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Scarica summary of the chapter e più Sintesi del corso in PDF di Politiche dell'Unione Europea solo su Docsity! EU POLITICS AND POLICIES IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD - B026821 VI. Interest Groups and Interest Representation I. INTEREST GROUPS AND LOBBYISTS: WHO ARE THEY? Interest groups use different strategies to influence policy-making, from public protests to direct contacts with decision-makers. Because of the limited role of public opinion in EU politics and the difficulties of organising cross-border protests, seeking direct contacts is a much more common strategy at the EU level than staging protests. Reflecting the EU’s multi- level set-up, many interest groups seek these contacts on multiple levels, lobbying not just the EU institutions but also member state authorities. In the end, lobbying is meant to affect policy-making. 1. The number of interest groups in the EU: - A lobbyist is an individual engaged in attempts to influence governmental decision-making on behalf of an interest group. Lobbying has become an important activity in the EU. Estimates of the number of individual lobbyists in Brussels range from 10,000 to 30,000, with 15,000 probably the most reasonable figure. - An interest group is a group of people that share certain preferences regarding the outcomes of governmental decision-making and organise in order to influence those outcomes, without seeking elected office. The number of interest groups lies between 3,500 and 4,000, with some authors quoting figures of up to 5,000 groups. - There are many obvious cases of interest groups with established offices in Brussels that make it their daily job to influence EU policy-making. But there are also groups that occasionally engage in lobbying activities, even though their main focus is on other types of activities. Some lobbyists fly in and out of Brussels to lobby the EU institutions but operate from another location. All this makes it difficult to pinpoint exactly how many lobbyists and interest groups there are. - The increasing number of interest groups and lobbyists in the past decades shows: 1. EU has become an important policy-making institution in many areas. Otherwise, interest groups would not bother to spend time and money in attempts to influence EU policy-making. AND 2. apparently interest groups believe they can in fact make a difference and influence EU policy- making. 2. Types of interest groups in the EU: All in all, business interests account for the vast majority of interest groups in Brussels. In comparison, NGOs are a much smaller group. This is a pattern that is also found in domestic political systems. One reason for this may be that it is more difficult for NGOs to organise and find financing. After all, business groups represent relatively limited numbers of firms that all have a distinct (financial) stake in lobbying the EU. Thus, they will find it easy to come together and fund EU lobbyists. NGOs, by contrast, represent some diffuse interest that does not yield concrete benefits to specific organisations or individuals. Types: - European trade federations: umbrella organisations that represent a specific type of industry. For instance, the European Chemical Industry Council (CEFIC) represents the European chemical industry. Its members include both national trade federations (such as the Hungarian Chemical Industry Association and the French Union des Industries Chimiques) and individual chemical companies (such as AkzoNobel and Procter & Gamble). This category also includes trade federations that represent a specific profession, such as the Standing Committee of European Doctors (CPME), which represents national medical associations. In all, European trade federations make up around 35% of all EU interest groups. - Commercial Consultants: Also known as ‘public affairs’ consultants, they do not represent one (type of) interest but make it their job to lobby on behalf of their clients. These clients range from firms to non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and governmental organisations from the EU member states. Hiring a commercial consultant is particularly useful if clients do not want to invest in setting up a lobby office and network in Brussels, for instance because they only need to lobby the EU occasionally. Professional consultants may also have expertise and contacts that clients find valuable in a specific lobbying effort. Professional consult- ants make up around 15% of all lobby groups in Brussels. - Large companies: they also lobby the EU alongside being members of a European trade federation. This offers them the opportunity to use different channels for different purposes: they can work together with other firms through their trade federation, but they can also directly contact EU officials if they want to convey a specific message. Individual companies account for some 13% of all interest groups in the EU. - NGO’S: They are called public interest groups. These groups do not represent an industry or a profession but some kind of public interest that they believe in. Well-known examples are Amnesty International (for human rights) and Greenpeace (for the environment). European NGOs come in different forms. Some are single organisations