Riassunto Perché l'Europa? L'ascesa dell'occidente nella storia mondiale. Cap 6., Appunti di Geopolitica

Scarica Riassunto Perché l'Europa? L'ascesa dell'occidente nella storia mondiale. Cap 6. e più Appunti in PDF di Geopolitica solo su Docsity! Cap 6. States, laws, taxes and revolu�ons 1. Introduc�on By 1800, there had been significant gains in agricultural produc�vity in some parts of Europe, but popula�on growth was overtaking those gains. As late as 1848, the onset of a potato blight meant widespread hunger across Europe. Agricultural produc�vity in Asia although it had been very high, did not increase further but appears to have declined a�er 1800. So, we most likely would have expected the world economy to enter the late nineteenth and early twen�eth centuries in much the same historical range as had been experienced in the preceding five centuries. Yet in the 1800s, real incomes suddenly headed upward in Europe. How could this have occurred? A number of scholars have looked for an answer in governments. These “ins�tu�onalists” have suggested that censorship, high taxa�on, arbitrary and tyrannical government, religious authority, and excess bureaucracy were obstacles to be�er ways of doing things. By contrast, free and open markets, light taxa�on and a small bureaucracy, security of property and restric�ons on the authority of government were the keys to rapid economic growth. 2. Did Europeans have more military & religious compe��on than Asians? One of the obvious differences between the history of European states and that of the major civiliza�ons of Asia is the absence of large empires in Europe, in the period from 1500 to 1800. Without any one dominant power that could impose order, Europe was repeatedly convulsed by wars between states (un�l 1945). By contrast, most of North Africa and the Middle East was ruled by the O�oman Empire, most of India was ruled by the Mughal Empire, and all of China was ruled by the Ming and then the Qing Empires. Several scholars have suggested that the presence of mul�ple, compe�ng states made Europe more innova�ve in art, poli�cs, and military technology. By contrast, in a large unified empire the ruler is more likely to be concerned with keeping control over his exis�ng empire than with fending off compe��ve threats. However, it is a misleading oversimplifica�on. It is more accurate to simply say that Asia had several states that were larger than any in Europe. The states of Asia were also o�en at war. Historians of China and Japan, o�en stress the highly civilized court and elite culture of these socie�es. Yet we can hardly ignore the military spirit of these Asian socie�es, which in the seventeenth century not only completed the Great Wall of China but also produced the world’s finest steel and swords, created the world’s most elaborate mar�al arts and built large and powerful navies. It must also be acknowledged that the compe��on among European states was not generally beneficial to freedom and pluralism. By the late seventeenth century, monarchs in Catholic lands had driven Protestants and other dissenters out of their territories. Many Protestant states were also strengthening the official state-supported religion. In Asia, as in Europe, there was also compe��on among religious faiths. In short, both Europe and Asia had dozens of compe�ng states. In both areas the large number of states led to constant military compe��on and allowed diverse views and religions to flourish despite the efforts of individual rulers to foster religious uniformity within their own countries. 3. Cycles of revolu�on and rebellion in Europe and Asia Another reason given for the rise of the West is that the West had more economic vitality than Asia because European countries had more dynamic poli�cs. Western social thinkers believed that Asian empires had experienced no significant poli�cal changes for centuries. Individual rulers and even dynas�es might change; there might be rebellions and civil wars, but nothing of importance was thought to have altered. Yet the claim that Asia had unchanging poli�cal structures and unchanging economies is completely mistaken. In fact, all of the major socie�es of Europe and Asia underwent periodic transforma�ons in the centuries from 1500 to 1800. Such changes in poli�cal, social, and economic organiza�on usually occurred in response to social and poli�cal crises, widespread in Europe and Asia. From the late 1500s to the mid-1600s and then again from the late 1700s to the mid-1800s, rebellions and revolu�ons led to the restructuring of the government, new class rela�ons, changes in economic organiza�on, and a shi� in the dominant ideological framework of European and Asian socie�es. Why were all these states affected by rebellions and revolu�ons in the same �me? All of the major socie�es of the world from 1500 to 1800 depended mainly on agriculture. When popula�on grew faster than agricultural output, food prices rose. When food prices rose, both elites and ordinary people needed more money, and states needed more money too. In some countries, religious divisions or regional conflicts added fuel to the fire, while in others rulers overreached in their efforts to raise taxes and increase revenues throughout Europe and Asia with the number and intensity of upheavals peaking in the 1640s and the 1840s. Nonetheless, European historians have argued that the results of these upheavals were different in Europe than in Asia. In Europe, it seemed that these revolts and revolu�ons were all about liberty and freedom and resulted in major changes in the powers of kings and the status of nobles. By contrast, in China and the Middle East it seemed that nothing much had changed. Yet the idea that these great rebellions changed everything in Europe, but nothing in Asia, is deeply mistaken. 4. Rebellion in Europe In Europe, the 17th-century rebels may have shouted their desire for liber�es, but they generally did not mean the individual liber�es and freedoms that we think of today. Rather, they meant privileges for specific groups. The 17th-century crises in Europe in fact did not create any las�ng change in the powers of kings or the privileges of nobility. Indeed, quite the reverse. It is thus no surprise that from the late eighteenth to the mid- nineteenth century, rebels once again raised their voices to call for liberty and democracy. But again with the excep�ons of Britain rebellions and revolu�ons generally failed to bring las�ng freedom and poli�cal change. Although the ideals of liberty had a long history in the West, it appears that the final triumph of democracy and individual liberty across Europe owed much to the rise of modern industrial economies. Rather than liberal revolu�ons paving the way for modern industry, modern industry came to many na�ons long before they achieved full democra�c freedom. 5. Rebellion in Asia 1