summary of a chapter of the book, Sintesi del corso di Politiche dell'Unione Europea

Scarica summary of a chapter of the book e più Sintesi del corso in PDF di Politiche dell'Unione Europea solo su Docsity! EU POLITICS AND POLICIES IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD - B026821 II. Analysing the EU Integration theories seek to understand how the EU has come about and which factors have made it what it is today. Theories of EU politics, the second group of approaches, focus on the actual function- ing of the EU: how does political decision-making work in the EU? Which actors and factors affect these decisions? What are the effects of the policies? Each of these perspectives, and the different approaches within them, offers useful insights into understanding what the EU is. Explaining Integration: 1. Neo-functionalism Neo-functionalism was developed at the end of the 1950s by Ernst B. Haas. It is an Integration theory which states that member states will work together to reap economic benefits, setting in motion a process in which ever more tasks are delegated to the supranational level. Haas’ approach was derived from the pluralist school which believed that all interests will eventually organise to affect decision-making. Thus, the process of integration and its results reflect the relative success of different groups in advancing their interests. Haas shows that in the case of European integration this means that groups are not restricted to the boundaries of their country but can forge transnational alliances with like-minded groups in other countries in order to further advance their interests. (An organisation is called transnational if it connects subnational levels of governments or brings together any other type of organisation (businesses, civil society groups) from different countries). Haas deliberately focuses upon activities of political elites (spokesmen, lobbyists, politicians, high-level civil servants). He claims that European integration was primarily an elite-driven process and shows that ordinary people were not very well informed or concerned about it. (Political elites consist of the relatively small number of people at the top of a political system who exercise disproportionate influence or power over political decisions). Why did these sovereign nations decide to start working together? Haas identifies four subsequent steps which drive integration: 1. Recognising the possibility of mutual economic gains, governments decide to start cooperation in a specific policy area. They set up a supranational body which is responsible for administering and implementing their arrangement. 2. After the arrangement has been put in place, all parties realise that further economic gains can only be arrived at if adjacent sectors are integrated as well, spurring additional integrative steps. The result is what Haas calls a spillover of integration into other fields (see functional spillover below). 3. The creation of a new centre of authority fosters the emergence of new transnational interests that put additional pressure on governments to move towards further integration. This process is advanced by the new supranational institutions – such as the Commission – as well, who are eager to take up new responsibilities in order to advance their status as policy-makers. 4. The increased complexity of several functional arrangements will lead to a further institutionalisation at the supranational level in order to coordinate policy-making. The result is a peculiar form of policy-making some- where in between that of a purely intergovernmental organisation and a fully fledged federal state. Spillover: Spillover is the major driver of integration. It refers to the way in which the creation and deepening of integration in one economic sector creates pressure for further economic integration within and beyond that sector and greater authoritative capacity at the European level. Thus the economic motives start the process of integration only to take more and more policy areas on board once it is moving ahead. It exists in three varieties: 1. Functional: This type of spillover is technical in nature and based upon the insight that the full benefits of integrative steps can only be attained if further moves in neighbouring fields are made. Haas pointed to the emergence of Euratom and the EEC as a proof of such integrative steps. Example: the creation of a single market: the abolition of tariffs between the member states will increase trade between them but only to some extent. Exchange rate fluctuations may constitute a further barrier. Hence functional pressures will develop in favour of moving towards the stabilisation of exchange rates. This will eventually lead to pleas for a single monetary policy and In line with his emphasis on the power of the nation-state Hoffmann also rejects the idea that supranational actors would be able to further integration beyond the limits set by the member states. He likens the process of integration to a grinder that comes to a halt as soon as the member states stop providing it with something to grind. Intergovernmentalism spin-off: liberal intergovernmentalism: The intergovermentalism theory was later developed by Andrew Moravcsik. Compared to Hoffmann, Moravcsik pays more attention to the role of domestic, economic influences on the positions of national governments in international negotiations and organisations. These national governments are still the key players in these contexts, however, with minimal influence of supranational actors such as the Commission. He examined the negotiations of the major treaties signed between 1952 and 1992. Moravcsik’s close reading of the positions, preferences and activities of Germany, France, Britain and the Commission generates the following conclusions: • The preferences of member states are not formed autonomously but are the result of the influence of different domestic interests on their respective governments. • Economic considerations are always a major consideration, while geopolitical considerations only play a role in half of the cases examined. • The outcomes of negotiations are the result of bargaining between the member states, with those standing to win the most willing to grant con- cessions to those not perceiving the deal to be in their interest. The role of policy entrepreneurs such as the Commission has been minimal, but not completely absent. • The institutional arrangements to put these deals into effect should be seen as means to ensure the credible commitment of each of the member states. While this may involve the delegation of tasks to supranational institutions such as the Commission or the Court of Justice, member states have organised this delegation in such a fashion that these institutions cannot go beyond their mandate. The main point of criticism is his focus on major treaty negotiations as the cases for his study. Many commentators have pointed out that member states are by definition