that operate at the EU level (such as Greenpeace). Others resemble the structure of trade federations, bring- ing together national umbrella organisations and NGOs. For instance, the Association of European Cancer Leagues represents national organisations in the field of the fight against cancer, such as the Irish Cancer Society and the League against Cancer in Slovakia. NGOs form around 13% of all interest groups in the EU. - National business and labour associations: they also lobby the EU even though they are often members of a European trade federation. They will do so if a specific national issue is at stake or if they feel that their interests are not sufficiently well represented by the European trade federation. This category includes both national business organisations and trade unions. Together they form around 10% of all EU interest groups. - Regional and local governments: The German Länder, Spanish autonomous regions, large cities and the Council of European Municipalities and Regions (CEMR). Regions and local governments often have a lot to gain (or lose) from EU policies. They are the main beneficiaries of the EU’s structural funds, which are meant to support poorer regions in Europe. Also, regional and local governments often have to implement or are affected by EU legislation. Consider, for instance, environmental directives to protect nature areas, which need to be implemented ‘on the ground’ by regional and local governments, or EU policies on state aid that may have opinions on decision-making. Moreover, they are usually consulted only after a Commission proposal has been published, while most influence for interest groups is to be had when a formal proposal is still being developed. The Social Dialogue is a much smaller platform, which, through the conclusion of agreements among the social partners, can also take more far-reaching initiatives than the EESC and the CoR. In practice, however, the number of agreements reached has remained limited, mainly because employers’ organisations have been reluctant to bind themselves to European-level agreements. As a result, these bodies have not achieved the level of corporatism that can be found in some EU member states. A. With the creation of the EEC in 1957, the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) was established as a way to involve social and economic interest groups in policy-making, The EESC currently consists of representatives of employers’ organisations and labour unions (the two traditional strongholds of corporatist systems) together with representatives from other interest groups, such as environmental groups and consumer groups. In a range of policy areas, the European Commission is obliged to ask the EESC for an opinion when it presents a proposal. In addition, the EP can ask the EESC for an opinion and the EESC can issue opinions on its own initiative on issues it deems important. B. In 1994, a similar body was established to create a platform for regional and local governments: the Committee of the Regions (CoR). The members of the CoR are elected politicians in local or regional governments in the EU member states. Like the EESC, the CoR needs to be consulted on proposals that potentially affect its members and it can issue own-initiative opinions. C. During the 1980s, an attempt was made to introduce a more far-reaching type of corporatism in the form of the Social Dialogue. The Social Dialogue includes a total of six organisations: three employers’ organisations, led by BusinessEurope, the overarching EU business group, and three organisation's of employees, the most important one being the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC), the federation of European labour unions. The Social Dialogue is a platform for discussing social and economic issues among the main ‘social partners’. This may lead to joint opinions as well as agreements between them. If the social partners wish so, these agreements are subsequently formalised into EU legislation by the Council. An example where that happened was the agreement on parental leave, which was reached within the Social Dialogue in 1995 and adopted as a Council Directive in 1996. D. Another policy area that shows elements of corporatism is agriculture. From the early 1960s onwards, the EU has had an extensive Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) with heavy subsidies for farmers. Policy-making on agricultural matters always included representatives of farmers’ groups, joined at the EU level in COPA/COGECA. COPA/COGECA would be routinely involved in policy debates with the European Commission’s DG Agriculture and the Council of Agricultural Ministers. Since the early 1990s, however, the stronghold of farmers has diminished, as new interests have become active in this area, including environmental groups and consumer groups. Although COPA/COGECA is still a powerful interest group in Brussels, it now has to compete with other groups, leading to a more pluralist constellation than used to be the case. 3. Designed pluralism in the EU: - The EU is open to interest groups and they tend to focus on one specific issue or sector of industry. At the same time, the variety of interest groups in the EU is also a result of attempts by the European Commission actively to stimulate the