Summary of "Muslim Peoples from XIX to XXI centuries” (book "A History of Islamic Societies" Lapidus), Sintesi del corso di Storia dei paesi islamici

Scarica Summary of "Muslim Peoples from XIX to XXI centuries” (book "A History of Islamic Societies" Lapidus) e più Sintesi del corso in PDF di Storia dei paesi islamici solo su Docsity! 1 OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND TURKEY The dissolution of Ottoman Empire was one of the more complex cases in transition from 18 th century Islamic imperial societies to modern national states. Ottoman regime was suzerain over a vast territory, including the Balkans, Turkey, Arab Fertile Crescent, Egypt and North Africa. 19th century, Ottomans restored power of central state, consolidated control over provinces and generated economic, social and cultural reforms. Ottomans depended increasingly upon the European balance of power for survival. Until 1878, UK and Russia offset each other and protected Ottoman regime from direct encroachment. 1878 - 1914 most of Balkans became independent and Russia, UK, Austria-Hungary acquired control of Ottoman territories.  The dismemberment of Ottoman Empire culminated at the end of WWI in creation of TURKEY and a plethora of new states in Balkans and Arab Middle East. Modern Turkish state emerged out of reforms promulgated in 19th - 20th Ottoman Empire, and reforms in period of national independence under Ataturk. These reforms were challenged in 20th by a revived assertion of Islam. Turkey today is ruled by a democratically elected Islamic party. PARTITION of OTTOMAN EMPIRE By end of 18th century, Ottoman Empire could no longer defend itself against Europe growing military power. Russia wanted to absorb Ottoman territories and win access to Mediterranean; UK wanted to shore up empire as a bulwark against Russian expansion and protect its commercial and imperial interests. In a series of political crises, Ottoman Empire was progressively dismantled. The first test of the balance of power came with the invasion of Syria in 1831 by Muhammad Ali, independent Ottoman governor of Egypt. Russia and Ottomans concluded treaty of Unkiar Skelessi (1833). UK tried to forestall a Russian intervention in Mediterranean, declaring for territorial integrity of Ottoman Empire and restoration of Syria to Ottoman control. Russia and UK would be 2 protected in their spheres of influence. By a supplementary agreement in 1841, powers allowed Muhammad Ali to establish a hereditary regime in Egypt.  The internal crisis led to a concert of European powers regulating Ottoman affairs. Ottoman Empire had become a protectorate of Europe and a pawn of the great powers. Balance of power and durability of Ottoman Empire were tested in Crimean War, 1853–56. The next crisis was revolt of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1876 against Ottoman rule. 1878 - 1908, further partition of empire postponed only by rivalries of European powers. Germany established its influence by investing in Ottoman railroads and by supplying advisors - technicians to Ottoman army. 1908, taking advantage of an Ottoman political crisis, Austria annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina. 1912, Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece, and Montenegro negotiated treaties to attack Ottoman Empire. The combined Balkan armies defeated Ottomans and took all of remaining Ottoman territories in Europe except for Istanbul and a small strip of surrounding territory. WWI completed the dismemberment of Ottoman Empire. Armenian genocide1914 -1923 Systematic mass murder-expulsion of 1.5 million Armenians carried out by Ottoman government. It was implemented in 2 phases: 1. wholesale killing of the able-bodied male population through massacre and subjection of army conscripts to forced labour 2. deportation of women, children, elderly, and infirm on death marches to the Syrian Desert. Deportees were deprived of food-water and subjected to robbery, rape, massacre. It is acknowledged as one of the first modern genocides,. Turkey denies that the word genocide to describe these crimes. In 2019, governments and parliaments of 32 countries, including US, Russia, Germany, have recognized the events as a genocide. In ‘14, Ottomans entered war on side of GERMANY and Austria. German military and economic assistance, traditional Ottoman fear of Russia, ambition to restore Ottoman control over lost provinces prompted Ottomans to join central powers.  UK, French, Russians and Italians agreed to divide Ottoman Empire among themselves. SYKES–PICOT AGREEMENT (‘16) UK and France delineated their shares of Arab provinces. 5 Signatories of treaty were deprived of their citizenship by Atatürk Turkish War of Independence. Atatürk led Turkish nationalists to defeat the combined armies of the signatories of the Treaty of Sèvres. ‘22  TREATY OF LAUSANNE It settled the conflict between Ottoman Empire and France-UK-Italy-Japan since WWI. It was result of a second attempt at peace after failed Treaty of Sèvres. Treaty of Lausanne ended conflict and DEFINED BORDERS OF MODERN TURKISH REPUBLIC. Turkey gave up all claims to the remainder of Ottoman Empire and Allies recognized Turkish sovereignty within its new borders. OTTOMAN REFORM The first phase of reform was followed by TANZIMAT (reorganization) period, 1839 - 1876. Tanzimat was a period of reform in Ottoman Empire. It began with purpose of modernization, desiring to consolidate social and political foundations of Ottoman Empire. It was characterized by various attempts to modernize Ottoman Empire and to secure its territorial integrity against internal nationalist movements and external aggressive powers. Reforms encouraged Ottomanism among the diverse ethnic groups and attempted to stem the tide of nationalist movements within the Ottoman Empire. Reforms sought to emancipate the empire's non-Muslim subjects and more thoroughly integrate non-Turks into Ottoman society by enhancing their civil liberties and granting them equality throughout the empire. Ottoman elite intellectuals attempted to bring reconciliation between West and East within the framework of Islam. Many changes were made to improve civil liberties, but many Muslims saw them as foreign influence on the world of Islam. During Tanzimat period, the government's series of constitutional reforms led to a fairly modern conscripted army, banking system reforms, decriminalization of homosexuality, replacement of religious law with secular law and modern factories. This reorganization program was extended from military and administrative to social and religious affairs. Noble Rescript of Gulhane (1839) recognized rights of life, property, and honor, and equality of all religious groups before law. 1856, Imperial Rescript promised equality for non-Muslims and guaranteed their right to serve in army. To further integrate Muslims and non-Muslims into an Ottoman nation, non-Muslim communities were reorganized to shift power from clergy to laymen. Important changes were made in legal system. 1847, to deal with legal issues involving Europeans and their local affiliates, Ottoman courts were established with both European and Ottoman judges, applying a combination of European and Ottoman laws and procedures. Foreign legal jurisdictions in Ottoman Empire continued until ‘23 treaty of Lausanne. 6 Treaty of Lausanne was a peace treaty negotiated during 1922–23. It settled the conflict that had originally existed between Ottoman Empire and Allied French Republic, UK, Italy, Japan, Greece and Romania since the onset of WWI. It was result of a second attempt at peace after failed Treaty of Sèvres. Treaty of Lausanne ended conflict and DEFINED BORDERS OF MODERN TURKISH REPUBLIC. Turkey gave up all claims to the remainder of Ottoman Empire and Allies recognized Turkish sovereignty within its new borders. New commercial and penal codes were promulgated to supplement Islamic law. New Ottoman codes were based on French law and were implemented by state courts. In late 19th, land ownership became increasingly privatized as part of integration of empire in global capitalist economy. 1869 Ottoman government issued a new civil code, MECELLE, which followed Islamic codes of law, but departed from tradition because it contained changes made on personal authority of sultan, was adjudicated in state courts, and required court registration of marriages and divorces. FAMILY LAW 1917, by adopting a European system of personal law, replaced Islamic law. Ottoman educational reforms began with the establishment of professional schools followed by elementary and secondary schools. 1870, first efforts to create a university that would integrate professional, humanistic and religious studies. TANZIMAT AMOUNTED to a CHANGE in the CONCEPT of OTTOMAN SOCIETY: It repudiated the autonomous functioning of Islamic educational and judicial institutions and challenged the very concept of Muslim supremacy. In interest of a strong state and integration of religious and ethnic populations, Ottoman authorities were tampering with fundamental structures of a historic Muslim society and replacing traditional educational, legal, religious systems with secular organizations. YOUNG OTTOMANS While Tanzimat did not affect most people, it did create a new class. With the destruction of janissaries, weakening of ulama and adoption of reform programs, political power in Ottoman society shifted to bureaucrats . Within that elite leading roles were held by Westernized and Westernizing elements. This group of bureaucrats was led by Reshid Pasha. 1860s, Tanzimat had generated its own opposition. While the new class occupied government offices, graduates of middle and professional schools, middle-level bureaucrats, sons of poor families who found their careers blocked by an entrenched older generation, turned their energies to literature, becoming poets, writers, journalists, editors of opposition newspapers. Resentful of 7 established bureaucrats, sought allies among lower-ranking military officers, liberal ulama, theological students. 1860s, literary intelligentsia formed YOUNG OTTOMAN SOCIETY, which favored a constitutional regime. They believed that ultimate value of empire was measured by its contribution to citizens’ rights, to security of life and property, to justice and to reconciliation of Christians and Muslims. They stressed aspects of Islamic heritage that encouraged scientific and technical learning, the value of reason above blind faith, and importance of actively striving for improvement. Young Ottomans advocated the use of a simplified version of Turkish language to bridge the gap between Ottoman elite and mass. Young Ottoman thinkers were modernist Muslims. 1876, constitutionalists staged a COUP D’ÉTAT and brought SULTAN ABD AL-HAMID II to power. He was forced to accept a parliament and a constitution mandating equality for all religious groups. But he suspended parliament and established an authoritarian and religiously conservative regime based on the absolute power of sultan, bureaucracy and police. The regime continued technical Tanzimat reforms. New schools, legal codes, railroads, and military techniques were introduced. Continued economic and educational development swelled the ranks of white-collar, technical, railroad, and telegraph workers. The press disseminated European ideas about science and politics. Popularized Western ideas spread from capital to provinces. YOUNG TURKS 1889 journalists, writers and agitators formed OTTOMAN SOCIETY for UNION AND PROGRESS. Young Turks, as they were now called, agitated for restoration of a parliamentary and constitutional regime. They were divided into: - a group led by Ahmed Riza strong sultan, centralization of power, predominance of Turkish- Muslim elements; - a group led by Prince Sabaheddin  decentralized forms of Ottoman rule, less emphasis to Turkish/Muslim peoples and advocated for a federated society with autonomy for Christians and other minorities. FATHERLAND SOCIETY was founded in 1905 by MUSTAFA KEMAL. A Young Turk congress created COMMITTEE FOR UNION AND PROGRESS (CUP) in 1907. 1908, CUP mutinied and forced sultan to restore the constitution of 1876 (before the coup d’etat). The military coup established a parliamentary government run by CUP and by army , and proved to be authoritarian and highly centralized. 10 During WWI, ARMENIAN POPULATION of ANATOLIA WAS DESTROYED in order to CREATE A TURKISH SPACE in eastern Anatolia. An estimated 1.3 million people were killed. Physical destruction of Armenians was accompanied by measures to assimilate some by forced conversion to Islam and forcing girls and women into marriages and prostitution. Armenian properties were seized for benefit of army and of Turkish businessmen and Muslim immigrants. Greeks of Anatolia were also subject to ethnic cleansing. After the Greco-Turkish war of 1919–22 , remaining Greek population was deported in exchange for repatriation of Turkish-speaking population of Greece. CUP policy was to assimilate KURDISH POPULATION by ending nomadism, separating leaders and communities, and resettling Kurds with a goal of reducing number of Kurds. By end of WWI, all left of Ottoman Empire was Anatolia, Istanbul and a small territory on European side of Bosphorus. Ottoman political life corresponded to nationalist concept of Turkish people. After the war, MUSTAFA KEMAL, a leading Turkish general, organized movement for Defense of the Rights of Anatolia and Rumelia, established a Grand National Assembly (1920), promulgated a NEW CONSTITUTION (1921), and established a REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENT. 1923, European powers agreed, by the treaty of Lausanne, to recognize the independence of Turkey in its present boundaries  Turkey emerged from WWI as a fully independent country. It came into being with a coherent state structure, national intelligentsia of army officers, experienced administrators, politicians, lawyers, and intellectuals, a unified national movement, and a strong cultural and political identity. REPUBLICAN TURKEY Ottoman tradition of a strong centralized state, military leadership and state control of religious elites was transmitted to Turkish Republic. History of modern Turkey can be divided into 3 phases: 1. 1921-1950  era of authoritarian nationalism, presidential dictatorship, religious reform, and first stages of industrialization 2. 1950-2000  era of a dual military rule and multiparty political system, increasing social differentiation, rapid economic change, ideological conflict, reassertion of Muslim identities 3. 21st century  new Muslim–Turkish regime TURKISH REPUBLIC under ATATURK 11 Kemalist period began in ‘21 with the Law of Fundamental Organization that declared the sovereignty of the Turkish people. ‘23 MUSTAFA KEMAL ATATURK was named president of Republic for life. He was head of government and leader of the Republican People’s Party. Despite brief experiments with an organized political opposition the regime proved intolerant of opposition . The party was its main instrument in the countryside. A highly educated, urban, bureaucratic, and military elite dominated the rest of country. Ulama and local notables were excluded from political power, but landlords were allowed to retain and consolidate their economic position. GOALS of Kemalist Turkey ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT and CULTURAL MODERNIZATION. 1908-1918, foreign capital was withdrawn, Greek and Armenian merchants were pushed out, and way was opened for the growth of a new Turkish commercial class. ‘20s, Kemalist regime promoted agricultural production by reducing taxes and by investing in roads and railways. Exports of cotton, tobacco, and dried fruit rose. With the help of Soviet loans and expertise, Turkish Republic took the lead in building textile factories. With collapse of export market in great depression of ‘29, Turkey turned to more energetic state control of economy and PLANNED ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. State nationalized railroads, utilities, ports and mines. First five-year plan (1929–33) promoted consumer substitution industries. UK helped finance construction of iron and steel works. ‘20s-’30s, f oundations were set for a modern industrial economy . Mustafa Kemal sought to absorb masses of people into ideological and cultural framework of republican regime, break attachment to Islam and win them to a Western/secular style of life.  OTTOMAN SULTANATE was ABOLISHED in 1923 and CALIPHATE in 1924 . Charitable trusts and ulama were put under control of a new office of religious affairs. 1925, Sufi orders were declared illegal and disbanded. 1927, the wearing of a fez was forbidden. 1935, Turks were required to take surnames in the Western fashion.  A new family law based upon Swiss legal codes replaced Islamic law. ISLAM WAS DISESTABLISHED AND DEPRIVED OF A ROLE IN PUBLIC LIFE and ordinary symbols of Turkish attachment to traditional culture were replaced by new legal, linguistic signs of modern identity. 12 Part of these changes was transformation in WOMEN status. Ziya Gokalp theorized that equality of women was essential for the development of a modern Turkish society. He advocated equality in education, employment and family life, allowing women equal rights in divorce and inheritance. Urban women began to dress in European fashion. The first lycée for women was established in ‘11, and schools for teachers, nurses, midwives, and secretaries expanded rapidly. War years brought women into new professions and factory labor. Family legislation in 1916 - 1917 broke with Islamic law , restricted polygamy, and allowed women to obtain divorces in specified conditions. Still, women remained segregated in public places. Many activities were still carried on separately for men and women. The reforms of ‘20s–‘30s brought still more radical changes. Family laws of 1924 abolished polygamy, required divorce be subject to court rulings on specified conditions, and made the sexes substantially equal in rights to divorce. Constitution guaranteed the right of women to equality in education and employment. 1934 women were accorded the right to vote in national elections. 1935, women deputies were elected to the Turkish parliament.  