the key players in these processes. Hence his finding that they had most influence on the outcomes is not surprising at all. Moravcsik has countered this criticism by pointing out that his theory not only applies to these major decision- making events, but in fact also helps explain day- to-day decision-making in intergovernmental decision-making bodies such as the Council of Ministers. For example: while member states can formally rely on majority voting in the Council, they rather seek consensus and strive for unanimity. He therefore argues that actual decision-making thus reflects a classic intergovernmental context in which each member state interest is maximally protected. Similarities between intergovernmentalists and supranationalists: • Member state preferences and activities are not fully autonomous, but partly the result of domestic circumstances, most importantly the activities of interest groups that try to lobby their governments. Hence, a better understanding of member state positions in negotiations requires know- ledge of the domestic forces that shaped those positions. • Supranational institutions amount to more than being the mere administrators of the deals struck between member states. (Even intergovernmentalists concede that in some rare instances the Commission has acted as an entrepreneur). Studying the actual behaviour of these different institutions is necessary to better grasp the processes of integration. • The roles and influence of actors depend upon the type of decision and the policy area studied. What may be true in some policy areas does not have to hold in other ones. Explaining EU Politics: These theories differ from integration theories. The analysis of integration was traditionally dominated by so-called actor-centred approaches. Neo-functionalists and intergovernmentalists paid most attention to the preferences and actions of member states, the Commission, etc., but they showed relatively little concern for contextual factors (rules, traditions, cultures) that shape their behaviour. Many analysts argued that greater insights in the behaviour of actors could be obtained by paying more attention to these factors. Hence, theories of EU politics employ a wide and diverse set of research angles in which more attention is paid to the role of these institutions and its impact on politicians, pressure groups and policies. 1. Multi-level governance (MLG): - This theory emerged as a new perspective for analysing EU politics at the beginning of the 1990s. This coincided with a more general trend in politics during the 1980s: the emergence of a different mode of policy-making known as governance (Governance: Term used to refer to a mode of governing characterised by collaborative and networked forms of policy-making). Instead of seeing the EU as a new level of government that stands at the pinnacle of a hierarchy, MLG scholars speak about ‘interconnected arenas’, in which local, regional, national and supranational levels of government depend upon each other. Through this view on policy making, it is necessary to also analyse the activities of local and regional levels of governments alongside governmental actors at the national level and the supranational level. - Policy-making in the area of EU cohesion policies developed in a highly fragmented and diverse manner and seriously challenged the dominance of the national governments. Decision-making authority has been dispersed over several levels of government and is no longer confined to national governments. It also includes subnational levels (regions) and supranational levels (Commission). The national level of government depends upon the resources (information, money, expertise) of other levels of government in order to prepare and implement these policies. Subnational levels of government are directly involved in making cohesion policies and do not have to rely on the willingness of their national government to press their case in Brussels. Hence, all these developments amount to the emergence of a system of multi-level governance in which national governments are no longer the dominant players in EU policy-making but rather act alongside subnational and supranational actors. Subnational actors (cities, regions, provinces) have found direct ways to access EU decision-making processes, alone and in tandem with others through building transnational coalitions. At the same time supranational actors have been able to seriously constrain the room for manoeuvre of member states, be it the Commission with its right to initiate legislation and set the levels of government such as when it comes to regulatory, fiscal or monetary policies. The actual allocation in the EU is then compared to that of other federal states to analyse and explain differences. There is also one strand of federalism which studies the way federations organise democratic representation. The issue here is how different types of interests – those of citizens, territories and other categories – are represented at the two levels of government and how democratic and effective the resulting policies can be considered to be. Generally, the simple comparative federalism believes that there are 3 characteristics the EU shares with federal states: 1. A federal system is a political system in which sovereign states have set up a higher, federal level of government to which they have delegated certain policy-making tasks. The EU is a two tier system, with MS forming the constituent states and the supranational level constituting the federal level. 2. In a federal system the autonomy of the MS is constitutionally guaranteed via the explicit enumeration of competences. In the RU, this is done through the Treaty of Lisbon. This treaty makes a distinction between exclusive competences for the EU and areas where the EU and MS share competences, leaving all other unnamed policy areas to the MS. 3. In a federal system there is a judicial system in which the legislation has precedence over lower level legislation. Rulings of the federal court take precedence over those of lower level courts. In the EU the doctrines of direct effect and supremacy guarantee that EU law has such a status in those domains where the EU is competent. - The concept of second-order elections: it refers to all those elections which are less important than the first-order elections, such as those for the national parliament. This concept was developed by two EU scholars to explain peoples voting behaviour for the first elections for the European Parliament and has also been used in analysing national political systems. Their main theory is that because there is less at stake at the second- order elections, turnout for these elections will be lower. In addition, many voters will not so much care about the positions of the parties in that race, but rather use their vote to evaluate national politics. This is of course a phenomenon that can also be witnessed during elections at local, regional and provincial