creation and activities of certain groups. For the European Commission, supporting EU-level interest groups has been a way to increase the legitimacy of EU initiatives. - On an annual basis, the Commission spends some one billion Euros on supporting EU-level interest groups. This money goes primarily to NGOs, which suffer most from the ‘logic of collective action’. - At the same time, Commission support for EU-level interest groups is not merely a matter of creating ‘fair’ competition between them. It has also been a way to develop a European ‘constituency’ that the Commission can mobilise in support of its initiatives. For the Commission, it is a great benefit if it can tell member state governments and the European Parliament that its proposal is supported by a wide range of European interest groups. As a result, the Commission has shown a clear preference for interest groups that are willing to support its causes and take a constructive (as opposed to confrontational) stance in influencing EU policy- making. Interest groups that fit into these categories have often enjoyed easier and more extensive access to the Commission than other groups. In that sense, although the EU represents a pluralist system of interest representation, it is a form of designed pluralism, shaped by the preferences and financial incentives of the European Commission. III. INTEREST GROUP STRATEGIES If an interest group seeks to influence policy-making, what it wants to achieve is to change the minds of the people who decide on a given issue. 1. Inside lobbying and outside lobbying: - The interest groups can use 2 basic strategies: - Inside lobbying: is a strategy in which interest groups seek to influence policies through direct contact with policy-makers. Interest groups can try to talk directly with decision-makers. They can phone them, arrange meetings to discuss policies, respond to consultations from the Commission or the Parliament, or become part of a committee or forum that advises EU institutions on a given issue . Interest groups try to become part of the debates among policy- makers and influence policy-making from within. Put simply, they want to sit at the same table as the decision-makers in order to affect their decisions. - Outside lobbying: is a strategy in which interest groups seek to put pressure on policy- makers by mobilising public opinion by organising strikes and demonstrations, or attracting media attention to its cause. When they use this strategy, interest groups hope to affect decision-makers by showing how much public sup- port they have. Rather than influencing policy-making from within, they seek to put pressure on decision-makers by mobilising groups and citizens outside the decision-making institutions. 2. The choice of strategy by interest groups: Some groups typically rely more on inside lobbying while other groups make greater use of outside lobbying. This depends on a number of factors. And as a result of these factors, some groups specialise in a certain strategy. Thus, interest groups that represent firms and industries or local governments rely almost completely on inside lobbying. By contrast, other groups mix the two strategies. Labour unions organise demonstrations and strikes, but they also engage in inside lobbying with decision-makers in the EU institutions. Likewise, farmers’ groups are part of consultations on agricultural policy and often meet with Commission officials (inside lobbying), but once in a while they also organise large-scale demonstrations and blockades in Brussels to show the determination of their members (outside lobbying). Groups that rely (almost) completely on outside lobbying are scarce at the EU level. The factors: a. The target of the lobby: Outside lobbying works best when the decision-maker that is targeted is sensitive to public opinion. For instance, elected politicians depend more on public opinion than civil servants, because they rely on public opinion for their re-election. Therefore, if an interest group wants to influence the EP, outside lobbying is more likely to be successful than when it wants to influence the European Commission. b. The organisation and identity of the interest group: For inside lobbying, a group needs to establish and maintain contacts with policy-makers, and be able to gather and present information in a way that ties in with the policy debates in a given field. For outside lobbying, a group needs to have a sufficiently large network of members and volunteers to organise large- scale events and relay those events to the media. These capabilities cannot be built up over- night. They are often the result of long experience and carefully developed networks. As a result, interest groups tend to rely on the time-tested strategies that they are familiar with. c. The issue at stake: Some issues appeal to public sentiments more easily than others. Thus, it is difficult to conceive of a large-scale demonstration being organised against a proposal on accounting standards. However, people can more easily be mobilised for things that they feel are close to their interests (such as the protection of their jobs and wages or environmental pollution in their neighbourhood) or that have great symbolic value (like the protection of whales). As a result, outside lobbying will typically be used only for the latter types of issues. 