Kemalist regime was not revolutionary. The position of women was improved for the sake of the state and national development rather than as a commitment to women’s rights. The dominant elites and organizations retained their authority. No effort was made to mobilize the peasantry. The cultural revolution, imposed from the top, had relatively slight penetration . It served to divide the country into an urban, modernized elite and rural peasant masses still oriented toward Islam. The combination of a radical cultural policy with conservative statist political and social policies made Turkey one of the first of a new type of modern Asian nation – an authoritarian regime attempting to carry out radical economic and cultural reforms. POST WWII TURKISH REPUBLIC When Mustafa Kemal DIED in 1938 , government continued under ISMET INONU. Economic development generated new groups of businessmen, factory managers, rural landowners, prosperous peasants, and a new generation of intellectuals who wanted political recognition. Turkish legislation after WWII relaxed government controls over commerce and universities and increased the expectation of political participation. Inonu government permitted the formation of Democrat Party and FREE PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS in ‘50. After WWII, US, main protector of Turkish political security and economic development, favored a less paternalistic and more democratic multiparty system. US intervention was 15 This allowed for rise of new movements/parties COMMITTED to RE-ISLAMIZATION of state and society. Even though ideology was secular, the influence of the Ulama was substantially destroyed, and urban educated classes considered Islam a symbol of backwardness  rural Sufi tradition survived, and Islamic loyalties of ordinary people were never seriously disturbed. Turkish populace continued to identify itself as Muslim and to carry on worship in mosques. Republican political parties lent legitimacy to Islam and compromised Kemalist dogma that only through secularization could Turkey become a modern country. Military regimes and conservative political parties saw enlightened ISLAM AS A BULWARK AGAINST COMMUNISM. The military also sought to use state-sponsored Islam to fight radical Islam, extremist nationalism, Marxist socialism, and Kurdish separatism. The post-Kemalist Turkish regime used ISLAM AS A STATE-SANCTIONED TOOL to enhance its own legitimacy and combat competing ideologies.  The policy of the state was to control Islam. ’50s Democrat Party set up seminaries for training of prayer leaders and teachers. Imam-Hatip schools are state sponsored and supervised by Ministry of Education. They appealed to people from rural areas and to rural migrants to the cities, and to families who viewed this as the only acceptable education for girls. The state also permitted voluntary religious courses in schools, and radio broadcasts and calls to prayer in Arabic. Mosques again received state support. Republic institutionalized Islam as a department of state by taking over courts, charitable endowments, and the education of imams. It is a vehicle for the promotion of Islam within a secular state. Neo-Islamic movements flourished outside the purview of government. These movements appealed to students as an expression of alienation from an authoritarian state, of concern over economic prospects, and of moral doubt stemming from social and educational mobility. They appealed to students and youth searching for networks to help them gain education and connections, identity, and a sense of belonging in a Muslim and Turkish national community. Islamic movement also led to the formation of political parties. NATIONAL SALVATION PARTY, formed in ‘60s, advocated reestablishment of an Islamic state in Turkey. It called upon the state to work for a moral and just society. The party rallied old Sufi networks. Hostile to capitalism and big business, it represented the economic interests of Anatolia’s petite bourgeoisie, but accepted the liberal, parliamentary, and human rights aspects 16 of secular political culture. ‘70s, National Salvation Party won a small percentage of the vote in Turkish elections. ISLAM AND THE STATE: ‘83–2000 In response to Turkey’s economic problems and climate of return to Islam, military regime that seized power in ‘80 - ‘83 returned government to civilian hands. A new constitution outlawed parties based on class, religion, and ethnicity, and restricted freedom of press and rights of labor organizations. The military retained a veto over government policies. TURGUT OZAL was prime minister and later president (‘83–93). Ozal regime, introducing a third phase in Turkish economic management, turned to NEOLIBERAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT POLICIES. Ozal government reduced state intervention and deregulated financial system. It encouraged private enterprise and welcomed foreign investment. Ozal’s economic policies NEO-LIBERALISM, PRIVATIZATION AND DEREGULATION – encouraged new business elites. Lifestyle of neo-Muslim Turks differs greatly from adherents of Islamist revivalism. While the Islamist lifestyle is marked by simplicity and emphasizes ideological commitments to Islamic law and to an Islamic state, Turkish neo-Islam is not an ideology, but an identity demonstrated through the choice of consumer goods and activities. New elite promotes an Islamic identity and values through contributions to favored political parties, charitable organizations, schools, scholarships. In public life, Islamic references and values play an ever-larger role in politics, schools, banking and businesses, media, and fashion. Political Islamism gives way to cultural Muslimhood and conservative forms of bourgeois lifestyle. Ozal government and Motherland Party encouraged this new Turkish–Islamic synthesis. ‘83 religious education compulsory for all elementary and secondary public schools. Ozal government fall because of its inability to manage economy: unable to tax the wealthy, curb its own expenditures or control inflation. Even so, state continued to subsidize housing and to provide benefits for the military, bureaucrats, and other favored groups. The results were destructive. Inflation was rampant, poor suffered, and there were economic crises in 1994, 2000, and 2001. ‘90s, REFAH (WELFARE) PARTY, successor of National Salvation Party, became leading Islamic party. It protested against unfair distribution of wealth and opportunity and against governmental and administrative corruption and authoritarian controls. 17 Refah became the country’s most popular party. Conservative Muslim business elites supported the party. It became the champion of economic and social justice, won numerous mayoralty positions in the elections of ‘94. ‘96–‘97 it formed a governing coalition. The head of the party, Necmettin Erbakan, became prime minister of Turkey. Refah provoked grave anxiety in secularist military, government, and intellectual circles. Erbakan denounced laicism and Westernization and criticizing Turkey’s military cooperation with Israel . He promised to leave NATO and European Customs Union. In the high tensions of ‘90s, army reverted to a rigidly authoritarian and secularist policy. Military opposed political and legal liberalization and attempted to control media and schools to maintain secular, authoritarian Kemalist heritage. ‘97, military forced Erbakan government out of power on the grounds of his reactionary Islamist agenda, opposed to secular principles of the constitution. The courts declared Refah illegal. Military opposed Kurdish demands for autonomy as a threat to the survival of Turkey and justified tight police control over the country and widespread human rights abuses.  Islamic and Kurdish interests were largely excluded from the political process. AKP: A NEW SYNTHESIS AND A NEW GOVERNING PARTY Cadres of the former Islamic party organized a new party,  JUSTICE AND VIRTUE PARTY, (AKP) led by TAYYIP ERDOGAN. It defined itself as - conservative democratic - party of a secular state - democratic polity , - capitalist economy - Muslim nation. AKP was successful as a governing party and fostered political stability and economic growth. AKP candidate, Abdullah Gul, was elected president in 2007,  AKP WAS VICTORIOUS in national elections held in 2011 . AKP favored neo-liberalism and integration into world markets, and entry into EU. In conjunction with new Ottomanism, Turkey has ever-widening trading networks with the Balkans, Central Asia and Middle East. 20 Erdogan government has also attempted to normalize relations with ARMENIA. 2009, diplomatic relations and other bilateral ties were established. KURDISH QUESTION is particularly important in Turkey’s relations with Middle Eastern countries. 1980-‘88, Turkey repeatedly invaded northern Iraq in an effort TO SUPPRESS PKK , and has continued sporadic military operations against Kurds in Iraq. Turkey’s relations with Iran have been roiled by Kurdish problem. Turkey objected to PKK attacks across Iranian–Turkish border and Iranian cooperation with Iraqi Kurds. 2004, Turkey and Iran decided to share intelligence and conduct common military operations against the PKK and PJAK (Iranian branch of PKK). President Ahmadinejad of Iran visited Turkey 2008 and signed an agreement to cooperate against terrorism. Relations with SYRIA are equally complicated. After ‘80 military coup in Turkey, many Turkish Kurds took refuge in Syria, which supported PKK until late ‘90s. To forestall Syrian support for the Kurds, Turkey has threatened to divert the Euphrates water supply and has developed ties with Israel. Turkish–Israeli relations were warm until Israeli invasion of Gaza in 2008–09, and Israel’s subsequent blockade of a flotilla of supply ships headed for Gaza in which nine Turkish nationals were killed.  Diplomatic relations were suspended when Israel refused to meet Erdogan’s demand for a full apology but were restored in 2012 in a deal brokered by US. Arab revolutions that began in 2011 have brought both new diplomatic and economic opportunities for Turkish leadership in the Arab and Mediterranean world, and new conundrums in dealing with volatile and dangerous Syrian conflicts. KURDISH PROBLEM PLAYS A LARGE PART in TURKEY’S ASPIRATIONS to JOIN EU. Turkey is held on probation for EU membership. Turkish policies in regard to Kurdish political representation and HRs and its denial of Turkish responsibility for the massacre of Armenians in WW I have been cited in EU reports as a hindrance to its candidacy. EU requires Turkey to improve its HRs record as a condition for admission . These include end torture, independent judiciary, freedom of press, political rights and respect for rights of women and Kurdish minority. EU has funded economic and social reforms, oversight of the police, and the training of lawyers and HRs activists. Apart from Kurdish issue, Greece resists Turkish participation because of a conflict 21 over Cyprus. Germany fears Turkish labor migration. There is a widespread, if barely spoken, reluctance to accept a Muslim country as part of Europe. THE CURRENT STATE OF TURKISH POLITICS AKP policies were opposed by military bureaucratic elites as a threat to Turkish secularism and national identity. Behind the army’s resistance to Muslim or Kurdish political and cultural demands lies a concept of the Turkish nation as a unitary, homogeneous entity. Turkish nationalists don’t allow for minority rights or for plural ethnic and cultural identities. Constitutional court threatened to remove government for its anti-secularism and its Kurdish policies. 2002 – 2007 influence of military in National Security Council and in supervisory bodies for higher education and media was diminished. 2010, Turkish voters approved amendments to constitution that made it more difficult for the constitutional court to dissolve political parties and weakened the military by permitting civilian courts to prosecute military officers. Armed with these new powers, Erdogan government arrested hundreds of officers accused of plotting a coup, forced the resignation of the leading generals, and appointed State elites considered educated women and nuclear family essential for birth of a modern, industrialized nation and a strong centralized state. FAMILY LAWS OF ‘24 abolished polygyny. Women were given equal rights to divorce and formal equality in inheritance matters. The new laws required that divorce be subject to court rulings on specified conditions rather than a male prerogative. The constitution guaranteed the right of women to equality in education and employment. Turkish women were given the right to vote in municipal elections in ‘30 and in national elections in ‘34.‘35, women deputies were elected to Turkish parliament. First constitution of Turkish Republic put all educational institutions (whether Ottoman, foreign, or confessional) under the control of the Ministry of Education. Although there was virtually complete legal equality, only upper- and middle-class women in urban areas actually received secondary or higher education and were professionally employed. The position of lower-class women was also changed, but in less positive ways. Female migrants to the cities sometimes became laborers. Lower-class women in rural areas engaged in agriculture when men left home to work in Europe. 22 Turkish Republic inherited Ottoman tradition of centralized government and military leadership, a long history of 19th-century reform and modernization, and an intelligentsia of army officers, administrators, engineers, technical experts, and intellectuals. Ottoman era, religious elites were subordinate functionaries of state; commercial classes were not sufficiently developed to be a rival for political power. Voice of Westernized political establishment was the only one heard at foundation of Turkish Republic. ‘20-‘30s, Turkey’s economic development generated a differentiated social structure, including new groups of businessmen, factory managers, rural landowners, prosperous peasants, engineers, industrial workers, and intellectuals basis for the formation of a parliamentary government after WWII. The army remained an important political force, and intervened in ‘60, ‘70, and from ‘80-‘83 to take temporary control of state in periods of economic and social crisis. Republican regime also attempted to submerge traditional religious organizations, break attachment of ordinary people to Islam, and win them over to a Western and secular style of life. Outside of Istanbul cultural changes imposed from top had relatively slight penetration. While state was secular, Turkish populace continued to identify itself as Muslim. ‘60s-‘70s, movements/parties committed to re-Islamization of society grew stronger. Said Nursi movement, Naqshbandi Sufis, and National Salvation Party, which favored the reestablishment of an Islamic state, grew increasingly active. ‘80s - ‘90s, state tried to institutionalize Islam via control of courts, charitable endowments, and education of imams. 2002, ISLAMIC-ORIENTED JUSTICE AND VIRTUE PARTY (AKP), led by Tayyip Erdogan, became the governing party until NOW.  The military/secular nationalists SEE AKP RULE AS HARBINGER OF an IRANIAN- STYLE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION and a THREAT to the EXISTENCE of a SECULAR TURKISH REPUBLIC. Islamic party presents itself as a democratic coalition of provincial peasant landowners, small-town businessmen, pious Muslims, Kurds opposed to unfair distribution of resources and power. It calls not for Islamization, but for a democratic government and society in which religious identity is integrated into the national polity. Erdogan government has also created openings for the integration of Kurds. It remains to be seen whether Turkey is evolving from Kemalist secular nationalism into a new and more pluralistic balance among its secular, religious, regional, and ethnic minority populations. 25 USSR supported separatist movements and Communist parties. ‘21, Iran and USSR concluded a treaty of friendship, favorable to Iran. USSR agreed to withdraw from Jilan, cancel Iranian debts and concessions and surrender special legal privileges afforded foreigners. USSR reserved the right to intervene if Iran was threatened by another foreign power. Strengthened by this new treaty with USSR, Iran denounced humiliating ‘19 treaty with UK. Iran was governed by a succession of ineffectual cabinets until REZA KHAN (PM ‘23–25), came to power as head of army and minister of defense. He consolidated control over army and police, defeated tribal and provincial forces, brought most of country under military control, and in 1925 made himself SHAH of IRAN . He was the founder of PAHLAVI DYNASTY, which lasted from ‘25 to ‘79. A strong centralized government committed to an ambitious program of economic modernization and cultural Westernization. Shah’s first accomplishment was to build a modern army. New regime broke power of tribal communities. It outlawed Communist Party and trade unions, reduced parliament to a rubber stamp, and censored the press. Through the creation of a secular education system, government supervision of religious schools, Pahlavis sought to bring Ulama under state control. Reorganization of judicial administration. ‘30s, a new court system was organized, following French models, to administer a mixture of Western and Islamic legal norms. ‘28, Shah introduced new law codes that replaced Islamic law. A law of ‘36 required every judge to hold a degree from the Tehran faculty of law or a foreign university, making it impossible for Ulama to sit in courts of law. in political terms it established STATE SUPREMACY. Secularization of legal administration and education was part of a larger program of state- controlled economic modernization. The infrastructure of a modern economy was developed in 20s–‘30s. Postal and telegraph communications and air transportation were introduced to facilitate economic development and help extend authority of central government. After ‘30, state sponsored numerous industrial projects. Priority was given to consumer substitution industries. By ‘41, state also controlled trade and foreign exchange. 20s–‘30s, RUSSIA was an important trading partner and UK controlled oil production. 26 To offset the influence of these two powers, Iran made use of GERMAN capital and technical assistance, and Germany maintained a strong presence by establishing research and cultural institutes. ‘09 ANGLO-PERSIAN OIL COMPANY was founded to exploit a discovery of oil. UK government acquired a controlling interest in ‘14. Oil production was profitable for Iran but also a source of resentment against foreign companies for manipulation of royalties and absence of Iranians in managerial positions. 1933, Iran demanded a reduction in territories conceded for foreign exploration and a fixed income; in return, it extended existing concessions to 1993 and exempted oil company from taxation. This phase of development created a small modern sector in an otherwise weak economy and society. Agriculture remained unproductive. State centralization, economic modernization, and a new education system helped to create a new elite, who adopted Western values and lifestyles. This new elite, allied to an older generation of Ulama, dominated an impoverished peasant population. Modernized Iran defined its legitimacy in nationalist and secularist terms. WWII put an end to this phase of Iranian experiment in centralization of state power and economic development.  