for researchers is not “winning a policy argument” → researchers should debate of policies freely, objectively and openly, regardless of the results Understanding policy problems + having their answers trusted takes a very long time. There should be no urge, otherwise researcher cannot make their job properly and they split their time between the academy and government We need to persuade academics that policy-making is not only reserved for those who failed research, but that it is absolutely crucial to our society + policy-making is different from research Researchers should be allowed to identify (at least some of) the issues they will work on. They should show that the results are important to find solutions to social and economic problems We should encourage policy-makers to want analytical results, by ▪ Give them research experience in their education ▪ The policy-maker needs to have a greater willingness to spend time with research It’s more about the policy-makers decide what to work on, even if there is not enough information on an issue. They avoid sensitive issue. It should be the other way around! Researcher should have the possibility work hard and find new patterns, new issues to be solved, and whether or not it is “policy-friendly”, policy-makers should take account of these results (not matter whether they are difficult to treat or not!) Creating policies is more in the “show”, they create sophisticated things but they don’t go to the point, they don’t fully make the effort to solve the real issues there are. Researchers and policy-makers should stop look for originality since it can deprive the accuracy of their work. Policy should be made out of deep understanding and strong evidence, not by the newest method! 44 Chapter 32] From Humanitarian to Development Reconfiguring the international refugee response regime Introduction and context The chapter explores the characteristics of development-led approaches to refugee crises (=the humanitarian– development nexus) The number of refugees has never been that high and keeping increasing (70.8 million people in 2017). This is official number but they are many more people which are displaced and that are not accounted in the official data Refugees overwhelmingly originate from and are located in the developing regions of the world, which host some 85 per cent of the total. More than two-thirds of the world’s refugees originate from just five countries, which, Syria excepted, are low- income countries – Afghanistan, Myanmar, South Sudan, and Somalia Forced displacement of refugees and others is the result of a complex interplay of socioeconomic and political circumstances and existential threats that are manifest in different configurations Armed conflict and severe human rights violations are the most obvious and familiar drivers of people seeking to ‘escape from violence’. This is predominantly the result of civil wars and internal conflict in countries such as Syria, Somalia, Afghanistan, and Rohingya from Myanmar, rather than interstate conflict which was more typical in the past, for example in World War II. Refugees are not the results of failed development, but it is the case that socio-economic vulnerability and the lack of sustainable livelihoods emanating from food insecurity and drought, environmental degradation, and climate change as well as governance fragility constitute significant drivers of forced displacement (often these factors occur in combination) The humanitarian-development nexus and its origins Humanitarian-development nexus (HDN): multi-agency and multi-sectoral approach to refugee crises that seeks complementarity between humanitarian and development programming, funding, time scales, and priorities. It aims to achieve coherence between short-term emergency assistance and sustainable, resilience-building development for refugees and their host communities. To this end, the HDN tackles two enduring challenges in refugee crises: 1. To mediate the impacts of prolonged forced displacement on receiving countries and communities 2. To transition to longer-term sustainable livelihoods for the refugees themselves and their hosts For many decades, , the displacement of refugees has pre-eminently been framed as a humanitarian challenge The reform of the UN humanitarian system in 2005 created an ‘early recovery’ cluster (one of 13 sectoral clusters). Led, significantly, by a development agency, the UNDP, rather than UNHCR, the cluster was designed to bridge humanitarian assistance to longer-term recovery and development, the dynamic for which the UNDP as expected to provide. But this failed to gain the traction that was anticipated, partly due to the unfamiliarity of the concept, partly the lack of buy-in by donors, and partly due to the lack of effective policy and programme instruments. The Transitional Solutions Initiative (TSI) in 2010 was created to have situations of forced displacement. It was a collaboration between the World Bank, UNHCR and UNDP: a grouping of development and humanitarian actors; But they encounter the similar constraints Global developments: the humanitarian-development nexus Over the last decade, several actors accelerated the international approach to strategy and policymaking, and underpin the reconfiguring of global responses governing prolonged refugee crises 45 1. There have been renewed attempts for global level institutional reform to build governmental commitment and institutional capacity and capability, collectively termed the ‘New Way of Working’ (2015) to strengthen the humanitarian-development nexus. There were SEVERAL donors. 