3. Inside lobbying and outside lobbying in the EU: - Why do we find so little EU-related political protest and why is it so often aimed at domestic governments? Only a few EU interest groups only rely on outside lobbying. This is so because of the unfavourable political opportunity structure for political protests at the EU level and the organisational constraints that many groups face. The political opportunity structure is the institutional and political context within which an interest group operates and that determines the receptiveness of decision-makers to the claims of that group. - As the EU’s political opportunity structure has evolved and groups have learnt how to organise themselves at the European level, outside lobbying has become more important in EU politics. money in order to set up a campaign. In a more general sense, lobbying can be seen as an example of a ‘resource exchange’: interest groups are able to influence policy-makers because they have something to offer that those policy-makers value. For instance, interest groups have a lot of information about the issues they deal with. Because the European Commission needs information in order to make policies, it is very interested in obtaining that information. This offers opportunities for interest groups to influence policy-making. Likewise, for the European Commission it is very helpful to be able to point at the support of certain interest groups. If the Commission can claim that its proposal is supported by the affected industry, or by most NGOs dealing with the issue, it can consider- ably strengthen its position vis-à-vis the EU member states and the European Parliament. As a result, the Commission will often make modifications to its proposals in order to obtain the support of important interest groups. The two examples point at two important sources of interest group influence in the EU: expertise and political support. The more knowledgeable an interest group is, the more impact it will have on policy- making. As we saw above, the EU is characterised more by inside lobbying than by outside lobbying. In inside lobbying processes, expertise is crucial because interest groups need to engage directly with policy-makers and other experts in discussions on the content of policies. In addition, the wider the constituency of an interest group, the stronger its voice will be. It makes quite a difference whether an interest group represents a few firms in one member state or it can claim to represent the entire European industry in a given field. This is the reason why, at the EU level, interest groups normally strive to form broad coalitions – both geographically (including as many member states as possible) and functionally (including as many different types of groups and sectors as possible). This is the only way to stand out from the crowd of EU interest groups. B. Characteristics of the political system: Whether or not an interest group is able to influence policies also depends on the way the political system operates. In addition, the ‘multi-level’ nature of the EU may affect the influence of interest groups. Exactly how it affects interest groups is subject to debate among political scientists. On the one hand, it can be argued that the EU strengthens interest groups by offering them various different access points. A group can choose whether to go to the EU level or to lobby a national government. As a result, the EU’s multi-level nature multiplies the options interest groups have, which decreases their dependence on any one level of government. If a group is not successful ‘back home’, it can always try again in Brussels. And if it is set to lose at the EU level, it can always try to reverse its odds by targeting member state governments. In this way, its position vis-à-vis each level is strengthened. On the other hand, the EU has also increased the options for member state governments. When dealing with interest groups, they can now point at agreements made at the EU level or obligations flowing from EU law. This offers them new opportunities to resist demands from interest groups. In reality, both things may take place at the same time: interest groups can exploit new opportunities at different levels of government, while governments can use the EU to circumvent domestic interest groups. Which of the two is stronger will vary between countries and between interest groups. The EU’s multi-level character strengthens groups that are in a relatively weak position domestically but face better chances in Brussels, while it weakens groups that are strong domestically but find it more difficult to operate at the EU level. C. Characteristics of the issue that is at stake: Interest groups are most effective if they face little competition from other interests. This means, first of all, that a particular interest group is more effective when few or no other interest groups are involved in the policy-making process. In addition, the impact of interest groups as a whole depends on the scope or salience of an issue. Interest groups can exert the greatest influence when an issue is confined to a small circle of policy- makers. This is often the case when the issue is seen as relatively ‘technical’ and with limited impact beyond the