UK and USSR – concerned to keep open supply routes across Iran and to assure control of Iranian oil – seized control of Iran, forced Reza Shah to resign, and made his minor son, MUHAMMAD REZA PAHLAVI, nominal suzerain. ‘41–‘53, Iran passed through a period of open political struggle among its various would-be foreign protectors and internal political parties. late ‘40s, US eager to create a Middle Eastern barrier against possible USSR expansion, emerged as principal patron of postwar Iranian regime. US advised Iranian government on economic management, organized Iran’s police and military forces, and supplied it with military aid. With US backing, Iran resisted USSR occupation, USSR demands for oil concessions and USSR sponsorship of separatist movements. ‘40s–‘50s, Iran also struggled to win control of ANGLO-IRANIAN OIL COMPANY. ‘51, MUHAMMAD MOSADDEQ, leader of National Front (supported by a coalition of landowners, tribal leaders, leftist intelligentsia, merchants and Ulama) pushed a bill through parliament to NATIONALIZE OIL COMPANY. Western powers boycotted Iranian oil. Iranian economy collapsed and Mosaddeq coalition broke up. 27  CIA HELPED ARMY and SHAH to SEIZE POWER, dismiss Mosaddeq, and reestablish an authoritarian regime. The dispute was settled in 1954 by formation of NATIONAL IRANIAN OIL COMPANY. The consortium would produce and market oil and divide the profits with the National Iranian Oil Company  foreign companies avoided nationalization and maintained control of oil pricing and marketing. ‘53 coup also put an end to the period of open struggle for political power. The restored regime of Shah was a constitutional monarchy, but shah ruled with absolute powers. He controlled army and SAVAK, appointed ministers, selected half of senate, and manipulated parliamentary elections. A small elite of officers, administrators, landowners, and some wealthy merchants and religious leaders dominated Iranian political life. Shah’s regime was closely allied to US and dependent upon US military and financial support. Iran joined Baghdad Pact (1955) and Central Treaty Organization (1959). Iran maintained close relations with ISRAEL. Close ties with US did not prevent Iran from maintaining good relations with USSR to balance US influence and political pressure. Pahlavi program (WHITE REVOLUTION) called also for further MODERNIZATION OF SOCIETY along Western lines. ‘60–‘77, government undertook to reform the structure of landowning, modernize industrial economy, build up military forces that would assure regional supremacy and reform social structure of the country. In conjunction with agricultural reforms, shah proposed the formation of a literacy corps and a health corps intended to bring the direct influence of the state into countryside. Other reforms included extension of voting rights to women and their employment in government offices. A crucial aspect of the white revolution was land reform. 1962–64–‘68, landowners were required to sell excess land to smallholders and tenants, but because of widespread evasion not as much was distributed as had officially been proposed. New owners lacked capital, technology, cooperative organizations and government extension services necessary to productivity. Main objective of shah’s agricultural programs was creation of large-scale, state-sponsored farm corporations and private agribusinesses. These state-controlled entities favored capital-intensive mechanized farming and forced peasants from land. Nomads were forced to sedentarize. These farms commonly failed, and result was falling per capita production and a large-scale movement of rural people to cities. Iran became more dependent upon industrial development. 30  spark for revolution: a demonstration by religious students against an alleged assassination by SAVAK. Police shot demonstrators and provoked a new demonstration. Every 40 days, protests were repeated, and grew in scale until fall of 1978, when millions of people demonstrated against the regime. Oil workers refused to produce, bazaar merchants closed their shops, and army either would not or could not suppress revolt. SHAH FLED the COUNTRY and a NEW REGIME CAME to POWER. Masses of Iranians had been mobilized by a coalition of religious and liberal leaders under the guidance of the highest Iranian religious authority, Ayatollah Khomeini.  Iranian Islamic revolution is a signal event in history of all Islamic societies. It marks the culmination of 200-year struggle between Iranian state and Ulama. 19th century, weaknesses of state, and strength of non-state tribal and ethnic communities, allowed for consolidation of a religious establishment capable of opposing regime and of mobilizing large- scale popular support. History of Ulama–state relations was ambiguous. Resistance to state was sporadic and at different times Ulama espoused both revolutionary activism and religious quietism. Iranian revolution cannot be said to be due to an inherent religious opposition to state authority, but has to be treated as a response to specific conditions. Constitutional revolution of 1905 and Iranian revolution of 1979 were not expressions of a constant hostility between state and religion, but the expression of a recurring possibility of confrontation between them. State weakness, organizational strength of religious establishment and latent cultural permission for Ulama resistance have all allowed for revolutionary struggle in name of Islam. The revolution also had worldwide importance. Revolution came from religious establishment; in name of Islam.  For the first time in modern era, religious leaders had defeated a modernized regime. The event shook the relations between states and religious movements and opened doubts about future of all Islamic societies. THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT ABOLISHED MONARCHY and ESTABLISHED ISLAMIC GOVERNMENT. The new regime was built upon charismatic authority of AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI, official head of government and authority of last resort.  His authority was legitimated by a modern Shiʿi theory, which obligated government to be under the rule of jurisprudential Ulama . 31 In ‘79, Khomeini established Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, deployed against opponents of revolution. By ‘89, religious elite controlled all leading positions in government and political authority of the Ulama was consolidated. ‘80s, clerical elite split into 3 main factions: 3. Religiously conservative and revolutionary faction that emphasized patriarchal authoritarian rule, cultural purity and social conformity. 4. Reformist and internationalist faction, led by Mehdi Karroubi and Muhammad Khatami, was committed to a democratic Islamic political system and independent civil society. 5. A pragmatic or centrist group was led by Ayatollah Rafsanjani.  New regime consolidated its power by eliminating its coalition allies. Thousands of officers of shah’s government were purged and executed. Minorities suffered arrest and destruction of property. Westernized middle class was forced into exile. A fierce puritanism took hold. Women were forced out of many professions and were required to be completely veiled. Places of entertainment were shut down. Iran was embroiled in disputes with other countries. Iran hostage crisis  ’79-‘81 Revolutionary government seized US embassy and held its personnel hostage for over a year. A Bureau of Islamic Propaganda was created to stimulate like-minded revolutionary action in other Muslim countries. Iran supported Hezbollah in Lebanese civil war and struggle against Israel.  ‘80 IRAQ ATTACKED oil-rich southwestern provinces of IRAN. Iraq claimed to be defending Arab countries against revolutionary threats and its own Shii population from revolutionary contamination, BUT its principal motive was expansionist opportunism. 8 years of warfare followed. Iran hurled countless men against Iraqis in a war reminiscent of WWI trench warfare, while Iraq fought with all means at its disposal, including chemical weapons and poison gas. US played a duplicitous role supplying arms and intelligence to both, but from 1986 weighed in on Iraqi side to forestall an Iranian victory. In Islamic Republican period, economic development was stymied by: - war with Iraq (‘80s) - collapse of international oil prices (‘90s) 32 - US-imposed sanctions (2000) intended to deter Iran from developing nuclear weapons - ongoing struggle between clerics favoring a privatized market economy and those favoring government regulation in interest of popular welfare. Economy, 80% controlled by state, was mismanaged by bureaucratic bungling and by corruption. Charitable foundations controlled vast resources and used them for political and clerical favorites. Government policies favored bazaar merchants, mainstay of revolution, but small-scale industries suffered from lack of foreign imports, weak exports and black-market competition. Agriculture stagnated, requiring importation of food. Islamic state had little impact upon the distribution of wealth, welfare, housing, and other domestic issues. Islamist policies were forceful in shaping media, education and treatment of women. Legal changes favorable to women’s rights introduced by shah were reversed and family protection laws of 1967-1975 were repealed. Men regained right to unilateral divorce and to custody of children. Polygyny was again permitted. Unsuccessful effort was made to restrict women’s employment. Women writers, artists, and intellectuals created new journals to subtly push back the demands of conservative Ulama and increase scope for women’s self-expression. Some women writers contested traditional interpretations of Islam. The journal of Women’s Society of Islamic Revolution of Iran, interpreted Islam in ways that supported women’s rights and argued that each individual has the right to interpret Quran. This FEMINIST CAMPAIGN met with some successes. Under President Rafsanjani (1989–97), new laws allowed for marriage contract stipulations, divorce law was revised to give women greater rights in divorce and child custody, and minimum age of marriage was raised to puberty. Facilities for women’s education were greatly improved, though women’s participation in workforce was still hindered by policy and social mores. With the DEATH of KHOMEINI in 1989 , Ayatollah ʿAli Khamenei succeeded him. Constitution was revised to strengthen president office and state apparatus; regime built cadres of younger Ulama, student activists and town militias to constitute a new elite. Government was divided: - More radical Ulama wished to consolidate authority of supreme Islamic jurist and to further Islamize the country. - Moderates led by President Rafsanjani wanted an efficient government adapted to realities of global economy.  Ayatollah Khamenei and President Rafsanjani formed an uneasy alliance. ‘90s, Islamic left revived. 35 US and Arabian states see Iran’s nuclear program as threatening Iranian dominance in Middle East. 2009 presidential elections precipitated a CRISIS IN IRANIAN POLITICS. Government lost support of leading Islamists. Reformists and pragmatists supported challenger, Mir-Hossein Moussavi, in an effort to defeat Ahmadinejad and return Iran to a more balanced relationship between religious and administrative spheres of government. Government declared an Ahmadinejad victory, but many Iranians contested legitimacy of results in mass demonstrations, violently suppressed by IRGC and Basij. Mass arrests and tortures destroyed regime image. Iran today is in effect ruled by martial law. There was a covert struggle for power between Khamenei and Ahmadinejad, between clerical hierarchy and military–economic–security elites. - Ahmadinejad hoped to increase presidency power and secure his influence in government, - Supreme Leader and conservative clerics sought to marginalize presidency and retain ultimate control over politically important government agencies. Ayatollah Khamenei floated a suggestion to transform the government to a parliamentary form that would eliminate the direct election of the president.  With the election of a new president, HASSAN ROUHANI (2013) Ahmadinejad faction seems to have been eclipsed. ISLAM AND THE STATE Modern Iranian history is marked by an ambiguous relationship between state institutions and those of religion. - Religious institutions have depended upon and opposed powers and authority of state. - Clerics have looked to state for defense and economic management of Iranian society, but have resisted state encroachment upon their prerogatives and opposed policies contrary to their interests. - Monarchies have looked to religious elites for political, cultural, administrative, and psychological support, while seeking to subordinate Ulama to state control. The seizure of state power in name of Islam has not changed that ambiguous relationship. Revolutionary government carries on the work of state building begun by shahs. Islamic Republic strengthened state bureaucracy and brought army under its control by IRGC.  Iranian foreign policy remains driven by national rather than religious interests. Despite authority of Supreme Leader and Islamic policies, state is not fully under clerics control. Even though a cleric is accepted as the highest authority, he shares power with an elected president who embodies public/governmental aspects of society. 36  There is an ambiguity as to whether authority derives from Islam or from people. N.B.  ISLAMIC LAW IS NOT the OFFICIAL LAW of IRAN and state remains its ultimate promulgator. Khomeini himself stressed importance of revolution over that of adhering to Islamic law. Iranian national state has absorbed its Islamic component, but historical tensions between Islamic and national identities, between religious and government secular institutions, and between clerical and governmental elites are still unresolved. Reza Shah promulgated measures to modernize women status. Women began to enter into teaching, nursing, and factory work, and in ‘30s education and public entertainments were opened to women. Whereas veiling was forbidden, women of urban upper and middle classes were adopting Western dress, rural and lower-class women continued to wear traditional clothing. Men retained important legal privileges in divorce and custody, but marriages had to be registered in court, and marriages to minors and temporary marriages were made more difficult. Pahlavi regime reforms didn’t fully alter Iranian culture.  shah’s abdication in ‘41 reversed many of the changes made. ‘50s - ‘60s, women again benefited from the authoritarian Pahlavi regime. Women were given the right to vote. New family laws were promulgated ‘67 - ‘73. They gave women equal rights to institute divorce proceedings, though criminal code still allowed a man to kill his adulterous wife, sister, or daughter in name of family honor. Women didn’t usually have economic power to realize legal rights. Lack of democratic institutions impeded formation of a genuine women’s movement. Iranian revolution initially attracted widespread female support. Intellectuals identified true Islam with modernity, including progress, autonomy, freedom, education, and justice. Women who supported Islamic revolution came from 3 groups: 1. lower-class women interested in betterment of material conditions 2. middle-class Bazaari families 3. educated women hostile to foreign influences. Some women who participated in revolutionary demonstrations believed that they were defying the West and that the revolution would lead to democracy. An Islamist program was implemented after the revolution. Women were required to veil in workplace. Men and women were segregated in schools. 37 The minimum marriage age for women was lowered from eighteen to thirteen and restrictions on polygyny were removed. The family protection laws were rescinded, making it easy for men to repudiate a marriage and very difficult for women to do so. A woman could obtain a divorce only if her husband was economically incapable of supporting a wife, impotent, infertile, insane, abusive, or absent for more than six months. These measures were part of a family policy meant to stabilize marriages and encourage the birth of children. Marriage was pronounced a divine institution, for God had given men economic power and women reproductive power. The state declared itself in favor of motherhood. Huge families were encouraged and were characterized as Islamic.  The new laws proved to be counterproductive and led to an increase in divorces. In ‘89, Iranian government tried to strengthen the position of women by giving them broader rights to stipulate conditions for a divorce in marriage contracts and by requiring that all divorces be registered with courts. The war with Iraq created a need in the economy for skilled workers and opened labor opportunities for women. The rhetoric of motherhood intensified. The facilities for women’s education were greatly improved, but women’s participation in the workforce was still hindered by policy and social mores. In public life, women maintained a right to vote, to be elected to parliament, and to hold cabinet positions, but they were excluded from the courts. After ‘82, only certain university subjects were deemed proper for women: nursing, education, and theology. Women were excluded from vocational education in fields such as agriculture, veterinary medicine, geology, and engineering, though after ‘90, when the state realized that there was a shortage of trained personnel, women were allowed to reenter technical professions. Conversely, men were barred from fashion design, gynecology, and nursing. These constraints were justified by an interest in separating men and women. Traditional Iranian culture legitimized government policies. These great efforts to restrict the activities of women promoted an energetic feminist reaction. Many educated women were repelled by Islamist program, but few would publicly defy or reject Islamic norms – it would be blasphemy and treason at the same time. Iranian women found private ways to express their dissent or advocated their own interpretations of Islamic norms. They found subtle language and gestures to protest against misogyny. They used Fatima, daughter of Muhammad, as a model for advocating women’s empowerment. Women writers, artists, and intellectuals created new journals to subtly push back against the demands of conservative clerics and increase the scope for women’s self-expression. Some women 40 society. He tried to create a centralized dictatorship based on an army. He devised a new tax system. Old Mamluk households were destroyed and all other political forces were broken. The administration and economy of the country were totally reorganized. Major irrigation projects were undertaken. State control of agriculture and trade allowed Ali to buy cotton from peasants at low prices and resell it to exporters at a profit. Ali’s descendant ISMA ‘IL PASHA (r. 1863–79) carried the development of the country still further. He continued the program of economic and technical growth and constructed the Suez Canal. He also gave Egypt European-type law courts, secular schools and colleges and a Western-type press. Egypt acquired the infrastructure of cultural modernity. balance of social power in Egyptian society was altered. Turko-Egyptian families became powerful in the army and administration. Ali’s economic and administrative policies promoted the development of a new landed elite. Changes in land law abolished restrictions on private ownership and made it possible to buy, sell, or mortgage land, and opened land to purchase by foreigners. While its base was in landowning, the new elite had a commercial wing, including Egyptian- Jewish and Syrian merchants. A new economy promoted state control and individualism in place of corporate structures. Government controls and private ownership replaced village collectivities and destroyed the village economies. The disruption led to peasant indebtedness, fugitivism, and to a series of peasant rebellions. The position of the religious elites was equally transformed. In the 18th century, the ulama of Egypt were an integral element of the ruling elite and represented the interests of the regime, acting as intermediaries between the government and the common people. Muhammad ʿAli subordinated the ulama to the regime, confiscated their tax farms and charitable endowments, and made them dependent upon the ruler for their incomes. During 19th ulama withdrew from public affairs to protect a narrow sphere of educational and judicial interests. Islamic legal institutions were taken under government control. Egypt adopted new criminal and civil law codes, and a civil code based on French models was introduced in 1873. Another civil law code was introduced in ‘49. Shaykh al-Azhar became principal spokesman of ulama and conduit of government influence among religious elite. The powers of Sufis were similarly circumscribed: Ali brought Sufi orders under state control. In ‘03 and ‘05, the regulation of Sufis became the function of a government ministry. Both ulama and Sufis had been made subordinate to the state. 