level. Summary: • Understanding the EU involves making a decision on the type of questions you are interested in and the way in which you want to answer them. • The most important distinction between different approaches to the EU is between theories of integration and theories explaining EU politics. • Neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism are the two major approach- es in integration studies. Intergovernmentalists claim that the EU is best seen and studied as a classic international organisation, to which member states have delegated a limited number of tasks. Neo-functionalists on the other hand argue that the initial delegation of tasks to the supranational level has generated an integrative dynamic of its own, leading to spillover of tasks into other policy domains. • Theories of EU politics seek to understand the actual functioning of the EU as a political system, rather than explain how the EU came about in the first place. Multi-level governance and the comparative politics approach are the two major strands of research in this area. • Multi-level governance scholars consider the EU to be a one-of-a-kind political system in which the old, hierarchical way of doing politics between member states has been replaced by a new, networked form of government where different levels of government (local, regional, national and supranational) have become mutually dependent for realising their policy objectives. •  Comparative politics scholars try to understand the EU by asking the same type of questions they ask when examining nation-states. It is exactly by comparing the EU to national political systems that it becomes possible to find out how and why the EU operates differently compared to its member states. Functionalism as a precursor to neo-functionalism ‘As its name suggests neo-functionalism has its roots in an earlier theory of inte- gration called functionalism. In integration theory functionalism is most clearly associated with the work of David Mitrany, an academic born in Romania who was struck by the cruelties of the First and Second World Wars. In 1943 he published A Working Peace System which aimed at setting up a form of world organization that would do away with the evils that were caused by conflicts between nation-states. Instead of the nation-state formula of organizing gov- emment on a territorial basis, Mitrany proposed the organization of tasks on the basis of functional interests which would advance human welfare. Form would follow function. Organizational arrangements should be tailored to the types of tasks that needed to be carried out. The result would be a proliferation of over- lapping international and transnational organizations, each of them specifically designed to optimally serve its purposes. Mitrany believed citizens would grad- ually shift their loyalties to these new organizational arrangements and thereby reduce nationalistic tendencies which had so often resulted in conflicts between states. Hence world peace would be the result of this functional organization of governmental tasks. Note, however, that Mitrany was strongly opposed to a comprehensive regional or federal organization of government, as this would simply reproduce nationalistic tendencies at a higher level. Mitrany's ideas of functionally organizing governmental tasks were further developed in theories of neo-functionalists. Three types of institutionalism Rational choice institutionalism assumes that actors try to maximize their self- interest. Institutions ai \portant because they define the ‘rules of the game’. In that way, they determine how decisions are made and what strategies actors can and cannot use. Institutions are therefore important as constraints on the behaviour of actors. Rational choice institutionalism defines institutions in a narrow sense as formal rules, such as laws and procedures. A real-life example concerns decision-making on fisheries quotas in the European Union. These quotas are often set at a much higher level than the level proposed by scientific advisers and the European Commission. This can be explained by looking at the institutional rules that gove decision-making on quotas. Fisheries quotas are ultimately determined by the Council of Ministers, in which each member state is primarily concemed with its own interests. Because member states with a large fisheries sector can block a decision, decision-making tends to inflate the quotas proposed by the Commission. According to sociological institutionalism, institutions do not merely define the rules of the game but shape the way actors perceive the world as well as their own preferences and identities. As a result, actors do not merely attempt to maximize their self-interests but are searching for the outcome that is most legitimate in terms of the institutional values within which they have been socialized. Sociological institutionalism also takes a broader perspective on institutions, including informal conventions, norms and traditions. We can illus- trate this by returning to the example of EU fisheries quotas. Instead of focusing on rational strategic bargaining within a given institutional context, sociologica! institutionalism would point out that EU fisheries policies are founded on three fundamental objectives: protecting fish stocks, protecting the economic viability of the fisheries sector, and protecting vulnerable communities dependent on fisheries. People working within fisheries policy have been socialized into this paradigm, and are therefore likely to seek a balance between these objectives father than give precedence to one of them. This may explain why quotas are set at a higher level than those proposed by scientists, who look exclusively at ecological aspects. Historical institutionalism includes elements of both rational choice institu- tionalism and sociological institutionalism. Its distinctive feature is the focus on sequences of decisions. The central idea behind historical institutional ism is that past choices exert an influence over current choices by making some alternatives more attractive than others. This is called ‘path depend- ency. Once it is decided to pursue a certain course of action, it becomes increasingly difficult radically to depart from that course later on. This is so both because such a change would require large investments (e.g. in new technologies) and because the status quo is often seen as ‘the right way” to do things. An example of this in EU fisheries policies is the division of quotas among member states. During the 1980s, it was decided to use a fixed formula for dividing the overall EU quota among the member states. This principle of ‘relative stability’ guides EU fisheries policy to this day and it is nearly impossible to change this pre-set formula. Therefore, the division of fisheries quotas among member states is highly path dependent: it can only be understood by looking at earlier decisions that have effectively ‘locked in' EU policies.