2. The resurgent interest has been precipitated by the regional and global impacts of the large-scale refugee displacement of Syrian refugees in the Middle East, and the operational and political challenges this has presented → the Syrian refugee has created international concerns and socio-economic impact ➔ The humanitarian-development nexus has gained much popularity and intention over the last decade Reconciling the humanitarian and development interface Humanitarian is short-term help, development is about long-term Humanitarian and development principles are different; funding and programming have to align with these different circumstances and reconciling these different principles, in other words achieving policy coherence, lies at the heart of establishing the humanitarian–development nexus – a challenge faced by all donors and other stakeholders. When there is a crisis, development and humanitarian should complement each other. Examples: → the sequencing of funding instruments and programming, with humanitarian interventions targeted to meeting short-term needs while development actors mobilise longer-term measures The main parameters of development-led approached Development modalities Development plays a key role in mitigating the macro- and micro-economic impacts of refugees on host countries, and in supporting the resilience and self-reliance of refugees and affected communities → different actors are involved Macro-level: new fundings have been set to tackle fiscal emphasis and the developmental shocks that large-scale refugees produce for host countries. Ex: Jordan received a lot of Syrian refugees, the World Bank gave money to Jordan to help it with the situation Opening of opportunities for other development actors such as private and corporate sector funding for development operations. The private sector can also participate (fund, invest, entrepreneur) for the development of the nexus Micro level: cash transfer programming is now the universal standard for the distribution of assistance to refugees by humanitarian actors The challenge: strategic planning and program co-ordination between the different actors. Some agencies are now working on how to deal with these challenges Refugees and hosts – agency and support Humanitarian actors has for many years created income-generation projects for refugees, but it was quite unsuccessful. Refugee camps were also quite unsuccessful Now, most refugees live in urban areas, with most diverse economic opportunities and wider access to market → the increasing development-led approached offers a much greater potential for enjoying the resources and skills of refugees, and their economic demand and supply functions which can add to the productive capacity of impacted countries. → this approach is supported by the concept of resilience-building of refugees Promoting self-independency and resilience, by designating forcibly displaced people as development actors, appeals to the wider aspirations of humanitarian agencies eager to promote the image of refugees as agentive contributors rather than passive recipients of assistance and thus very much aligned with the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals. At the same time, if successful, it will relieve donors of long-term funding commitments. The humanitarian-development nexus: experience so far The nexus reconfiguration still require experimental, and it is being tried in some countries (ex: Jordan) The instruments, modalities and principles put in placed is an international strategy for a public welfare model response to contemporary refugee crises; but it is a paradigm which has the seeds of a privatised refugee assistance model firmly embedded in it → from private to enormous measures for development 46 Humanitarian-peace-development nexus The humanitarian-development nexus occurred in host countries impacted by refugees. Conflict remains ‘the biggest obstacle to human development’ → for that reason, there was a growing international interest There is growing international interest in promoting peace and security as an essential missing link in the nexus between humanitarian action and sustainable development in those countries that are actually caught up itself (the so-called “triple nexus” of the humanitarian–peace–development nexus) The triple nexus constitutes a critical platform whereby civilian crisis management, peace-building, security, rule of law, and governance processes, link humanitarian assistance (during and in the immediate consequences of conflict) to longer-term reconstruction and development Recap There are more and more refugees Humanitarian (short-term help) and development (long-term) need to collaborate to achieve meaningful outcomes to help the refugee crisis Refugees should be put in a situation where there are active actors rather than passive 49 At the extreme, it may represent an existential threat to identity and the sovereignty of places and cultures. Population might go more and more to urban places, where new populations may be exposed to new risks and new dilemmas. These issues demonstrate how climate change is tied up with the political economy of development processes. 