41 UK COLONIAL RULE Subordination of ulama and emergence of a new landed, commercial and intellectual elite opened the way for further radical change in Egyptian society. But, before these elites could make their influence felt, Egypt fell under direct UK rule. UK interest in Egypt derived from consolidation of UK Empire in India. Egypt lay on the route to India and was essential to empire defense. UK had acquired a major interest in the Egyptian economy. The reforms of Ali had made Egypt an exporter of cotton and dependent on the world market. Egypt had become an importer of UK cloth. Heavy Egyptian borrowing to purchase consumer luxuries, military equipment, manufacturing machinery and capital equipment for Suez Canal put Egypt into debt to European banks. Egypt’s economic dependence led to bankruptcy and to imposition of a foreign-managed debt administration under Anglo-French control (1875). The debt administration was the beginning of colonial rule: it led to conflict between foreign interests and new Egyptian elites. In 1881, these elites formed a parliamentary government. UK refused to compromise and in 1882 took complete control of the country. In 1898, UK took the Sudan under joint Anglo-Egyptian rule. From 1882 until WWI, UK managed Egyptian economy efficiently, but in the imperial interest. UK improved agricultural productivity by investments in railroads and irrigation, built the first Aswan dam (‘06). UK improved tax collection, consolidated private property ownership and raised adequate revenues to pay for Egyptian budget and foreign debt. Economic development encouraged concentration of surplus wealth in large landlords. However, peasantry didn’t benefit. Industrialization was inhibited by lack of UK interest in encouraging competition, the unwillingness of landowners to invest and the lack of natural resources. Although UK administration was favorable to Egyptian interests, there was deep resentment over the imposition of UK rule. The Egyptian landowning elite and intelligentsias resisted UK rule through two ideological positions: Islamic modernism and Egyptian nationalism. EGYPTIAN RESISTANCE: FROM ISLAMIC MODERNISM TO NATIONALISM The most influential spokesmen for 19th were JAMAL AL-DIN AL-AFGHANI and his disciple MUHAMMAD ABDUH, who was appointed chief of Islamic law. Abduh’s endeavors were directed toward modernizing Islamic law. He combined reformist principles – return to the Quran and Prophet’s sayings, right of independent judgment and opposition to Sufi practices – with a modernist responsiveness to the political and cultural 42 pressures of Europe. He advocated educational reform and saint religious practices, as means for modern economic and technological conditions. The goal was autonomy from European powers and restoration of the vitality of Islamic states and societies. Under influence of al-Afghani and Abduh, Islamic modernism and Islamic religious reform became ideological programs of Egyptian intelligentsia. Islamic modernism and reformism gave way to a more secular nationalist concept of Egyptian identity. In late 19th century, Egyptian patriotic sentiment was blended with the idea of modernizing reform. Nationalist writers such as Mustafa Kamil propounded the idea of a unified nation, patriotic in spirit, passionate in its hatred of foreign rule, but also dedicated to constitutional form of government and Western-type education. Freedom and recognition of the inherent civil and political rights of citizens were the basis of society. Country homogeneity and isolation, its long history of central government and its cultural past encouraged a consciousness of Egyptian identity. The national movement began with speeches and journals, but it took political form with the formation of the National Party (Hizb al-Watani), led by Mustafa Kamil in the 1890s. Denshawai episode in ‘06 conveyed the nationalist idea from its original middle-class milieu to students and even to the masses. The outrage awakened Egyptian hostility to UK rule. WWI crystallized determination to be independent. The declaration of a UK protectorate, martial law, requisitions of Egyptian labor and manufacturing capacity, heavy migration to Cairo and widespread hardship stiffened Egyptian opposition to UK rule. At the end of the war, a delegation led by Sad Zaghlul demanded complete independence. Zaghlul was able to mobilize mass support and forced UK to dissolve the protectorate. THE LIBERAL REPUBLIC In ‘22, Egypt emerged as a semi-independent state under UK tutelage with all the makings of a national state, including a unified population, a history of centralized government and a Westernized intelligentsia committed to liberal constitutionalism (Unilateral Declaration of Egyptian Independence issued by UK government). A parliament and a king governed Egyptian affairs . But foreign policy, army, Sudan region and jurisdiction over all foreigners in the country remained under UK control . Egypt came out of WW I with a secular national regime, but it remained partially dependent. Egyptian elite (landowners, journalists, politicians) was able to organize a political, but not an effective military resistance in the struggle for independence. Once in power, liberal regime failed to win full independence. 45 mismanagement and profiteering in supply of military hardware was exposed. Soldiers returned embittered and denounced the regime for their defeat. A new force had come into being in the persons of students and army officers with professional and technical educations, not implicated in old regime. Shocked by its failure to defeat UK and by corruption that undermined Egyptian army in Palestine, they conspired to seize power. In ‘52, the Free Officers movement , led by MUHAMMAD NAGUIB, JAMAL ʿABD AL-NASSER and ANWAR SADAT, overthrew the king and brought the parliamentary regime to an end. In the three-way struggle among the liberal, secularized older generation, Muslim and lower-class reformers, and new generation of technically educated military intelligentsia, army conspirators were victorious. THE NASSER ERA The regime established by Free Officers in ‘52 set Egypt on a course that has lasted to the present. It was a military and authoritarian regime, which successfully cultivate mass support. Monarchy, parliament, and the political parties were abolished. The old elites were replaced by a presidential regime and one-party system, which rested on an elite of army officers and bureaucrats of middle-class origin. Free Officers’ government turned to socialism, anti-imperialism, and pan-Arabism to define the objectives of Egyptian national development. Nasser government also strove to control Islamic affairs. Society of MB was dissolved in ‘56 and driven underground. The new regime brought al-Azhar University, mosques and charitable endowments under state control. Nasser was the dominant figure in domestic affairs, basing his power on the army, the bureaucracy, and his talents for political manipulation. A major innovation was the one-party system. LIBERATION RALLY was formed in ‘52 and was succeeded in ‘55 by the NATIONAL UNION. The single political party helped keep upper echelons of the government in touch with the needs of society responsive to decisions at the top. In ‘62, a national congress created the Arab Socialist Union, which established a local party organization to influence municipal administration, to train youth cadres for leadership in party and government, and to inculcate a socialist ideology among peasants and workers. In ‘65, ʿAli Sabri reorganized the party to stress youth militancy and a more aggressive party role in local affairs. The one-party system was not as important as Nasser’s personal authority, charisma, and ability to balance the powers of the officers and officials who controlled the army, the ministries, and the major industries against each other. 46 WWII generated a great upheaval throughout Middle East. France was destroyed as a colonial power and UK greatly weakened. Many Middle Eastern states – Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, Israel– became independent. US and USSR emerged as global superpowers and immediate rivals for regional influence, contesting control of the Balkans, Turkey, and Iran. NATO was established to contain the threat of Soviet expansion. In ‘55, Iraq and Turkey joined the Baghdad Pact promoted by US secretary of state Dulles: Egypt came under intense pressure to join the new alliance. Nasser feared the loss of Egypt’s newly won independence, Iraq hegemony within Middle East and the possibility of being connected, via an US alliance, to Israel. In response, he attended Bandung Conference of non-aligned nations, and emerged as a leading spokesman for independence of 3° World nations and for neutrality in Cold War. In ‘55, Egypt refused to accept the Baghdad Pact, and negotiated USSR security guarantees. In ‘56, Dulles withdrew from promises to fund the construction of an Aswan dam; Nasser retaliated by nationalizing Suez Canal. UK, France and Israel attacked Egypt to regain control of the canal, but were forced to withdraw because of united US and USSR opposition . SUEZ CRISIS , Nasser’s neutralism, his defiance of US and UK and his survival of the UK– French–Israeli assault made him the leader of the Arab world in the struggle against imperialism and Zionism . Nasserite parties were founded in several Arab countries. In ‘58, a union (UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC) was formed between Egypt and Syria that would be the basis for a single Arab state. The union broke up in ‘61, mainly because of Syrian resentment of Egyptian domination. Egypt, committed to redressing injustice in Palestine and achieving Arab unity, continued the struggle against Israel. Defeat in the ‘67 war with Israel (Six-days war) set back the movement for Arab unity and damaged Nasser’s and Egypt’s anti-Israel, pan-Arab, and pro-Soviet foreign policy. From the late ‘50s, Free Officers regime also began to organize a socialist economy. The basic economic problem was to check the decline in Egyptian standard of living . Economic development required a new strategy, based on industrialization financed by increased agricultural productivity and appropriation of agricultural surplus. Limits on land undermined economic base of old landowning elite. Productivity was to be increased by the creation of state-controlled cooperatives and government provision of credits, fertilizers, and seeds. Peasants were to be politically mobilized by opportunities to participate in local government. 47 To promote industrialization, the Free Officers at first encouraged private entrepreneurs, but its laissez-faire economic policy, discouraged by hostility of the regime to large-scale private ownership in agriculture and handicapped by lack of capital and expertise, failed to improve the economy. Between ‘57 and ‘60, state took control of the major banks, sequestered UK, French, and Jewish property, and developed plans for agricultural reform and for construction of Aswan dam. In ‘60 and ‘61, banks and major industries were nationalized, and direct government control of banking, insurance, foreign trade, transportation, construction, textile, and other manufactures was instituted. Only retail trade and housing were left to private sector. Bourgeoisies were dispossessed and economy was nationalized (Egyptianized). The army, took charge of government administration and industrial management. With the nationalization of industry came a welfare policy that promised mass education and subsidies for rents and basic commodities. The result was not development but stagnation . Economic resources were used for maintenance of a large army, an ambitious foreign policy, a bloated bureaucracy and a welfare state. Excessively ambitious planning, inefficiency and corruption took their toll. The ‘67 war with Israel brought an end to Nasserite style of Egyptian development and ruined socialist experiment. Nasser’s personal charisma was tarnished, and it was left to his successor, Anwar Sadat to rethink foreign and economic policies. SADAT AND MUBARAK SADAT began with fundamental political decisions: Egypt would  disengage from USSR  expulsion of Soviet advisors in ‘72  ally with US and with conservative Arab regimes  resolve the conflict with Israel, which required one last war to give legitimacy to Sadat’s regime. In ’73 (Yom Kippur War), Egypt surprised Israeli forces by attacking across Suez Canal and by winning the initial battles. Israel counter-attacked, penetrating Egyptian territory, but US intervened to stop Israel’s advances and to arrange a truce. Sadat was able to break Israeli invincibility, claim a moral victory in the war, and to offer Israel peace with Egypt. By the CAMP DAVID ACCORDS brokered by President Carter in ‘79, Egypt agreed to recognize existence of Israel in return for Sinai territories conquered in ‘67 war. Sadat an international celebrity , won US aid and Saudi and Gulf state investments. The years that followed brought formal peace but a tense and unsatisfactory relationship for both. 50 This was the context for the reemergence of an Islamic-led opposition. Since 19th, Egyptian state had been trying to bring Islamic institutions under government control. In ‘50s and ‘60s, Nasser’s regime outlawed MB and curtailed autonomy of other religious institutions. In ‘55, government consolidated Islamic courts and civil courts dealing with matters of personal status. In ‘61, al-Azhar was made a state university. In ‘60 and ’73, endowed lands were taken under government control and private mosques were brought under government ministries, to control religious life, to support government policy, and to identify Islam with national and socialist programs. Sadat cultivated regime-supporting ulama by giving scholarly establishment access to media and by making religion a compulsory subject.  This effort to fuse Islam and the state was only partially successful. Ulama and official Islamic establishment remained under government control, independent preachers, missionaries and teachers actively promoted a renewed commitment to Islam. Political and social atmosphere of ‘60s-‘70s gave a new cachet to religious loyalties. Defeat in Six Days war, failure to solve Palestinian problem, burden of authoritarian government, economic failure, unfair distribution of income and power, migration of people from rural areas to cities and collapse of old and meaningful cultures into empty nationalistic and ideological slogans led to condemnation of Egypt’s secular and socialist policies. As Egyptians returned to their faith for consolation, Sadat took up the rhetoric of Islam and gave it official sanction. As secular nationalism failed, economic failures and social breakdown strengthened the potential for a new surge of Islamic identifications. Islamic revival (Islamic awakening) refers to a revival of the Islamic religion. The revivers are known in Islam as Mujaddids. Within the Islamic tradition, tajdid has been an important religious concept, which has manifested itself throughout Islamic history in periodic calls for a renewed commitment to the fundamental principles of Islam and reconstruction of society in accordance with the Quran and the traditions of the Islamic prophet. Islamic revival is an umbrella term encompassing a wide variety of movements, some intolerant and exclusivist, some pluralistic; some favorable to science, some anti-scientific; some primarily devotional, and some primarily political; some democratic, some authoritarian; some pacific, some violent. Since the ‘70s, a worldwide Islamic revival has emerged, owing in large part to popular disappointment with the secular nation states and Westernized ruling elites, seen as authoritarian, ineffective and lacking cultural authenticity. It’s motivated by a desire to restore Islam to ascendancy in a world that has turned away from God. The revival has been accompanied by growth of various reformist-political movements inspired by Islam and by re-Islamisation of society, with manifestations ranging from sharia-based legal reforms to greater piety and growing adoption of Islamic culture. Among immigrants in non-Muslim countries, it includes a feeling of a growing universalistic Islamic identity or transnational Islam, brought on by easier communications, media 51 and travel. The revival has also been accompanied by an increased influence of fundamentalist preachers and terrorist attacks carried out by some radical Islamist groups on a global scale. Preachers and scholars who have been described as revivalists or mujaddideen, in the history of Islam include Ahmad ibn Hanbal, Ibn Taymiyyah, Shah Waliullah, Ahmad Sirhindi, Muhammad ibn Abd-al-Wahhab, and Muhammad Ahmad. In the 20th century, Hassan al-Banna, Abul Ala Maududi, Malcolm X and Ruhollah Khomeini, have been described as such. Contemporary revivalist currents include Islamic liberalism, which seeks to reconcile Islamic beliefs with modern values; neo-Sufism, which cultivates Muslim spirituality; and neo-fundamentalism, which stresses obedience to Islamic law and ritual observance. ISLAMIC REVIVAL expressed itself in a great variety of ways. Some revivalist groups preached that Quran and Sunna must be the basis of individual morality and Islamic law be applied in all relevant matters. In social policy they held that primary role of women should be family care. They avoided ideological positions in economic matters but stressed the importance of minimizing the differences in wealth between rich and poor (importance of social justice). These groups believed that their society had been corrupted by secular values and that only a return to Islamic principles would restore morality, economic well-being, and political power. In ‘70s, Islamic revivalism appealed especially to students and professional people from rural backgrounds, but socially conservative families. Students had almost no direct instruction, and lived in poor and crowded conditions, oppressed, marginalized and frustrated. Since poverty hindered possibility of marriage, they were beset by sexual tensions and concerned about finding proper spouses. Young female professional students began to wear Islamic dress. For women who were entering the public world dominated by men, the veil and the