immediate area it deals with. This is favourable for interest groups because it means that they can target their efforts on a limited number of policy-makers. Moreover, the policy-makers themselves are more likely to consider interest group claims when they do not have to worry about the repercussions of their decisions for other stakeholders. All of this changes when an issue becomes subject to broader debates, involving a wider range of stakeholders and political actors at higher levels. In those situations, interest group demands have to compete with a host of other considerations. This is clearest for issues that are considered to be ‘high politics’. High politics issues are dealt with at the highest level of government (in the EU: the European Council). Here, interest group demands are easily swamped by geopolitical or electoral considerations. These considerations may work to the advantage of some groups, but no group will be able to exert the kind of direct influence that can be had with more limited issues. V. LOBBYING AND DEMOCRACY - In a democratic political system, decisions should ideally reflect the preferences of the full citizenry, not of specific interests. Moreover, decision-making should be more or less transparent, so that citizens are able to know how and why a decision was taken and can hold their elected representatives to account if they do not agree. Lobbying may undermine both qualities. By lobbying for specific interests, decisions may move away from what most citizens would prefer. In addition, lobbying (particularly inside lobbying) is almost by nature an informal activity that takes place outside of the public view. As a result, it detracts from the transparency of the policy- making process and makes it more difficult to assess why and how a decision was taken. - This, however, does not automatically make lobbying an undemocratic or even anti-democratic activity. In fact, an argument can also be made in favour of lobbying. Lobbying can improve the quality of decision-making by giving new information and additional viewpoints to policy- makers. Often, interest groups are knowledgeable about the issue they are engaged in. That knowledge can add to the quality of deliberations in the policy-making process. In addition, lobbying can bring viewpoints to the attention of policy-makers that would otherwise be ignored. There is no reason to assume that, in the absence of interest groups and lobbying, policy-makers would automatically do what is ‘in the best interest’ of citizens or what is supported by the majority of them. By promoting alternative viewpoints, interest groups may represent points of view that are shared by many citizens but are not (yet) heard in the policy-making process. - All this relies crucially on two conditions. First, whether or not lobbying helps the representativeness of policy-making depends on the balance between interest groups. If only one interest group is represented in the policy-making process, the outcome is likely to be severely biased towards that group. The second condition that determines whether lobbying helps or threatens democracy has to do with the way in which lobbying takes place. Some forms of lobbying, such as giving objective information in order to highlight certain consequences of proposed policies, can hardly be objected to. This becomes different when lobbyists deliberately distort information or studies in order to mislead decision-makers. In the extreme, bribing decision-makers is even a criminal activity. In terms of transparency, as well, there is a continuum from more or less open contacts between interest groups and policy-makers to secretive meetings that are deliberately hidden from the public eye. Thus, there is a continuum of lobbying activities, from those activities that do not harm and may actually help democratic policy-making to activities that undermine it. Therefore, it is impossible to pass judgement on lobbying and interest groups per se: much depends on how the lobbying is done. This is the reason why there has been much debate about rules and codes of conduct for lobbyists. Both the European Commission and the European Parliament have a register for interest groups and individual lobbyists. Yet, these registers do not show what types of contacts actually take place between lobbyists and policy-makers. Moreover, the Commission register is voluntary, while registration with the EP is only required if a lobbyist wants to obtain access to the Parliament buildings. - Whatever one’s normative judgement on lobbying, it is also a fact of political life. As long as (groups of ) people are affected by government decisions or passionate about their ideas, they will try to convince policy-makers of their point of view. In the EU, as well, lobbying is set to remain an important feature of its political process. Hence, understanding which groups are involved and how lobbying works is an important precondition for understanding EU politics in general. SUMMARY: • According to estimates some 15,000 lobbyists and more than 3,500 interest groups are active in Brussels. • The vast majority of these groups represent business interests. This can be explained by the fact that business groups typically represent specific interests while NGOs represent diffuse interests.