50 Chapter 38] On the Margins Migrants smuggling in the context of development Smuggling Protocol Introduction On of the policy issues about migrant smuggling within migration and development context → human impact of migrant smuggling on migrants, their families, and home communities, as well as on the societies of transit and destination A smuggle migrant is at greater risk of serious abuse, exploitation, or even death during a journey, than a migrant who is travelling on a valid visa and travel document Smuggle migrants are a small fraction of people moving internationally, most migration is regulated Smuggle migration in relation to development in not studied a lot (unlike to human rights) The second: we know little about migrant smuggling globally, especially when compared with other forms of migration and mobility → A key reason for this is the clandestine nature of smuggling, making it difficult to collect accurate data and other information on smuggling → It is difficult to track and have data on smuggle migration Some areas are more susceptible to smuggling migration due to civil conflict, environmental degradation and disaster Definitions matter Definition also depends of the context, “migrant” can have different definitions depending on the context Most widely accepted definition of ‘migrant smuggling”: The procurement, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit, of the illegal entry of a person into a State Party of which the person is not a national or a permanent resident (define it as a crime which pose security threat, but it does not seek to criminalise migrants who are smuggled → it is not the fault of the migrant because he is probably escaping from danger) Human trafficking: the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. The line between smuggled migration and migrant smuggling is sometimes blurred. a smuggled migrant may quickly and unwillingly become a trafficked person Relating these definitions to development: these definitions should focus more on the long-term Again, there is not enough data on migration smuggling to have thorough analysis Remittances are sometimes transferred back home in specific regions in origin countries, so some poorest areas don’t benefit from remittances where irregular migration and smuggling feature, the pressures for others to undertake such journeys (go immigrate in other country to send remittances)can be immense Remittances Irregular remittances generates more money (better for the development in origin countries) so origin and transit countries of significance when it comes to irregular migration and smuggled migrants, are less likely to sign and ratify the Smuggling Protocol, which is in part related to levels of development 51 There are also sometimes direct economic benefits that come with being a transit country for smuggling, notwithstanding the significant downsides that may eventuate, including those related to insecurity and risks to efforts to improve regulatory capacities Diaspora Research on diaspora focus in high-skilled migrants The relevance of diaspora falls more to political engagement and/or informal engagement outside of regulated systems (e.g. informal remittances). Brain circulation, mobility, and the “management” or irregularity Again, brain circulation tend to focus on high-skilled migrants ‘brain’ circulation is not necessarily the most useful construct to consider migrant smuggling (it rather happens in hgh- income countries) The ‘winners’ in all this, some argue, are the receiving countries, who are able to benefit from a steady supply of workers in the informal economy and so keep wage costs down Segmentation of the labour market can occur over time, which acts to entrench practices whereby migrant workers undertake the so-called three dimensional jobs – dirty, dangerous, demanding jobs – with local workers increasingly unwilling to do such work → employers benefit from irregular migration because migrants accept low-wage while working in bad condition Conclusions Now, there is not enough data, but a case is to be made for further examination of the potential impacts of irregular migration and smuggling in terms of costs and benefits over the longer term. It is difficult to establish the relation between smuggling migration with other trend data, including on remittances, ODA, human development, and international migrant stock. A case is to be made for further examination of the potential impacts of irregular migration and smuggling in terms of costs and benefits over the longer term. What may be perceived as securing access to overseas labour markets and enabling remittances back home ( a short-term gain) needs to be assessed against the human costs and losses as well as the potential for continued systematic erosion of regulatory systems, structures and processes that are interlinked to development progress while at the same time helping to ensure more equitable development within and between countries. In addition, our current knowledge of the systemic problems that exist within those industry sectors more likely to engage irregular migrant workers, warrants further examination. The focus on national regulatory environments needs to continue to be supplemented with the scrutiny of transnational systems and practices supporting ‘bad actors’ and unethical supply chains, creating further advantages for short-term gains at the expense of sustainable development.