profession of Islamic modesty were ways of recreating the traditional separation among young people. Adoption of Islamic dress served as a way of protecting family values and marriage possibilities. Islamic revival in Egypt had important political aspects, but it was also a mechanism for the adjustment of Muslim students to the complexities of an urban environment. Islamic revival also appealed to segments of population that had lost out in the drive to modernization. It appealed to old literate elite of schoolteachers and religious functionaries, to bazaar economy, small factory owners, migrants from rural areas. MB was the premier Muslim religio-political organization. It favored formation of an Islamic state whose defining characteristic is primacy of Shariʿa. An Islamic state would in their vision reduce private sector, respect private property, and provide welfare/social security. It sponsored social service projects in poor neighborhoods, and since ‘92 has had control of 52 doctors’, lawyers’, engineers’, and pharmacists’ professional associations, university faculties, and student associations. The party was divided by generational and class differences. It contained both a radical revolutionary wing and a moderate reformist wing that was ready to participate in multiparty politics. Some segments were tacit collaborators with Mubarak. Older-generation leaders tended to be authoritarian and exclusive; younger leaders often expressed themselves as more open to compromise with other political or religious tendencies. MB in Egypt is the home base for numerous affiliated international chapters. Branches are found in Jordan, Gaza and other Arab countries, and wherever there are growing Muslim communities. These branches uphold a revivalist version of Islam but are only loosely coordinated and play different roles in different countries depending upon local educational, social, and political conditions. Apart from MB, more student associations dedicated to Islamization, (i.e. - the Islamic group) emerged after ‘67 defeat. Their objective was to re-create an Islamic society on the basis of a restored caliphate. They were aided by government to counter communists power and other leftists. They adopted veil for women, unshaven beard and long white robe for men and favored public prayer demonstrations. Muslim propaganda was circulated to denounce alleged Christian aggressions, proselytizing among Muslims, and cooperation between state and Coptic community. The Copts are an ethnoreligious group indigenous to North Africa. In Egypt constitute the largest Christian population in MENA, as well as the largest religious minority in the region. Most Copts adhere to the Coptic Orthodox Church of Alexandria, an Oriental Orthodox church. Copts of Egyptian ancestry maintain a distinct ethnic identity from Muslim Egyptians, and generally reject an Arab identity. Copts are a distinct population, albeit more closely related to the Muslims of Egypt than to any other population. There is considerable diversity within the Coptic ethno-religious group, with cultural, linguistic, and genetic differences existing between Copts from southern and northern Egypt. The security of Copts was undermined by Muslim assaults and Muslim–Christian riots. While student groups focused on moral and social issues, radicals held that only the overthrow of government and establishment of an Islamic state could lead to a truly Islamic society. They were inspired by the teaching of Sayyid Qutb whose Signs of the Road has become an influential manifesto: sovereignty belongs to God and that all human authority derives from God’s sovereignty. In ‘70s, Shukri Mustafa, head of al-Jamaʿat al-Muslimin took up this doctrine, denouncing reformist and collaborationist points of view, and excommunicated society led by Sadat. He gathered a small group of followers, refused collaboration with Egyptian institutions and introduced 55 From 2003 to 2011, dozens of independent newspapers and magazines appeared. Kifaya was the first political movement in Egypt to use internet and social media to mobilize demonstrations and strikes. Kifaya organized demonstrations between 2004 and 2007 that called for Mubarak to resign. In 2008, workers and students joined in a strike organized on Facebook in support of workers at the Mahalla textile factory who were seeking better salaries and working conditions. The strike grew into a national day of protest against the regime. Kifaya began to decline in importance due to repression, internal divisions and lack of appeal. Nonetheless, what appeared to some to be a sudden upsurge of popular protests in 2011 in fact followed years of growing political unity among all those opposed to Mubarak’s authoritarian rule. Labor opposition, in a series of occupations, strikes, demonstrations, or other collective actions, played a critical part in developing resistance. REVOLUTION AND REACTION These developments were the prelude to great outburst of January 2011. The rebellion was prompted by the self-immolation of a Tunisian street merchant, Muhammad Bouazizi, on December 2010. Broadcast by Al-Jazeera , Bouazizi’s death became a symbol of the frustration of young people all over the Arab world due to lack of work and indignities and punishments heaped on them by authoritarian and abusive governments.  It provoked uprisings in Egypt, Syria, Libya, Yemen, Bahrain, and elsewhere in the Arab world. The demonstrations revealed a powerful current of young but unemployed, technically savvy youngs. In Egypt, thousands of blogs, Facebook, Twitter, and other media helped mobilize hundreds of thousands of people for protracted demonstrations. Mubarak government tried to suppress and disperse demonstrators by force, but they persevered despite hundreds of deaths until they compelled the resignation of Mubarak on February 2011. Supreme Council of Armed Forces assumed power. Military, supported by Mubarak-appointed judiciary, entrenched in privilege, refused to surrender real power, continued to try civilians in military courts and proposed maintaining a position outside the control of a civilian government. The military has a direct interest in protecting its privileged economic position in society. In November 2011, there were massive demonstrations protesting military rule. A series of constitutional drafting committees, referendums and elections brought MB and other Islamists to political power.  MB won 40% of national vote and Salafis 25 %. 56 They dominated the first elected parliament and in 2012 MUHAMMAD MORSI (candidate of MB) was elected president. N.B.  Morsi was the first democratically elected president in Egyptian history. The new government treated its victory as the victory of Islamist movement. He attempted to staff key government offices entirely with MB. He didn’t even include the MB reformers who stood for democracy, pluralism, and human rights, and ignored their demands for fair representation of women. He then attempted to bypass the judicial system and to push through a new constitution on his own authority. The bureaucracy (police and army) and leftist secular opposition refused to accept the authority of the elected government.  by a coup d’état, the army led by GENERAL ABDAL-FATTAH AL-SISI, set up a new military regime. It arrested Morsi and MB’s leaders. Its troops opened fire on MB demonstrators, appointed military governors to provinces, and reversed the defeat of Mubarak to reestablish the military regime under new leadership. Two factors are critical to the logic of Egyptian politics: 1. The power of the military as an armed force , as an economic elite and as perceived representative the Egypt nation. Behind restored military rule is an already long tradition, going back to Nasser, of mobilizing bureaucratic, business, and landowning elites to support the regime, and a long experience in co-opting and manipulating opposition and potential opposition forces. 2. The antimilitary and antigovernment forces have an equally long history of being unable to consistently work together. The Islamic movement is divided among traditional ulama, moderate MB, radical MB and revolutionary Salafis. Morsi government demonstrated that it couldn’t cooperate with secularists and leftists. The secularists are no more able to cooperate with the Islamists. Since the Islamists have a much greater mobilizing potential due to their networks of mosques, charities, businesses, and sociopolitical groups, they are generally stronger than the secularists. In the crises of regime transition, the secularists opt for military authoritarian rule rather than risk an Islamic government. Each of them fears the consequences of the rise to power of the other more than it fears authoritarian rule.  Egypt faces a military regime, severe economic problems, and the challenges of integrating Muslim and secular identities with democratic aspirations. In the period of liberal republic (after WWII), Egyptian feminists concentrated on reforming the legal structure of the family. 57 In ‘23, minimum age for marriage was 16 for women and 18 for men. In ’29, mother’s legal custody of her children was extended to age 11 for girls and 9 for boys. Egypt adopted Maliki rules that provided women with greater opportunities to divorce. Egyptian feminists were not in favor of secular law and their goals for the restriction of polygamy and the regulation of men’s prerogatives in divorce were not achieved. Western concepts of private property motivated reforms in property laws. Egypt passed inheritance laws in ‘43 and ‘46. Orphaned grandchildren were allowed to become designated legal heirs in their grandfathers’ wills. Egypt’s ‘46 trust (waqf) law required all trusts to be registered in Islamic courts. A more comprehensive Egyptian Civil Code was promulgated in ‘49, based both on a variety of civil codes from other countries and Islamic legal traditions. Abd al-Razzaq al-Sanhuri, the most influential legal reformer in XX century Middle East, led the way to the codification of Egyptian civil laws, fusing French and Egyptian legal norms. After the military coup of ‘52, the regime of Nasser vastly expanded women’s rights . In order to industrialize, modernize and secularize, Nasser provided for women’s suffrage, education and employment. Women entered professions, assisted by maternity leave and childcare. They were given the right to vote in ’56 and were elected to public office. Nonetheless, since there were no women in the military they were excluded from the highest state positions. Sadat further expanded women’s participation in government, especially for upper-class women who had education, organizing skills and experience in voluntary organizations. In ‘79, Sadat introduced a quota system to allocate thirty parliamentary seats and 10 to 20 % of seats on government councils for women (Mubarak repealed Sadat’s quota system in ‘86). Women turned to the syndicates for representation. Sadat introduced changes in family law. A decree in ‘79 compelled registration of divorces and expanded alimony payments. The new laws (called Jihan’s Laws, after Sadat’s wife) required the agreement of first wife for a second marriage, compensated women for nonconsensual divorces and extended a mother’s custody over children to 10 years old for boys and 15 for girls. High Constitutional Court nullified most of these decrees in ‘85. In 2000, the government promulgated a new divorce law: khul law stipulated that a woman could divorce her husband by returning the bridal gift and renouncing all other financial compensation. Married women were given right to travel without their husbands’ permission. However, changes in law didn’t necessarily bring changes in social realities. There is still a stigma attached to women going to court to insist upon their legal rights. Women who advocate Western values may be criticized as traitors. 60 the imposition of European legal, economic and political controls, and (after WWI) of direct colonial administration, favored the development of a new Middle Eastern middle class. This included doctors, lawyers and military officers. Muslims tended to be stronger in landowning ; Christians and Jews in commerce and banking . Based on the expanding commercial and educational opportunities provided by contacts with Europe, this new middle class took on many of the mores, attitudes, and political ideas of their Western models. These foreign influences led to the formation of a new literary intelligentsia and to several Arab literary and political movements. The first was the emergence of an Arab identity. Educated Arabs became aware of their own literary heritage. The early figures, such as Nasif Yaziji and BUTRUS BUSTANI were Christian Arabs. Bustani compiled a dictionary of the Arabic language. These early publicists disseminated their views through cultural associations. The early Arab literary thinkers also stressed modernization and reform. Their newspapers and journals presented Western European scientific and political ideas. Government should be conducted in the interest of the governed and provide for just and regular taxation, education, and legal reform. The wealthy Christian elites were turning from religious communal identity to secular and national identities. This was prompted by the rising influence of lay leaders instead of clerics within the Syrian churches. Christian Arab writers put forward the idea of secession from the Ottoman Empire. Naguib Azoury called for the formation of a secular Arab state in which Christians and Muslims would be equal citizens under a constitutional regime. Arab identity also emerged among Arab Muslim literati. They had turned into political unrest, based upon strong anti-Turkish feeling and a sense of the superiority of Arab. The new attitude may have been promoted by a conspiracy for the restoration of caliphate in the person of Sharif of Mecca, custodian of holy places. Behind this revival of Arab sensibility also lay Islamic religious feelings channeled into Arab sentiments. Arabs were the first people of Islam. The Quran was revealed in Arabic and the early Islamic empires were Arab glories. Arab nationalism took root among Muslim notables of Damascus. The primary factors were struggles for power within Ottoman system and a Muslim reaction against growing European and local Christian commercial successes. By the late 19th century, ulama and elite military families had merged into a combined religious and landowning elite. Rich merchants and Ottoman officeholders were part of this elite. The notables were divided into competing families and factions. The position of notables was challenged, but not overturned, by programs for centralization (Tanzimat) of state power. 61 Already threatened by European commercial competition, the growing role of Christians and Jews as intermediaries in trade with Europe, and the beginning of Christian and Jewish money lending in rural areas, Damascus notables were hostile to Ottoman reforms. The rise of Ottoman Committee for Union and Progress (CUP) in 1908 pushed Damascus notables into adopting Arab intellectual and political currents. CUP tried to centralize power in the hands of Turks. In Damascus, it imposed Turkish as the language of schools and courts. It took control of charitable endowments, dismissed local officials and blocked the careers and cultural self-expression of educated Arabs. These measures prompted the adoption of Arabism as expression of opposition to secularization and Turkish rule. Just before and during WWI, Arabism became the ideology of Damascus notables, military officers, lawyers, and those ulama who were out of government favor. Arabism before ‘18 didn’t mean political independence. Arab leaders generally favored an Arab– Turkish ruling condominium. Another current in the formation of Arabism came from Arabia. HUSAYN, the Sharif of Mecca, hoped to overthrow the Ottomans and become king of an Arab state. His ambition was based upon his religious prestige as a descendant of the Prophet, as custodian of holy places. Husayn tried to rally Arab sentiment to his side by cultivating al-Fatat, a secret society. In ‘15, Husayn entered secret negotiations with the UK to promote an Arab revolt against Ottoman rule in Syria and Arabia. McMahon (UK high commissioner in Egypt) implied that UK would recognize an independent Arab state. In ‘16, Husayn was declared king and attempted to seize the Hijaz. He waged guerrilla warfare against the Turks with the help of UK agents and military advisors. UK and Arabs took Damascus. UK were in control of most of the Near East, while Faysal (son of Husayn) established himself as governor of Damascus under UK auspices. Faysal demanded that UK recognize him as monarch of an independent Arab state. However, the Arab attempt to establish an independent state was aborted by European powers. UK were not really committed to Husayn. By the Sykes–Picot agreement with France (‘16), they had promised to partition the Arab Near East into two zones of direct colonial rule and two spheres of influence. In ‘17 , by Balfour Declaration, they promised to establish a Jewish national home in Palestine . In response to Husayn’s, UK assured that political, civil and religious rights of Arabs would be protected, to assist in the formation of independent states based on the consent of the governed. At the conference of San Remo in ‘ 20 , UK and France nonetheless divided the Arab world in accord with the Sykes–Picot agreement. European allies created four dependent states Syria, Lebanon (under France) and Palestine , Iraq (under UK) 62 In ‘22, Palestine was divided to create Transjordan. The new colonies were legitimized as mandates of League of Nations. The turmoil surrounding the creation of these states mobilized merchants, ulama and street gangs. Their involvement in politics was the basis of later nationalism. UK and French created modern Arab states and gave them territorial boundaries and central governments. The Arab national movement was too weak and divided to affect the fortunes of the region. Literary wings were barely coming to political consciousness, Arab revolt led by Husayn didn’t represent modernist aspirations of intellectuals. Damascus notables were divided for power. Although there was a shared Arab ethnic and linguistic pride, there were competing tendencies toward decentralization, toward a single Arab state, and toward regional states. In a society that had no history of independent states and of institutional/economic reforms, nationalist literary–political movement was too weak to counter imperialist forces. ARABISM and ARAB STATES in COLONIAL PERIOD From ‘20s to ‘50s, these states (apart from Palestine) was caught up in political struggle. Attempted to win independence from French or UK, within each there was a growing struggle for power between a dominant older-generation conservative elite and rising younger elites. In the mandate period, each country was in control of a foreign power allied to a conservative domestic political elite. In each country, the political elites accepted the mandate system. Their primary goal was the consolidation of central governments, despite the fragmentation of population into numerous tribal and sectarian communities. Their long-term goal was  independence from UK and France. 65 In ‘66, socialization of agriculture began with the formation of agricultural collectives, a state monopoly of cotton production. To break the patron–client ties of peasants to landlords and urban- based money lenders, cooperatives and a peasants’ union were established, which gave the state direct control of the population. Revolution was not complete. A portion of land remained in control of rich peasants, landlords, and urban investors. These measures were followed by nationalization of industry and commerce in ‘65. Electricity, oil distribution and most foreign trade were taken under government control. Finally, Bath state took control of charitable endowments and appointments to religious offices. Regime attempted to overcome the inherent familial, ethnic and religious factionalism of the country by creating a mass Leninist-type political machine based on middle and lower-middle class youths. Party cadres monopolized officer positions in army, government jobs, agricultural and village cooperatives, and youth organizations. The creation of a mass society was constrained by intra-elite struggles for power. Between ‘63 and ‘70, army officers eliminated the civilian Bath Party ideologues. From ‘70 until 2000, Hafiz al-Assad diminished the importance of the party and opened new channels to political power through army, police and intelligence services. The state relied more on factional and clientele loyalties, especially from Alawis, and from specific families and tribes. Alawis came to power in ‘60-70s under Hafiz al-Assad. The ALAWIS are a sect of Shia Islam, primarily centered in Syria.  The Alawites revere Ali, considered the first Imam of the Twelver school. Alawites represent 17% of Syrian population and are a significant minority in the Hatay Province of Turkey and northern Lebanon. Alawites form the dominant religious group on the Syrian coast and towns near the coast which are also inhabited by Sunnis, Christians, and Ismailis . Alawites identify as a separate ethnoreligious group. Quran is only one of their holy books, their interpretation has very little in common with Shia Muslim. Alawite theology and rituals break from mainstream Shia Islam. Alawites drink wine and are encouraged to drink socially in moderation. They believe in reincarnation. Alawites have historically kept their beliefs secret from outsiders and non-initiated Alawites, so rumours about them have arisen. The establishment of French Mandate of Syria marked a turning point in Alawi history. It gave the French the power to recruit Syrian civilians into their armed forces for an indefinite period and created exclusive areas for minorities, including an Alawite State, which was later dismantled, but the Alawites continued to be a significant part of the Syrian Armed Forces. Since Hafez al-Assad took power, government has been dominated by a political elite led by the Alawite Al-Assad family. During the Islamist uprising in Syria in the ‘70s and ‘80s, the establishment came under pressure. Even greater pressure has resulted from the Syrian Civil War. Economic development was subordinated to political objectives. Syrian economy was managed to reinforce regime by favoring party members, government workers and peasants. 66 Under Bath rule, the regime’s middle-class base has been vastly broadened by free education, white-collar jobs, protection for local businesses against foreign competition and by food subsidies. Christian and other minorities continue to be protected. In return, they have taken a politically quietist line, giving up independent civil society and political participation. In ‘60s-‘70s, public sector failed to generate the resources needed to finance state. Domestic investment was limited, and self-sustaining economic growth has not been achieved. Deficit spending financed by foreign loans and a liberalization of economy resulted in a trade boom in ‘70s, BUT by the late ‘80s expansion led to payments deficit, inflation and economic collapse. While the state was dominated by an ʿAlawi minority and its powerful military and intelligence apparatus, the majority of the population is Sunni Muslim. Position of Muslim religious elites (ulama) in Syria was very different from that of their counterparts in other Muslim countries, in which the secularization of educational, charitable, and legal institutions limited the scope of ulama influence. They had to face the competition of alternative, secular, scientific and intellectual elites, and the diffusion of ideas through the media. In Syria they didn’t face the same measures of bureaucratic control. The BATH DIDN’T INCORPORATE ULAMA into STATE APPARATUS, but instead tried to maintain control by security and surveillance measures. Syrian ulama adapted to these circumstances by creating informal worship and study groups. They offered informal instruction to students and young professionals. Many sought a larger audience through newspaper articles, radio, television and internet. Their connection to economy’s private sectors rather than state proved advantageous in periods of liberalization/relaxation of state controls. Through their connections to businessmen, they were linked to political–military elites.  Muslim opposition to state didn’t come from neo-traditional ulama, but from radical Society of MB and Salafis. MB was founded in Aleppo and Damascus in the ‘30s. As in Egypt, MB appealed to old bazaar shopkeepers, artisans, craftsmen, student and intelligentsia. Operating as a political party in Syrian elections of ‘61, MB won 6% of national vote and 18% of Damascus vote. In ‘60s - ‘70s, MB turned to civil disobedience and armed resistance. Islamist movement in Syria was a reaction against a rural-based regime, an expression of Sunni hostility to Alawis, a rebellion of governed against governing elite. From mid-’79 to late ‘81, in response to Syrian government’s intervention against Palestinians in Lebanon, rising inflation and decline of Sunni political influence, they launched guerrilla attacks and large-scale uprisings.  destruction of MB opened the way to the rising influence of the neo-traditional ulama. 67 Bathist regime was happy to support a quietist religious orientation and ulama were willing to accept an authoritarian regime in return for ratification of their position in society. Since advent of Hafiz al-Assad, SYRIA’S FOREIGN POLICY has been shaped by complicated considerations. From ‘55 ‘til ‘89, mainstay of Syrian policy was:  ALLIANCE with URSS and HOSTILITY to ISRAEL . Syria advocated that Arab states mobilize to defeat/dismantle Israel and expel European population. The only way was for the Arab states to come abreast of Israel in economic, military, and organizational capacities. Syria’s support for cross-border attacks upon Israel were among the critical precipitating factors in ‘67 Six days war in which Syria lost the Golan Heights.  After ‘67, Syrian policy was carefully calculated to avoid premature hostilities. Syria never permitted PLO to attack Israel from its territory. Syria intervened in the Lebanese civil war (‘75–91), partly to forestall the emergence of a PLO- dominated Lebanon that might drag Syria into a premature war with Israel, and partly to forestall the possibility of a Lebanese–Iraqi alliance against Syria. The collapse of URSS in ‘89 led to a reorientation of Syrian foreign policy . The withdrawal of URSS military and financial support made it impossible to sustain an energetic anti-Israel policy. US-led coalition of Arab and European states to defeat Iraq in Gulf War (‘91) made shift to US, Egyptian and Arabian political hegemony in region. Hafiz al-Assad adapted himself to these new circumstances by joining the anti-Iraq coalition, pacifying Lebanon and entering into talks with Israel over the Golan Heights.  Syria didn’t come to an agreement with Israel. With the death of Hafiz al-Assad in 2000, his son Bashar al-Assad succeeded him. Lebanon was his first concern. Syria controlled Lebanon through three agencies: 1. Syrian military intelligence network based in Biqaʾ Valley; 2. Lebanon’s General Security Directorate, under Lebanese president Emile Lahoud; 3. Syrian liaisons with Hezbollah, Lebanese Shiʿi political and paramilitary organization. Control of Lebanon gave Syria access to financial and smuggling networks and terrorist groups. After the murder of Lebanese prime minister, Rafiq al-Hariri, opponent of Syrian occupation, US and French governments insisted on a full Syrian withdrawal. 70 ’26 constitution divided political power among the major religious communities: it provided for a president, a ministerial government and a bicameral legislature, in which seats were distributed in a ratio of 6:5 for Christians and Muslims. - president would always be a Maronite - prime minister a Sunni - head of parliament a Shiʿi - Foreign affairs would be in the hands of a Christian minister - Army would be headed by a Maronite, with Muslim or Druze subalterns. State institutions were designed to reinforce sectarian divisions rather than integrate society. Political parties in Lebanon were expressions of Zuama, local landowners and religious leaders, whose powers were based on control of peasants and on patron–client networks. ‘20 - ‘45, Lebanese government based on a compromise among sectarian and communal bosses. Bosses were linked up in 2 main political parties: - National Bloc was substantially Maronite Christian and favored independence, but resisted ties with other Arab countries - Constitutional Bloc favored close relations with Syria. End of French Mandate over Lebanon in ‘43, after 23 years of Mandate rule. ‘43, Lebanese factions agreed on a National Pact Christians and Muslims deemphasized outside political ties for sake of internal cooperation.  preparation for an independent regime in ‘45. The state existed to maintain balance of power among bosses and confessional groups, and from ‘47 to ‘58, country was ruled by a succession of coalition governments. The new state of Lebanon led a precarious existence before it disintegrated into civil war . The mandate-period constitution of ‘26 divided power among various religious communities but Lebanese government was never able to centralize power, and country was run by local bosses through their networks of political parties, religious charities, schools, and courts. ‘43, Christian and Muslim bosses agreed to cooperate in formation of an independent state and formed a coalition that lasted until ‘58. The regime of bosses didn’t allow for rise of new strata in Lebanese society, including technocrats and bureaucrats, upwardly mobile lower-middle-class persons and Arab nationalists and urban gangs. As Muslims became demographic majority, they demanded a larger share of political power and economic opportunities. 71 ‘58, pro-Nasser Arab nationalists tried to seize power, but US helped restore status quo. ‘60s - ‘70s, the critical issue was the role of Palestinian refugee population. Lebanon was divided between those who would allow Palestinians to use Lebanon as a base for the struggle against Israel and those who wanted to restrict Palestinian activities and avoid a confrontation with Israel. The country was polarized between coalitions : - CONSERVATIVE  Maronite and Shiʿis groups. o Maronite coalition headed by P. Gemayel, head of Phalange, and C. Chamoun, former president of Lebanon. Its goal was to dominate Lebanon or to partition the country and create a Maronite state. This group favored a free-enterprise economy and noninvolvement in struggle against Israel. - LEFTIST COALITIONS  Muslims, Druze, Palestinians and Christian minorities. Prominent was Progressive Socialist Party, which supported Palestinians, a program of socialist development and neutralism in world affairs. This faction also included Syrian Social Nationalist Party, opposed to separatism of Maronites. The increase in social and political mobilization sparked by growing presence of Palestinian guerrillas led to emergence of various new social and political movements, and to the rise of numerous sectarian-based militias. Unable to maintain a monopoly of force, state security apparatus was powerless to stop the increase in violence that was gradually destroying the country’s fragile social and political fabric. Escalating violence had deepened fault line between Maronite Christian and Muslim communities, symbolized in turn by increasing power of Christian Phalangists and predominantly Muslim Lebanese National Movement. Although occasional communal violence was already occurring, many date beginning of the war to April 13, 1975, when the Phalangists attacked a bus taking Palestinians to a refugee camp. The attack escalated an intermittent cycle of violence into a more general battle between Phalangists and LNM. Lebanon witnessed disintegration of many of its administrative apparatuses, including army, which splintered into its various sectarian components. Elias Sarkis was elected president in 1976, he called for an end to war, and an increasingly involved Syria added pressure on the factions to negotiate a cease-fire . Sarkis’s mediation efforts were thwarted by two principal factors that continued to plague negotiation efforts throughout the civil war:  increasing interference of external actors in Lebanese conflict  emergence of power struggles within various sectarian communities The first major intervention by an external actor in Lebanese civil war was carried out by Syria. Despite its earlier support for PLO, Syria feared that an LNM-PLO victory would provoke Israeli intervention against Palestinians and lead Syria into a confrontation with Israel, complicating Syria’s own interests. In ‘76 it launched a large-scale intervention to redress the emerging imbalance of power in favour of Christians. Syria’s intervention sparked a more active Israeli involvement in Lebanese affairs, in which Israel also intervened on behalf of Christians, whom Israelis looked upon as their main ally in their fight against the PLO. Israel provided arms and finances to Christians while Palestinian forces (who by 1977 again enjoyed Syrian support) continued to conduct cross-border raids into Israel. In 1978 Israel launched a major reprisal attack, sending troops into south Lebanon. The resulting conflict led to the establishment of the UN Interim Force in 72 Lebanon ()—a peacekeeping force meant to secure Israeli withdrawal and support the return of Lebanese authority in the south—as well as to the creation of the South Lebanese Army. The most significant Israeli intervention during the course of the Lebanese civil war, however, was the invasion that began on June 6, 1982. Although the stated goal of Israel was only to secure the territory north of its border with Lebanon so as to stop PLO raids, Israeli forces quickly progressed as far as Beirut’s suburbs and laid siege to the capital, particularly to West Beirut. The invasion resulted in the eventual removal of PLO militia from Lebanon under the supervision of a multinational peacekeeping force, the transfer of the PLO headquarters to Tunis, Tunisia, and the temporary withdrawal of Syrian forces back to Al-Biqāʿ . Galvanized by the Israeli invasion, a number of Shiʿi groups subsequently emerged, including Hezbollah, an Iranian- backed militia that led an insurgency campaign against Israeli troops. In 1982 Pierre Gemayel’s son Bashir was elected to the presidency. 3 weeks after his election, he was assassinated in a bombing at the Phalangist headquarters. Two days later Christian militiamen under command of Hobeika, permitted entry to area by Israeli forces, retaliated by killing hundreds of people in Palestinian refugee camps. The election of Bashir’s brother, Amin Gemayel, to the presidency in late September 1982 failed to temper the mounting violence as battles between the Christians and the Druze broke out in the traditionally Druze territory of the Shūf Mountains, resulting in numerous Christian fatalities. Western peacekeeping forces that had been dispatched to Lebanon suffered heavy casualties, among them the destruction of the US embassy in 1983 and suicide attacks on the US and French troops of multinational force stationed in Lebanon in 1983, which hastened their withdrawal from Lebanon early the following year. By ‘85 most of the Israeli troops had also withdrawn, leaving in their wake the proxy SLA in control of a buffer zone north of the international border. Exacerbated by various foreign interventions, the Lebanese civil war descended into a complicated synthesis of inter- and intracommunal conflict characterized by the increasing fragmentation of the militias associated with each of the sectarian communities. The Phalangist-dominated LF fractured into various contending parties that were in turn challenged by the militias of the Franjieh and Chamoun families in the north and south of the country, respectively. Meanwhile, the Sunni community’s militias were challenged by militias organized by Islamic fundamentalist groups, and the Shiʿi community experienced fierce divisions between the more clerical Hezbollah in the south and the more secular Amal (Hope, also an acronym for Afwāj al-Muqāwamah al- Lubnāniyyah [Lebanese Resistance Detachments]) movement led by Nabbih Berri. The Palestinians in turn endured serious infighting between Fatah factions of the PLO that had begun to return to the country following the Israeli withdrawal. Fueled by continuing foreign patronage, Lebanon between 1985 and 1989 descended into a war society as the various militias became increasingly involved in smuggling, extortion, and the arms and drug trades and began to lose their populist legitimacy. This period of disintegration was crystallized with the decline of many of the country’s remaining institutions, and in 1987 the collapse of the Lebanese pound—which had demonstrated a surprising resiliency throughout the first 10 years of the war—led to a period of profound economic hardship and inflation. Furthermore, when Gemayel’s term ended on September 22, 1988, parliament could not agree on the selection of a new president; as a result, Gemayel named Gen. Michel Aoun, a Maronite and the head of what was left of the Lebanese Army, as acting prime minister moments before his own term expired, despite the continuing claim to that office by the incumbent, Salim al-Hoss. Lebanon thus had no president but two prime ministers, and two separate governments emerged in competition for legitimacy. In late November 1988, General Aoun was dismissed as commander in chief of the armed forces; because of the continued loyalty of large portions of the military, however, Aoun was able to retain a de facto leadership. In February 1989 Aoun launched an offensive against the rival LF, and in March he declared a war of liberation in an attempt to expel the Syrian influence. In September 1989, following months of intense violence, Aoun accepted a cease-fire brokered by a tripartite committee made up of the leaders of Algeria, Morocco, and Saudi Arabia. On October 22, 1989, most members of the Lebanese parliament (last elected in 1972) met in Ṭāʾif, Saudi Arabia, and accepted a constitutional reform package that restored consociational government in Lebanon in modified form. The power of the traditionally Maronite president was reduced in relation to those of the Sunni prime minister and the Shiʿi speaker of the National Assembly, and the division of parliamentary seats, cabinet posts, 75 In response, a rival Shiʿi movement, Hezbollah (Party of God) was created by Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah. Backed by Iran, it took the lead in struggle against Israel. Hezbollah fought against Israeli invasion of ’82. From ‘90 to 2000, it fought against the Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon. In 2006, Israel again invaded Lebanon in an effort to crush and disarm Hezbollah , and inflicted terrible damage and heavy losses of life. Its military attempts to disarm and disperse Hezbollah failed again. Hezbollah emerged from the war better armed and with missiles that could reach Israeli cities. It remains a client of Syrian regime and underwrote Syrian domination of Lebanon. It’s also a client of Iran, receiving Iranian military and political support and acting in Iranian interests. In ‘90s, Hezbollah also became a major POLITICAL PARTY. It provides schooling and social and charitable services to its communities, inculcating Shiʿi values and loyalties. Some Lebanese view perpetual war against Israel and Hezbollah’s dependency on Iranian religious authority and military and financial assistance as barriers to integration of Shiis into Lebanese state. Rival political parties fear its militias and its ambitions to dominate Lebanon. Many Shiis who had suffered greatly in war also questioned wisdom of Hezbollah’s provocations against Israel. Tension between Hezbollah and its opponents has led to repeated political crises. In 2008, Hariri government attempted to shut down Hezbollah’s private military telecommunications network. In response, Hezbollah seized control of western Beirut, set up encampments, took over port and media outlets, and engaged in battles with rival militias. Lebanese Army under General Michel Suleiman, as a neutral force, proposed a compromise in which the army would investigate Hezbollah’s private telephone network without actually removing it. In 2008, the rival groups reached a political agreement and elected General Suleiman as president. Hezbollah and its allies emerged with a third of the cabinet seats, which effectively gave it veto power over cabinet decisions. Hezbollah moved from being a minority paramilitary movement to having a central political role in Lebanese politics. IRAQ 76 When UK conquered Iraq in ‘ 17 , they first ruled it as a colony, but in ‘20 a revolt of Ottoman officials, Sunni and Shiʿi religious leaders, and tribal groups forced them to include Iraqi elites. They set up a constitutional monarchy under KING FAYSAL II , allied in WWI. Anglo-Iraqi treaty of ‘ 22 gave UK control of military, financial, judicial and foreign affairs. ‘30, new treaty made Iraq legally independent but allowed UK continued control over foreign and military affairs. Under UK rule, Iraq was run by a coalition of rural landowners, tribal chiefs, ulama, Shiʿi religious leaders, and army officers. This elite was deeply divided. Between ‘36 and ‘41, there were a number of military coups. WWII brought bitter struggles between pro-UK and pro-German factions. ‘41, Rashid ʿAli al-Kiylani took control of government in interests of a pro-German policy, but UK troops seized the country. until ‘58, King Faysal II governed with the collaboration of his principal minister, Nuri al-Said and a small minority of landowners. In name of Arab nationalism, this elite predominantly of Sunni background, governed a populace  60% Shiʿi and 25% Kurdish. Oil was discovered in Iraq before WWI and was first exploited by Turkish Petroleum Company, founded in ‘12 with German, Dutch, and UK participation. ‘29, company was reorganized as the Iraqi Petroleum Company (IPC). ‘38, various companies exploring for oil were merged into IPC. ‘52 Iraq obtained an agreement from the international oil companies for a 50–50 share of oil profits. ‘61, Iraq revoked oil concessions, and in ‘72 nationalized the IPC. Oil production was maintained with Soviet and French help, but Iraq suffered considerable losses. Old elite dominance was challenged by a new generation of lower-ranking officials, junior army officers, textile workers and displaced peasants. The appropriation of land by shaykhs and breakup of tribal communities drove large numbers of people to cities. A new urban generation hostile to entrenched regime took form.  Army became opposition center Until ‘58, regime contained this growing opposition by proposals for extensive development programs, but it didn’t survive to carry them out. Army coup brought an end to the monarchy in ‘58. 77 The 14 July Revolution (‘58 Iraqi coup d'état) resulted in overthrow of Hashemite monarchy, established by King Faisal I in ‘21 under UK auspices. King Faisal II, Prince 'Abd al-Ilah, and Prime Minister Nuri al-Said were killed during the uprising. The coup d'état established the Iraqi Republic. Abd al-Karim Qasim took power as Prime Minister until ‘63, when he was overthrown and killed in the Ramadan Revolution. Ramadan Revolution, (8 February Revolution and February ‘63 coup d'état in Iraq) was a military coup by the Baath Party's Iraqi-wing which overthrew the Prime Minister of Iraq, Abd al-Karim Qasim. Qasim's former deputy, Abdul Salam Arif was given title of President, while prominent Ba'athist general Ahmed Hassan al- Bakr was named Prime Minister. Most powerful leader was secretary general Baath Party, Ali Salih al-Sa'di, who controlled National Guard militia and organized a massacre of dissidents. Old regime was overthrown in the name of pan-Arab nationalism and domestic reform and was replaced by an authoritarian military regime. In ‘58, a group of young army officers led by ʿAbd al-Karim Qassim, representing soldiers, administrators, intellectuals and ideologues schooled in the nationalist ideals, seized power (14 JULY REVOLUTION) Their hatred of Iraq’s dependence on UK, Baghdad Pact, and effort to form a conservative alliance between Iraq and Jordan, precipitated a coup dʾétat, execution of king and formation of a Revolutionary Council. The new regime favored conservative reforms in land ownership, free enterprise in industry and strong state Policies to promote health care and education.  Under Qassim’s leadership, it quickly turned into a military dictatorship based on strong Communist Party support. Bath Party, MB and other opposition groups were suppressed.  Qassim regime was overthrown by a Bath coup in ’63 (RAMADAN REVOLUTION), in the name of Arab unity. Bath nationalized the major banks and industries. In ‘68, military coup brought AHMAD HASSAN AL-BAKR and SADDAM HUSAYN to power. The 17 July Revolution was a bloodless coup in Iraq in ‘68 led by Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr, Abd ar-Razzaq an- Naif, and Abd ar-Rahman al-Dawud that ousted President Abdul Rahman Arif and Prime Minister Tahir Yahya and brought the Iraqi Regional Branch of the Arab Socialist Baath Party to power. Ba'athists involved in the coup included Saddam Hussein, future Iraqi President. The coup was primarily directed against Yahya, who exploited political crisis of 6-Day War to push government to nationalize UK/US owned Iraq Petroleum Company in order to use Iraq's oil as a weapon in the battle against Israel. Full nationalization of IPC did not occur until ‘72, under Ba'athist administration. The new Iraqi government consolidated power by denouncing alleged US and Israeli machinations. The Ba'ath Party ruled from the 17 July Revolution until 2003, when it was removed from power by UK- US forces. 80  He was opposed by Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf states and by a U N coalition led by the US. US intervention was governed by two considerations: - US was opposed to any regional concentration of power that might affect long-term access to oil on favorable terms for industrialized countries (in ‘53, it helped bring down Premier Mosaddeq of Iran; it had opposed Nasser in ‘60s and revolutionary government of Iran in ‘80s). now it would oppose Saddam Husayn. - US was concerned about proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, thus far possessed only by Israel. In ‘91, UN coalition launched a rapid and decisive attack on Iraqi forces.  The military victory was not pursued to the point of overthrowing Saddam Husayn. Shiʿi and Kurdish rebellions were abandoned by US and its allies and were crushed by Saddam. US and its Arab allies were probably reluctant to destroy Iraqi regime. They feared Iranian hegemony over the Shiʿi population. Turkey feared emergence of an independent Kurdish state in Iraq. In addition to imposing an economic embargo, CEASE-FIRE of April ‘91 required Iraq to cooperate with a UN arms-inspection regime and to destroy missiles and weapons of mass destruction. Saddam Husayn maintained unchallenged control of the country. US and its allies sought by every means to undermine his regime and to forestall Iraq’s resurgence as a regional power. US supported creation of an Iraqi National Congress. UN imposed an embargo on exports/ imports. ‘96, Saddam agreed to UN oil for food program: half proceeds of oil sales went to Kurds, to reparations payments for Kuwait and UN expenses, and the rest for food and medicines for Iraq. By 2000, embargo had caused death of countless Iraqis and was failing. Smuggling through Turkey, Syria and Iran undermined embargo and provided revenues to Iraqi government. By 2001, Russia, France and US were buying Iraqi oil. Salaried urban middle class was ruined, and Iraqis suffered from a badly deteriorated standard of living, shortages of food and medical supplies and a high rate of infant mortality. The regime maintained its power based on military, intelligence services, Bath Party and on revived tribal loyalties. In 2001, 9/11 ATTACKS on TWIN TOWERS and PENTAGON were the pretexts for BUSH to invade AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ –alleged al-Qaeda bases. Iraq was accused of attempting to develop nuclear weapons (later proven to be false). 81 Various theories have been advanced to explain US determination to invade Iraq: - desire for bases in Middle East - control of oil - protection of Israel - to assert US hegemony in the region. 2003, US and coalition forces invaded Iraq. L. Paul Bremer, made critical counterproductive decisions that led to an Iraqi insurgency. He postponed formation of an interim Iraqi government. He set up an Iraqi advisory Governing Council based on representation by sect and ethnicity and adopted a program of de-Baathification that dissolved Iraqi army. US-sponsored political arrangements promoted sectarian conflict. A rival Shiʿi movement was organized by Muqtada al-Sadr, who created the Jaysh al-Mahdi (Army of the redeemer, JAM). Sadrists declared their own state in 2003. Liberated from Saddam’s oppressive rule and bolstered by thousands of Iranian pilgrims, Shiʿi religious seminary rose rapidly to power. Ayatollah ʿAli al-Sistani was the most powerful man. As Shiʿis became politically more assertive, Sunni guerrillas led by former army officers, Bath Party members and security and intelligence agents, reinforced by influx of foreign fighters, rebelled against US occupation. One strand of Sunni opposition wanted to restore Sunni Arab power in Iraq and other to establish a Salafi Islamic state. A Salafi, ABU MUSAB AL-ZARQAWI, declared allegiance to Osama bin Laden in 2004. His organization became known as al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia. Zarqawi’s money came from Islamic charities in Saudi Arabia and UAE. US attempted to crush insurgency militarily. Invasion and destruction of Fallujah in 2004 was a signal moment in this phase of occupation. This ambiguous victory was followed by the revelation of photographs of US troops torturing and humiliating Iraqi prisoners at Abu Ghraib prison. 2005, the first multiparty elections in 50 years were held to elect a parliament that would write a constitution. Shiis won the elections and Nuri al-Maliki became prime minister , but Shiʿis were splintered into mutually hostile parties. The elections didn’t pacify the intense civil war already under way. Mixed neighborhoods were ethnically cleansed, hundreds of thousands killed and displaced from their homes. Middle class was forced into mass exile in Jordan or Syria. The country was divided into fiefdoms. Kurds controlled north and northeast. Al-Qaeda and other Sunni insurgent groups, controlled parts of western and northern Iraq. Human and political crisis became unbearable. 82 Sunnis began to rethink their positions. By 2006, they couldn’t militarily defeat US forces nor overthrow the Shiʿi-led government. They came to regard Iran as the greatest danger. Sunni tribal forces, called the Sahwa (Awakening), accepted US money and turned against the al-Qaeda extremists. Iraqi government was supposed to incorporate Sunni militias into its security forces. By 2008, there were 4 main positions in Iraqi politics: - Iyad al-Allawi led a party for integration of Sunnis and Shiʿis in a secular Iraqi movement. - Muqtada al-Sadr and other Shiʿi leaders wanted to rule a united Iraq. - Some wings of SCIRI wanted to form a separate state in south allied to Iran. - Kurdish leaders wanted an independent Kurdistan . 2010 national elections generated a fractured parliament. 2008, parliament approved a security pact with US  COMPLETE US WITHDRAWAL FROM IRAQ by the end of 2011 . After 8 years of war, effect of US intervention had been to remove an anti-Iranian regime and bring the Shiʿis to power. Iraq is overcome by waves of political violence. Iranian influence is at a maximum due to political support for the Maliki regime, investments and pilgrimage. Shiʿi communities in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Lebanon anticipate liberation or increasing political and economic influence. TRANSJORDAN AND JORDAN Transjordan was a UK creation the most unnatural of the new states, corresponding to no historical province or local community. Originally it was thought to be implied in Balfour Declaration’s promise of Palestine as a Jewish homeland, but in ‘21–22 UK helped Amir Abdallah (brother of Faysal) to establish a government and build up Arab Legion. ‘28 treaty established a constitutional monarchy, a legislature and political parties, but reserved for UK control over foreign policy and the army. IN ‘46 , TRANSJORDAN BECAME INDEPENDENT , though a treaty of ‘48 reserved for UK the right to maintain bases. ‘48 ‘50, as a result of the Arab–Israeli war, Transjordan absorbed parts of Palestine and was reorganized as the Kingdom of Jordan. 85 In 2015, the General Secretary announced the establishment of a Joint Arab Force with the aim of counteracting extremism and other threats to the Arab States. Participation in the project is voluntary and the army intervenes only at the request of one of member states. The growing militarization of the region and the increase in violent civil wars as well as terrorist movements are the reason behind the creation of the JAF, financed by the rich Gulf countries. Hashimite rulers of Iraq and Transjordan had their own schemes for Arab unification and resisted Egyptian hegemony. League failed to prevent the formation of the state of Israel in ‘48. The cause of Arab unity was revived in the ‘50s, it had been taken up by Nasser in Egypt, by the Bath Party in Syria and other elements of the new postwar Arab intelligentsia (opposition to Israel, to colonial and postcolonial domination and to conservative domestic elites who stopped social reform and economic development). Inspired by Nasser’s charismatic leadership, struggle for power was waged in the name of Arab unity. - In Syria, Bath Party took power in the late ‘50s and ‘60s. - In Iraq, a coup d’état overthrew the monarchy and brought a military regime to power in ‘58. - In Lebanon and Jordan US-UK intervention helped defeat opposition and kept the established regimes. These domestic struggles were entangled in big-power rivalries. At the end of WWII, UK and France were no longer able to maintain their Middle Eastern positions and had to concede independence. US and URSS emerged as the principal competitors for regional influence. In the ‘50s, US attempted to align UK, Turkey, Iran, Pakistan and Arab countries in an US- sponsored treaty organization. US was supported by Nuri al-Saʿid prime minister of Iraq and Adnan Menderes prime minister of Turkey (‘50–60), who proclaimed the BAGHDAD PACT in January ‘55. THE CENTRAL TREATY ORGANIZATION (CENTO), originally known as Baghdad Pact, was a military alliance of Cold War, formed in ‘55 by Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Turkey and UK and dissolved in ‘79 . US pressure and promises of military and economic aid were key in the negotiations, but US could not initially participate. Dulles, involved in negotiations as US Secretary of State under Eisenhower, claimed that was due to the pro-Israel lobby and the difficulty of obtaining Congressional Approval. Others said that the reason was for purely technical reasons of budgeting procedures. In ‘58, US joined military committee of alliance. Egypt and Syria opposed Iraqi initiative and refused US aid. 86 After an Israeli attack on the Sinai in ‘55, Nasser emerged as the leader of the Arab struggle against imperialism and Zionism. Operation Black Arrow was an Israeli military operation carried out in Gaza (while under Egyptian control) in ‘55. The operation targeted the Egyptian Army. 38 Egyptian soldiers were killed as were 8 Israelis. The ‘48 Arab–Israeli War resulted in a decisive Israeli victory. Arab nations remained intransigent and were willing to sign armistice agreements with Israel. A static situation of no war, no peace emerged. Hundreds of thousands of Arab refugees now camped alongside Israel's borders. Refugees lived in squalor and were kept under martial law. Arab governments, in particular Egypt, capitalized on the opportunity to recruit Palestinians for armed actions against Israel. The infiltrations and border transgressions took the form of banditry. By ‘54, Egyptian military intelligence was taking an active role in providing various forms of support for Palestinian activity. After an attack by the fedayeen, Israel decided to take decisive action against Egypt for its sponsorship of Palestinians and initiated Operation Black Arrow. Arab infiltrators murdered an Israeli civilian. One of the militants who was pursued and killed by Israeli forces was found to be in possession of documents linking him to Egyptian military intelligence. Defense Minister Ben-Gurion and Chief of Staff Dayan demanded a harsh response directed against those believed to have sponsored the atrocity. All the Arab countries were swept by a wave of sentiment in favor of Arab unity. The crisis of the ‘50s gave new regimes in Egypt, Syria and Iraq their political and ideological identity. The dominant force was a military elite legitimized by its commitments to Arab national independence and state-guided modernization of economy. The political consciousness of these elites was anti-imperialist, anti-Israel and neutralist in international politics. They adopted socialist economic policies, in accord with rejection of Western imperialism, with the support given by URSS and with the need to reject the previous generation that had failed to make national economic and social progress.  The crisis didn’t lead to Arab unity. Despite their common interests, the rivalries among Egypt, Syria and Iraq prevented Arab unification. From the ‘60s, Syria, Iraq and Jordan were subject to authoritarian military regimes. Regimes in Syria and Iraq were military regimes with organized bureaucratic and one-party political support. They depended upon patronage relationships between leaders and a favored clientele. They subscribed to populist Arab nationalist ideologies. In these states, there were no independent political parties, labor unions or student groups. Religiously based opposition was crushed. While Egyptian government had a broad popular base, governments of Syria and Iraq were drawn from minority groups. Syria was about 2/3 Sunni Muslim, but there were strong Alawi, Druze and Christian minorities. The Syrian regime was supported by ʿAlawis, minority Christians, and Ismailis. Iraq was divided among a Shiʿi majority (60%) and 2 large minorities: Kurdish (20%) and Sunni (20%), ruled by a minority from within the Sunni population. 87 In Jordan, Palestinian population was subordinate to military drawn from trans-Jordanian Bedouin. This phase of Arab nationalism ended with the defeat of Arab states in ‘67 war with Israel (six days war). Nasser’s leadership was discredited. Arab states were condemned as ineffectual and political appeal of Arab unity was weakened. Egypt’s authoritarian government abandoned Palestinian cause, eventually made peace with Israel (‘79), and allied itself with US and with conservative Arabian states. Bath Party in Syria and Iraq gave up the goal of Arab unity in favor of power in each separate country. In ‘70s, Arabism came to be associated with oil and the economic wealth of the Gulf states and Saudi Arabia. PALESTINIAN MOVEMENT and STRUGGLE for PALESTINE ZIONISTS and PALESTINIANS to ‘48 Palestine is the only part of Fertile Crescent not to have become an Arab state.  PRECLUDED by UK SUPPORT for ZIONIST MOVEMENT and FORMATION of STATE OF ISRAEL. ZIONISM is the nationalist movement of the Jewish people that espouses the re-establishment of and support for a Jewish state in the territory defined as the historic Land of Israel . Modern Zionism emerged in the late 19th century in Europe as a national revival movement, both in reaction to newer waves of antisemitism and as a response to Jewish Enlightenment. Most leaders of movement associated the main goal with creating the desired state in Palestine, an area controlled by Ottoman Empire.Until ‘48, primary goals of Zionism were the re-establishment of Jewish sovereignty in the Land of Israel, in gathering of exiles and liberation of Jews from the anti-Semitic discrimination and persecution that they experienced during their diaspora. Since the establishment of the State of Israel, Zionism continues primarily to advocate on behalf of Israel and to address threats to its continued existence and security. Advocates of Zionism view it as a national liberation movement for the repatriation of a persecuted people residing as minorities in a variety of nations to their ancestral homeland. Critics of Zionism view it as a colonialist, racist and exceptionalist ideology that led advocates to violence during Mandatory Palestine, followed by the exodus of Palestinians and the subsequent denial of their right to return to lands and property lost during the ‘48 and ‘67 wars. Zionist movement was sparked by publication in 1896 of Theodor HERZL’s The Jewish State, written in response to rising anti-Semitism and loss of Jewish identity.  Zionism advocated for the transformation of a religious community into a nation requiring a territorial home. Jewish nationalism paralleled emergence of other nationalist movements. Jews wished to establish national home in a territory where Jews were a tiny minority amidst an Arab Palestinian population. 90 Transjordan absorbed portions of Palestine west of Jordan River and Egypt took control of Gaza. Palestinians and Arab states refused to acknowledge defeat. PALESTINIAN MOVEMENT AND ISRAEL ‘48 - ‘90S Until ‘67, Arab states took the lead in the campaign against Israel: trade boycott, blocked passage through Suez Canal for goods going to/from Israel and launched guerrilla attacks. ‘56, UK, France, and Israel attacked Egypt (SUEZ CANAL CRISIS), but were forced to desist by objections from both US and USSR. war of ’67 (SIX DAYS WAR) Israel won a rapid-complete victory over Arab states, taking possession of: - Gaza and Sinai from Egypt - West Bank from Jordan - Golan Heights from Syria. Israel also won control of Jerusalem. The struggle was not yet over. A war with Egypt over Suez Canal followed in ‘69–70, in ’73 Egypt surprised Israel by an attack in Sinai and fought another war to a stalemate. ‘67–‘70.WAR OF ATTRITION  fighting between Israel and Egypt, Jordan, PLO (’67) Arab states formulated "three nos policy”: NO Peace NO recognition NO negotiations with Israel. 1969 large-scale shelling along Suez Canal, extensive aerial warfare and commando raids. Hostilities ended with a ceasefire, frontiers remaining the same. This time Egypt was maneuvering to back out of conflict  YOM KIPPUR WAR ‘77, Sadat went to Jerusalem to offer peace. 78  CAMP DAVID ACCORDS ‘79, Israel returned Sinai to Egypt and Israel and Egypt agreed to normalize relations. No agreements were reached concerning Palestinians.  This marked END of the period of Arab state leadership in the name of the Palestinians. From ‘67, Palestinians began to convert the Arab–Israeli struggle into a Palestinian–Israeli struggle. They organized a Palestinian National Council and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). AL-FATAH, led by ARAFAT, represented Muslim and nationalist oriented segment of Palestinian population, with aspirations to reconquer Palestine. Smaller, more radical Marxist–Leninist groups advocated restoration of Palestinians to their homeland and also need for a revolutionary transformation of all Arab countries as a prelude to a showdown with Israel. 91 Competition among old Palestinian notable families, local bosses and clients of other Arab states also promoted factionalism. It was difficult for Palestinians to define their common identity because of divisions between Christians and Muslims, secularists and Islamists, and West Bank middle-class town populations living under Israeli occupation and lower-class Palestinians living in refugee camps. Palestinians also suffered from difficult relations with their nominal supporters, Arab states. Indeed, activities of PLO were a threat to legitimacy of established states. ‘70 al-Fatah in Jordan was defeated by the Jordanian army and forced to evacuate to Lebanon. When PLO threatened to become dominant in Lebanon, it was suppressed by Syria. CAMP DAVID ACCORDS of ‘79 were another setback in Palestinian relations with Arab states. Camp David Accords  political agreements signed by Egyptian President Sadat and Israeli PM Begin in ’78, witnessed by President Carter. The second of these frameworks led to ‘79 Egypt–Israel Peace Treaty. Sadat and Begin received the shared 1978 Nobel Peace Prize. The first framework, which dealt with Palestinian territories, was written without participation of Palestinians and was condemned by UN. Indicated the breakdown of Arab solidarity in defense of Palestinian interests and development of a counter-trend, as Arab states pursued their own interests regardless of Palestinians. ‘60s-‘70s, Palestinians carried on a guerrilla war against Israel, winning worldwide sympathy for their plight and fostered a shared national consciousness. Islam permeated Palestinian discourse: terms as jihad, mujahid (warrior for faith) and holy land. Islamic concepts helped articulate and mobilize the Palestinians for political struggle. They have acquired a secular identity, preserving Islamic loyalties as basis of political solidarity. ‘80s-‘90s, Palestinian society was profoundly changed. A majority of Palestinians had dispersed throughout Middle East, Europe and US, acquired educations and become a middle-class population. Palestinian diaspora population was one of the most highly educated communities in Arab world. In West Bank and Gaza, a younger generation of Palestinian came to power. Awakening in West Bank and Gaza led in ‘87 to INTIFADA, a campaign of strikes, demonstrations, riots in protest against Israeli occupation, construction of Israeli settlements in West Bank, taxation and administrative harassment. FIRST INTIFADA  series of Palestinian protests and violent riots against Israeli occupation of West Bank and Gaza. It lasted from ‘87 until Madrid Conference in ’91. It began in ’87. Palestinians suspected collision was a deliberate response for killing of a Jew in Gaza days earlier. Palestinians reacted by organizing efforts of resistance and civil disobedience, accompanied in a number of instances by violent protests. Israel deployed 80,000 soldiers in response. Israeli countermeasures were disproportionate. 92 Local businessmen protested against taxes and Israeli economic controls; street youths took the lead in calling for the formation of a Palestinian state. The new leaders were divided between: - those with a secular nationalistic orientation - those with an Islamic religious orientation  these founded HAMAS and Islamic Jihad. Hamas is a Palestinian Sunni-Islamic fundamentalist militant organization. It has a social service wing and a military wing. It has been the governing authority of Gaza Strip since 2007. It fought several wars with Israel.  Israel, US and EU classify Hamas as a terrorist organization.  Russia, China and Turkey view Hamas in a positive light. Founded in ‘87, after First Intifada, as an offshoot of Egyptian MB. Co-founder Sheik Ahmed Yassin stated in ‘87 that Hamas was founded to liberate Palestine from Israeli occupation and to establish an Islamic state in Israel, West Bank and Gaza Strip. Military wing has launched attacks against Israeli civilians and soldiers. Tactics have included suicide bombings and rocket attacks. The attacks on civilians have been condemned as war crimes and crimes against humanity by HRs groups. Hamas violence and rhetoric against Israelis are unpopular and a majority of Palestinians would rather accept a permanent two-state solution based on ‘67 borders. 2006 Palestinian parliamentary elections, Hamas won a plurality in Palestinian Parliament, defeating Fatah party. Following elections, Quartet (US, Russia, UN, EU) made future foreign assistance to PA conditional upon future government's commitment to non- violence, recognition of state of Israel, and acceptance of previous agreements. bHamas rejected those changes, which led to the Quartet suspending its foreign assistance program and Israel imposing economic sanctions on the Hamas-led administration. In 2007, a national unity government headed by PM Haniyeh of Hamas was formed but failed to restart international financial assistance. Tensions over control of Palestinian security forces erupted in 2007 Battle of Gaza, after which Hamas took control of Gaza, while its officials were ousted from government positions in West Bank. Israel and Egypt imposed an economic blockade of Gaza Strip, on the grounds that Fatah forces were no longer providing security there. Palestinian opinion in West Bank and Gaza split between - those who favored compromise with Israel as a way of ending the occupation - those, usually Islamists, who favored a continuing struggle for the liberation of all Palestine. The period between War of ‘67 and Gulf War of ‘91 also saw major CHANGES IN THE ISRAELI POSITION. Under the government of Likud coalition and Menachem Begin (‘77–83), Israel expected to prevail by military superiority rather than political compromise. Israeli victory in ‘67 war, control of Jerusalem and occupation of the West Bank and Gaza led to a rebirth of Jewish messianic hopes and a renewed desire to take over the remainder of Palestine. By ‘90s, Israel expropriated land and water resources, employed Palestinians as workers, and provided most of the West Bank’s imports. ‘80s, Israeli opinion divided over how to deal with Palestinians . ‘82, Israel invaded Lebanon in an effort to crush PLO, but the continuing occupation of southern Lebanon and rise of Hezbollah made it costly for Israel in terms of soldiers’ lives and political 95 sporadic terrorist attacks and to potential for a Palestinian state to be used as a frontline base for renewed Arab wars against Israel. They noted continued Syrian, Iraqi and Iranian hostility to Israel, and were convinced that Israeli security could only be assured by superior military power. In Israeli politics, these divisions produced a virtual stalemate. ‘94, Prime Minister Rabin was assassinated by a Jewish orthodox extremist. For a time, it appeared that peace process had taken hold. Jordan made its own peace agreement with Israel. Negotiations with Syria over the return of Golan Heights and ratification of peace were suspended ‘96, but President Assad was not provocative with Israel. Economic deals between Israel and Gulf states went forward. In Israel, religious parties and settlers came to power in ‘96 under PRIME MINISTER BENJAMIN NETANYAHU (‘96–99) and resisted progress in negotiations with the Palestinians. ‘99, Israel elected a new Labor prime minister, Ehud BARAK, who pledged himself to peace, security, an open and tolerant Israeli society, and a resolution of the Israeli–Palestinian problem. 2000, negotiations between Clinton, Arafat and Barak at Camp David collapsed . Israel offered  to recognize a Palestinian state in 90% of West Bank and Gaza, sovereignty over some Arab neighborhoods of Jerusalem and administrative jurisdiction over Muslim holy places. These offers didn’t meet the Palestinian demands for a return to ‘67 borders, for a sovereign capital in Jerusalem and holy places, or for a contiguous bloc of territory not partitioned by Israeli zones. Palestinians also demanded Israeli recognition of the right for refugees to return to Palestine. This was unacceptable to Israel. Instead of peace, a new wave of Palestinian resistance – the SECOND INTIFADA – broke out and met with severe Israeli repression. Struggle escalated to Palestinian suicide bombings of Israelis and Israeli military occupation of West Bank cities. In the bitterness of renewed large-scale violence, the Oslo accords failed . The XXI century virtually repeats the same story – military pressures and counter pressures, a succession of failed negotiations and no resolution. The new century began with a series of failed diplomatic and political initiatives. 2001, Bush and Israeli PM Sharon declared their support for an independent Palestinian state. 2002, Arab League, with Saudi leadership, proposed an Arab Initiative that set out compromise terms for a peace agreement including a promise that all the Arab states would normalize relations with Israel. 2003, Quartet, a committee representing US, Europe and Russia, proposed a three-phase step-by- step route to a peace agreement. This was followed by the Geneva Initiative, a peace plan devised 96 by former Israeli and Palestinian officials. These proposals all turned on variations of arrangements in which Jerusalem would be shared or divided among Israelis and Palestinians, adjustments of borders allowing large West Bank Israeli settlements to be included in Israel in exchange for lands in Negev, and schemes for repatriation and/or compensation of Palestinians. None of these proposals proved satisfactory to both sides. 2004-2007, Israel builded more Zionist settlements and demolishing more Palestinian homes. Yassir Arafat died in 2004. Prime Minister Ariel Sharon unilaterally withdrew Israeli settlements from Gaza in order to reduce Palestinians under Israeli occupation and to reduce international pressures for the return of West Bank. Israel began the construction of a lengthy security barrier to forestall terrorist attacks, but barrier incorporated more Palestinian West Bank land on the Israeli side. 2006, Israel invaded Lebanon in an attempt to defeat Hezbollah and to secure its northern frontier. Despite the devastation of Lebanon and the restraining effect, Hezbollah remained a political power in Lebanon and a military threat to Israel. A new phase of negotiations between Israel and Palestinian West Bank authority began in 2007. It seems that Israel and Palestinian Authority agreed to accept the ‘67 borders with adjustments. Arab neighborhoods of East Jerusalem would be under Palestinian sovereignty and holy places under international administration. The terms for repatriation of Palestinian refugees are disputed but it seems that president of the Palestinian Authority, Abu Mazen, and Israeli prime minister, Ehud Olmert, had agreed to a token return of 30,000 Palestinians to their former homes. Israeli opinion was divided. Prime Minister Olmert believed that Israel’s long-term security and identity as a democratic Jewish state was threatened by occupation of a large Palestinian population and lay in withdrawal from West Bank and formation of two states. A new Israeli government elected in 2009 repudiated the unofficial agreement. His successor, Benjamin Netanyahu preferred to depend upon Israeli military power and the spread of Israeli settlements on West Bank. His terms for a peace settlement insisted on: - Israeli occupation of all of Jerusalem - no return of Palestinian refugees - Palestinian recognition of Israel as Jewish state  this is an impossible condition for Palestinians to accept. Israeli nationalists and orthodox nationalists are committed to occupation of all of historical Palestine west of Jordan River and are persuaded, pointing to HAMAS, that Palestinians don’t want peace in any case. 97 The Palestinians are also divided. Abu Mazen, head of Palestinian Authority, attempts to reach an agreement and create a Palestinian state. HAMAS wishes to reoccupy all of Palestine, and many Palestinians believe that Israel doesn’t want peace. Both sides are divided between forces that favor and those that oppose an agreement. Negotiations resumed in 2013. ARABIAN PENINSULA The peninsula was governed by family and tribal elites. Islam was a crucial factor in the unification of disparate clan and tribal groups into regional confederations and kingdoms. In Yemen and sultanates of Oman and Saudi Arabia, religion and state were closely identified. While in Persian Gulf region didn’t formally claim charismatic religious authority, the rulers were considered the heads of religion, responsible for the implementation of Islamic values. Throughout the peninsula, ulama also played an important role as political advisors to rulers, administrators of judicial and educational institutions, and a source of moral advice and political legitimacy. Only since WWII has the peninsula become subject to the forces that have shaped the rest of the Middle East. YEMEN Yemen has an exceptional position in history of Arabian Peninsula. North and South Yemen had different regimes and different religious orientations. Yemen was converted to Islam during Prophet lifetime and was later absorbed into Umayyad and Abbasid empires. - South has been center of an agricultural and state-organized society. It came under Egypt influence In 1839 Aden in south Yemen came under UK rule